

HINTS

ON THE

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY OF BRITAIN,

AND

ON HER RESOURCES

TO MAINTAIN

THE PRESENT CONTEST WITH FRANCE.

BY

JOHN BRISTED.

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By

District of New-York, ss:

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the twenty-fifth day of November, in the thirty-fourth year of the independence of the United States of America, Ezra Sargeant, of the said district, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as proprietor, in the words following: viz. "Hints on the National Bankruptcy of Britain, and on her Resources to maintain the present contest with France. By John Bristed."

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CHARLES CLINTON, *Clerk of the district of New-York.*

ADVERTISEMENT.

AS a very general misconception prevails throughout the United States, respecting the actual condition of the national wealth of Britain, and more particularly of her public finances, I flatter myself that a few hours, borrowed from my severer professional studies, might be profitably and I hope not unacceptably employed in laying before the American people a series of facts developing the real state of Britain's affairs, and more especially of her national debt and funding system.

In the following pages the sums of money stated always mean sterling, unless it be otherwise particularly mentioned.

It is not within the scope of my present design to touch upon the internal system of complicated polity, which distinguishes the federal republic of America from all other governments ancient or modern; to descant upon her eighteen separate, independent sovereignties, each containing its own state-executive, legislative, and judicial departments; her federal or general head, with its own separate, superintending executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; her blind voting by ballot; her right of universal suffrage; her perpetually recurring elections of federal executive, senators, and representatives of state executive, senators and representatives; and of charter officers and servants.

All these and many other practical comments upon the theories of speculative, metaphysical politicians, are made in this country under the most favorable of all possible circumstances, namely, a scanty population spread over an immense territory, a large body of independent yeomanry, who are for the most part lords of the soil which they occupy; a very general diffusion of property; a monopoly-price of labor, and the most jealous, fearful exclusion of the two only natural and effective aristocracies of man, namely, talent and property, from all political power and influence.

Whence, if the great experiment of democracy, which is now in operation upon so large a scale in the United States, should fail, it fails for ever; and men will be induced once more to have recourse to the essential fundamental principles of human nature, namely, the ascendancy of talent and property, as the only basis, upon which the superstructure of permanent and effectual government can ever be reared.

The consideration of the domestic policy, the foreign relations, the manners and habits, the laws, religion, morals, literature and science, of this very interesting and unparalleled country, whose institutions are almost entirely unknown to the people of Europe, and undoubtedly by no means too distinctly understood, at least in their remoter consequences, by the generality of the inhabitants of these United States, I shall take up as soon as I have leisure and opportunity to arrange the great mass of materials, facts, documents and state papers, on this important subject, with which I am furnished by the careful and diligent collection of more than three years, aided by the abundant and liberal communications of some American gentlemen, who have distinguished themselves as statesmen of the highest order, by the zeal, fidelity, industry, and talent, with which they have discharged the most arduous political duties, both in their own country, and in the courts of the most powerful European kingdoms.

JOHN BRISTED.

2, Hudson-square, New-York, October 30th, 1809.

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HINTS

ON THE

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY OF BRITAIN,

&c.

FIRST DIVISION.

CHAPTER I.

MORE than a century has now elapsed, since a loud and frequent cry, announcing the speedily approaching national bankruptcy of Britain, has been heard, not only within the precincts of the British dominions, but over by far the greatest portion of the continent of Europe.

Of all the nations, that dread the power, and envy the superiority of Britain, France has ever been the most industriously employed in propagating the belief of the instantaneously impending bankruptcy of her ancient rival. And, of late years, she has increased her zeal to an almost incredible height of enthusiasm and extravagance.

It was chiefly to effect this purpose, that, towards the close of the year 1800, Bonaparte or-

dered M. Hauterive, his sub-minister of Foreign Relations, standing, indeed, next only to M. Talleyrand in that department, to write and publish the celebrated work, entitled—“*De l'Etat de la France, à la fin de l'An 8.*”—The great aim of M. Hauterive is to persuade the European world of the power, the happiness, the virtue, and above all, the universal benevolence of France; while it is called upon to give equal credence to his account of the crimes, the approaching degradation, and more particularly, the impending universal bankruptcy of Britain.

In the year 1804, by the command, also, of Bonaparte, Arthur O'Connor published at Paris a pamphlet, called—“The Present State of Great-Britain.” This Arthur O'Connor is a United Irishman, was tried for high treason at Maidstone in Kent, (England) and, through the mistaken lenity of the British government, suffered to escape from the gallows into France, where he now enjoys the distinction of being a General in the French army.

O'Connor's book has been dispersed, by the active and openly avowed patronage of Bonaparte, over all the continent of Europe, with unwearied assiduity, and with considerable effect. The intention of the Irish-Frenchman is to show—“that Britain is now, (in 1804) arrived at a point, beyond which her burdens can be no more increased; that she has accumulated five hundred mil-

lions of debt, purely by means of the paper-credit system, and that every step, which she advances farther, must be in the gulf of bankruptcy ; that any continuance of the scheme must increase the depreciation of money, and the price of all commodities ; she will be undersold in every foreign market ; nations, fresh in the vigor of youth, will profit by her decrepitude ; states that have no debts to weigh them down will outstrip her in every competition ; her taxes will become daily less and less productive ; her public funds sink in value ; the interest will cease to be paid ; new taxes will become impracticable ; universal confusion and disorganization will ensue, and Britain fall prostrate, without a struggle, *before France and the United States of America.*"

It is, therefore, no wonder, that the United States, who have been so closely tied to France, since the year 1778, down to the present hour, by the bond of national gratitude and affection, should very generally participate in the French sentiments respecting a British national bankruptcy. And, accordingly, for these fifteen years past, a large body of American politicians have been anxiously looking out for every fresh arrival from Europe to announce the desired catastrophe.

Before I enter upon that statement of facts which, I hope, will put the question of British National Bankruptcy for ever at rest, I would beg leave to notice a strange but palpable inconsis-

tency in the conduct of France and her adherents upon this point. I mean, that while she perpetually affects to deride, and teaches all her minions and vassals in every country throughout the globe to deride, Britain as a bankrupt nation, she, and her partisans all over the world, are incessantly exclaiming against Britain for buying up, and corrupting with her wealth, the whole world, except France and her admirers.

According to these politicians, Britain has, during the last fifteen years, been in a state of real bankruptcy ; and yet, during all this time, has annually expended much more money than all the world contains, in keeping the four quarters of the globe, Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, continually in her pay. It is this Britain, this bankrupted Britain, who now, in 1809, bribes, with her gold, all the commercial states in the union to dislike those political measures which entirely destroy their trade, and consign them to hopeless penury ;—she pays money to the Dutch, in order that they may object to seeing their fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers, torn away by the French conscription-system, and hurried onward to the field of carnage, to gratify the individual selfish vanity, and family-ambition, of an upstart usurper ;—she gives great largesses to induce Austria to make one last bloody stand for national existence against the common enemy of mankind ;—and, finally, she excites, by the pro-

digal distribution of her wealth, the heroic Spaniards to resist Bonaparte, who comes to rob them of their government and personal liberty, and to transfer them, like a herd of cattle selected for the slaughter, from the hands of the infatuated Charles to those of Joseph Napoleon.

Nay, those very men, who incessantly prate about the inevitably impending bankruptcy of Britain, will go into the American money-market, and give ten per cent. above par for bills drawn on this same British, bankrupted, government. During the last five months of the American embargo, British government bills bore a regular premium of ten per cent. in the money-market of the United States. And the non-intercourse act, although it has been in operation only a few weeks, has already raised British bills in this country, whether drawn upon the government of Britain, or on English individuals, to five per cent. above par.

The following monthly average of exchange on Britain, in the New-York money-market, (which regulates all the other markets in the union) for the years 1804, 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1808, was furnished to me by the most eminent money-broker in the continent of America.

	1804.	1805.	1806.	1807.	1808.
January	103	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{1}{2}$	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	102 $\frac{1}{2}$
February	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	99	98 $\frac{1}{4}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	103
March	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	98	99	99	103 $\frac{1}{4}$
April	103 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	100 $\frac{1}{2}$	98	107
May	103	98	<i>par.</i>	98	108
June	102 $\frac{1}{4}$	95	<i>par.</i>	98	106 $\frac{1}{2}$
July	102 $\frac{1}{2}$	95	99	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	106
August	102	95	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	96 $\frac{3}{4}$	106
September	102	97 $\frac{1}{2}$	<i>par.</i>	97	106
October	102	98	99 $\frac{1}{2}$	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	106
November	101 $\frac{1}{2}$	99	99	<i>par.</i>	107
December	<i>par.</i>	98	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	102	110

The exchange on Britain bore a steady average of ten per cent. above par, in the New-York money-market, from December, 1808, until it fell down rapidly to par, or nearly to par, in consequence of Mr. David Erskine's patching up an agreement with Mr. Madison, in April, 1809, in direct violation of the instructions which he had received from the British government.

Some few months since, a French government-bill, of only one thousand dollars in value, was offered for sale in New-York; and could not be disposed of at any price. The English traders laughed at the tender of a French money-bill to them; the Americans doubted the paper of his Imperial and Royal Majesty; and at length it was declined

by a respectable Swiss merchant, who—"could not afford to buy it, because" as he said, "the French government are not in the habit of paying their bills."

The man, who hawked about this bill for sale, was finally obliged to transmit it to France at his own risque; for he well knew, that it was in vain to apply to the French merchants in New-York; because the few French mercantile houses that had ever ventured to purchase bills drawn upon the government of the Great Nation had long since been ruined; there being very rarely any instances of bills, drawn on the French government, and purchased by merchants in the United States, having ever been paid.

CHAPTER II.

THIS subject, however, demands a little serious consideration; for, perhaps, on no points, relating to Britain, are the people of the union more completely misinformed, than on those, respecting her finances and national resources. On all sides, we hear that the horrible weight of *taxation* grinds her people down to the dust, and must, infallibly, soon stop the operations of her government.

The complete refutation of this error I shall extract from a work, whose authority on all the great subjects of general science, and of political economy, more particularly, will be doubted by no one, who is informed that some men, the most illustrious for talent and knowledge, who, at this day, adorn and enlighten Europe, are its chief supporters, I mean the *Edinburgh Review*, whose pages are illumined by the productions of the Earl of Aberdeen; of Lord Henry Petty, late chancellor of the British exchequer; of Mr. Brougham, author of "*An Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers*," an admirable work, which will be better understood, and more correctly appreciated, a century hence than it now is; of Mr. Horner; of Mr. Jeffray; of Mr. Playfair, the professor of natural philosophy in the university of Edinburgh; of Mr. Hamilton, cousin-german to our late ever to be lamented and unrivalled General Hamilton of New-York; of Mr. Murray, a son of the late Lord Henderland; of Mr. Cockburn, son of Baron Cockburn of the exchequer; of Mr. Napier; of the Revd. Sidney Smith; and some other gentlemen of distinguished abilities, and comprehensive information.

In the twenty-sixth number of the *Edinburgh Review*, page four hundred and forty-eight, may be found the following note.

"Montesquieu remarks, that in moderate go-

vernments there is an indemnity for the weight of taxes, which is liberty. In despotic countries, that there is an equivalent for liberty, which is the lightness of the taxes, (*L'Esprit des Lois*, liv. 13. c. 12.) The French have scarcely this consolation as yet. The budget of 1807 states the whole receipts of the treasury for the preceding year at nine hundred and eighty-six millions, nine hundred and ninety-two thousand, five hundred and thirty-nine livres. It is well known to their officers, that this *printed amount* falls greatly short of what is actually collected. The real revenue may be estimated at fifty-five millions sterling.

“Peuchet calculates the whole product of industry, throughout the empire, at something more than two hundred and fifty millions sterling. This, however, must be greatly exaggerated, as he includes a large amount for colonial produce.

“In Colquhoun's *Tables* for 1803, the whole income of *England and Wales* (excluding Scotland and Ireland) is rated at two hundred and twenty-two millions sterling; the whole taxes, including war-imposts and the poor rates, at forty millions. This is *eighteen per cent.* upon the national income. It is stated, that the proportion, to the opulent, is about *twenty-eight per cent.* to the middling *twenty*, to the third *sixteen*, and to the laboring classes about *nine per cent.* on their respective incomes.

“It may be well to annex here the official state-

ment of the French Minister of finances, on the operation of the property-tax in France. He is suggesting the necessity of reform in the mode of collection, and states, that—while some proprietors paid, in 1806, the *fourth*, the *third*, the *moiety*, and *still more*, of their incomes, others were only taxed at the rate of one twentieth, one tenth, and one hundredth ! He adds, that this evil may not be so sensibly felt in the great towns, but indulges in an emphatic exclamation, concerning its influence on the happiness of families in the country.

“ Adopting the preceding *data*, with regard to France, conjecturing what must be the situation of her tributary states, at this moment, and considering our resources, we may still, perhaps, apply to the present period a remark made by Mr. Burke in 1769—“that England is *more lightly taxed* than *any other* country in Europe ; with a system of collection infinitely less vexatious and oppressive.”

In confirmation of the assertion, that the system of collecting the taxes in Britain is neither vexatious nor oppressive, I shall add a statement of the expense attending the collection of the revenue of the kingdom, including all the establishments ; as made-by the Committee of Finance to the House of Commons in the year 1797. I shall extract it from a very valuable work, to which many references will be made, in the course of the

following pages;—I mean, “A brief examination into the increase of the revenue, commerce, and navigation of Great Britain, during the administration of the Right Hon. William Pitt; with allusions to some of the principal events, which occurred in that period, and a sketch of Mr. Pitt’s character;” by the right Hon. George Rose, M. P. (the father of the Special Minister, who was sent by the British government to the United States, in the spring of 1806, on account of the Chesapeake transaction) published at London in 1806.

Mr. Rose, in p. 54—5, states the charges on the gross receipt to be, in 1797,

	£	s.	d.	per cent.
Customs,	6	2	6	
Excise,	4	12	1	
Stamps,	4	17	7	
Taxes,	3	12	5	

In the post-office, a large part of the expense incurred, is for the conveyance of letters by land and sea. On the whole revenue, as increased since 1797, and under the change of management of a part of it, the expense of collection in 1805 was reduced to

	£	s.	d.	per cent.
Customs,	5	4	7	
Excise,	3	0	7	
Stamps,	3	5	0	

In the taxes there is hardly any variation, as the poundage is uniform. To these charges nothing is to be added for defalcations by remittances, or for failure of collectors, receivers, &c. &c. &c. as there have not been losses, in the public revenue, to the amount of more than nine hundred pounds sterling (nearly all of which has been lost by letter-carriers, &c.) in the whole, from these, or other causes, during some years past.

The average expense of collecting the French taxes is stated to be rather more than one third of the gross amount, that is, *thirty-three and a third per cent.* fraud and speculation being qualities inseparably attendant upon all the officers, primary and subordinate, of that extensive empire.

Mr. Rose, p. 44, states the permanent taxes in Britain, in the year 1805, to amount to £ 32,083,000.

Mr. Comber in his "Inquiry into the state of national subsistence, as connected with the progress of wealth and population," published at London, in the year 1808, appendix, p. 42, states the present annual burden of Britain, including her poor-rates, and every other impost, to be as follows :

Permanent taxes and hereditary revenue,	£ 38,414,099
War-tax, property-tax, and incidents,	21,775,315
Total,	<hr/> 60,189,414 <hr/>

CHAPTER III.

THE only question then is, what are the means which enable Britain to support this annual burden of taxation?

This question will be satisfactorily answered, by a view of the actual condition of her national resources, and more especially that part of her system of finance called the *sinking funds*.

Notwithstanding Bonaparte's blockading decrees, and their various reinforcements by the obsequious edicts and acts of his vassal-states, the commerce of Britain, during the year 1808, as appears from the statements made in the House of Commons in the spring of 1809, exceeded in quantity and in value that of any former year. And during the latter part of 1808, and the beginning of 1809, the freight of British shipping averaged from eight to ten pounds sterling a ton on the voyage; and half that sum on the passage; so inadequate is the whole immense tonnage of Britain to carry on her extensive trade. The ordinary price of freight in Britain, before the American embargo was laid, amounted to from three to four pounds sterling a ton on the voyage, and from thirty to forty shillings on the passage.

Mr. Rose, in the work above cited, p. 96—7, thus rates the navigation of Britain in the years

1784 and 1805, shewing the great increase in this department of her wealth, during the course of twenty years; more than ten of which were employed in sustaining the burdens of the most expensive and trying war ever recorded in the annals of human history.

<i>Navigation.</i>	1784.	1805.
	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>
Shipping belonging to Great Britain and her colonies, Ireland not included, . . .	1,301,000	2,226,000
Number of seamen employed in that shipping in the merchants' service, . . .	101,870	152,642

For the same years Mr. Rose gives the following statement of the commerce of Britain.

<i>Commerce.</i>	1784.	1805.
	£	£
Imports, from British colonies, and from possessions in India, . . .	6,751,000	13,271,000
— from Ireland, . . .	1,820,000	3,010,000
— from foreign countries,	6,573,000	13,221,000
Total,	15,144,000	29,502,000

	1784.	1805.
	£	£
Exports of British manufactures to British possessions,	3,757,000	9,322,000
Exports to foreign countries,	7,517,000	14,613,000
	<hr/>	
Total,	11,274,000	23,935,000
	<hr/>	

	1784.	1805.
	£	£
Exports of foreign merchandise,	3,846,000	12,227,000
	<hr/>	

The above are the *custom-house* valuations, according to rules established more than a century ago. But the *real* value of the exports of British manufactures, in the two periods, were as follows:

In 1784.	In 1805.
£ 18,603,000	£ 41,068,000
<hr/>	

The *real* value of the British exports of foreign merchandise, during these two years, Mr. Rose does not state; but Mr. M'Arthur, in his—"Financial and political facts of the eighteenth and present century,"—published at London, in 1803,

page 8,—explains the precise difference between the *official*, or custom-house, and the *real* value of British imports and exports, to be about *seventy per cent.* in favor of the real value.

The *official* value, says Mr. M'Arthur, of British exports for the year, ending on the 5th of January 1801, as laid before parliament, was,
of British manufactures, *in value*, £ 24,411,067
of Foreign merchandise, . . . 17,466,145

Total of annual exports, £ 41,877,213

But the operations of the convoy-tax have proved, that the *real* value of British exports exceeds in the proportion of seventy per cent. the *official* value; whence the *real* value of British exports, during the year 1800, was,

of British manufactures, . £ 41,498,813
of Foreign merchandise, . . 29,172,449

Total annual value, . . £ 70,671,262
To which add the real value of im-
ports into Britain during that year, £ 45,000,000

Total annual value of Bri-
tish imports and exports, . . £ 115,671,262

Eight years of progressive national industry,
and of continually accumulating national stock,

or capital, have considerably increased the annual quantity of British commerce since the year 1800; for the malignant, but futile, attempts of Bonaparte to annihilate the trade of the whole world, cannot countervail the habits and the wants of mankind, who are compelled, in the present situation of human affairs, to have recourse to Britain, as the only market, which can supply them with many articles of prime and indispensable necessity, as well as of convenience and comfort.

If such be the state of Britain's foreign commerce, of what extent must be her internal trade; seeing that the greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation is that which is carried on by the inhabitants of the towns with those of the country? The townsmen draw from the people of the country the rude produce, for which they pay, by sending back into the country a part of this rude produce manufactured and prepared for immediate use.

Or, in other words, this trade between town and country consists in a given quantity of rude produce being passed in exchange for a given quantity of manufactured produce. In this direct home-trade, two British capitals are employed, one in putting in motion the country-trade, and the other in moving the town-trade; whereas, in her foreign commerce, whether it be direct, or round-about, there can, in general, be only one British capital used; namely, that employed in

the British exports, the imports being the produce, and, consequently, the capital, of some other country.

CHAPTER IV.

THE following statement of the manufactures of Britain, in the year 1800, extracted from Mr. Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, 4th volume, p. 549, will, perhaps, have a tendency to show, in conjunction with other facts, that the British people are not yet altogether trembling on the verge of national bankruptcy.

The same observation, as to the annual increase of the value of British commodities, in consequence of the progressive augmentation of productive industry, and of national capital, applies equally to the subject of manufactures, as to that of commerce.

Woollen goods, annual produce,	£ 19,000,000
————— export,	8,000,000
————— home-con-	
sumption,	11,000,000
Cotton goods, annual produce,	10,000,000
————— export,	4,000,000

Cotton goods, annual home-consumption,	£ 6,000,000
Flaxen goods, home-consumption,	2,000,000
Hempen do.	2,000,000
Silk do.	3,000,000
Leather, in shoes, boots, saddle-ry, harness, military accoutrements, carriages, &c. home-consumption,	12,000,000
Glass, (plate-glass, of late much improved) home-consumption,	2,000,000
Porcelain and pottery (much improved in the last twenty years) home-consumption,	2,000,000
Paper (increased in price and quantity) home-consumption,	1,500,000
Hardware, (made at Birmingham, Sheffield, &c.) home-consumption,	6,000,000
Beer, annual home-consumption, 200,000,000 of gallons, at 1s. per gallon,	10,000,000
Spirits, annual home-consumption, 10,000,000 of gallons, at 8s. per gallon,	4,000,000
Soap, for 2,260,802, families, at 3½d. per week, home-consumption, above	1,500,000
Salt, 46,000 tons, of 40 bushels each, (not including smuggled salt) annual home-consumption,	1,000,000

Candles, wax and tallow, annual home-consumption, above	£ 2,000,000
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White lead, and other colors, for painters and dyers, turpentine, casks, vats for liquors, drugs, hats, straw-work, snuff, horn, books, furniture, musical instruments, watches, jewellery, coaches, and other carriages, printing apparatus, salted beef, pork, butter, fish, &c. &c. annual home-consumption, above	10,000,000
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Annual amount of British manufactures for home-consumption,	£ 76,000,000
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British manufactures for annual exportation in 1800, . . .	40,000,000
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Total annual value of British manufactures,	£ 116,000,000
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From the following statement of Mr. McArthur, in the sixty-fifth page of his introduction, it will appear, that Mr. Macpherson has considerably *under-rated* the annual value of British woollens, as far, at least, as relates to their home-consumption, by omitting to notice the fabrics made from imported wool.

It is computed, that about three millions of

souls are employed in the British woollen manufacture, and the trades dependent upon it ; a piece of broad-cloth passing through a hundred different hands in finding its way, through the various stages of its fabric, from the wool-grower to the consumer. Add to which the number of persons employed in the many different trades dependent on the woollen manufacture.

The quantity of Spanish wool, imported into Britain, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, was annually about one million of pounds weight ; but in the year 1803, as appears from documents, laid before a Committee of the House of Commons 32,000 bags of fine wool were imported ; which, at 200 lbs. weight for each bag, amounts to 6,400,000 pounds weight ; and valuing each pound at six shillings, it constitutes a total value of £ 1,920,000.

From the testimony of some of the principal manufacturers and dealers in wool, as laid before the Parliament in the year 1800, it was shown, that the quantity of fine and other wool, produced from the estimated number of 28,800,000 sheep, in England alone, (not including Scotland and Ireland) amounted, on an average, annually, to 600,000 packs, of 240. lbs each, making a total of 144,000,000 of pounds weight, and valuing each pack at eleven pounds sterling, or each pound at eleven pence and a fraction, it will constitute a total value of £ 6,600,000 for the native wool, as

a raw material. In its manufactured state, the value, being at least tripled, will amount to £ 19,800,000.

If to this value of British native wool, in a manufactured state, we add the value of the fabric from fine wool imported into Britain, multiplying the value of the raw material by three, namely $\text{£ } 1,920,000 + 3 = \text{£ } 5,760,000$ it will give a total annual value of fine and coarse fabrics, amounting to £ 25,560,000 of which is annually exported an

amount of 8,500,000
leaving an annual *home-consumption* of 17,060,000

being *six millions and sixty thousand pounds sterling* more than Mr. Macpherson allots to the yearly home-consumption of woollens in Britain.

A very elaborate essay has been published, within these twelve months past, (in August 1808) on sheep, wool, and woollen manufactures, by Robert R. Livingston, L. L. D. president of the society for the promotion of useful arts in the State of New-York; generally called Chancellor Livingston in the United States, but better known in Europe, as the American minister, who bought Louisiana of Bonaparte, for the general government of the Union.

The great reputation of Mr. Livingston, as an agricultural philosopher, renders it necessary to notice some errors in point of *fact*, relating to the

fleece, sheep, and woollen manufactures of Britain, and also to the Spanish wool.

I have this day received *An Essay on Sheep, &c.* by Mr. Livingston, published in September 1809; but, after examining it, I do not find, that he has materially corrected the errors of his last year's production; he speaks, indeed, in terms a little less contemptuous of the prices and quality of British wool, which he has discovered to be not quite so low, nor so bad, as he imagined twelve months since. I shall, therefore, state the positions, as applicable to Mr. Livingston's Essay, published in 1808, omitting all consideration of that put forth in 1809, because the facts to be stated in the following pages are of themselves sufficiently important to deserve notice.

1. Mr. Livingston positively asserts, that Spanish wool cannot be mixed with any other species of wool; but that it is always worked up alone into cloth of different degrees of fineness, according to the quality of the staple.

But in the first volume of Mr. Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, p. 651, it is expressly stated, that Spanish wool was carried to Flanders, but could not be made into fine cloth *without* a mixture of English wool, which was then the chief support of the Flemish manufacture.

And in the year 1744, as cited by Mr. Macpherson, 3d vol. p. 240, the British Turkey or Levant Company distinctly stated at the bar of the

House of Commons that the French, under the auspices of their then Minister, the celebrated M. Colbert, had greatly improved and extended their woollen manufacture by *mixing* one third of the wool of the province of Languedoc with two thirds of Spanish wool, and had thus beaten the English out of the Turkey markets.

And, at this day, if Mr. Livingston will take the trouble of inquiring of any intelligent British woollen-manufacturer, he may be informed, that Spanish and British wools are continually worked up together in the manufacture of fine cloths. It is a common question in the cloth-halls of Yorkshire, in England, to ask,—How much Spanish wool is there in this piece?—and the answer generally is,—half and half;—that is, half Spanish and half English wool.

Neither is it true, as Mr. Livingston also roundly asserts, that the British native wool is only capable of being made into coarse cloths. Fine broad cloth, up to the price of fifteen or sixteen shillings a yard, is, every day, made entirely of English wool;—cloth, from fifteen to twenty shillings a yard, is made of Spanish and English wool mixed; and superfine cloth, from twenty to thirty shillings a yard and upwards, is made altogether of Spanish wool. These prices relate to cloth in its *undressed* state; when it comes to the hand of the consumer, of course, the cost is considerably enhanced.

2. Mr. Livingston declares, that the finest Spanish wool never goes to Britain; because, one year, the price happened to be higher at Madrid than in London; and in 1796, Mr. Livingston assures us, England imported *six millions* of pounds weight of wool from Spain.

Now, both these assertions are incorrect; for, by examining the table of British imports, for the year 1796, as published in the 4th vol. p. 527, of Mr. Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, we shall find, that there were imported into Britain, during that year only *three millions* four hundred thousand and two hundred and thirty-six pounds weight of Spanish wool, and 53,975 pounds weight of other wool.

Nor is Mr. Livingston's reasoning conclusive to show, that the finest sort of Spanish wool never goes to England; namely, because in the year 1796, the price of Spanish wool was higher at Madrid than in London; a circumstance which might easily be occasioned by a sudden glut of Spanish wool in the London market. It sometimes happens, that cloth of British manufacture is sold at a less price here, in the city of New-York, than cloth of the same quality is in London. Would Mr. Livingston infer from this, that the British cloth, so sold at New-York, was never imported into the United States from Britain?

The fact is notorious, that the finest Spanish wool is constantly imported into Britain, which, indeed,

might *a priori*, be inferred from this circumstance, that Britain imports the largest quantity annually, and can afford to pay the best price for Spanish wool. And yet, by an unaccountable mode of reasoning, Mr. Livingston draws two inferences from two facts, which, to an ordinary logician, would suggest precisely opposite conclusions.

In the year 1796, says Mr. Livingston, England imported six millions of pounds weight of Spanish wool, while France, during that year, imported only six hundred thousand pounds weight; and, *therefore*, England never gets any of the finer wool from Spain; and France makes better cloths than Britain. Q. E. D.

3. Mr. Livingston very much under-rates the price of British wool, when he puts the coarsest at only seven pence half-penny per pound weight, and the finest at one shilling a pound. It is evident, also, that he industriously compares the finest Spanish wool, that has been picked, sorted, washed, and prepared for the market, with the coarsest British wool, still remaining in the fleece.

But the finest British wool, namely, that from the South-down sheep, is sold at from forty to fifty pounds sterling the pack, which contains 240lbs. weight; and, consequently, this wool is always above three shillings, and, sometimes above four shillings the pound weight, instead of being only one shilling as Mr. Livingston states. And the

coarsest British wool is sold at from twelve to fifteen pounds sterling a pack ; and, therefore, always costs one shilling, and sometimes more than one shilling a pound, and not only seven pence and a half-penny, as Mr. Livingston asserts.

4. Mr. Livingston very greatly under-rates the *quality* of British wool, when he says, that it is only capable of being worked up into coarse cloths. And, in his calculations as to the most profitable breed of sheep, he carefully compares the quality of the finest Spanish wool, from the Merino breed, with that of the coarsest British, namely the Durham and the Dishley breeds ; omitting all consideration of the South-down, the Herefordshire, the Ryeland, and some other species of English wool, which do not fall very far short of Spanish wool, in the fineness and evenness of their staple.

As the quality of British wool, and an inquiry into the means of improving its staple, is a subject of very considerable importance, not only to Britain, but to other nations whose wants are supplied, and whose conveniences and comforts are augmented by the use of British woollens, perhaps it may be excusable to enter somewhat at length into this question.

It will be seen, by the following references to, and extracts from, respectable authorities, that—formerly, British wool was reckoned to be of a finer quality than the Spanish ;—that it is supposed to have, in general, degenerated, but that in

some parts of Britain, it yet retains all its native excellence ; and lastly, that of late years, several successful attempts have been made to improve the staple by an intermixture of the Spanish Merinos with the flocks of Britain.

Mr. Macpherson, in the 4th volume of his very valuable and laborious work, the *Annals of Commerce*, p. 204, says, that from many incontrovertible facts related in several scattered parts of the first volume, it is sufficiently shown in what high estimation the wool of England was held, and with what avidity it was sought after by foreign manufacturers, especially those of the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, which last country now produces the best wool in Europe.

Yet in the sixteenth century Guicciardini describes the English wool as superior to that of Spain, which he ranks as next in quality and value. He also repeatedly mentions the wool of Scotland as being then in great request in the Netherlands. Indeed, wool was the chief article of the Scottish exports, till the year 1581, when its exportation was strictly prohibited by the Parliament. In Camden's time, the wool of Leominster was the pride of Herefordshire, and preferred all over Europe to every other wool, except the Apulian and Tarentine.

The Spaniards ascribe the improvement of their wool to a stock of rams, obtained from the Arabs of Africa by Cardinal Ximenes in the early part

of the sixteenth century. They had been accustomed, theretofore, to import English sheep into Spain, in order to mend the Spanish breed. And as it plainly appears, that Spanish wool has only lately attained its superiority over the other European wools, and that British wool was universally esteemed to be the best in Europe, down to the beginning of the seventeenth century, it may be asked, what has now become of that breed of sheep in Britain, which produced wool of such superior quality?

This breed must have degenerated; and it is supposed, that the laws, which prevent the exportation of wool from Britain, although intended for the benefit of the manufacturer, have, by turning the attention of the former to the weight of the carcass, rather than to the quality of the wool, been the real cause of the degeneracy of the British sheep, and consequently of the importation of fine wool.

The Herefordshire breed still retain much of that superiority of wool, for which their progenitors were formerly celebrated; and, perhaps, they are the least adulterated remains of the ancient stock of British sheep, now existing in the main land of Britain. But their wool is greatly inferior to that of the fine woolled sheep of Scotland, which by the advantage of their remote insular situation, have, probably, remained uncontaminated by any mixture with inferior breeds, and are, appa-

rently, the most genuine offspring of the ancient British race of fine-woolled sheep.

About the year 1790, many gentlemen, in different parts of Britain, turned their attention to the improvement of the breed of fine-woolled sheep. At an anniversary meeting of the Bath Society for the encouragement of agriculture, arts, manufactures and commerce, a number of sheep of various kinds were inspected, in order to ascertain which is the most advantageous breed for general stock, in respect to carcass and wool; and the small-boned Leister and the South-down breeds were adjudged to be the most profitable.

The attention of the Highland Society was more especially directed to the recovery of the superior quality of the Scottish wool; the report of their committee, published in the year 1790, states that there are two kinds of fine-woolled sheep in the Shetland Islands, of which that called the *kindly* sheep is almost entirely covered with wool of a most excellent quality, worth at least five shillings sterling per pound; the other species having the fine wool only about the neck and some other parts of the body.

Yet the people who possess this most precious wool, are so deficient in its management, and especially in sorting it, that they work up the finest along with the coarse wool of inferior sheep, in knitting stockings, which they sell at from three pence to three shillings a pair; (whereas stockings made entirely of the finest wool are sold at as

high a rate as two guineas for each pair) whence it often happens, that some of them contain as much fine wool, as is worth more, in a raw state, than the price of the manufactured stockings.

The Society strongly recommended it to the proprietors of the small islands to attend to their breed of sheep, which such sea-girt pastures can best preserve from being debased by mixing with sheep of inferior quality; to obtain the best breeding kinds, especially selecting the finest rams; to breed only the best species, and to extirpate the inferior kinds as soon as possible.

From the communications of the ministers of several of the islands for Sir John Sinclair's Statistical Account of Scotland, it appears that these islands already possess a breed of sheep, producing wool of a very fine quality, although not equal to the best Shetland wool.

To these observations of Mr. Macpherson it might be added, that the process, begun some few years since, and now (in 1809) still going on in the Highlands, and western islands of Scotland, I mean, the breaking up of the old clannish, or feudal tenures, by which the peasantry had theretofore held their farms, and converting the system of cottar-husbandry, or *crofting*, (as the Scottish call it) into extensive sheep-pastures, according to the present more improved modes of agriculture, will, in all probability, tend materially to improve the quality of British wool; by turning the attention

of intelligent farmers: towards the attainment of that important object, which can only be accomplished by carefully selecting and properly managing the best breeds of fine-woolled sheep; and by judiciously picking and sorting the wool, when shorn, according to the different qualities of its staple.

Now, neither of these desirable purposes could ever possibly be accomplished on the small farms, and by the scanty capital of the former rude and unproductive system of husbandry, which remained until lately, and was cherished by the military services, on the performance of which, together with a small rent paid in kind, the Scottish highlanders were accustomed to hold their lands.

For a full exposition of the great national results to be expected from the breaking up of these old, patriarchal tenures, and the consequent introduction of a better order of agriculture into the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, the reader will do well to consult and to study the very interesting and able work of the Earl of Selkirk, entitled—"Observations on the present state of the Highlands of Scotland, with a view of the causes and probable consequences of Emigration;"—published at Edinburgh, in 1806.

In the 58th volume of the *Monthly Review*, p. 256*—we are informed, in a Review of Anderson's

* I am obliged to refer to this very meritorious and valuable repository not only of British, but of European science and li-

Observations on the means of exciting a spirit of National Industry, &c. published in the year 1777, that very fine wool is produced in Scotland; an assertion which Mr. Anderson corroborates by relating the following fact.

About the beginning of Lord Chatham's famous war, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the magistrates of Aberdeen, a town in the north of Scotland, much celebrated for its manufactures of worsted stockings, resolved to make their countryman, Marshal Keith, then in the service of Frederic 2nd, King of Prussia, a present of a pair of stockings of an extraordinary degree of fineness. They, therefore, obtained from London some pounds of the very finest Spanish wool, which they put into the hands of the women, who were appointed to manufacture the Marshal's stockings.

But these women complained of the coarse quality of the Spanish wool, from a pound weight of which they could only draw forty heeres, each heere being a thread of six hundred yards in length; whereas, from the Scottish Highland wool they could spin to the fineness of seventy heeres to the pound; the Scottish Highland wool being finer than that of the best Spanish Merino-fleece, in the proportion of seven to four.

terature in general for more than half a century past; because I do not possess, neither can I procure in this country, the original works on the subject now under examination, which are criticised by the Monthly Reviewers.

Accordingly, the stockings were made of Highland wool, and when finished, were valued at more than five guineas, being so fine, that although of the largest size, they were easily drawn, both together, through an ordinary thumb-ring. They were sent to Marshal Keith, who presented them to the Empress of Russia.

Mr. Anderson states a vast variety of other facts to prove the existence of fine wool in many parts of Scotland; and labors much to show that *uniformly cold* climates are peculiarly calculated for the production of the finest wool. He also endeavors to point out, how the quality of the wool may be improved or debased, independently of the influence of climate; and concludes, that the chief requisite towards improvement is a minute attention to the qualities of that particular variety of the animal employed in breeding.

I would beg leave to observe, that, although Mr. Anderson is correct in his inference as to improving the quality of the fleece, by crossing the breeds of sheep, yet he appears to be too confident in his position, that the *uniformly cold* climates are the best adapted for the production of fine wool.

It is, indeed, true, that about a century since, Sweden imported Merino-sheep from Spain, and has been so successful in breeding them, that the present (in 1809) Swedish stock of pure and mixed Merino amounts to above one hundred thou-

sand ; and no deterioration in the quality of the wool, or of the carcass, has taken place. Into Norway, also, and Denmark, Saxony, Prussia, Germany, Holland, Britain, France, Italy, the Cape of Good Hope, and New-South Wales, has the Spanish Merino been imported ; and in all these countries been propagated with success.

Now, whatever we might attribute to the *cold* of the more northern of these countries ; it cannot be the cold of France, or of Italy, or of the Cape of Good Hope, or of New-South Wales, which produces such fine wool. I am inclined to think, that the climate is by no means so essential to the quality of the fleece, as the peculiar breed of the sheep itself is.

In the 64th volume of the Monthly Review, p. 533, in the examination of a memoir of M. Du Rondeau, published in the year 1780, in the *Memoirs* of the Imperial and Royal Academy of Sciences and Belles Lettres, at Brussels, we are told, that in ancient times the Belgic wool was preferred to that of Calabria and Apulia ; and that the Spaniards, as far back as the days of the Romans, greatly improved their wool by coupling African rams with Iberian ewes ; but this improvement was of short duration, owing to the negligence of the Spanish agriculturalists.

The attempt, however, was successfully renewed by Don Pedro, the fourth king of Castile ; whence the origin of that fine breed of sheep, which con-

stitutes the chief opulence of Old Castile. This breed, also, having degenerated through the carelessness and incapacity of the Spanish keepers, was restored to its pristine excellence by the Cardinal Ximenes, who imported a large stock of African rams in the sixteenth century ; and this superior breed of sheep has since been spread through all the parts of Spain, whose pastures are similar to those of Segovia.

The free use of air, and the disuse of folds contribute much to maintain the excellence of this breed ; the Spanish shepherds invariably perceiving a dimunition of their sheep, and a deterioration in the quality of their wool, whenever they shut up their flocks in folds.

The English wool grew into great repute about the middle of the fifteenth century, when three thousand sheep were transported from Castile to England, and there propagated with success.

The French, under their great minister, Colbert, attempted to form a fine breed of sheep in France ; but failed, in consequence of depriving their flocks of the free use of air. A blunder into which it is singular that the French, whose climate is so mild, should fall ; when it is well known, that the Tartars of Great-Thibet, or Bouton, whose wool is beautiful, and in high request, never fold, or confine their sheep, though the air of that region is extremely cold, and the earth is covered with snow above five months in the year.

The wether of Flanders is of the largest kind in Europe ; this species of sheep was brought by the Dutch from the East-Indies, in the seventeenth century ; and its wool is almost equal to that of the English, in length, whiteness, fineness, and strength. The attempts to raise this breed in England were unsuccessful ; but it thrives in several parts of Holland, and may prosper in Brabant, Hainault, and several districts of Flanders.

Upon the whole, M. Du Rondeau recommends the English method of managing sheep, as the most eligible, and the best adapted to restore to the Flemings, the lucrative branch of commerce, consisting of the growth and manufacture of wool, which the English and the Spaniards have carried away from them.

It only remains to show, that, of late years, several successful attempts have been made in England to improve the quality of British wool by an intermixture of the sheep of Britain with the Spanish Merinos.

We learn from Mr. Macpherson's *Annals of Commerce*, 4th vol. p. 524, that, during several years past, his Britannic Majesty has kept a flock of sheep of the true Merino breed, the quality of whose wool has nothing degenerated by continuing in the climate and pasture of Britain. A long experience has uniformly proved that the cross of a Merino ram increases the quantity, and improves the quality of the native, short-woolled, British

sheep, particularly the South-down, Hereford, and Devonshire breeds.

Encouraged by these facts, the British Monarch obtained from the Marchioness del Campo de Alange, in the year 1792, five rams and thirty-five ewes of the Negretti breed, which is as highly esteemed as any sheep in Spain, for purity of blood, and fineness of wool. These, with their descendants, are carefully kept upon the King's farm at Oatlands.

Though the wool of all these sheep, the Merino, as well as the Negretti, was equal in quality to any imported Spanish wool, yet, at first, the British manufacturers would not buy it, wherefore, the King ordered it to be manufactured, and it made excellent superfine cloth. The manufacturers were then suffered to buy the wool at their own price; and the following table shows the gradual augmentation of its money-value, in proportion as its excellence became more generally known.

QUALITY AND PRICE PER POUND.				
YEARS.	FIRST.	SECOND.	THIRD.	Total Sale.
1796.	2s. per lb.			
1797.	2s. 2d. per lb.			£. s. d.
1798—eighty-nine fleeces,	167 lb. at 5s. per lb.	23 lb. at 3s. 6d. per lb.	13 lb. at 2s. 6d. per lb.	47 8 0
1799—one hundred and one fleeces.	207 lb. at 5s. 6d. per lb.	28 lb. at 3s. 6d. per lb.	19 lb. at 2s. per lb.	63 14 6
Ram's wool of 1798—9.	181 lb. at 4s. 6d. per lb.	22 lb. at 3s. 6d. per lb.	12 lb. at 2s. per lb.	45 15 6

Observe, that in the year 1799, when this Bri-

tish wool of 1798—9 was sold, the price of Spanish wool in the London market was higher than ever it was before ; yet no wool from Spain, was, during that year, sold for more than 5*s.* 6*d.*—except a very small quantity, which fetched 5*s.* 9*d.* per pound. The London market prices of Spanish wool in the year 1808, were, for Seville, per lb. 3*s.* 4*d.* to 5*s.* 3*d.* for Segovia, from 6*s.* to 6*s.* 6*d.* and for Leonese, from 6*s.* 6*d.* to 6*s.* 9*d.*

In order to render the propagation of so valuable a race of sheep as extensive as possible, his Britannic Majesty gave a hundred of his rams, and many of his ewes, as presents to different persons ; and that the improvement of the staple commodity of Britain might be accessible to all, he ordered a number of the rams and ewes to be occasionally drafted from his flocks, and sold to any one, who chose to be the purchaser.

In the 116th volume of the Monthly Review p. 324, from an examination of a work by Doctor Parry, a celebrated physician of Bath, as to the practicability of producing in the British Isles clothing wool equal to that of Spain, published in the year 1800, it appears, that a breed of sheep can be produced and kept up in Britain, whose wool is equal in quality to that of Spain ; and that it would be advantageous to the farmer individually, and to the public in general, to cherish such a breed in the British Isles.

Doctor Parry chose the Ryeland breed of sheep,

as the basis of an attempt to improve British wool by an admixture with the Spanish race. He commenced his experiments in the year 1792, by sending four ewes to the Spanish ram, belonging to the Bath Agricultural Society, and two ewes to another ram, belonging to the late Earl Bathurst, both given by the King.

The breed, thus obtained by Dr. Parry, are entirely enveloped in wool, which grows under the jaws, down the forehead to the eyes, under the belly, and down the legs to the very feet. It covers the skin very thickly, scarcely gives way to the even pressure of the hand, but yields by starts, like the close, short hair of an extremely fine clothes-brush. In washing the sheep, the water penetrates to the skin with great difficulty.

The fleece of these sheep is heavier, in proportion to their carcass, than that of any other known breed in Europe. In the raw state (that is, unwashed, on the sheep's back, or afterwards) the fleeces of the two shear-ewes average $4\frac{1}{2}$ lb. averdupoise; the weight of the living ewe being sixty pounds, the proportion of wool to that of carcass is about one to twelve and a half. The fleece of a fat wether, of the same age, will be from five to seven pounds. From a ram of seventy pounds and a half living weight, in 1797, Dr. Parry clipped eight pounds two ounces of raw wool.

The length of the staple or filaments averages three inches and a quarter, and the wool is of uni-

form fineness in different parts of the fleece; even in those parts, which, in other breeds, generally produce the best and the worst wool; namely, the shoulder and the breech. This wool contains a great deal of *yolk*, or oil, but is wholly free from *stickel*, hairs, or kemps. The breed is also very healthy; and the nature of the food, whether hay, grass, chicory, Scottish cabbage, or oil-cakes, in indefinite proportions, given so as to maintain a certain quantity of flesh, makes no obvious difference in the fineness of the wool.

This breed is small, and the carcass is not so finely formed as that of the present fashionable breeds in Britain. The wethers, when tolerably fat, weigh from twelve to fifteen pounds per quarter, and the ewes from ten to twelve pounds; the flavor of the mutton is excellent. The smallest breed of sheep is the most profitable, both as to flesh and wool.

Nevertheless, adds Dr. Parry, fine wool cannot be produced by only one or two crosses with Spanish rams from any breed of ewes in England. The sheep must have at least five-sixths of the Spanish blood. One or two descents will improve the quality, and greatly increase the quantity of wool; but it will require many more crosses to produce wool equal in quality to that of the Spanish Merino.

In the 133d volume of the Monthly Review, p. 415, in an examination of the tenth volume of

Letters and Papers of the Bath Agricultural Society, published in the year 1807, we are informed, that from ten fleeces of Merino wool, out of Lord Somerville's flock, were made fourteen and a half yards of broad-cloth, (of the usual superfine breadth) which was, in respect of fineness of wool, somewhat inferior to the best superfine cloth. Dr. Parry, and some other agriculturalists, however, were more successful than Lord Somerville. The Merino race surpass other sheep in excellence of carcass, as well as in quality of fleece.

Lord Somerville, also, laid claim to a premium for producing the greatest number, and the most profitable sort of sheep. His Lordship's sheep-stock were the Merino breed crossed with the Ryeland, and amounted to 302 lambs, and 783 store sheep, total 1,085. Their produce was:

	£.	s.	d.
Wool, twelve packs and one score,			
worth	446	0	0
216 store sheep, sold for . . .	409	3	0
132 fat sheep, sold and used, .	238	16	2
Letting rams,	524	10	0

These sheep were depastured on 188 acres, with the run of 33 acres of turnips; and the whole receipt, deducting 26*l.* for extra feed, amounted to 1,592*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.*

Dr. Parry, in an address to the Society, on this sheep-stock of Lord Somerville, observes, that the

profit of his Lordship's stock amounted to 9*l.* 1*s.* 3*d.* per acre. And, in another address, Dr. Parry communicates the result of his own experience ; as to Merinos crossed with Ryelands, in the form of the following propositions :

1. That the wool of the fourth cross of this breed is fully equal in fineness to that of the male parent stock, (the Spanish Merino) in England.

2. By breeding from select Merino-Ryeland rams and ewes of this stock, sheep may be obtained whose fleeces are superior to those of the cross-breed parents ; and, consequently, to those of the original progenitors of the pure Merino blood in England.

3. From mixed rams of this breed may be obtained sheep, having wool, at least equal in fineness to the best which can be procured from Spain.

4. Wool, from sheep of a proper modification of Merino and Ryeland, will make cloth equal to that made from the Spanish wool, which is imported into Britain.

5. The proportion of fine wool, in the fleeces of this cross-breed, is equal, if not superior to that of the best Spanish piles.

6. This wool is more profitable in the manufacture than the best Spanish wool.

7. The lamb's wool of the Merino-Ryeland breed will make finer cloth than the best of that of the pure Merino breed.

8. Should long wool, of this degree of fineness, be wanted for shawls, or any manufactures, which

cannot be perfected with the common, coarse, long British wools, this can be effected by allowing the ram's fleece to remain on the animal unshorn for two years.

9. That although Doctor Parry never selected a breeding ram or ewe, on account of any other quality than the fineness of the fleece, this stock is already much improved as to the form of its carcass, comparatively with the Merinos originally imported.

I shall only add two circumstances, both conclusive as to the *quality* of British wool, which escaped my recollection while I was examining Mr. Livingston's assertions on this subject.

1. Since the annual produce of wool in England, from twenty-eight millions eight hundred thousand sheep, amounts to six hundred thousand packs, which, at two hundred and forty pounds a pack, gives a yearly produce of one hundred and forty-four millions of pounds weight, the whole or nearly the whole of which is worked up into woollen manufactures in the British Isles; and since the annual importation of Spanish wool into Britain averages four millions of pounds weight; we might, without any fear of refutation, infer, that British wool *can* and *does make* some fabrics a little finer than those merely of the coarse cloths, which Mr. Livingston denies; inasmuch as the British fine woollen bear a much greater proportion to the British coarse woollen cloths, than that of four to one hundred and forty-four.

2. It is a notorious fact, that on the 23d of June 1806, at Mr. Coke's Annual Meeting for the encouragement of Agriculture, at his seat in Holkam, Norfolk, England, Mr. John Herring, junior, received a premium for producing three shawls, manufactured by Messrs. John Herring and sons, of Norwich, in England, *entirely* of Mr. Coke's South-down fleece.

And, at this same meeting, Mr. Tollet, a very extensive breeder of Merino sheep in England, declared, that he had tried all kinds of wool, and had proved that in Britain could be grown wool equal, if not superior, to that of the finest Spanish fleeces. And that, after the fairest, and frequently repeated trials, Mr. Coke's South-down wool was found to be better fitted for the shawl manufactory than the finest Spanish wool, or any mixture of it.

CHAPTER V.

IT is a universally received truth, that a better and a more productive system of agriculture prevails in Britain than in any other country on the face of the earth; that more capital, industry, knowledge, and talent, are applied to the cultivation of land; and that the flourishing state of Bri-

tish manufactures and commerce ensures the progressive improvement of agricultural pursuits, by creating a constant, and a perpetually widening demand for the rude produce of the soil.

Mr. Comber, p. 193 of the body of his book, and in p. 52 of the appendix, gives the following table of the proportion of land cultivated for the different kinds of crops, in England and Wales.

	<i>Acres.</i>
Wheat,	3,160,000
Barley and Rye,	86,000
Oats and beans,	2,872,000
Clover, rye-grass, &c.	1,149,000
Roots and cabbages, cultivated by the plough,	1,150,000
Fallow,	2,297,000
Hop-grounds,	36,000
Nursery grounds,	9,000
Fruit, and kitchen gardens, cultivated by the spade,	41,000
Pleasure-grounds,	16,000
Land depastured by cattle,	17,479,000
Hedge-rows, copses, and woods, . .	1,641,000
Ways, water, &c.	1,316,000
Total of acres cultivated,	32,027,000
Commons, and waste lands,	6,473,000
Total of acres in England and Wales.	38,500,000

The general diffusion of wealth, throughout Britain, in consequence of the wonderful extension of its industry, has been attended, not only by an increased consumption, and almost general substitution of wheat for other grain, but by a more extended and nearly universal use of animal food. The improvements, made in this branch of farming, were attended with considerable profit, not merely, from the natural consequences of these progressive improvements, but from the continually increasing demand, and increased ability of the consumers.

It naturally requires a larger extent of territory to support the same number of persons on animal than on vegetable food ; and when the mode of raising, and of feeding cattle on rich and fertile lands, became general in Britain, it occasioned a very serious competition in the employment of land for tillage. To these advantages in favor of grazing was to be added the greater certainty attending its operations, in comparison with those of tillage ; the fewer laborers required on a pasture than on a corn-farm ; and the exemption from so great an amount of ecclesiastical tithes.

From a combination of all these circumstances, a very great proportion of the cultivated lands of England and Wales is employed in depasturing, and raising animal food for the consumption of the people. That employed for pasture alone amounts to seventeen and a half millions of acres, besides

upwards of five millions used in the growth of oats, beans, clover, artificial grasses, turnips, cabbages, &c. for feeding cattle.

There are, also, six millions of acres of common and waste land, which, if used at all, are employed in feeding cattle, and may be considered as equal to a million and a half of acres of cultivated land; making a total of twenty-four millions of acres, devoted to the raising of food for those animals, which administer to the pleasure, the labor, and the consumption of man. The quantity of land employed in the cultivation of wheat in England and Wales, amounts to three millions, one hundred and sixty thousand acres; and in raising every other species of vegetable food for man, nine hundred and thirty-eight thousand acres are used; making a total of only a little more than four millions of acres, and about one sixth of the quantity of land, which is directed to the raising of animal food for the inhabitants of Britain.

It is evident, therefore, that, at present, less than a due proportion of land in England and Wales is devoted to the cultivation of grain. This inconvenience, however, will soon remedy itself, unless the British government should interfere with any regulations operating upon the corn-farmers. If the competition in agricultural employments be left perfectly free to find its own level, the present disproportion between the quantity of land in Britain employed in grazing, and that used in tillage,

will soon cease, and a proper adjustment take place of its own accord.

For the very high profits upon grazing-stock will, naturally, divert so much capital from other pursuits, into the channel of pasture-farming, as to diminish these profits below the level of those which the corn-farmers obtain from the use of their capital employed in tillage; and then, consequently, a portion of the surplus grazing capital will be directed to the breaking up of new ground with the plough, and thus extend the compass and the produce of tillage-husbandry.

It ought to be noticed, that the Scottish farmers excel those of England and Wales in their mode of managing land; and, in consequence of their improved system of agriculture, can afford, and do actually pay, a larger rent to the proprietors of the soil, than can be drawn for the same number of acres from their more southern brethren. The farmers in Ireland, also, are gradually emerging from their rude, miserable, unproductive mode of *cottar-husbandry*, and becoming agriculturalists on a more enlightened and extensive scale; after the manner of their English and Scottish neighbours.

It should be remarked, as greatly in favor of the Scottish system of husbandry, that the farmers in Scotland are not afflicted with the pressure of ecclesiastical tithes, nor the absurd custom of *rack*, or *annual* rent: their farms being generally held on long, and, sometimes, on *open* leases.

I willingly borrow some interesting observations from the 33d, 34th and 36th numbers, for the months of March, June, and December, of the year 1808, p. 97, 213, and 520, of the Farmer's Magazine, an able and popular periodical work, exclusively devoted to agriculture and rural affairs, published quarterly, in Edinburgh, respecting the agricultural improvements in Britain, and more particularly in the Scottish section of the Kingdom.

Should the territory of Great Britain not be improved to the extent permitted by physical circumstances, the deficiency cannot be attributed to any want of public and private societies, established for the express purpose of benefiting and promoting agriculture in all its branches; either by conferring reward, bestowing advice, or furnishing protection to those concerned in carrying it on.

These institutions may be classed under two heads—1st, The societies, whose operations are not confined to a local district, but extended over the whole Island, or, at least, a considerable portion of it; such as, the Society of Arts &c. in London; the Trustees for Fisheries and Improvements in Scotland; the Bath and West of England Society; the Highland Society; and, though last, not least, the National Board of Agriculture.—2nd, The county and parochial societies, mostly established since agriculture became a fashionable art,

and which are so numerous as to set calculation at defiance.

In a word, no country in the known world is so liberally supplied with agricultural societies as Britain; and if improvement could go forward in a degree proportional to the number of hands engaged in promoting it, the British Isles would, in a short time, wear the face of a terrestrial Paradise.

There are various obstacles in the way of agricultural improvement, not to be removed by *individual* strength; though they may be successfully combatted, and overcome, by the joint force of a society of persons leagued together for the purpose of accomplishing one common object. The collision of sentiment occasioned at such meetings, serves to place the human mind in something like a state of requisition for the public good, by which latent genius may be drawn forth, and made to act upon a stage, where, otherwise, it would never have appeared.

We live at a period, not only of greater interest, in respect to the events which take place upon the political theatre, but more pleasingly interesting than any former epoch, from the rapid and steady course with which the people of Britain, and more especially the Scottish portion of that people, advance towards perfection in their system of agriculture, and those improvements which are calculated to encourage it.

The last thirty years have, indeed, been the

commencement of a new era to Scotland; and a person, who left it twenty-five years since, will, on his return no doubt, be very agreeably surprised at the prosperous and opulent appearance, both of the country and of the towns. The time is not remote, when the nakedness of the Scottish mountains and vallies was almost proverbial; and the cities of Caledonia, with the exception of Glasgow, presented little better than a spectacle of meanness and decay.

With all our partiality as Scottishmen, we cannot but admit, that our fore-fathers little understood the art of living comfortably; and those, who remember the state of filth, in the midst of which they passed their lives in the towns, can hardly escape some emotions of disgust at the recollection. These days are, however, past; and, perhaps, the greatest change for the better, which has ever, in so short a time, taken place in any part of the earth, has been produced over Scotland generally.

Those, who knew Edinburgh and Leith thirty years ago, can best contrast their appearance and comforts, at that period, with the present splendid and imposing aspect of the Scottish capital, and its sea-port. The mind is almost bewildered in endeavouring to trace the causes of such a change, from the excess of meanness to the height of magnificence; and when we survey the country, we are equally surprised by the improvement of its

cultivation, and the extent of the thriving plantations, which shelter and adorn it in every direction.

In proceeding north from Edinburgh, Perth first attracts the attention. A few years since, it was an ugly, mean place, with nothing to excite admiration, except the beauty of its situation, and the grandeur of its bridge. At present, it is one of the prettiest towns in Europe, and displays all the fascinations of architecture, and all the elegance of regularity. Aberdeen has likewise greatly increased, both in beauty and population. Peterhead, from a trifling village, has become a handsome town. Every other town in the north has increased in size, cleanliness, and beauty; nay, even Inverness is fast emerging from its dusky hue, into regularity and splendor. In every other part of Scotland similar advances have been made; and Glasgow, so long super-eminent in beauty, still by new exertions maintains her superiority.

But the improvements which are of most importance to the farmer, are the new roads and bridges, which, not only facilitate the labors of the traveller, but add, in a very great degree, to the comforts of the husbandman. Every thing which the farmer requires for the produce of his crop, and every step which he must take for the disposal of his harvest, and of his cattle, must be subject to the direct influences of easy, or of difficult communication; and the richest country, without easy

means of intercourse between its different parts, both contiguous and remote, must soon yield the palm of fertility and of value, to districts naturally sterile, but enjoying the inestimable advantages of free and facile communication.

The bridges over the Spay, and the Findhorn have been finished for some time ; and are both works of the greatest beauty and utility. The noble bridge at Dunkeld is far advanced towards completion ; and, united with the superb scenery at that romantic place, will surpass any structures of a similar kind, in Britain. Bridges are soon to be commenced over the rivers to the north of Inverness ; so that, in a short time, the whole of the waters in the north of Scotland will present no obstacle to the intercourse of the inhabitants, in that section of the country.

These improvements, and those likewise going forward in England and Ireland, are the more encouraging to the lover of his country, from the solicitude, which the French display in pushing onward similar works, in every part of their immense empire. In some respects, they surpass the British in the nobleness of their works ; such as, the grandeur of their public roads, and the beautiful wharfs, which adorn many of their maritime and inland cities ; while in bridges and canals, they fall far below the people of Britain. France has no bridges to boast of, any way comparable to those which adorn the cities of London and Westminster.

Except the canal of Languedoc, and that which unites the Seine to the Loire, there were no canals, until lately, of any consequence in France. At present we hear of several, and they seem to be carried on with spirit. It would be difficult to give a description of the canals in England; they are so numerous, and so well constructed. The munificence of the British government, in the present reign, has made *Scotland* the mistress of a canal, of larger dimensions than any other country can boast. The largest canals in Europe can only carry vessels of limited tonnage; but the *Caledonian canal* is calculated for frigates of thirty-two guns. It is carried on with great vigor and judgment, and, when finished, will be a noble remembrance of Britain's present excellent Sovereign.

Few countries are so well provided with suitable implements for executing rural labor as is Great-Britain; and to this circumstance, in a great measure, we may attribute the increased and increasing perfection of her agriculture. She has ploughs of all the different kinds which at any time have been invented; whilst harrows, wheel-carriages, and other common implements of various constructions and dimensions are equally numerous.

But it is in the articles which, strictly speaking, may be called agricultural machinery, that the superiority of Britain is most conspicuous. Drills

for sowing grain and other seeds, have been constructed upon scientific principles; and machines for separating grain from the straw, and for cleaning it from the offal, with which it was intermixed, have been brought to a high degree of perfection.

Imperfect labor is a necessary consequence of defective implements. In former times, the construction of rural machinery was almost entirely left to rude and ignorant artisans, whose operations were guided by no fixed and determinate principle, and with whom any shadow of improvement was altogether out of sight, because every thing of that nature was regarded as superfluous and unnecessary. The principles on which ploughs, and other rural implements should be constructed, have of late been ascertained with mathematical precision; and artisans, in every district, have been enabled to imitate, what they had not genius sufficient to invent.

To Small, Bailey, Meikle, and many other ingenious men, the British public are under great obligations for bringing agricultural machinery to its present perfect state. In consequence of their exertions, labor is executed in a style vastly superior to what was formerly practicable. Owing to more perfect labor, a greater produce is obtained from the earth. This has increased the rent-roll of the proprietors without lessening the welfare or prosperity of the occupiers. In a word, the in-

terest of the state has been, in like manner, promoted, by the increased supply of the necessities of life, furnished in consequence of this labor-improving machinery; without which, neither the manufactures, nor the commerce of Britain could have been so extensively undertaken.

Upon the whole, the British system of agriculture is so good, that, notwithstanding the comparatively small quantity of land employed in the cultivation of wheat, the annual growth of that grain in the United Kingdom is adequate to the usual and ordinary consumption of its inhabitants, as is demonstrated by the experience of the years 1806 and 1807, each of which produced twelve millions of quarters of wheat, being the quantity yearly consumed by the whole British population.

Hence, it is manifest, that the stocks of Poland, of the United States, and of some other grain-bearing countries, which are occasionally imported into Britain, bear so small a proportion to the whole consumption of the British isles, as to do very little more than cause small temporary fluctuations in the money-price of wheat, while their influence is too feeble to be felt, either in increasing or diminishing the wants or the comforts of the inhabitants of Britain. The greatest quantity of wheat ever imported into Britain from the United States of America, in one year, bore to the whole annual consumption of that grain by the British people, only the proportion of *one to forty-seven and a half*.

It did not amount to three hundred thousand quarters. And the proportion of wheat imported from Poland and from some of the grain-bearing districts of Germany, into Britain, in comparison of the whole yearly British consumption, is still less.

CHAPTER. VI.

THE testimony of Mr. Comber, p. 274, and of Mr. M^rArthur, p. 214, 236, 267, is also conclusive as to the very important fact of the present state of the British poor being in every respect, of food, clothing, lodging, and other necessities and comforts, considerably better than at any former period of time, and far superior to the condition of the lower orders of society in every other country in Europe. And yet a strange notion pervades almost all the people of the United States, “that the great mass of the inhabitants of Britain are ground down by the weight of taxation, and the universal distress in all classes of the community, to the lowest possible state of human misery, want, nakedness, and degradation.”

There are some circumstances, arising from the very rapidity of the progress of improvement in Britain, which have contributed to increase the

number of dependants upon the community for support.

Independently of casual cessations of demand for particular species of industry, by which numbers may be deprived of employment, many of the improvements in different branches of British manufactures, being substitutions of mechanical powers for mere human force, have a tendency to diminish the value of that labor which is not accompanied with skill. That kind of labor, indeed, in the exercise of which skill is necessary, and which cannot be supplanted by capital, rises in value; but numbers, either from age, or natural inaptitude, are left behind in the race of industrious competition, and have no other resource than in the voluntary charity or the legal allowance of the community at large.

Such an effect is said to be avoided in China, by uniformly giving the preference to the manual labor of man, over that both of other animals, and of machines. But in addition to limiting the productive powers of a country by such an absurd and senseless custom, the reward of human labor itself, at length, becomes so small, in consequence of the vast and continually increasing number of laboring competitors, as to afford a very beggarly and miserable subsistence to the great body of the people.

The effects arising from these substitutions for human labor, are, however, counteracted, as to

the great body of the laboring orders in Britain, by the more liberal remuneration of labor, by the more rapid increase of the annual produce of the country, and the reciprocity of demand among the employers and the laborers, which results from the general affluence.

In addition to the numbers thus thrown on the community, the various accidents and misfortunes, to which all human beings are liable, may interrupt the exertions of industry, and, in consequence, cut off the means of subsistence. These unfortunate persons are not confined to the laborious classes alone; but many who may have possessed some previous accumulation of capital, and omitted to acquire any species of useful industry, if deprived, by vice or misfortune, of this support, sink into the same class.

In addition to these, there are many, who, from natural indolence, cannot be goaded to exertion; and others, who, from neglected education, and vicious habits early imbibed, are rendered unworthy of trust; besides, the whole of the vagrant, and mendicant tribes, who formerly existed by theft, or precarious benevolence, are now, by the vigilance of the police, confined to their own parishes, thus augmenting the amount of the poor-rates, without increasing the number of the poor.

Yet, notwithstanding this combination of causes, the proportion of British poor is not greater, at

present, than it has been at any former period. In the time of Henry the eighth, the legislature itself acknowledged, that many of the lower orders of the English died from absolute want, in times, remarkable for the regularity of the seasons. And, in the reign of Elizabeth, almost every parish furnished three or four hundred vagrants.

Even in the reign of Charles the second, when industry began to take root in Britain, the poor-rates amounted to £ 665,000, and were probably still higher at the Revolution, at which time, according to Gregory King, the cottagers, paupers and vagrants amounted to one million three hundred and thirty thousand; amongst whom neither laborers, nor out-servants were included; and these two last-mentioned classes were numbered at one million two hundred and seventy-five thousand. The former class, therefore, may be considered as of the same description with those, who now receive alms, in the shape of poor-rates; and composed nearly *one-fourth* of the whole population of England, which was then estimated at five millions five hundred thousand. According to Mr. Playfair's Statistical Tables, the number of English poor receiving relief in the year 1804, amounted to nine hundred thousand; less than *one-tenth* of the present population of England.

This statement, therefore, exhibits a considerable *decrease* in the number of persons in a state of mendicity and poverty, in England, in proportion

to the population, since the Revolution in the year 1688 ; notwithstanding the increase of the poor-rates, nominally ; that is to say, in the amount of the sums annually expended, owing to the necessary depreciation of the value of money, in consequence of the vast and continual influx of wealth into Britain. And the superior manner, in which the British poor are fed, clothed, and lodged, in comparison with the condition of their ancestors in these respects, indicates no decline in the means of subsistence for the lower orders of the people in Britain.

Those authors, who have given such exaggerated statements of the misery of the laboring classes of the British community, in the present age, never once compare their condition, either with that of the same classes of society in the former periods of British history ; or with that of the same classes of society, at present existing in any other part of the world ; but with some ideal standard founded on a preconceived theory, not only unwarranted, but actually contradicted by the whole current of human experience, a theory which they have engendered in their own moon-struck brains, and which excludes the existence of indolence, ignorance, dulness, vice, and misfortune in the world. Or, instead of considering these unfortunate circumstances, as the necessary concomitants of human nature, these ingenious politicians refer their origin to some derangement in the order of

civilized society, to some radical defect in the constitution of all the governments upon earth; or to some other assumed principle, equally unreal, and equally inconsistent with itself.

If brought to the test of comparison and experience, it will be found that the condition of the lower orders of the people in Britain, *at present*, is superior, in the essential articles of food; clothing, and lodging, to that of the same class of society, in any other of the countries of Europe; and also, to that of the same class in Britain, at any former period of her history.

A decisive proof of this assertion is the small proportion of annual deaths in Britain. These are stated by Mr. Malthus to be only one in forty. In 1780, the proportion was one in thirty-six; so that there has been an improved healthiness in the country of ten per cent. in a period of less than thirty years; which, as the lower orders form so large a majority of the whole population, demonstrates a very great melioration in their condition and general happiness.

That a certain number of the members of a community become dependant upon that community for support, arises partly from the causes above-mentioned; and partly from the natural and characteristic improvidence of that class of people, whose activity is, in a great measure, stifled by poverty and ignorance.

This improvidence, no doubt, is greatly increas-

sed by the miserable system of *poor-laws* in England, which at all times promises a certainty of relief to idleness. Scotland and Ireland are not, as yet, cursed with the English method of providing for the poor; and, it is devoutly to be hoped, that they never will.

After the flood of light poured upon this subject by that distinguished political philosopher, Mr. Malthus in his invaluable *Essay on Population*; it would seem superfluous to offer any remarks upon the evil tendencies of the English poor-laws; but as many politicians in the United States affect to deride all the great and important principles laid down by Mr. Malthus, as absurd and visionary, merely because they perceive that, in this country, six millions of human beings are not a redundant population, when spread out upon a superficies of territory, extending two millions of square miles; I shall very briefly notice the fundamental political blunder, on which the poor laws of England rest.

These poor-laws have now, for more than two hundred years past, been proclaiming in the loudest, and most intelligible language, their own pernicious tendencies to cut up by the roots all the active industry of the laboring orders of the community. I pass over the various acts of the English Parliament, relating to this subject, made in the times of Henry the seventh, Henry the eighth, Edward the sixth, and Philip and Mary;

and shall only notice that made in the reign of Elizabeth.

The 43d Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, ordains, that the overseers of each parish, shall find materials and work for the children of *all* those who cannot maintain their own offspring; and also, for *all* persons, married or unmarried, having no money to maintain them, and using no ordinary or daily trade by which to get their living; and also to find food and raiment for *all* the impotent poor, who cannot find it for themselves.

But, surely, this statute cannot effect impossibilities; an English act of Parliament can never work a miracle. The position is now for ever settled by Mr. Malthus, who draws his proofs from the observation and the recorded experience of all ages, that the principle of population always outruns the means of subsistence; that man has a power of multiplying his species far surpassing in rapidity and force the capacity of the earth to produce food; that population increases in a geometrical, while the means of subsistence increase only in an arithmetical ratio.

It is also manifest, that the mass of population in any given country, must always be measured and limited by the quantity of food in that country; for, where there are no means of subsistence, people must die. And yet the statute of Elizabeth requires, that work, materials, and food shall be provided for *all* the poor that

want these things. As if the overseers of an English parish could create work and materials where there was no effectual demand for them; or could manufacture food when it did not exist in the kingdom.

What is this but holding up a high bounty for the production of a greater population than the country can actually maintain; whence the consequent increase of the bills of mortality, by penury, disease, and all the complicated miseries of famine? The English poor are thus prevented from being taught this most important truth; that *no* individual human being, who cannot maintain a wife and family, has any business with them; has any right to entail them as additional incumbrances on the community; whence, without the least exercise of reflection or calculation, they proceed to augment the mass of beggarly population, to an extent far beyond that which the country can properly support; far beyond the power of the land to produce the full means of subsistence for them, because the Legislature has told them, that they may produce any number of unnecessary and superfluous children they please, and the parish shall be compelled to provide them with food and covering.

Depopulation, says Lord Kames, in his *Sketches of the History of Man*, vol. 3. p. 76, 107—inequality in the price of labor, and extravagant wages are deplorable evils. But the English poor-

laws are productive of evils still more deplorable: they are subversive both of morality and industry.

Fear of want is the only effectual motive to industry with the laboring poor; remove that fear, and they cease to be industrious. The ruling passion of those who live by bodily labor, is, to save a pittance for their children, and for supporting themselves in their old age: stimulated by the desire of accomplishing these ends, they are frugal and industrious, and the prospect of success is to them a continual feast.

Now, what worse can malice invent against such a man, under color of friendship, than to secure bread to him and to his children, whenever he takes a dislike to work; which effectually deadens his sole ambition, and with it, his honest industry? Relying on the certainty of a provision against want, he relaxes gradually till he sinks into idleness; idleness leads to profligacy; profligacy begets diseases; and the wretch becomes an object of *public* charity before he has run half his course.

Such are the genuine effects of the English tax for the poor, under a mistaken notion of charity. There never was known in any country a scheme for the poor more contradictory to sound policy. Might it not have been foreseen, that to a groveling creature, who has no sense of honor, and scarcely any of shame, the certainty of maintenance would

prove an irresistible temptation to idleness and debauchery?

Wisely, therefore, is it ordered by Providence, that charity should, in every instance, be *voluntary*; to prevent the idle and profligate from depending upon it for support. I am indeed aware, that during the reign of Elizabeth, some legal compulsion on the public might be necessary to preserve the English poor from starving. Her father, Henry the eighth, had sequestered all the hospitals, a hundred and ten in number, and squandered their revenues; he had also demolished all the abbeys. By these means the poor of England were reduced to a miserable condition; especially as private charity, from want of exercise, was at a low ebb.

That critical juncture required help from the Legislature; and a temporary provision for the poor would have been a proper measure; so contrived as not to supersede, but rather to promote voluntary charity. Unlucky is it for England, that such a measure was overlooked; but Queen Elizabeth and her Parliaments had not the talent of foreseeing consequences without the aid of experience. A perpetual tax, the most pernicious ever imposed in any country, was therefore laid on for the provision of the poor.

Yet, notwithstanding the existence of this great national curse in England, it is obvious to every impartial observer, that the proportion which the

industrious classes in Britain at present obtain of the whole annual produce of the community, is *much larger* than that which they enjoyed previous to the improvements that have, within these last thirty years, been produced in the country by the progress of commerce, and the consequent diffusion of knowledge ; and their condition is become both *positively* and *relatively* improved.

For it is a general maxim, admitting but few exceptions, that every nation, taken collectively, is happy in proportion to its industry ; and the number of the industrious classes in a commercial state is in general the greater proportion to the whole number ; but in Britain these classes are more numerous in proportion to the whole population, than in any other state in Europe, and than they ever were in any former period of the British history.

The resources of Britain are chiefly derived from the labor and industry of its inhabitants. The active classes are the principal sinews of a nation in peace and war ; and in no country in the world is more attention paid (with the exception of the English poor-tax) to their comforts and happiness than in Britain. In France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, there have always been less labor and industry, and, consequently, a greater proportion of wretchedness, than in the British isles.

It is a notorious fact, that within the last thirty years, the number of industrious or laboring clas-

ses of the community in Britain has increased in a greater proportion than have the other classes, which constitute the remainder of the British population. The number in the middle and higher classes forms a very small proportion to the whole number of the laboring and industrious portion of the community ; and as labor is much better paid in Britain than elsewhere in Europe, it may be fairly inferred that the British enjoy a greater degree of national happiness than any other European people.

In most of the states of Europe asylums are provided for the poor ; but in no country so liberally as in Britain. The money annually destined to the alleviation of the distresses of the English poor alone, exceeds twelve millions of pounds sterling. This sum includes the relief of the various objects of charity, parochial and private, voluntary contributions, asylums, hospitals, charity-schools, &c. &c.

And, although the depraved morals of the English poor, in the present, compared with those of former ages, are the constant theme of vulgar declamation ; yet, if we recur to historical facts, we shall find the charge to be as false as it is common. In the sixteenth century, during the reign of Henry the eighth, a period of thirty-six years, seventy-two thousand thieves and rogues, besides other malefactors, were hanged in England ; making, on an average, about two thousand offenders executed each year during this monarch's reign.

In Queen Elizabeth's reign, between three and four hundred malefactors were hanged each year, for theft and robbery. But in the present reign, upon an average, not more than fifty each year have been hanged for these crimes, in all the British isles ; yet the population of all Britain is now more than quadruple that which England possessed in Elizabeth's time. And in no country under the cope of Heaven, are the laws, as they are now administered, more mild and well-defined ; in no country are the judges of the tribunals more independent and upright than in Britain.

I would just notice, that great pains are taken, by certain politicians in this country, to induce their more uninformed brethren to believe that the people in Britain are continually harassed with criminal prosecutions for a vast variety of species of treason ; and that capital punishments are multiplied there beyond all example in the history of the world ; but the notorious fact is that criminal prosecutions and capital punishments have become extremely rare of late years in Britain, in comparison with the former periods of her history, and with the practice ancient and modern of all the other countries in Europe.

Americans would more consult their reputation for prudence if they were to talk less of the " odious examples of frequent executions for treason " in Britain *previous* to the reign of her present monarch ; because all those laws and all those execu-

tions existed when the ancestors of the present natives of the United States *boasted* of their attachment to the British Crown, and demanded no greater happiness than to have the unimpaired privileges of British subjects under British law.

All that I mean to prove is, that *at present* the condition of the people in Britain is far better in every respect than is perpetually represented by men in this country, who ought not be uninformed upon this subject, and who betray the weakness of their cause by incessantly pointing the battery of their abuse against the earlier and ruder ages of the British government. As for those imported traitors who in this country assume the name of patriots, and measure their excellence by the frantic zeal with which they revile the people, the government, the laws, the morals, and the religion of Britain, I shall only say, in the words of an acute Scottishman—"It is no new thing under the sun for rogues to be afraid of the gallows."

CHAPTER VII.

THE mines of tin, copper, iron, &c. and the fisheries of the British empire, add greatly to her productive industry and wealth ; but for want of suf-

ficient documents, I am unable to state their precise value.

Yet one circumstance, which confers upon Britain wide and ample sources of national wealth and prosperity, and in which she far surpasses all the other nations of Europe, must not pass entirely without notice. I mean the full supply of subterranean fuel within her own territorial boundaries; which at once enables her to administer to the comfort of her people, and to carry on her system of manufactures to an extent, and with a success, unparralleled in the history of the world.

On the continent of Europe, wood is chiefly used for fuel, to the great inconvenience and detriment of its inhabitants; who are by this, as well as other circumstances, prevented from establishing and keeping up large and extensive manufactories, owing to the difficulty of conveying this kind of fuel to any given spot, after the neighboring forests have been once cleared away.

In Britain, wood for fuel cannot be furnished in any great quantities; its supply being altogether impracticable, owing to the comparatively small proportion of wood-land, the vast population, and the high state of agriculture in the country. Her inexhaustible coal mines, however, more than supply her want of wood, and give her a national superiority as to an easily acquired, and cheap article of fuel, an effectual mode of breeding a vast body of hardy and dexterous seamen

and a sure source of extending her manufactures and commerce; which no other country on the globe at present possesses.

The immense and continually increasing national wealth of Britain, and her consequent ability to bear her present burden of taxation, without incurring that universal bankruptcy and ruin, which the French politicians, and their partisans, all over the world, loudly predict, and incessantly desire, will appear from the following facts, stated by Mr. M'Arthur, beginning at page 46th of his valuable and important work:

“From all the foregoing results, as to the state of British Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce, obvious to every one conversant with the common rules of arithmetic, and disposed to make the calculation, it is manifest, that the wealth and resources of Britain, in this essential point of view, have been progressively increasing, during the last century, *in a greater ratio* than her taxes. And from the above-mentioned causes, as well as the effects resulting from the comparative value of labor, provisions, improvements in agriculture, and manufactures, the subjects of the British empire, with a very few exceptions, *feel less*, at this moment, the various burdens imposed upon them, than did their predecessors at the beginning of the eighteenth century.”

If any doubt, as to the truth of this assertion, yet remain, perhaps it will be removed by a perusal

of the following tables, exhibiting the public revenue and expenditure of Britain, during the last century, computed on a medium of every seven years, together with the supplies, and ways and means; and also the *official* (which is above *seventy per cent.* below the *real*,) value of British imports and exports; and the balance of trade for every year of the eighteenth century.

State of the public revenue from the year 1700 to 1800 inclusive, computed on the medium of every seven years; and also the amount of Loans for the same period.

YEARS.	HEADS OF ORDINARY REVENUE.	<i>Annual medium of seven years.</i>	AMOUNT OF LOANS.
1700 to 1707	Annual average amount of customs, excise, stamps, land-tax, miscellaneous taxes, including salt, post-office, &c. for seven years, from Michaelmas 1700 to Michaelmas 1707, inclusive,	£ 5,011,770	£ 24,952,545
	Annual average amount of do. to 1714,	4,419,111	34,900,609
	Do. do. to 1721,	5,629,004	00,000,000
	Do. do. to 1728,	5,059,000	2,832,093
	Do. do. to 1735,	5,224,961	1,800,000
	Do. do. to 1742,	5,911,128	2,600,000
	Do. do. to 1749,	6,290,422	22,302,472
	Do. do. to 1756,	6,481,946	6,100,000
	Do. do. to 1763,	7,540,065	7,313,553
	Do. do. to 1770,	9,314,285	4,900,000
	Do. do. to 1777,	10,395,687	7,000,000
	Do. do. to 1784,	12,013,747	68,500,000
	Do. do. to 1791,	15,732,561	1,002,500
	Do. do. to 1798,	21,434,000	100,500,000
	Do. do. to 1799,	34,707,906	18,000,000
	Do. do. to 1800,	36,728,000	20,500,000

The amount of the permanent and temporary taxes in Britain, for the year 1800, was estimated at £ 36,728,000, namely,

The gross receipt of the permanent Revenue, after deducting repayments for over-entries, drawbacks, and bounties, amounted in the year, ending the 5th of July, 1800, to £ 28,238,000

The tax on income, estimated at 7,000,000

Tax on imports and exports 1,250,000,

Expected additional produce of taxes

for 1800 240,000

Total £ 36,728,000

By adding the loans, sums raised by lottery, and other extraordinary resources, to the ordinary revenue, the public income of Britain is ascertained.

General view of the public expenditure in Britain from the year 1700 to 1800 inclusive; computed on the medium of every seven years, with the particular amounts of the two last years of the century :—

The average per annum, of expenditure, army, navy, civil list, ordnance, miscellaneous service, interest of debts, &c. from 1700 to 1707, inclusive, £ 5,765,173

Annual Medium for
seven years.

To 1714	10,087,079
1721	6,283,048
1728	11,715,455
1735	6,215,310
1742	9,151,422
1749	9,910,433
1756	6,900,477
1763	17,885,328
1770	13,139,600
1777	14,117,992
1784	21,210,398
1791	13,181,326
1798	30,440,398

Sum of mediums £ 176,003,440

Which multiplied by 7, gives the 7

total amount of British public expenditure from 1700 to

1798, inclusive, £ 1,232,024,080

1799. Amount of expenditure for one year, to 5th of Janu-

ary, 1800, £ 54,566,306

1800. Do. for the year 1800, 64,438,427

Total British public expenditure for one hundred years, .

£ 1,351,028,813

The heads of public expenditure in Britain, for the year 1800, were interest of public funded debt, charges of management, and sinking fund, after deducting interest payable by Ireland, 19,307,000

Interest on Stock created by Loans,	962,000
Do. on Exchequer-bills,	1,021,626
The Civil List,	898,000
Other charges on Consolidated Funds,	239,297
Civil government of Scotland, pen- sions on hereditary revenue, militia and deserters' warrants, bounties, &c.	647,183
Charges of management of the Reve- nue,	1,779,769

Total £ 24,854,875

Supplies voted for the year 1800, in-
cluding advance to Ireland, vote of
credit for probable contingencies,
and interest for Imperial Loan, . 39,583,552

Total expenditure for 1800, £ 64,438,427

The following table exhibits the *official* value of imports and exports, and *apparent* balance of trade, distinguishing the official value of West India imports into Britain; for upwards of 100 years.

N. B. The rates of value in the office of the British Inspector General were established in the year 1697; and as no alterations have since taken place, although the money-prices in the market

have been progressively rising, the *real* now exceeds the *official* value of British imports and exports, in the proportion of one hundred and seventy-one to one hundred; that is to say, by *seventy-one per cent.*

Periods.	Years	Imports.	Exports.	Balance.	West-India im- ports.
		£	£	£	£
<i>Peace.</i>	1697	3,482,586	3,525,906	43,320	
	1698	4,732,360	6,522,104	1,789,844	629,533
	1699	5,707,669	6,788,166	1,080,497	586,255
	1700	5,970,175	7,302,716	1,332,541	824,246
	1701	5,869,606	7,621,053	1,751,447	738,601
	1702	4,159,304	5,235,874	1,076,570	476,168
	1703	4,526,596	6,644,103	2,117,507	626,488
	1704	5,383,200	6,552,019	1,169,819	489,906
	1705	4,031,649	5,501,677	1,470,028	706,574
	1706	4,113,933	6,512,086	2,398,153	537,744
<i>War.</i>	1707	4,274,055	6,767,178	2,493,123	604,889
	1708	4,698,663	6,969,098	2,270,426	592,750
	1709	4,510,593	6,627,045	2,116,452	645,689
	1710	4,011,341	6,690,828	2,679,487	780,505
	1711	4,685,785	6,447,170	1,761,385	556,198
	1712	4,454,682	7,468,857	3,014,175	648,190
	1713	5,811,077	7,352,655	1,541,578	762,248
	1714	5,929,227	8,361,638	2,432,411	843,390
	1715	5,640,943	7,379,409	1,738,466	999,412
	1716	5,800,258	7,614,085	1,813,827	1,104,188
<i>Peace.</i>	1717	6,346,768	9,147,700	2,800,932	1,204,057
	1718	6,669,390	8,255,302	1,585,912	896,031
	1719	5,267,499	7,709,528	2,342,079	875,858
	1720	6,090,083	7,936,728	1,846,645	1,117,576
	1721	5,768,510	8,681,200	2,912,790	852,529
	1722	6,378,098	9,650,789	3,272,691	1,015,617
	1723	6,505,676	9,489,811	2,984,135	1,087,254
	1724	7,394,405	9,143,356	1,748,951	1,160,568
	1725	7,094,708	11,325,480	4,230,772	1,359,185
	1726	6,677,865	9,406,731	2,728,866	1,222,511
<i>War.</i>	1727	6,798,908	9,553,043	2,854,135	1,039,513
	1728	7,569,299	11,631,383	4,062,084	1,498,023

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>	<i>Balance.</i>	<i>West-India im- ports.</i>
		£	£	£	£
<i>Peace.</i>	1729	7,540,620	11,475,771	3,935,151	1,515,451
	1730	7,780,019	11,974,135	4,194,116	1,571,608
	1731	6,991,500	11,167,380	4,175,880	1,310,580
	1732	7,087,914	11,786,658	4,698,744	1,315,458
	1733	8,016,814	11,777,306	3,760,492	1,618,013
	1734	7,095,861	11,000,645	3,904,784	1,141,068
	1735	8,160,184	13,544,144	5,383,960	1,460,609
	1736	7,307,966	11,616,356	4,308,390	1,423,039
	1737	7,073,638	11,842,320	4,762,682	946,423
	1738	7,438,960	12,289,495	4,850,535	1,475,610
<i>War.</i>	1739	7,829,373	9,495,366	1,665,993	1,566,838
	1740	6,703,778	8,869,939	2,166,161	1,185,107
	1741	7,936,084	11,469,872	3,533,788	1,402,986
	1742	6,866,864	11,584,427	4,717,563	1,309,886
	1743	7,802,353	14,623,653	6,821,300	1,404,510
	1744	6,362,971	11,429,628	5,066,657	1,156,952
	1745	7,847,123	10,497,329	2,650,206	1,024,097
	1746	6,205,687	11,360,792	5,155,105	1,148,124
	1747	7,116,757	11,442,049	5,325,292	941,116
	1748	8,136,408	12,351,432	4,215,024	1,615,122
<i>Peace.</i>	1749	7,917,804	14,099,366	6,181,562	1,478,075
	1750	7,772,039	15,132,004	7,359,965	1,514,452
	1751	7,943,436	13,967,811	6,024,375	1,444,775
	1752	7,889,369	13,221,116	5,331,747	1,428,824
	1753	8,625,029	14,264,614	5,639,585	1,838,137
	1754	8,093,472	13,396,853	5,303,381	1,462,601
	1755	9,238,276	12,717,832	3,479,556	1,867,256
	1756	8,442,027	13,143,689	4,701,662	1,687,177
	1757	9,873,153	14,266,861	4,393,708	1,906,147
	1758	9,074,190	15,866,251	6,792,061	1,858,425
<i>War.</i>	1759	9,528,864	15,637,696	6,108,832	1,833,646
	1760	10,683,595	16,665,278	5,981,683	1,861,668
	1761	10,292,541	17,531,675	7,239,134	1,953,622
	1762	9,579,160	15,132,258	5,553,098	1,762,406
	1763	12,568,927	17,251,617	4,682,690	2,254,231
	1764	11,250,660	17,756,331	6,505,671	2,391,552
	1765	11,812,144	15,721,374	3,909,230	2,196,549
	1766	12,456,764	15,188,668	2,731,904	2,704,114
	1767	13,097,153	15,090,001	1,992,848	2,690,673
	1768	13,115,309	16,620,132	3,504,823	2,942,717

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>	<i>Balance.</i>	<i>West-India im- ports.</i>
		£	£	£	£
<i>Peace.</i>	1769	13,134,090	14,401,289	1,267,199	2,686,714
	1770	13,430,298	15,994,571	2,564,273	2,110,026
	1771	14,218,324	19,018,480	4,800,156	2,979,378
	1772	14,508,715	17,720,168	3,211,453	3,538,082
	1773	12,522,643	16,375,430	3,852,787	2,902,407
	1774	14,549,914	17,288,486	2,738,572	3,574,702
	1775	14,815,855	16,326,363	1,510,508	3,688,795
	1776	12,443,429	14,755,698	2,312,269	3,340,949
	1777	12,643,833	13,491,006	847,173	2,840,802
	1778	10,975,533	12,253,890	1,278,357	3,059,922
<i>War.</i>	1779	11,435,264	13,530,702	2,095,438	2,836,489
	1780	11,664,967	13,554,093	1,889,126	2,612,236
	1781	12,722,862	11,332,295		2,023,546
	1782	10,341,628	13,009,458	2,657,830	2,612,910
	1783	13,122,235	14,681,494	1,559,259	2,820,387
	1784	15,272,672	15,101,276		3,531,705
	1785	16,279,418	16,770,228	490,810	4,400,956
	1786	15,786,072	16,300,725	514,653	3,484,025
	1787	17,804,024	18,296,166	492,142	3,758,087
	1788	18,027,170	18,124,082	96,912	4,307,866
<i>Peace.</i>	1789	17,821,202	20,014,298	2,193,096	3,917,301
	1790	19,130,596	20,120,120	989,524	3,854,204
	1791	19,600,000	22,731,994	3,131,994	3,651,611
	1792	19,128,585	24,905,200	5,776,615	4,128,047
	1793	19,256,000	20,390,000	1,134,000	4,339,613
	1794	22,288,000	26,734,000	4,446,000	5,294,742
	1795	22,736,000	27,312,000	4,576,000	4,645,972
	1796	23,187,000	30,518,000	7,331,000	4,541,217
	1797	21,013,000	28,917,000	7,904,000	5,173,069
	1798	29,275,760	33,591,777	6,316,017	6,390,658
<i>War.</i>	1799	26,837,432	35,991,392	9,153,960	7,456,983
	1800	29,945,808	35,990,000	6,044,192	8,136,453

In the year 1781, the imports of Britain exceeded her exports by £ 1,390,567; and in the year 1784, by £ 171,396. In the year 1781, a great part of the capital of the British merchants was

suddenly withdrawn from trade, owing to the great speculations, and vast losses, of some notorious individuals, which for a time impaired that mutual confidence, which is the very life's blood of all commerce. The greatest apparent balance of trade, in favor of Britain, in the eighteenth century, during peace, was in the year 1750, amounting to £ 7,359,965 ; and the greatest balance during war, arose in the year 1799 amounting to £ 9,153,960.

By a reference to Sir William Young's common-place book, p. 86, 87, 88, we shall find that the annual value of the imports from the British West-Indies into the mother-country, at present, amounts, on an average, to seventeen millions sterling ; of which sum five millions yearly are paid into the public treasury, namely, the duty on sugar three millions ; on rum, one million five hundred thousand pounds ; and on the lesser commodities, five hundred thousand pounds. Of the remaining twelve millions, eight go in payment of the British manufactures exported ; while the other four millions are appropriated to the homeward freight and the mercantile charges. See Mr. Lowe's Inquiry into the State of the British West-Indies, p. 12, published in London, in the year 1807.

An account of the British Supplies and Ways and Means, during the eighteenth century.

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual Sup- plies.</i>	<i>Annual Ways and Means.</i>
		£	£
<i>Peace.</i>	1700	2,886,536	2,620,000
	1701	4,380,045	6,913,628
	1702	3,535,457	3,887,630
	1703	4,005,369	4,200,000
	1704	4,717,488	4,914,888
	1705	5,075,761	5,282,232
<i>War.</i>	1706	5,941,841	6,142,381
	1707	5,926,849	6,189,067
	1708	6,563,138	6,868,839
	1709	6,425,268	6,895,552
	1710	14,370,744	16,246,325
	1711	6,671,386	6,304,615
	1712	3,520,072	3,400,000
	1713	3,062,379	3,100,000
<i>Peace the 11th of A- pril, 1713.</i>	1714	3,282,223	7,317,751
	1715	2,053,363	
	1716	3,697,767	3,211,313
	1717	2,644,437	2,229,514
<i>War with Spain.</i>	1718	2,989,109	2,735,509
	1719	2,623,537	2,742,000
	1720	2,738,156	2,920,264
	1721	2,923,108	2,719,412
	1722	1,935,054	1,837,799
<i>Peace, June 1721</i>	1723	1,863,888	1,730,744
	1724	1,823,229	1,782,212
	1725	2,978,954	3,282,328
	1726	2,895,305	3,175,287

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual Sup- plies.</i>	<i>Annual Ways and Means.</i>
		£	£
<i>Peace.</i>	1727	5,392,966	5,544,594
	1728	3,224,699	3,540,478
	1729	3,345,190	3,530,766
	1730	2,752,833	3,826,825
	1731	2,784,705	2,883,180
	1732	3,004,926	2,887,943
	1733	3,870,230	3,989,689
	1734	3,150,452	3,269,000
	1735	3,225,903	3,380,565
	1736	3,025,172	3,269,000
	1737	3,444,246	3,769,000
	1738	2,633,328	2,908,506
<i>War with Spain, 19th October, 1759, and with France 15th March 1744.</i>	1739	3,874,076	4,097,831
	1740	5,017,651	5,039,102
	1741	5,723,537	6,188,065
	1742	5,912,483	6,119,157
	1743	6,283,537	6,624,065
	1744	6,462,902	6,609,310
	1745	7,088,353	7,303,065
	1746	9,402,978	9,400,574
	1747	10,059,104	10,088,065
	1748	8,082,409	8,018,007
<i>Peace, 7th October, 1748.</i>	1749	4,014,136	4,313,730
	1750	4,969,365	5,175,023
	1751	3,907,435	4,178,459
	1752	2,132,707	2,422,911
	1753	2,797,916	3,077,897
	1754	4,073,779	4,256,909
	1755	7,229,117	7,427,261
<i>War.</i>	1756	8,350,325	8,689,051
	1757	10,486,447	11,079,722
	1758	12,749,860	12,991,240

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual Supplies.</i>	<i>Annual Ways and Means.</i>
		£	£
<i>War.</i>	1759	15,503,564	16,130,561
	1760	19,616,119	19,953,922
	1761	18,299,153	18,655,750
	1762	13,522,040	14,199,375
	1763	13,522,039	14,199,373
	1764	7,712,562	7,759,574
	1765	7,763,090	7,783,068
	1766	8,273,280	8,558,824
	1767	8,527,728	8,753,256
<i>Peace.</i>	1768	8,335,740	8,754,626
	1769	6,909,003	7,208,312
	1770	7,455,042	7,794,224
	1771	7,158,779	7,639,782
	1772	7,186,253	7,222,593
	1773	6,980,216	7,539,360
	1774	6,159,661	6,546,108
	1775	6,559,246	6,559,246
	1776	9,097,577	9,154,230
<i>War.</i>	1777	12,895,543	12,952,534
	1778	14,345,497	14,378,567
	1779	15,729,654	15,729,915
	1780	21,196,496	21,382,249
	1781	25,373,524	25,353,857
	1782	24,261,477	24,244,373
	1783	19,788,863	20,009,236
	1784	11,988,174	12,957,520
	1785	9,736,868	10,436,668
<i>Peace in 1783.</i>	1786	13,420,962	13,900,992
	1787	12,414,579	12,931,855
	1788	11,860,263	11,886,600
	1789	11,293,036	11,639,831
	1790	11,931,201	12,496,088

<i>Periods.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual Supplies.</i>	<i>Annual Ways and Means.</i>
		£	£
<i>Peace in</i>	{ 1791	14,064,606	14,881,634
	{ 1792	11,138,813	11,503,995
	{ 1793	16,698,553	16,157,436
	{ 1794	20,228,119	20,419,508
	{ 1795	29,307,265	29,903,541
<i>War.</i>	{ 1796	37,588,502	38,030,000
	{ 1797	44,781,262	41,816,250
	{ 1798	35,028,798	33,980,672
	{ 1799	44,782,923	42,738,577
	{ 1800	39,500,000	39,500,000

Heads under which the Supplies and Ways and Means of the year 1799 were classed.

Supplies.

Navy,	£ 13,654,013
Army,	7,277,319
Militia and Fencible Corps, . .	4,532,435
Ordnance,	1,570,827
Miscellaneous services, . . .	6,105,310
Reduction of national debt, . .	200,000
Exchequer bills,	8,443,017
Vote of credit,	3,000,000

Total amount of Supplies

for 1799 £ 44,782,922

Ways and Means for 1799.

Annual grants of certain duties	
on sugar malt, tobacco, &c.	£ 2,750,000
Extraordinary aids by loans,	18,500,000
Exchequer bills,	17,000,000
Surplus of consolidated fund	521,000
Lottery	703,541
Further application out of the monies of the surplus of consolidated fund,	3,229,000
Remaining in the hands of the Pay-Master General of the Forces,	34,145

Total amount of Ways and
Means for 1799, . . . £ 42,738,577

Supplies for the year 1800.

Navy,	£ 13,619,079
Army,	11,350,079
Ordnance,	1, 695,958
Miscellaneous services,	750,000
Interest due to the bank,	816,650
Deficiency of Ways and Means,	447,089
To pay off exchequer bills,	2,906,250
Do. aids and contributions,	1,079,730
Do. supply	1,194,000

Reduction of national debt,	£ 200,000
Subsidies,	3,000,000
	<hr/>
	£ 37,778,785
For unforeseen services	1,771,215
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	£ 39,500,000
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The following Table shews that the increased revenue of Britain, in the year 1799, arising from the amount of old and new taxes, annual profits on the land-tax then redeemed, East India participation, and Lottery, would exceed by £ 1,330,000, the estimate of the annual expenditure of the British peace establishment, as stated by the Select Committee on Finance, in the year 1791, as well as the amount of annual charges incurred during the war by loans and funding, and all the increased charges thereunto incident.

Amount of old taxes in the year,	
ending 10th October, 1799, .	£ 15,245,000
Taxes imposed during the war, in-	
cluding £ 62,000 annual profit on	
land-tax,	8,301,000
Land and malt-tax, East-India parti-	
cipation, and Lottery,	3,308,000
	<hr/>
Total,	£ 26,854,000
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Charges incurred during the war by loans and funding, also increased charges of the sinking and consoli- dated funds,	£ 16,000,000
Additional charges, in consequence of the augmented pay, and provi- sions of the navy and army, &c.	9,524,000
Total,	£ 25,524,000
Excess of income,	£ 1,330,000

CHAPTER. VIII.

AN unerring criterion of the wealth and prosperity of a nation is derived from the low rate of interest on money, and the increased value of land. In Britain, a hundred years since, the rate of interest was from eight to ten per cent. and landed property fetched a purchase-money of from fifteen to eighteen years. But now, the British government can borrow money at an interest of less than five per cent. Mr. Pitt, in the year 1800, raised a loan of eighteen and a half millions, at the rate of four and three quarters per cent. and landed property

in Britain is now sold at from twenty-eight to thirty years purchase.

By a purchase-money of so many years I mean the annual rent of land multiplied by so many years ; for instance, a given landed estate produces an annual rent of five hundred pounds ; if the purchase-money of this estate amount to ten years, it will be worth five thousand pounds : if to twenty years it will be valued at ten thousand pounds, and so on. When the purchase-price of land is low it yields a large interest for the capital laid out ; and when the price is high the stock employed yields a small return of interest.

In the middle ages, when commerce was fettered and restrained throughout Europe, most exorbitant interest was demanded. In the fourteenth century, A. D. 1311, Philip the fourth fixed the interest which might be legally exacted in the fairs of Champagne, at twenty per cent. James the first, of Scotland, A. D. 1242, fixed it by law at eighteen per cent. In the year 1490, the interest of money in Placentia was at forty per cent. Lodovico Guicciardini says, that Charles the fifth of Germany fixed the rate of interest in his dominions in the Low Countries at twelve per cent. and at the time when Guicciardini wrote, about the year 1560, it was common to exact more than that sum. The high rate of interest on money is alone a proof, that the profits on commerce

were exorbitant, and that trade was not carried on to any great extent.

Lowness of interest, Mr. Hume remarks, proceeds from three circumstances, namely, the small demand for borrowing; great riches to supply that demand; and small profits arising from commerce. These circumstances are all connected together, and proceed from the increase of industry and trade. Lowness of interest therefore raises the value of land; and the converse of this proposition is equally true; namely, that a high rate of interest depresses the price of landed property.

The mode in which the low rate of interest raises the price of land, and conversely; and the circumstances under which a low rate of interest, namely, in combination with the high price of land and the low profits of stock, is a conclusive proof of national prosperity; are thus explained by Doctor Smith, in his *Wealth of Nations*, 1st vol. p. 66, 70, 129, and 2d vol. p. 122, and by Mr. Hume in his *Essay on Interest*, vol. 1, p. 315.

As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords demand a rent for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the laborer only the trouble of gathering them, come to him now with an additional price fixed upon them. He must pay for the license to gather them; and must give up to the

landlord a portion of what his labor either collects or produces. This portion, or what comes to the same thing, the price of this portion constitutes the *rent* of land ; and in the price of the greater part of commodities it makes a third component part.

The real value of all the different component parts of price is measured by the quantity of labor which they can, each of them, purchase or command. Labor measures the value not only of that part of price which resolves itself into labor, but of that which resolves itself into rent, and of that which resolves itself into profit.

In every society the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into some one or other, or all of these three parts ; and in every improved society all the three enter more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far greater portion of commodities. In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord ; another pays the wages or maintenance of the laborers and laboring cattle employed in producing it ; and the third part pays the living profit of the farmer.

The ordinary market-price of land depends every where upon the ordinary market-rate of interest. The person who has a capital from which he wishes to derive a revenue, without the trouble of employing it himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with his money or lend it out at interest.

The superior security of land, together with some other advantages which almost every where attend upon this species of property, will generally dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from land, than he could gain by lending his money out at interest.

These advantages however are only sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; and if the rent of land should fall short of the interest of money by a greater difference, no one would buy land, which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the contrary, if the advantages should much more than compensate the difference, every one would buy land, which again would soon raise its ordinary price.

When interest was at ten per cent. land was commonly sold for ten and twelve years purchase. As interest sunk to six, five, and four per cent. the price of land rose to twenty, five-and-twenty, and thirty year's purchase. Before the French revolution, the market rate of interest was higher in France than in England, and the common price of land lower. In England it was commonly sold, as it now is, at thirty, and in France at twenty years purchase.

At present, in 1809, land in France fetches a purchase-money of only ten or twelve years; and I am assured, on the authority of a most respectable American merchant, lately returned from Paris, that money may be had in that city at a

rate of interest so low as three or four per cent. since the British Orders in Council have destroyed the French trade ; but that before the full operation of those Orders was felt, namely, so late as the beginning of the year 1808, money at Paris bore an interest of from ten to fifteen per cent.

This apparent paradox depends, I imagine, upon the total annihilation of French commerce throwing the small pittance of capital now in France nearly or altogether out of employment ; whence the capitalists being able to raise no revenue from their stock, are willing to let it out even at a low rate of interest rather than suffer it to lie quite idle, and produce no return of profit.

From not taking into consideration, that lowness of interest must be connected with a high price of land, and with small profits on stock, in order to exhibit the proof of national prosperity, many politicians in the United States now adduce the present low rate of interest in France as conclusive of her great internal prosperity ; forgetting at the same time to state that the price of her land is very low, and the profits of the little stock which she can employ are enormously high ; the most evident demonstration of the miserable and beggarly state of all her people.

There is another mistake respecting the condition of France, which is also very freely travelling over the union. The American merchants and captains of vessels on their return to this country uni-

formly report that there is a great quantity of *specie*, and scarcely any *paper-money* circulating in France, "and therefore," say the class of politicians to whom I allude, "since France has plenty of money in coin and no paper, and since Britain has no money in specie and large quantities of paper-currency, France is richer than Britain."—
Q. E. D.

This very palpable *non-sequitur* originates in an extreme unacquaintance with the most obvious truths, and the very fundamental principles of political economy.

The substitution of paper-money in the room of specie is evidently one of those great improvements which necessarily takes place in a country where credit and confidence are established by a steady and equitable administration of justice, protecting private property, and giving scope to commercial enterprise. It substitutes a cheap for a dear instrument, with which to carry on the operations of trade; it leaves a larger quantity of specie to be employed in those branches of foreign commerce where specie is absolutely necessary; it abridges time and labor, and thus facilitates and quickens commercial transactions; since a check for a hundred thousand dollars might be signed in a minute, whereas it would consume a whole day to count out this sum in specie.

Accordingly those nations which are best governed, which have the most internal liberty com

bined with the most extensive commercial enterprise, use the least quantity of specie, and the most paper-currency in their transactions. In Britain and in the United States, the only two countries in the world where there are any pretensions to a regular administration of justice, the merchants trade on credit, because they have sufficient confidence in each other's integrity, and in the justice of the laws of the respective countries that they will enforce the payment of just debts. But among the French, Italians, and Spaniards, here is little or no commercial credit.

But commercial credit is the origin and support of paper-money; whence in Britain, where commercial credit stands higher than any where else, specie is less frequently seen in circulation; and paper-money constitutes nearly the whole medium of exchange in that country. In the United States, whose commerce, before it was destroyed by the embargo, laid on in December 1807, was next in extent and importance to that of Britain, there was proportionally rather more specie in circulation than in Britain; but if the trade of this country should ever revive, and be increased beyond its former size, specie will be more and more withdrawn from the market, and paper-currency will supply its place.

In the British dominions bordering on the union, namely, in Canada, Nova Scotia, and New-Brunswick, before the American embargo had laid the

axe to the root of all the commerce in the United States, gold and silver were the common currency, and little or no paper-money was to be seen; but now that the embargo has poured a vast and a continually increasing flood of trade and wealth into those colonies of Britain, banks begin to be established, and paper money to be substituted for specie.

Will the politicians whose inferences I am now combating, conclude from these facts, that the British American colonies were richer than the United States because before the embargo they had more specie, and less paper-money? and also that these colonies, since the embargo has so incalculably augmented their trade and capital, are poorer than they were before, because they have now less gold and silver and more paper-money in circulation?

In France, at this moment, the transfers of money are made chiefly in specie, very little paper being seen in circulation; because credit is almost stifled in that country by the despotism of the government, which renders all private property insecure. In Algiers also, the government of which is nearly as infamous and oppressive as that of France, the medium of exchange consists almost entirely of gold and silver.

The reason of this is obvious; it is because despotism and credit are incompatible; for who will voluntarily trust him that cannot be compelled to

pay his debts? Hence the absurdity of supposing that an enslaved country can ever become extensively commercial; the rigors of despotism must be softened before even the germ of an extended trade can be planted; before credit, which is the true aliment of commerce, can flourish, or even be brought into existence.

In Russia the Government has long endeavored to create and foster an extensive commerce; but all the attempts of the Muscovite Monarchs, from the first Peter down to the present emperor Alexander, have been ineffectual; and a scanty trade, together with a circulation consisting chiefly of specie, continues to mock the attempts of those northern barbarians to unite despotism with commercial credit. In order to establish that mercantile confidence which alone can substitute paper-currency in the room of specie, for the purpose of carrying on the ordinary money-transactions of that empire, the Russian government must give a much greater security to the life, the liberty, and the property of its people, than can possibly be found in the contents of a ukase, or imperial decree, published at the uncontrolled will of the Sovereign, or at the interested suggestion of his courtiers.

Bonaparte and Alexander may continue for a while to be great military powers, by continuing to oppress their people, and to sacrifice the happiness of their subjects to their own peculiar views

of personal, selfish ambition: but it is not in their power, by all their edicts and decrees, to compel the establishment of commerce in the soil of tyranny.

But to return;—the circumstances under which a low rate of interest demonstrates the national prosperity of a country, may be seen from the following facts and observations:

Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, must draw it either from his labor, or from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived from labor is called wages; that derived from stock by the person who manages or employs it is called profit; but that derived from stock by the person who does not employ it himself, but lends it to another, is called the *interest*, or the use of the money. It is the compensation which the borrower pays to the lender for the profit that he has an opportunity of making by the use of the money.

Part of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs the risk, and takes the trouble of employing it; and part to the lender, who affords him the opportunity of making this profit. The interest of money is always a derivative revenue, which, if it is not paid from the profit that is made by the use of the money, must be paid from some other source of revenue, unless perhaps the borrower be a spendthrift, who contracts a second debt in order to pay the interest of the first.

The revenue which proceeds altogether from

land is called rent, and belongs to the landlord. Now although it be impossible to determine precisely what are, or were, the average profits of stock, either in the present or in ancient times, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of money; because wherever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal will commonly be given for its use; and wherever little can be made by its use, little will be given for that use.

According, therefore, as the usual market rate of interest varies in any country, we may be assured that the ordinary profits of stock must vary with it, must sink as it sinks, and rise as it rises; whence the progress of interest may point out in some measure the progress of profit.

A high rate of interest arises from three circumstances; a great demand for borrowing; little riches to supply that demand; and great profits arising from the use of stock. And these circumstances are a conclusive proof of the small advance of industry and commerce.

A low rate of interest proceeds from three opposite circumstances; a small demand for borrowing; great riches to supply that demand; and small profits arising from the employment of capital. And these three circumstances are all connected together, and are the results of increased industry and extensive commerce.

1. As to the causes and effects of a great or

small demand for borrowing; when a people have emerged ever so little from a savage state, and their numbers have increased beyond the original multitude, an inequality of property must instantly arise; and while some possess large tracts of land, others are confined within narrow limits, and some have no landed property. Those who possess more land than they can themselves occupy, employ those who possess none, and agree to receive a determinate part of the product, as rent.

Thus the *landed* interest is immediately established; nor is there any settled government, however rude, in which affairs are not on this footing. Of these proprietors some must presently discover themselves to be of different tempers from others; and while one would willingly store up the produce of his land for futurity, another desires to consume at present what ought to suffice for many years. But as the spending of a settled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation, and men have a continual need of something to fix and engage their attention, pleasures, such as they are, will be the pursuit of the greater part of the land holders, and the prodigals among them will always be more numerous than the misers.

In a state, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed or agricultural interest, as there is little frugality, the borrowers must be very numerous and the rate of interest proportionally high. This depends on the prevailing habits and manners, by which alone the demand for borrowing is increased.

or diminished. So long as there are only landed gentry and peasants in the state, the borrowers must be numerous and the rate of interest high ; because the idleness of the landlord dissipates property rapidly, and incurs the necessity of his running in debt.

2. As to the great or little wealth which is to supply the demand for borrowing ;—this also depends upon the prevailing habits and manners of the people. In order to produce in any given country a great number of lenders, it is only requisite that the property, or the command of that quantity which is in the state, whether great or small, should be collected in particular hands, so as to form considerable sums, or compose a great *monied* interest. This begets a number of lenders, and sinks the rate of interest, in consequence of those particular manners and customs which cause the specie to be gathered into separate sums or masses of considerable value.

But these particular manners and customs result from an increase of industry and frugality ; of arts and of commerce. Every thing useful to man arises from the ground ; but few things arise in a condition fitted to render them useful. There must be, therefore, in addition to the peasants and the land-proprietors, another rank of men, who, receiving from the husbandman the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own subsistence. In the infan-

cy of society these contracts between the artisans and the peasants, and between one species of artisans and another, are commonly entered into by the persons themselves, who, being neighbors, are easily acquainted with each others necessities, and can lend their mutual assistance to supply them.

But when the industry of men increases, and their views enlarge, it is found that the most remote parts of the state can assist each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourse of good offices can be carried on to the utmost extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, one of the most useful races of men, who serve as agents between those parts of the state that are wholly unacquainted with, and ignorant of each other's necessity.

In a city, say, there are fifty workmen in silk and linen, and a thousand customers; these two ranks of men, so necessary to each other, can never rightly meet until one man erects a shop or store, to which all the workmen and all customers repair. In this province, say, grass rises in abundance; the inhabitants have plenty of cheese, butter, and cattle, but want corn and bread, which in a neighboring province are too abundant for the sole use of its inhabitants. One man discovers this; and he forthwith carries corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and thus sup-

plying the wants of both, he is a common benefactor.

As the people increase in numbers and industry, the difficulty of their intercourse increases. The business of the agency or merchandise becomes more intricate, and divides, sub-divides, compounds, and mixes in a greater degree of variety. In all these transactions it is necessary and reasonable that a considerable portion of the commodities and labor should belong to the merchant, to whom they are in a great measure owing. And these commodities he will sometimes preserve in kind, but more generally convert into money which is their common representation.

There is no craving or demand of the human mind more constant and insatiable than that for exercise and employment; and this desire appears to put in motion almost all our passions and pursuits. Deprive a man of all business and serious occupation, and he runs restless from one amusement to another, and the weight and oppression which he feels from idleness is so great, that he forgets the ruin which must inevitably overtake him from his immoderate expenses.

Give him a more harmless way of employing his mind or his body, according to his capacity, he is satisfied, and no longer feels an insatiable thirst after pleasure. But if the employment given to him be lucrative, more especially if the profit be attached to *every particular* exertion of

his industry, he has gain so often in his eye, that he gradually acquires a passion for it, and knows no pleasure equal to that of seeing the daily increase of his fortune. And this is the reason why trade increases frugality, and why among merchants there is the same overplus of misers above prodigals, as among the land-proprietors the converse takes place.

Commerce increases industry by conveying it readily from one member of the state to another, and allowing none of it to perish or become useless. It increases frugality by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which soon engage their affections, and remove all desire for pleasure and expense. It is an infallible consequence of all industrious professions to beget frugality, and make the love of gain predominate over the love of pleasure.

Thus, among lawyers and physicians who have any practice, there are many more who live within than beyond, or even up to the limits of their income. But lawyers and physicians, according to Doctor Adam Smith's theoretical division of laborers into productive, and unproductive beget no industry ; nay, they acquire their riches at the expense of others, so that they diminish the possessions of some of their fellow-citizens as fast as they increase their own.

Merchants on the contrary create industry, by serving as canals to convey it through every corner

of the state ; and at the same time by their frugality they acquire great power over that industry, and collect a large property in the labor and commodities, which they are chiefly instrumental in producing. There is, therefore, no other profession except that of merchandise which can produce a great monied interest ; or in other words, can increase industry, and by increasing frugality also, give a great command of that industry to particular members of the community.

Without commerce the state must consist chiefly of landed gentry whose prodigality and expense create a continual demand for borrowing ; and of peasantry who have no sums to supply that demand. For an exemplification of this principle, look at Virginia, the most anti-commercial state in the union, where the land is almost entirely parcelled out amongst a few over-grown proprietors, who, with very few exceptions, pass the whole of their lives, in every succeeding generation, in debt to an enormous amount ; and as their landed property cannot be attached for debt, their creditors who belong mostly to the commercial states of this country, in general have the satisfaction of losing both principal and interest.

In a mere landed or agricultural state of society, money never can be gathered into large stocks or sums, which may be lent out at interest. It is dispersed into numberless hands, who either squander it in idle show and beggarly magnificence, or

employ it in the purchase of the common necessities of life. Commerce alone is able to assemble it into considerable sums and masses; in consequence of the industry which it creates, and the frugality which it inspires. Whence commerce produces a great number of lenders, by whose mutual competition in the money-market, the rate of interest is considerably lowered.

3. As to the increase of commerce diminishing the profits of stock, and thus lowering the rate of interest. Low interest and low profits of stock mutually forward each others progress, and are both originally derived from that extensive commerce which produces opulent merchants, and builds up a great monied interest.

Where merchants possess great stocks, it must frequently happen that when they either become tired of business, or leave heirs unfit or unwilling to engage in commerce, a large proportion of the stock or capital naturally seeks an annual and a secure revenue. The abundance of money, like the plenty of every other marketable commodity, diminishes its price, and compels the lenders to accept a low rate of interest; which very circumstance obliges many to keep their stock still employed in trade, and rather be content with low profits on their merchandise than dispose of their money to the borrowers at an under-value of interest.

But when commerce has become extensive, and

employs large capitals, there must arise great competition among the merchants, which diminishes the profits of each separate portion of trade, while at the same time it increases the aggregate quantity of trade itself. The low profits of stock induce the merchants more willingly to accept a low rate of interest, when they leave off business, and begin to sink into indolence and ease.

Thus low interest for money and low profits on stock arise from an extensive commerce, and mutually forward each others progress. No man will accept of low profits in trade where he can have high interest on his money out of it; and no man will accept of low interest for his money where he can have high profits on the employment of his stock. An extensive commerce, by creating large capitals, diminishes both interest and profits, and is always assisted in its diminution of the one by the proportional sinking of the other. Low profits also, as they arise from the increase of commerce and industry, serve in their turn to promote the progress of commerce by rendering the commodities cheaper, encouraging their more extended consumption, and thus augmenting industry.

Whence, if we consider the *whole connection* of causes and effects, *interest* of money is the barometer of every community, and its *low rate* is an almost infallible sign of the flourishing condition of a people. It proves the increase of industry,

and its prompt circulation throughout every quarter of the state, with a force and clearness little inferior to mathematical demonstration.

And though it may not be impossible for a sudden and a great check to commerce, as is the case in France, now in 1809, to produce a *momentary* effect of the same kind, namely, to lower the rate of interest, by throwing a vast many stocks out of trade ; yet this must always be attended with such extensive misery and want of employment to the poor ; with such a low price of land ; and with such enormous profits on the stock still employed ; that besides its inevitably *short duration*, owing to the universal beggary speedily following such an order of things, it will not be possible to mistake the one case for the other ; to be for a moment doubtful *when*, and under *what* circumstances, a low rate of interest is a conclusive proof of national prosperity.

The value of land in Britain has progressively increased, in consequence of improvements in agriculture, low rate of interest, and the increased consumption of the produce of the soil. Before England became a trading nation, the average price of land was only twelve years purchase ; and it is no more, at the present day, in France, since her commerce has been annihilated.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century land in England was sold for a purchase-money of from fourteen to sixteen years ; and at the commence-

ment of the eighteenth century it had advanced to about eighteen years purchase; in half a century more it rose to about twenty-four years purchase; and, at present, is generally valued at from twenty-eight to thirty years purchase. In some parts of Scotland the value of land has increased in a still greater proportion. We learn from Mr. Smith's Statistical Account and Agricultural Survey of Argyleshire, that it is not unfrequent for estates in North Britain, and more especially in the Scottish Highlands, to fetch a purchase-money of forty years. The valued rent of the county of Argyle in the year 1757 was only £ 12,466; but the real value in 1795 was £ 112,752, having in less than forty years increased nine fold.

The progressive influx of wealth into Britain bears a proportion still much greater than the most sanguine calculator could expect; since, according to Sir William D'Avenant, the general rental of England for lands, houses, and mines, in the year 1600, did not exceed six millions per annum, which multiplied by twelve years purchase, the common price for land at that period, made a total value of landed property equal to seventy-two millions.

The general rental of England for 1688, by the same writer computed at fourteen millions, and valued at eighteen years purchase, would consequently at that time be worth two hundred and fifty-two millions. At this rate he also estimated the general rental and value of land in 1698, when

his discourses on public revenue and trade were written. Hence, in the seventeenth century the rental of land had increased in more than a two-fold, and its value in more than a threefold proportion.

By Sir William Petty's computation in the year 1664, the total wealth of the nation, consisting of lands, houses, shipping, gold and silver coin, wares, merchandise, plate, furniture, &c. amounted only to two hundred and fifty millions; and the whole annual profit upon this national stock, he computed at fifteen millions. In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Mr. Gregory King, in his *Political Observations*, computed the landed and personal property of Britain at six hundred and fifteen millions. Mr. Hooke, in his *Essay on the National Debt*, &c. published in 1750, estimated the whole value of British real and personal property at two thousand one hundred millions sterling.

Sir William Pulteny, in his *Considerations on the present state of Public Affairs*, published in 1779, valued the landed and personal property of Britain at two thousand millions. The total amount of British wealth in the year 1790, was computed by Dr. Beeke to be two thousand five hundred millions sterling, exclusive of one hundred millions sterling, the value of foreign possessions belonging to the subjects of Britain. And finally the value of lands, houses, and per-

sonal property in Britain was computed (and with sufficient exactness) by Mr. Bird, in his Proposal for paying off the National Debt, published in 1799 to amount to two thousand seven hundred millions; the value of the landed property being £ 1,520,000,000

And that of the personal property

amounting to 1,450,000,000

Total of British property, £ 2,700,000,000

The value of the whole annual produce of landed and personal property in Britain may be fairly estimated at four hundred and five millions sterling, being computed at fifteen per cent. since the annual legal interest of five per cent. of this accumulated wealth amounts to one hundred and thirty-five millions; for the usual allowance of the annual value of the produce of a farm is three times the amount of the yearly rent; namely, one third paid as rent to the land proprietor; one third expended in replacing the wear and tear of the farming stock, consisting of tools, cattle, buildings, &c and the remaining third goes as living profit to the farmer for the maintenance of himself and his family. The same process also takes place as to capital employed in trade, one third portion goes to pay the legal interest of five per cent. to the owner of the capital; another third goes towards the maintenance of the trader and his household; and the

remaining third goes towards the accumulation of fresh capital.

In comparing the rental and value of Britain's landed property at present with the estimate made by Sir Wiliam D'Avenant one hundred years since, we shall find, by a simple calculation, that valuing the present British landed property, incumbered with tithes, at twenty-eight years purchase, the annual rental corresponding to one thousand two hundred and fifty millions, will amount to upwards of forty-four millions and a half; which proves an increased rental of thirty millions per annum in the space of one century.

In the year 1798, Mr. Pitt in the House of Commons stated the annual income, arising from lands, tithes, mines, timber, and houses in Britain, to be forty-four millions sterling.

In comparing the present valued amount with that of the year 1700, we shall find that during the eighteenth century the national capital has increased in more than a *ten-fold* proportion; for instance:

In 1700 the national capital	
amounted to	£ 250,000,000
Which multiplied by	10
	—
Gives	£ 2,500,000,000

But in 1800 the British national

capital was £ 2,700,000,000

making an excess of two hundred millions sterling, above ten times the sum of British national capital in the year 1700.

Hence, since Sir William Petty's computation, one hundred and thirty-six years ago, the national wealth of Britain has increased in the immense sum of two thousand four hundred and fifty millions ; and the annual legal interest of this increase of wealth, amounts to upwards of one hundred and twenty-seven millions five hundred thousand pounds sterling. If, therefore, we allow fifteen per cent. for the annual profits or produce of such increase of wealth, it will amount to upwards of three hundred and eighty-two millions five hundred thousand pounds of additional national increase in less than one hundred and fifty years.

The national wealth of Britain having increased in so wonderful a degree, it is natural to suppose that her power has also kept pace with the augmentation of her riches. And whether we consider separately or conjointly the increased number of shipping and seamen ; the increase of buildings and population ; the augmented manufactures and trade ; the improvements in agriculture, and the increased value of lands and

houses ; the increased conveniencies and luxuries of life, and the augmented circulating medium, including gold and silver, and paper currency in Britain, we shall find that they have all increased nearly in the same proportion, and have mutually kept pace with each other.

It therefore requires no depth of argument, nor ingenuity of disquisition, to convince the most incredulous mind of the *comparative facility* with which the present immense British revenue is drawn from such indubitable sources ; and that too, without bearing hard upon the lower orders of the people in Britain.

The following table will show at one glance, the annual expenditure, computed on a medium of twenty-five years ; the national capital and the yearly national income of Britain, during the eighteenth century.

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual Expenditure computed on a medium of twenty-five years.</i>	<i>National Capital.</i>	<i>National Income.</i>
	£	£	£
1700	5,765,173	250,000,000	15,000,000
1725	8,357,765	615,000,000	45,000,000
1750	10,473,620	2,000,000,000	200,000,000
1775	18,478,932	2,200,000,000	270,000,000
1800	26,789,604	2,700,000,000	405,000,000

Now the third part of the whole national income of a country, that part which in general goes to the accumulation of national capital, may be con-

sidered as the nett or *taxable* income of that country; the other two-thirds of the gross annual income go to maintain the annual consumption, and to put in motion the annual productive industry of the country. Whence, as the whole yearly national income of Britain amounts to four hundred and five millions sterling, her nett or taxable income, being one-third of her gross income, is one hundred and thirty-five millions per annum.

But her present annual amount in 1809 of *taxation* is only sixty millions, not half of her taxable, and about *eighteen per cent.* on the whole of her gross income. The following table will show that her taxable income has increased in a greater ratio during the eighteenth century than her expenditure has increased; and consequently that she is better able to bear her present annual burdens than she was those which were imposed upon her in the beginning of the period in question.

<i>Years.</i>	<i>Annual expenditure on a medium of 25 years.</i>	<i>Annual taxable income.</i>
	£	£
1700	5,765,173	5,000,000
1725	8,357,765	15,000,000
1750	10,473,620	66,600,000
1775	18,578,932	90,000,000
1800	26,789,604	135,000,000

It is to be remembered that the present extraordinary expenditure of Britain, far exceeds the average amount of her annual expenditure com-

puted on a medium of twenty-five years ; and, therefore, that her taxable income, in point of fact, bears a much greater proportion to her usual expenditure, than at this crisis of affairs it appears to bear.

The *increased productiveness* of the taxes of Britain is also a conclusive proof that her nett annual or taxable income increases more rapidly than her yearly burden of taxation is augmented ; a circumstance indeed that might *a priori* have been inferred from the vast increase of British manufactures and commerce.

In the space of twenty-two years from the restoration, in 1666, to the British revolution, in 1688, the exports of Britain and the tonnage of her trading ships were doubled ; for instance :

	Exports.	Tons of shipping.
At the restoration	£ 2,043,043 . .	95,266
At the revolution	4,086,000 . .	190,533

And in the last twenty years of the eighteenth century, namely, from 1780 to 1800, inclusive, the imports of Britain were more than doubled, and her exports nearly trebled :

	Imports.	Exports.
In 1780, . .	£ 11,700,000	£ 13,554,093
In 1800, . .	29,945,808	35,990,000

The revenue of the British Post-Office, which is always a pretty exact gage of a nation's prosperity, has increased twelve-fold within the eighteenth century :

In 1700, £ 58,672

In 1800, 717,335

The revenue arising from consumption of luxuries has also increased in a very great degree, particularly during the last twenty years. The British taxes in the year 1792, including those repealed that year, amounted to £ 14,132,000. The following is the state of the *old* revenue up to the year 1802 ; its average increase is the more remarkable, because in the year 1799 *new* taxes were imposed to the amount of more than £ 7,500,000 a year, and in 1802, nearly the most productive year of the whole, a farther sum of £ 7,000,000 was raised by an aid and contribution, by voluntary subscriptions, and by the convoy-tax.

During the last British war, which commenced in 1793, by the provisions of the consolidation act, the accounts of the *new* taxes imposed since the year 1792, were kept distinct from the *old* revenue arising from taxes laid on before the year 1792. These accounts were annually laid before the Parliament of Britain, in order to show how far the taxes imposed were sufficient to pay the interest of the debt created, and to provide a sinking fund for its gradual extinction. But in the year 1803 the duties of customs, excise, and stamps,

imposed before 1792, were consolidated with those imposed since that year; whence the amount of the old, as distinguished from that of the new taxes, can no longer be known at the British exchequer.

Produce of the permanent taxes imposed in Britain before 1792.

<i>Remarks.</i>	<i>Years.</i>	<i>Sums.</i>
The taxes for the debt funded were imposed in 1784 and 1785; and the consolidation of the Customs took place in 1787.	{ 1785	. £ 12,104,798
	{ 1786	. 11,867,055
	{ 1787	. 12,923,134
	{ 1788	. 13,007,642
	{ 1789	. 13,433,068
	{ 1790	. 14,072,978
	{ 1791	. 14,132,000

Total, £ 91,540,675

Average of these seven years, . £ 13,077,239

Deducted taxes repealed in 1792, 223,000

And the average of the seven years is £ 12,854,239

In this period new taxes were imposed to the amount of £ 7,500,000 a Year.	{ 1792	. 14,284,000
	{ 1793	. 13,941,000
	{ 1794	. 13,858,000
	{ 1795	. 13,557,000
	{ 1796	. 14,292,000
	{ 1797	. 13,332,000
	{ 1798	. 14,275,000

Total, £ 97,539,000

Average of these seven years, .	£ 13,934,000
Average of the first seven years, .	12,854,000

Excess in the last over the first average of seven years	1,080,000
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In this period taxes were imposed to the amount of

£ 7,468,000, as proved by their actual produce laid before the British House of Commons, in June, 1804.	{	1799, .	15,727,000
		1800, .	14,238,000
		1801, .	14,641,000
		1802, .	15,433,000

Total,	£ 60,039,000
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Average of these four years . .	£ 15,009,000
Average of the first seven years	12,854,000

Excess of the average of these four years over that of the first seven years	£ 2,155,000
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The permanent taxes in Britain imposed since the year 1792, exhibit rather a greater ratio of increased productiveness than do those which were laid on before that year.

The *permanent* taxes and hereditary revenue of Britain produces now, in 1809, an annual income of thirty-eight millions, four hundred fourteen thousand, and ninety-nine pounds.

A very general mistake prevails throughout the United States respecting the portion of her public revenue which Britain derives from her imposts on commerce. As the American government derives the whole of its revenue from duties on commodities imported into the union, the people of this country generally imagine that the British national revenue also depends chiefly upon her customs, which however, in fact, make but a very small part of her annual public income.

The following statement of the amount of the British customs in the year 1800, is taken from the Returns of the Collector-General to the Committee of Finance.

	£	s.	d.
On imports and exports from the custom-house, London, . .	6,432,197,	18	10
On imports and exports from the custom-house in Edinburgh,	331,100	0	0
West-India duty of four and a half per cent.	36,457	14	9
	<hr/>		
Total of British customs for the year 1800,	£ 6,799,775	13	7
	<hr/>		

In the year 1800, the british merchandise on which these customs were paid, amounted to an *official* value of

	£	s.
Imports from Asia	9,827,278	0
<hr/> elsewhere	45,573,138	0
	<hr/>	
Total of imports,	£ 55,400,416	5
	<hr/>	
Exports of British merchandise, £	39,471,203	0
<hr/> foreign do.	16,359,640	13
	<hr/>	
Total of exports,	£ 55,830,843	13
<hr/> imports,	55,400,416	5
	<hr/>	
Total of British exports and imports for 1800,	£ 111,231,259	17
	<hr/>	

Thus the customs of Britain produce only an annual revenue of about *six per cent.* upon the whole *official* amount of her yearly imports and exports.

It appears from the report of the Secretary of the American treasury, dated February 27, 1808, that in the year 1807, the trade of the United States surpassed by about the value of fifty millions of dollars all that any former year had produced ; the whole annual value being then two hundred and sixteen millions of dollars. In this year the

imports from Britain into the United States, together with their exports into Britain, reduced from dollars into sterling, ran thus :

Imports from Britain into the Union in 1807,	£ 11,600,000
Exports from the Union to Britain,	5,400,000
	<hr/>
Total of imports and exports,	£ 17,000,000
	<hr/>

The British Customs upon the whole of this sum at six per cent. would give a yearly revenue of	£ 1,020,000
	<hr/>

But from this sum of seventeen millions must be deducted four millions ; because goods to that amount, which had been usually imported from Britain into the United States, were annually smuggled from the Union into the Spanish and Portuguese American colonies. These goods, however, now find their way direct from Britain into Spanish and Portuguese America, in British bottoms, and can no longer be considered as part of the trade between the United States and the British empire.

Supposing, then, that the United States will ever again possess such an extensive commerce as they had in the year 1807, the whole annual trade between them and Britain will amount to seventeen millions, minus four millions, that is to say, to thirteen millions sterling, upon which the British customs at six per cent. will yield a yearly revenue to the public treasury of England, of only seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds; not quite *one hundredth* part of Britain's annual national expenditure; about enough to supply the expenses of her government for *four days*.



SECOND DIVISION.



CHAPTER 1.

BUT the *national debt* of Britain, say Mr. Hauteville, and Arthur O'Conner, whose assertions are re-echoed by many millions of tongues, throughout the globe, is so enormous, that having no means of ever paying it off; nay, not even of pre-

venting its rapid increase, she must speedily take the sponge and wipe the whole away in exhibiting an awful spectacle of universal bankruptcy.

I am very well aware that using the sponge, or in plain English, cheating their creditors, is a much more palatable measure to all the jacobins of France and of every other country than is the payment of their just debts. But such an infamous and cowardly proceeding does not suit either the policy or the inclination of the British government.

Hitherto Britain has found no difficulty in regularly paying the annual interest of her public debt; and she will not easily be induced to adopt so revolutionary, so jacobinical a measure as that of falsifying the national faith; and, descending from her present elevated station, as the champion of justice, law, order, and integrity, become in fact the imitator and the rival of the fraudulent and profligate policy of France.

For what, as the late justly celebrated Fisher Ames emphatically observes, is revolution? what is jacobinism? what is their favorite work, but first and with most malignant ardor to destroy what faith, and law, and morals, and religion have established and guarded?

The British national debt is spread over all the empire, it has taken wide and deep root for more than a century; and rudely to tear up that root from the soil would shake the security of all property and perhaps overturn the constitution of

England itself. If such a nefarious step be taken where will the British government stop? will it not proceed, as well as begin, in imitation of its neighbor France, and go onward to proscribe the property of its clergy, its nobles, its merchants, its manufacturers, its farmers, and eventually involve the whole nation in all the horrors of anarchy and blood?

The national debt is as much *private* property as are the possessions, landed or personal, of any gentleman in Britian. And if that sheet-anchor of society, the security of private property, be cut away in one instance, I see no reason why it should not be done in every other. If the British goverment sponge the public debt, what is to prevent it from plundering the vessels and the warehouses of the merchants; from seizing on the farms of the landed gentry, and from confiscating the stock in trade of the manufacturers?

So much for the justice of a government's cheating its creditors. Is the policy of such a measure a counterbalance for its iniquity? Suppose the debt were spunged away, and new loans were required to carry on the vast expenditure of the British nation, standing, as she does, in the gap to defend the whole civilized world from the most atrocious oppression, could the government of Britain hope again to erect the superstructure of national credit upon the ruins of public faith? would the British people willingly lend their money, for the plea-

sure of seeing both principal and interest annihilated at the will of any chancellor of the Exchequer who might think fit to flourish the sponge.

Add to this the incalculable evils, which would be produced by the subversion of public credit, in all the classes of the community; in the causing the distress and ruin of so many individual stock holders; in palsyng the arm of private industry; in deranging the whole state of commerce, in drying up the sources of manufactures; in crippling the progress of agriculture, in tarnishing the national honour, and in rendering Britain unable to cope with the common enemy of mankind.

Nor should we forget the effect which a bankruptcy of the British funds would produce upon other nations; for 1st, foreigners are stock-holders to the amount of nearly fifty millions. Now the ruin which the total loss of all this money must entail upon a vast number of individuals dispersed through different countries, would be very grievously felt, and most effectually extinguish all future faith on their part in the credit of the British government.

And secondly, independently of the foreign stock-holders, the most unshaken faith in the credit of the British government at present pervades all the civilized nations of the world, and a bill drawn on it would find a readier sale, and command a higher price, in Paris, in Amsterdam, in St. Petersburg, in Vienna, in Berlin, in Konings-

burgh, in Madrid, and in Washington, than would bills drawn upon the respective governments of France, Holland, Russia, Austria, Westphalia, Prussia, Spain, or the United States.

But if the British government should commit so flagrant a breach of national faith as to sponge her public debt, it would justify the suspicion that no great prudishness would be observed as to any other violation of solemn engagements; and the consequent want of all confidence in her truth and honour would come back upon Britain from other nations, like a protested bill which returns to embarrass and to disgrace an individual merchant.

And although her own subjects might be induced after a while again to repose confidence in her promises, and to purchase public stock, when fresh loans should be raised; yet her bills in all foreign money-markets would be worth no more than French government bills are now; that is to say, just good for nothing. How very dreadfully this loss of all credit would impede all the foreign commercial and political operations of Britain, it is quite needless to expatiate upon.

Nevertheless there is no occasion for the least shadow of alarm on this head. The British government will never be under any necessity or temptation to sponge the public debts. A brief statement of the *Funding System* in Britain will plainly show, that her national debt is not so great as people in general imagine, and also that

the operation of the sinking funds is gradually and certainly liquidating the whole amount of the capital borrowed, without taking a single farthing out of the pockets of the stock-holders.

I shall extract the materials of the following statement from the facts, documents, and tables that are scattered up and down throughout the works of Mr. Rose, Mr. M'Arthur, and Mr. Comber, but more particularly from the very valuable and interesting productions of Mr. Rose and Mr. M'Arthur.

A very general mistake prevails as to the *real* magnitude of Britain's national debt. It is pretty universally believed that she owes the enormous sum of six hundred millions of pounds sterling, for which she is supposed to pay an annual interest of thirty millions *sterling*. It is evident that those who make or believe this statement, are not aware of two circumstances, which most materially diminish the bulk of the British public debt, and reduce its *real* dimensions far below its *apparent* size.

1. The gradual depreciation of the value of money in reality, makes the public debt much less burdensome to Britain than it would otherwise be. Fifty years since, a million of pounds sterling would go as far as double that sum would go now; and at the present period it is much easier to acquire two millions sterling than it was to obtain half that sum fifty years ago. That is to say, a

million sterling then would put in motion twice the quantity of labor that it can now purchase; and was more difficult to raise than double that sum now.

Yet no more than the legal interest of five per cent. is annually paid now for the public stock, which was borrowed fifty years since, although a given quantity of that stock *then* would really purchase double the amount of the necessaries, conveniences, or luxuries of life, which could be procured by the same quantity *now*, and consequently if it were to be borrowed now, would entail a double burden of capital and interest upon the community. Half a century ago, say twenty millions sterling were borrowed, for which an annual interest of one million is now paid; but if it were necessary now to borrow as much money as would put in motion precisely the *same* quantity of labor as twenty millions could then command, no less than forty millions must be raised; and consequently an annual interest of two millions be entailed upon the public.

So that in point of fact the British government is continually paying a *very low* rate of interest for the greater portion of its public debt, owing to the gradual but incessant depreciation of the value of money; and the perpetually augmenting facility of raising large sums in consequence of the rapid influx of wealth into the country from all quarters of the globe.

Hence the burden of taxation necessary to pay the interest of the British national debt is always much less in reality than in appearance.

2. But independently of this consideration, the national debt of Britain falls very far short of six hundred millions sterling. In the beginning of the year 1800, the *nominal* funded debt of Britain amounted to four hundred and fifty-one millions, six hundred and ninety-nine thousand, nine hundred and nineteen pounds; but as the greater part of the funded debt was invested in the three per cent. consols, or three per cent. reduced annuities, the *real* value of the whole capital of the funded debt did not exceed two hundred and eighty-six millions sterling; estimating the several funds at their market prices in August 1801, namely, three per cent. consols at sixty; and three per cent. reduced annuities at sixty-one, &c. &c.

The heads of the public funded debt in Britain on the 1st of February 1800, were as follows:

Bank of England three per cent.	
annuities,	£ 11,686,800
Old and new South Sea annuities,	24,065,084
Three per cent. annuities, anno 1751,	1,919,600
Three per cent. consolidated annuities,	250,484,272
Three per cent. reduced annuities,	69,023,876

Four per cent. do.	£ 45,269,860
Five per cent. do.	28,125,583
Three per cent. annuities, anno 1726,	1,000,100
Five per cent annuities,	20,124,844

Total *nominal* capital of Britain's
public funded debt in 1800 . £ 451,699,919

The following column will show the vast difference between the real quantity of *sterling* money borrowed, and the *nominal* capital created by funding the sum borrowed. In the year 1806, a loan of *eighteen* millions sterling was raised, but the nominal capital funded amounted to nearly *thirty* millions.

Money borrowed in 1806.	Capital created, or funded.	Interest	Manage- ment.	New sinking fund.	Annual charge.
£	£	£	£	£	£
18,000,000	29,880,000	896,400	13,446	298,800	1,208,646

The *cause* of the great difference between the real sum borrowed and the nominal capital funded, is thus fully explained in the third volume of the *Edinburgh Review*, p. 478.

The public debt of Britain has been contracted during seasons of difficulty and embarrassment, when the monied interest had a ready market for their capital, and the public revenue, including the funds allotted to the payment of the interest,

naturally labored under a greater or a less degree of suspicion and discredit.

Partly in consequence of this distrust, and partly from the demand for money, the new lenders have always extorted much better terms than they could have procured at other times by relieving former creditors of their share in the old loans; and somewhat better terms than they could have obtained, even at those times of difficulty, by purchasing shares in former loans. Thus every sum of money, which the public has occasion to borrow during the periods of extraordinary national expenditure; that is to say, all the sums which the state ever has occasion to raise by loan, are necessarily procured at a very considerable disadvantage; the creditor receiving a premium, not only beyond what he would have obtained by lending his money at ordinary times, but even beyond what he could obtain by vesting his money in the other loans at their present discount.

Financiers have still farther increased this disadvantage by funding in those stocks, which bore the greatest discount, and a lower rate of interest; and in order to diminish the amount of the taxes required for paying the interest of the new debt, they have generally scrupled little about making a needless addition to the principal. The loans made during the American war are now universally allowed to have been negociated on terms peculiarly injurious to the revenue, and it is the opinion of

many impartial persons that during the last war, also, which commenced in the year 1793, the British finances would have suffered less, had the burden of the loans been thrown more upon the interest, and had smaller premiums been given in the form of capital.

But be this as it may, the fact is undoubted that, whenever the state borrows, a *nominal* capital of debt is created *much greater* than the sums received and employed in the public service. So long as the nation is only burdened with the annuity payable upon this nominal capital, the interest at which it has raised the money is not exorbitant, although the loans may have been made at high premiums, because the interest is considerably under the market rate when stocks are at par. But if the principal of the debt is to be paid at par, the nation loses the whole difference between the sums really advanced and the capital created, which in every case must be very great.

Thus, during the American war, and for the payment of the surplus expenses after the peace, nearly ninety-seven millions and a half were funded in the three and four per cents; sometimes without any other premium than what necessarily arose from the low price of stocks at the time; sometimes by the grant of a premium in the form of short or of long annuities; and, making no allowance on account of such premiums, the sum actually received for the capital added to the debt amounted

only to seventy-five millions five hundred thousand pounds.

If then this debt were redeemed at par, the nation would lose nearly twenty-two millions, besides a farther loss on money-bills, &c. funded after the peace. During the last war, beginning in 1793, the stock having been still lower, and the three per cents more resorted to in proportion, the difference between the money received and the capital created was still greater.

If we suppose the average price of the three per cents. to be sixty (that is three per cent. which is higher than the average at which the operation of the sinking fund was carried on) the nation would lose about sixty-three millions by reducing at par the stock created in the three per cents. alone, previous to the fifth of April 1801, and independent of the imperial loan. It is certainly not estimating too high the whole loss, which such an operation must occasion, when carried through all the branches of the debt now funded, if we reckon the difference between the par and the money advanced at one hundred millions sterling.

Nor would it be possible to make any deduction from this amount in paying the stock-holders; for in the first place, the constant transference of funded property prevents us from discovering who are the actual gainers of so enormous a premium; and next, though we could get at these, it would be a direct violation of the faith, upon which they

lent their money to the government. We take it for granted that the redemption is made at par; for the necessary effects of the *sudden* payment of the debt must inevitably be to restore the par in all the permanent funds, and to raise much higher than par the stock which is not redeemable as the life annuities, and the long and short annuities."

How effectually this loss, which would arise to the British nation from the difference between the real sum borrowed and the nominal capital funded, if the public debt were to be paid at par, is prevented by the operation of the sinking funds, will hereafter appear.

Now, in the year 1809, the *real* capital of Britain's funded debt, that is to say, the sum actually borrowed, amounts only to four hundred and fourteen millions sterling, and a small fraction, for which the interest and charges of management draw a yearly sum of twenty millions seven hundred and one thousand, two hundred and fifty-two pounds; reckoning all the stock at par and the interest at five per cent.

Thus, although the nominal debt

of Britain is	£ 600,000,000
for which the nominal interest is	
reckoned at	30,000,000

yet the real debt of Britain is only .	414,000,000
the annual interest of which	
amounts to	20,701,252

making a burden of capital and of interest pressing upon Britain to be almost *one third* less than is generally imagined. And of this public debt, as we shall presently see, nearly *one third* part is already actually *paid off* by the operation of the *sinking funds*.

CHAPTER II.

IN the year 1716 a sinking fund was first established in Britain, but, owing to the want of firmness or of capacity in the several successive administrations of that country, the money, which ought to have been appropriated solely to the redemption of the public debt, was generally diverted to some other object, so that at the commencement of the war in 1741, a period of twenty-five years, no more than eight millions and a fraction of the national debt had been liquidated.

The following table is taken from a return to an order of the House of Commons containing a statement of the funded debt of Britain from the year 1730 to 1800, both inclusive.

Beginning of the years.	Funded debt.	Beginning of the years.	Funded debt.
	£		£
1730	47,705,122	1791	238,231,248
1740	44,072,024	1792	238,231,248
1750	72 108,898	1793	238,231,248
1760	88,341,268	1794	244,481,248
1765	127,585,281	1795	260,157,773
1770	126,963,267	1796	285,767,670
1775	122,963,267	1797	327,671,869
1780	142,113,266	1798	394,159,046
1785	226,260,805	1799	424,159,046
1790	238,234,248	1800	451,699,919

The following statement gives a general view of the British public debts, funded and unfunded, at particular periods, from the year 1700 to 1786, together with the operation of the sinking fund, established in the year 1716, during that time.

Years.	Remarks.	Amount of debt.	Annual interest.
1700	At the commence- ment of the 18th century, the fund- ed and unfunded debts amounted to,	£ 16,394,700	£ 1,109,132
1714	Do.	55,681,076	2,811,904
1722	Do.	55,282,987	
1728	Do.	51,008,431	2,137,782
1739	Do.	46,954,623	1,964,025

Years.	Remarks.	Amount of debt.	Annual interest.
	In seventeen years of profound peace only £ 8,328,354, of the capital paid off.	£	£
1748	After nine years of war the debt was	78,293,303	3,061,004
1755	Before the commencement of a new war, . . .	74,571,840	2,516,719
	In seven years of peace only four million pounds of debt paid off.		
1763	After seven years of war the debt was	139,561,806	4,840,821
1770	After seven years of peace, it was, (seven millions being paid off,) . . .	135,506,500	
1775	In these four years about four millions paid off, and the debt was, .	129,146,322	
1783	After the American war of 7 years, the debt was, . . .	262,318,198	
1786	From an authentic list laid before the British Parliament, the debt was, . . .	266,725,097	

It was reserved for the wisdom and energy of the late Mr. Pitt to place the finances of Britain on a solid and indestructible basis.

The interest of the debt contracted in the American war, and funds at the end of it, was £4,864,000. The increase of revenue in the year ending Christmas 1784, nine months after the peace, was only £1,755,000 above that of the year 1774, leaving a deficiency of £3,108,000, less than what was requisite to meet the increased expenditure occasioned by the interest on the debt incurred during the war. The floating debt in 1784 was £27,000,000, exclusive of loyalists' debentures, amounting to £2,000,000.

The British funds were also in a state of the utmost depression; the three per cents, which on the peace of 1763, rose to £95, never rose higher after the peace of 1783 than £69, and had fallen in the beginning of 1784 to £56.

Mr. Pitt, notwithstanding all these disadvantages and difficulties, funded the floating debt in the years 1784 and 1785; he imposed new taxes, which, while they were productive to the public treasury, did not affect the sources of national industry, nor press upon those classes of the community by whom that industry is supported; he was most successfully vigilant in preventing frauds in the collection of the old revenue; and made that collection more simple and less expensive, more productive to the state, and less embarrassing to the trader.

The consequence of these measures was, that in 1792, the revenue was increased (exclusively of taxes to the extent of £ 800,000 a year, imposed to defray the expenses of the Spanish armament in 1791) upwards of £ 4,000,000, of which something less than one million arose from new taxes and an increase derived from the consolidation of the customs.

But the measure, which above all others tended to give credit and vigor to Britain's system of finance was the appropriation, in the year 1786, of an annual million to the extinction of the national debt. This is the basis of what is now called the *Old Sinking Fund*. This measure was calculated to give the firmest confidence in the stability of the national funds. The act was guarded by every provision that could be devised to ensure a fidelity in the execution equal to the wisdom and extent of the design; and in its detail so contrived as regularly to afford to the Parliament and to the public the clearest and most distinct view of its progressive operation.

This old sinking fund, established in the year 1786, had redeemed in 1792, a period of six years, eight millions, and two hundred thousand pounds of the capital of the national debt.

To this yearly appropriation of a million, the additional sum of two hundred thousand pounds annually was voted by the Parliament in the year 1792; making the sum of one million two hun-

dred thousand pounds to be the basis of the annual income of the old sinking fund.

In the year 1792, also, on the suggestion of the late Mr. Fox, readily adopted by Mr. Pitt, another act of the British Parliament was passed, providing that *on all future loans* (in addition to the taxes to be imposed for paying the interest on these loans) a surplus of *one per cent.* per annum on the capital created, should be raised for the redemption of that capital. This is the basis of the annual income of what is now called the *New Sinking Fund*.

Both these sinking funds are perpetually increasing their annual income by the *interest* of all the capital of the national debt, which they respectively redeem, and also by that of the annuities, as they expire. Thus, say the present yearly income of the old sinking fund is three millions sterling; by next year we must add to that income the interest of all the capital of debt which these three millions will redeem; call it one hundred and fifty thousand pounds, reckoning the interest at five per cent. and the income of the old sinking fund will next year be three millions one hundred and fifty thousand pounds, and so on every year will its income progressively increase with a continually augmented velocity and force. The same progress takes place, in the perpetually increasing annual income of the new sinking fund.

But the annual income of the old sinking fund

is limited to a *maximum* of four millions two hundred thousand pounds, beyond which sum it is not suffered to accumulate. The yearly excess of its income above four millions two hundred thousand pounds is at the disposal of the British Parliament either to be applied to the redemption of the public debt incurred since the year 1792, or to the reduction of taxes annually to the amount of such excess. The new sinking fund has no limitation of a maximum to fetter its progress; its annual income might go on progressively increasing to any amount, which the discretion of the British Parliament shall allow.

The establishment of the new sinking fund is a measure of the utmost importance to the stability of British credit. If its infallible operation were generally understood, all fears of British bankruptcy would vanish from the minds of the most timid, and all doubts would be removed from the scepticism of the most incredulous.

In point of fact, the new sinking fund of Britain has reduced every debt to an *annuity*, determinable at a period more or less distant, according to the price of stocks in the interval of its operation; of which annuity a large proportion of the persons existing at the time of the creation of the debt, must, in the ordinary course of human nature, live to see the end. With every additional burden, which might be vulgarly supposed to weaken the security of the public creditor, is thus

interwoven a provision for establishing that security by confirming within certain limits the extent to which any given debt can be accumulated ; and also by ascertaining the redemption of the whole debt, whatever may be its amount, within a given period from its creation.

For as every fresh loan is accompanied with a provision in the sinking fund, to redeem its whole amount within a period of time determined by the existing prices of the stocks ; every fresh portion of public debt becomes an annuity, which is sure to expire at the termination of a given number of years. And as this number of years cannot well, under any supposable circumstances exceed *forty*, a great portion of the people who see the beginning, will also live to see the end of such a portion of the public debt.

Every fresh burden of debt apparently weakens the security of the stock-holder, or public creditor, by increasing the difficulty of raising an annual revenue in the form of taxes for the purpose of paying the interest upon the public debt. But the new sinking fund in reality strengthens the security of the stock-holders, by preventing the too great accumulation of the aggregate debt which is perpetually diminished by the continual encroachments of that sinking fund upon the capital of the debt, and also by the certainty which it establishes of redeeming each separate portion of the public debt within a certain period from the time of its creation.

The rapid and effectual operation of the old and new sinking funds to discharge the national debt of Britain, will appear from the following statement :

Years.	Remarks.	Amount of debt.	Annual interest.
		£	£
1793	By the report of the Select Committee on Finances, the debt was	247,156,670	10,332,435
	In 7 years the sinking fund had redeemed £ 19,600,000 of the capital of the debt.		
1800	Amount of the debt, including upwards of 12 millions unfunded.	463,878,034	20,186,507

From this sum of £ 463,878,034,
Deduct as charged on account
for Ireland 15,315,000
And as provided by the income-
tax, the sum of 56,000,000

Total £ 71,315,000

And there will remain of permanent debt charged on Britain in the year 1800 . . .

£ 379,525,746

By the operation of the sinking funds from the year 1786, to the opening of the Budget 18th of February, 1801, a portion of the capital of the national debt had been redeemed, to the amount of

£ 52,000,000

To which add the sum redeemed

by the land-tax, 18,000,000

Total, £ 70,000,000

The sum annually applicable to the reduction of the national debt, or, in other words, the yearly income of the sinking funds in 1800, amounted to

£ 5,233,000

The following is a statement of the *annual income* arising from the old and new sinking funds on 1st of May, 1806 :

Old Sinking Fund.

	£	s.	d.
Annual million, 26, Geo. 3d.	1,000,000	0	0
Annual additional issue from			

	£	s.	d.
1792, perpetuated by 42d.			
Geo. 3d.	200,000	0	0
Annuities 1777 expired . .	25,000	0	0
Annuities 1796—1797 expired	54,880	14	6
Unclaimed and expired annuities on lives	50,308	5	7
Annual interest on £56,317-489, the capital redeemed May 1st, 1806, at three per cent.	1,689,524	13	4
Do. on £2,617,400 at four per cent.	104,696	0	0
Do. on £142,000 at five per cent.	7,000	0	0
<hr/>			
Total income of the old sinking fund in the year 1806	3,131,509	13	5
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New Sinking Fund.

	£	s.	d.
One per cent. per annum, on account of loans raised from 1793 to 1806, both inclusive	3,494,541	6	6
Annual interest on £44,989-533, the capital redeemed			

May 1st, 1806, at three	£	s.	d.
per cent.	1,349,685,	19	9

Total annual income of the new sinking fund in the year 1806	4,844,227.	6	3
Ditto of the old sinking fund in the year 1806	3,131,509	13	5

Annual income of both old and new sinking funds in 1806	7,975,736	19	8
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Imperial.

	£	s.	d.
One per cent. per annum. on account of loan 1797	36,693	0	0
Annual interest on £ 673, 126, the capital redeemed May 1st 1806, at three per cent.	20,193	15	7
Total annual income of the Imperial	56,876	15	7
———of old sink- ing fund	3,131,509	13	5

Total annual income of new sinking fund . . .	£	s.	d.
	4,844,227	6	3
<hr/>			
Annual income of all the sinking funds . . .	8,032,623	15	3
<hr/>			
Capital of the national debt paid off by the old sinking fund . . .	59,076,000	0	0
—by the Imperial	673,000	0	0
—by the new sink- ing fund	44,989,000	0	0
<hr/>			
Total of the capi- tal paid off .	104,738,000	0	0
Expense of Spanish arma- ment in 1791, by de- benture paid off . . .	3,133,000	0	0
Debentures granted to loy- alists in America paid off	2,946,000	0	0
<hr/>			
Total of national debt liquidated	110,817,000	0	0
From which deduct debt created by Tontine in 1789, and Navy-bills funded	1,458,000	0	0
And the whole capital of British national debt re- deemed in 1806 is . . .	109,359,000	0	0

By the operation of these sinking funds, without any farther intervention of the parliament, the old sinking fund, established in 1786, must attain its maximum, namely an annual income of four millions two hundred thousand pounds, at the very farthest period by the beginning of 1811, and probably by the month of February, 1809.

And taking the three per cents. on an average to be at £ 85, which is perhaps the fairest medium to take, considering the probable rapid rise of the British funds on a return of peace, owing to the immense purchases which will then be made from the accumulation of the sinking funds; and also considering how little the average is likely to be affected by the low price of stocks in the early part of the period; the capital of the old debt, incurred before the year 1792, amounting to about £ 240,000,000, will be completely redeemed in January 1846.

If the same price of the three per cents be assumed in computing the period of the redemption of the new debt, created since the year 1792, the three per cents will be redeemed in less than thirty-nine years and a half from the time of making each loan. At the price of £ 3½, which the funds bore in 1799, the three per cents, created by new loans, would be redeemed in twenty-three years and a quarter from the time each loan was made.

The following table will explain the several dates when the old sinking fund shall have increa-

sed to its greatest yearly amount, namely, four millions a year, to which add the two hundred thousand pounds annually voted by the Parliament, making together an annual income of four millions two hundred thousand pounds; and also the dates when the whole amount of the debt incurred before the year 1793 will be redeemed by the operation of the old sinking fund, according to the several average prices at which the three per cents may hereafter be purchased.

Average prices of the three per cent. funds from 1st Feb. 1799.	Dates when the old sinking fund will have increased to four million pounds per ann. 1793, will be cancelled.		Dates when the whole of the debt incurred before the year 1793, will be cancelled.	
		its greatest lawful amount.		
55	November	1808	October	1832
60	August	1809	October	1835
65	April	1810	September	1838
70	February	1811	August,	1841
75	February	1808	June	1842
80	February	1808	April	1844
85	February	1808	January	1846
90	February	1808	January	1848
100	February	1808	May	1852

It is obvious that in some cases the sinking fund will increase to its greatest amount sooner with the stocks at a high than a lower price, by the reduction of the five per cents. or four per cents.

The excess above £ 4,200,000, in the first year after the old sinking fund shall attain its maxi-

mun, according to the different prices of stocks, will be

At 75	£ 23,000
80	203,300
85	376,800
90	488,400
100	643,900

The annexed table will show the several periods of time in which each capital of public debt, bearing interest at 3, 4, or 5 per cent. per ann. respectively, will be redeemed by an annual fund of one per cent. applied by quarterly issues, in purchasing the said capitals at the several average prices at which the 3 per cent. funds may be redeemed. This table shews the time in which the new sinking fund redeems the capital created, according to the different average prices of the stocks.

Average prices of 3 per cent. funds.	Periods of redeeming by a sinking of one per cent. per annum issued by quarterly payments, a capital of debt bearing interest.					
	At 3 per cent. per ann.		At 4 per cent. per ann.		At 5 per cent. per ann.	
	Years.	Months.	Years.	Months.	Years.	Months.
50	23	3 $\frac{1}{4}$	27	0 $\frac{1}{4}$	30	1
55	25	7	29	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	33	0 $\frac{3}{4}$
60	27	10 $\frac{3}{4}$	32	4 $\frac{3}{4}$	36	$\frac{3}{4}$
65	30	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	35	0 $\frac{3}{4}$	39	$\frac{1}{2}$
70	32	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	37	9	42	$\frac{1}{4}$
75	34	10	40	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	45	$\frac{1}{4}$
80	37	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	43	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	48	0
85	39	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	45	9 $\frac{1}{2}$	50	11 $\frac{3}{4}$
90	41	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	48	5 $\frac{3}{4}$	53	11 $\frac{3}{4}$
95	44	0 $\frac{3}{4}$	51	2	56	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
100	46	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	53	10 $\frac{1}{4}$	59	11 $\frac{1}{4}$

Years.	Remarks.	Funded debt.	Long & short annuities.	Stock purchased by commissioners.	Annuities fallen in.	Sum annually applicable to reduction.	Proportion to the capital.	Annual charge including sums applicable to reduction.
		£	£	£	£	£	£	£
1786	Amount of old debt, .	238,231,248	1,373,550			1,400,000	$\frac{1}{238}$ th part.	9,297,000
1793	Ditto,	227,989,148	1,293,670	10,242,670	79,880	1,427,143	$\frac{1}{160}$ th part.	10,325,000
1800	Ditto,	205,826,403	1,253,670	22,162,745	40,000			
1800	New debt created since 1793,	257,787,729						
	from which deduct on account of Ireland, . .	15,315,000						
	and also as provided for by the income tax,	56,545,000						
	Total,	71,860,000						
	and the capital of debt is	185,927,729						
	Amount of new debt, after deducting the annexed stock bought by the commissioners,	173,599,343	283,206	12,238,449				8,582,429
	Total amount of old and new permanent debts	379,425,764	1,573,077	40,733,294		4,730,000	$\frac{1}{182}$ d part.	18,907,429

As the dividends due on such parts of the old debt as shall be paid off after the sinking fund has attained its maximum, and the annuities which shall afterwards fall in, will be at the disposal of the British Parliament, either to apply towards the liquidation of the new debt, incurred since the year 1792, or to the repealing of taxes annually to an amount equal to such dividends, and to the yearly income of such annuities; either the new debt will be more speedily cancelled than could be effected by the operation of the new sinking fund alone, or an annual reduction of taxes in Britain to a considerable amount cannot be delayed longer than the year 1811.

The table on page 153, exhibits at one view the state of Britain's funded debt, long and short annuities, together with the progress of the sinking funds from January 1786 to January 1800, a period of fourteen years, and annual charges, including the sums applicable to the reduction of the debt.

It only now remains to state the *mode* in which the sinking funds operate in liquidating the national debt.

The basis of the old sinking fund, as before observed, is the annual appropriation of one million, by an act of the British Parliament passed in 1786, and an aftergrant of the yearly sum of two hundred thousand pounds in 1792, making together an annual income of £ 1,200,000, this income is continually increasing by an addition of the yearly in-

terest of all the capital of the public debt, which it from time to time redeems, and by the annuities which fall in or expire; but its income is restricted to a maximum, amounting to four millions two hundred thousand pounds per annum, beyond which it is not suffered to accumulate.

The foundation of the new sinking fund is the grant made by the British Parliament in 1792 of one per cent. per annum on the capital of every future loan, to be issued in quarterly payments. The annual income thus created is continually augmented by the yearly interest of all the capital of the debt incurred since 1793, which it redeems; and this process of augmentation goes on without any restriction, as no maximum is applied to curtail the boundaries of its incessantly increasing revenue.

The British Parliament sends certain commissioners into the stock exchange in London, to buy up a given portion of the public debt, as the annual income of the sinking funds becomes due. Say the government purchases a million of stock; from that moment this stock becomes fixed; it floats for sale no longer in the market; but the British government itself is a stock-holder to that amount and consequently receives, in the capacity of a public creditor, the existing rate of interest upon it according to the nature of the stocks, namely, three per cent. from the three per cents. four per cent. from the four per cents. &c. making the annual interest

amount to thirty or forty thousand pounds sterling.

By this operation a capital, to the whole amount of the purchase-money of this million of stock, is let loose from its investment in the public funds, to find its way into the channels of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures, according to the will of the late public creditors who have transferred their share of stock to the government; and thus to put in motion a great mass of productive industry in Britain.

It is however to be especially kept in mind that this *letting loose* of capital applies only to the *individual* stock-holders who transfer their share of the public credit to the government for an equitable purchase-money; and that, in point of fact, as relates to the *community*, *no capital* is let loose, as we shall presently have occasion to notice. The whole transaction being a mere *transfer or shifting* of capital from one hand to another.

The government proceeds in this manner until it has displaced, or transferred the whole, or a part of the national debt from the individual public creditors to itself; say to the amount of one hundred millions; all which it lets loose, as far as the individual stock-holders are concerned, to find its way into other channels of employment. Suppose that the government then says "I will pay off these hundred millions of debt," it will then only have to remit, or take off from the people *taxes*

to the amount of the interest, which is annually paid upon these hundred millions; for it has already *redeemed*, or liquidated the *capital* of the national debt, to the amount of one hundred millions, by its gradual purchases of stock from the individual public creditors.

So that the government, first, redeems the capital of the funded debt, by transferring on purchase, out of the annual proceeds of the sinking funds, a portion of the public stock from the individual public creditors to itself;—and then, secondly, remits the interest which that capital bears, and which is now paid to itself as the public creditor, whenever it sees fit, by taking off taxes to the amount of that interest.

The government buys up portions of the public debt to the amount of nearly *a million sterling a month*; and is now a public creditor, or stockholder to the amount of *one hundred and eighty millions*; that is to say, has *redeemed* or paid off one hundred and eighty millions of the capital of the national debt, which is nearly a third part of its whole bulk.

The yearly interest upon these hundred and eighty millions is *not* applied to defray the annual expenditure of the government, but goes to swell the yearly income of the sinking fund, and thus farther to diminish the amount of the national debt by continual purchases of fresh portions of its capital.

It is no valid objection to this statement to say that Britain is perpetually borrowing money, and thus adding to the vast load of her national debt. For in the first place, the redeeming power and progressive force of the sinking funds to liquidate, far outweigh the tendency of new loans to augment the public debt ; and secondly the one per cent. per annum on the capital of every sum borrowed *ensures* the gradual redemption of the whole debt, at periods determinable according to the prices of the stocks, during the operation of the new sinking fund.

The yearly taxes, permanent and temporary, in Britain amount to sixty millions sterling ; her *war expenditure* is computed to average from sixty-five to seventy millions annually. But war cannot last for ever ; and at the return of peace the yearly expenses of the British government will be reduced at least one third ; say down to forty millions, including the twenty millions, which are annually paid as interest for the public debt. So that in time of peace there will be no occasion for Britain to borrow any money ; and the sinking funds go on with a force and rapidity augmenting yearly towards the redemption of the whole capital of the funded debt.

But if the war should continue for half a century to come, the progressive operations of the sinking funds would liquidate the national debt faster than the new loans could augment it.

The government might borrow upon an average, during the war, eight millions annually; a sum which now, in 1809, is not nearly equal to the yearly income of the sinking funds; and this yearly income is annually augmented by the interest of all the capital of the public debt, which it redeems. The income now, in September 1809, may be thus stated in round numbers:

Old Sinking Fund.

	£
Annual million, 26 Geo. 3d	1,000,000
Annual additional issue from 1792, perpetuated by 42d. Geo. 3d.	200,000
Annuities unclaimed, expired, &c.	400,000
Annual interest on £ 80,000, 000 of capital redeemed at three per cent.	2,400,000
Annual interest on £ 3,000,000 of capital redeemed at four per cent.	120,000
Annual interest on £ 1,600,000 of capital redeemed at five per cent.	80,000
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Total annual income of the old sinking fund be- ing its legal maximum	£ 4,200,000

New Sinking Fund.

£

One per cent. per annum on account of loans raised from 1793 to 1809, both inclusive	4,000,000
Annual interest on £ 100,000, 000, of capital redeemed at three per cent.	<u>3,000,000</u>

Total annual income of the new sinking fund in 1809	£ 7,000,000
<u> </u> of the old sinking fund	<u>4,200,000</u>

<u> </u> of both old and new sinking funds	<u>£ 11,200,000</u>
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Capital of debt paid off by the old sinking fund	£ 84,600,000
<u> </u> by the new sinking fund	<u>100,000,000</u>

Total capital of national debt paid off in 1809	<u>£ 184,600,000</u>
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When we consider the vast progressive force of the new sinking fund, whose operations are not restrained by any maximum, we need be under no alarm as to the ability of Britain to bear her burden of annual expenditure, and also to redeem the whole capital of her public debt. In the space of ten years, by the year 1820, the annual income of the sinking funds, if steadily applied to their *only legitimate* object, the redemption of the national debt, will amount to *more than twenty millions* sterling; and will go on annually augmenting with enormous rapidity; unless indeed the government of Britain shall choose to diminish the rate of their increase by a yearly remission of taxes, to the amount, or nearly to the amount of the interest on the stock-capital which it from time to time purchases.

By the remission of taxes to the whole amount of the interest payable on the stock which the British government holds in the public funds, the income of the old sinking fund may be reduced to its annual appropriation of one million two hundred thousand pounds; and the yearly income of the new sinking fund may be diminished to the mere amount of the one per cent. upon all the capital of debt created since the year 1793. For the two sinking funds have no other means of augmenting their yearly revenue than by receiving the interest payable upon all the funded stock which they purchase.

But it would appear to be the more sound policy to push forward the operations of the sinking funds by a rapid increase of their annual income, and gradually and slowly to remit some of the most oppressive and least productive taxes; in order that a large portion of the national debt may be paid off, and its bulk reduced to a tolerable and convenient size.

The vast progressive force of the new sinking fund may appear from the following statement.

In consequence of the improved and more productive system of taxation yielding a much larger annual revenue to Britain than heretofore, the future loans will be neither so frequent nor so large as those in times past have been. During the first ten years of the period in question, namely, from 1792 to 1802, the loans upon an average were much greater in amount than they have been from 1802 to 1809. We shall, however, state the whole sum borrowed, and take the annual average of the whole from the year 1792 to 1809, a period of seventeen years.

Four hundred millions of *nominal* capital of debt have been created in these seventeen years, making an annual average of debt incurred to the amount of twenty-three millions and a fraction. The new sinking fund started with the commencement of this debt in the year 1793, with an annual income of only one per cent. upon all the capital created; say two hundred and thirty thousand

pounds for the first year, taking the debt incurred that year at twenty-three millions.

From such small beginnings, the new sinking fund continually adding to its income of one per cent. annually upon all the capital borrowed, the yearly interest upon all the capital redeemed, has, in the space of seventeen years, encroached upon the whole of the debt so far as to reduce one fourth of its bulk, and has made its own income nearly equal to the amount of the yearly interest upon all the yet unredeemed portion of the public debt.

It is also to be particularly noted that the operations of the new sinking fund are comparatively slow and feeble in the first years of its progress; and that in proportion to its advancement in age it rapidly swells the amount of its income by the annual addition of the interest upon all the enormous sums of the capital of the funded debt, which it from time to time redeems.

	£
Nominal debt created from	
1792 to 1809	400,000,000
Annual interest of that debt	
at three per cent.	12,000,000

Annual income of the New Sinking Fund in 1809.

One per cent. per annum. on
all the capital of debt crea-

	£
ted from 1792 to 1809 . . .	4,000,000
Annual interest upon £ 100,- 000,000 of capital of that debt redeemed at three per cent.	3,000,000
	<hr/>
Total annual income of new sinking fund in 1809	7,000,000
	<hr/>
The whole nominal debt of Britain created since 1792	400,000,000
Deduct as redeemed by the new sinking fund	100,000,000
	<hr/>
And there remains of capital of public debt	300,000,000
	<hr/>
The whole annual interest of the debt since 1792	12,000,000
Deduct the interest on £ 100,- 000,000 redeemed by the new sinking fund	3,000,000
	<hr/>

And there remains of yearly
interest on the yet unre-
deemed portion of the debt £ 9,000,000

So that the annual income of the new sinking fund, now in 1809, is only two millions less than the whole yearly interest of all the unredeemed portion of the public debt. In less than ten years from this time, namely by the year 1819, it will be more than double the amount of that interest ; because its income is every year rapidly increasing by that very process which is annually diminishing the capital, and consequently the interest, of the yet unliquidated part of the national debt.

The following table will show how rapidly the progressive force of the new sinking fund gains upon the accumulation of the public debt, however enormous that accumulation be.

Years.	Capital of debt.	Income of new sinking fund.			Proportion of the income of new sinking fund to the whole capital of debt.
	£	£	s	d	
1793	23,000,000	230,000	—	—	$\frac{1}{100}$ th part.
1798	138,000,000	1,533,333	6	8	$\frac{1}{90}$ th part.
1803	253,000,000	3,373,333	6	8	$\frac{1}{75}$ th part.
1808	400,000,000	7,000,000	—	—	$\frac{1}{57}$ th part.

Thus in seventeen years, although so enormous a capital of debt as that of four hundred millions was created, yet the income of the new sinking

fund has gained upon it, from the proportion of a *one hundredth* part of the whole debt to that of one *fifty-seventh* of the whole debt ; and the progressive force of this income is increasing in rapidity every year, so that every new accumulation of debt will be swept away with still greater facility and speed than has ever hitherto been accomplished.

It is likewise to be especially noticed that the income of the new sinking fund is in *sterling*, whereas the capital of the debt is *funded stock*, almost the whole of which is vested in the three per cents. whence we may fairly cut away at least one fourth, in order to reduce it to sterling ; and then the capital of debt being only three hundred millions, and the annual income of the new sinking fund being seven millions, the proportion of the yearly income applied to the reduction of the debt is about *one forty-third* instead of *one fifty-seventh* of its whole bulk.

CHAPTER III.

I AM well aware that one of the chief reasons, which induced the framers of the old sinking fund, established in 1786, to clog and cripple its operation by the imposition of a maximum, was partly

the unfounded and mistaken notion that the sums of capital-stock bought up by the commissioners, would *let loose* so much capital upon the public as to reduce the value, and injure the circulation of money throughout the empire ; and partly the fear lest its too vast progressive increase might derange the order of prices in the country.

And the Earl of Lauderdale even ventures to exceed this error ; for in his “ Inquiry into the nature and origin of public wealth, and into the means and causes of its increase,” he roundly asserts that the very principle of the sinking funds is false, and ridicules the whole project of paying off the British national debt as chimerical. The substance of his argument, to prove that the late Mr. Pitt and some others of the ablest and best financiers whom the world ever saw, were altogether in the dark as to this important point, is as follows.

His lordship says, that when the stock-holder receives his capital from the British government, who buys up his stock with the proceeds of the sinking funds, he must invest it again somewhere for the purpose of producing an income, or he must spend the capital and ruin himself. The very large sums which would thus be repaid, would increase the circulating capital so much as to render it impossible to find new channels of employment for all the capital thus released. The public creditor not having the means of investing the

money which he thus receives from the government in payment for his funded stock, so as to produce an income; and not choosing to spend the capital, the demand for commodities to the extent of the sum paid off must cease. Whence the Earl of Lauderdale infers that before the sinking funds can redeem one hundred millions of debt, three hundred millions of the real wealth of the country must be extinguished.

But his lordship appears to have overlooked some very material circumstances which go to prove the entire fallacy of his conclusion, that the sinking funds, by paying off the whole or a part of the national debt, *increase* the floating capital of the community.

The fairest and the most comprehensive view of the funding system and its invaluable attendants, the sinking funds, which I have ever seen, is to be found in the Edinburgh Reviews of Bishop Watson's *intended* speech in the British House of Lords on the national debt of Britain, in the year 1803, 3d vol. Ed. Review, p. 468; of Lord Lauderdale's book on Public Wealth; 4th vol. Ed. Rev. p. 443; of Arthur O'Connor's pamphlet on the Present State of Great Britain in the year 1804, 5th vol. Ed. Rev. p. 104; and of Lord Henry Petty's Plan of Finance in 1807, 10th vol. 72. From these Reviews I shall extract such facts and arguments as go to prove conclusively the *policy* and *wisdom* of the funding system, and the *efficacy* of the sinking

funds. The observations of my own which I shall have occasion now and then to introduce will be so very few, and so entirely founded on the great general principles of finance laid down in the Edinburgh Review, that I consider myself as altogether indebted to that unrivalled periodical work for the following explanation of a very important part of the British financial system.

1. The *fact* is directly against the Earl of Lauderdale's position, that the paying off the national debt so floods Britain with a *surplus* capital, as in a great measure to extinguish the national wealth by constantly throwing a large portion of the capital of the community out of employment. For although one hundred and eighty millions of the capital of the funded debt have been actually redeemed, yet the capital, thus *let loose*, or *created*, as Lord Lauderdale calls it, but which in reality is only *transferred* or *shifted* from one portion of the community to another, *has not* so overflowed the country as to find no channel of employment.

For the price of the British stocks has not risen very high in consequence of these vast purchases of the capital of the funded debt by the government. An event which must inevitably have taken place if the capital redeemed could find no channel of employment; because then the private capitalists, not being able to raise any income upon their capital, would incessantly bid against the government for the purchase of funded stock; and thus the mu-

tual competition of the government and of wealthy individuals would force up the price of stocks to such a height as to render the operation of the sinking funds utterly weak and insignificant; whereas, now, their operation is very rapid and powerful.—But,

2dly. The redemption of the national debt by the operation of the sinking funds *cannot* flood Britain with a redundant capital. The British government has no private purse, no other means of obtaining money than by collecting it from the public in the shape of taxes, whence all the capital which it pays to the public creditors for their respective shares of funded stock is only a *transfer* of so much capital from the community at large amongst whom it lay floating, until the government drew it unto itself by taxation, to certain individuals late stock-holders, who may either send it into the same channels of employment which it occupied before it was embodied into taxes; or may use it in some other occupations which are laid open by the very circumstance of subtracting so much capital from the public in the form of taxes.

This must be the case, unless we choose to assert that *all* the channels of British trade, manufactures, and agriculture, both domestic and colonial, are absolutely full of as much capital or stock as they can receive, which every child knows not to be true.

The redemption of the national debt then cannot overflow Britain with useless capital, since *all* the capital which is paid off by the operation of the sinking funds must have previously existed in the form of revenue. The state must have received it in taxes upon individuals who had produced it as profit from time to time. The whole income of the sinking funds, namely, the annual appropriation of one million two hundred thousand pounds for the old sinking fund, and the annual appropriation of one per cent. upon all the capital of loans raised since the year 1792, for the new sinking fund ; together with the interest of all the capital of funded debt which both the sinking funds respectively redeem, is raised in the shape of taxes from the community, and is applied to the purchase of funded stock from the individual public creditors.

The capital therefore is not "*let loose or created,*" as far as the public is concerned, which Lord Lauderdale asserts ; it is only *transferred*, it would have actually existed in the community although it had never passed through the hands of the government, and part of it has been necessarily expended *as revenue* by the managers of the funds, which would have remained in the hands of the producers had there been no impost levied.

In a word the whole operation is simply this :—a given quantity of capital is drawn from the nation at large in the form of taxes ; and this *same*

capital is returned by the government to the nation in the shape of purchase of stock. . And the whole effect of this transfer of the *same capital* is, that first the government draws it from a vast number of hands spread over the community ; and secondly, that government returns it into the hands of a *few* individuals, who sell their respective shares of the public stock.

3dly. The real operation of the British sinking funds is, with a pace gradually accelerated, to encroach upon the capital, of the national debt ; and *scarcely influencing* the price of stocks, silently to transfer the property from the individual public creditors to the government.

This transference is made in small portions at different times ; so that the lowest fund, or the fund which is lowest in proportion to its profits, may always be chosen. During a long war a vast portion of the debt may be purchased by the commissioners at a *lower* rate than that at which it is funded ; whence, while the nation is borrowing at a disadvantage, it is, in the same degree, reaping a benefit from discharging former incumbrances at little cost.

After a very great part of the funded stock has been purchased by the commissioners, the remainder will indeed rise higher than it would have done if the same stock had continued in the possession of men who often brought it into the market. But the change is so slow that a number of channels

now empty must be filled, before the difficulty of obtaining employment for capital shall occasion a glut in the stock-market.

No doubt, if a resolution to pay off the national debt speedily, say in four years, were to be suddenly formed, three per cents being at sixty, every proprietor must know that by holding out he would gain forty per cent. in consequence of the stocks rising up to par, while he receives in the mean time five per cent. of interest. But when the payment is effected by a slow transference to the sinking funds, proprietors know that they cannot force their stock upon the commissioners at par. In the case above assumed, namely that of paying the whole debt in four years, monied men will eagerly strive to get a share of the funds before they are near par, knowing that by this purchase their gain is sure. But in the case of the gradual operation of the sinking funds they may gain one or two per cent. and then be obliged to sell again before the commissioners choose to pay more.

It is probable then that the effect of the sinking funds will be to displace gradually a part of the capital now vested in the national loans, and to restore it to the commerce and agriculture of the country, while the annuitants, who cannot engage in trade, and are anxious for the best security, being the last to sell out, will receive the highest price, that is the *par* of all the respective stocks, at which price the government is entitled to pay off

all the remaining stock-holders, whenever the proceeds of the sinking funds shall enable it to take such a step.

The debt will thus be redeemed with as little loss as possible, and when, during a season of peace, the revenue of the sinking funds shall be so great as to render the speedy completion of the transfer certain, the government may begin the change by lightening the national burdens in the remission of taxes ; so that on one hand, the enormous taxes required to maintain the process of liquidation may not all at once be repealed, and on the other, the increased rapidity of the process of liquidation may not occasion towards its conclusion, too sudden a shifting of the remaining stock.

To redeem the whole national debt of Britain, a revenue of more than eleven millions sterling, being the amount of the sinking funds in the year 1809, is yearly set apart with its own accumulations ; and being raised on the income of the people, by means of taxes, which, except the legacy-duty, and a few stamp-taxes, never can be shifted upon capital ; it is equally distributed over the different kinds of profit which constitute the whole national revenue.

The transfer of this sum to the sinking funds sets free a stock equal to the sum raised from the people, after deducting the expenses of management. This stock will be employed in the cultivation and commerce of the country ; and so far from

being afraid lest the process of paying the debt by the operation of the sinking funds should go on too slowly, a prudent statesman, supposing the nation to be at peace, would rather incline to check the velocity of so powerful an engine, lest it should acquire a momentum fatal to the stability of commerce.

Our alarm however is diminished, when we reflect upon the gradual increase of the action of the sinking funds; upon its being entirely under the control of the government; and more particularly, upon its never being able to set free at once more than the *interest* of the original incumbrances. We hear people talk of the sinking fund accumulating until in a given number of years it shall have increased to some hundreds of millions; but its income can never exceed the nett amount of the taxes; and during the last year, when it has reached the maximum, it sets free exactly that amount of stock, and no more.

If, instead of being raised in taxes, this sum had remained in the pockets of the people, together with the expenses of collection and management, we cannot doubt that it would have found employment as easily as the other accumulations of profits, wages, and rents. In like manner, had the whole revenue of the funds from the beginning remained in the possession of the nation, a real capital would have been accumulated, much greater than the whole debt, which would certainly have found an easy vent in the extension of trade, the im-

provement of waste lands, and the cultivation of colonial territories.

But if the separation of the capital from its possessors be suddenly made, a stock is accumulated in hands unable to employ it, unless by restoring it to the space which the tax has left vacant. In like manner, if the accumulation of a real capital were made by means of a fund over and above the amount of the debt, (not, of course, by means of interest,) it would be impossible suddenly to employ it.

The objections to the funding system, which the very deservedly celebrated Dr. Adam Smith urges with so much zeal and ingenuity in his invaluable book on the Wealth of Nations, and which have been copied and re-copied by a vast multitude of succeeding political writers, among the rest by Mr. Albert Gallatin, the present Secretary of the American Treasury, in his "Sketch of the Finances of the United States," published in New-York in the year 1796; may all be reduced to three heads; namely,—

1st. That the funding system unjustly burdens posterity with a load of debt.

2d. That it needlessly annihilates national capital without reproducing any equivalent for its loss.

3dly. That it weakens every government which has recourse to it.

That none of these objections to the funding system are founded on fact or on correct reasoning

it is the aim of the following pages to demonstrate.

1st. As to its being unjust to burden posterity with a load of debt. Strictly speaking, a nation *has no posterity*. It is a great *unit* from the beginning to the end of its career; and therefore, although individuals shift and continually succeed each other from age to age, and from generation to generation, yet the great interests of the nation always remain the same; they are always one and indivisible. It is equally the interest of those individuals of a nation who shall come into existence fifty or a hundred years hence, that vast sums of money should *now* be spent in securing the national honor or the national safety, and in promoting the national prosperity and the national aggrandizement, as it is the interest of the now-existing individuals of that nation.

For if it be necessary that such sums be expended, either to repel the aggressions of a foreign foe, or to prevent the too great accumulation of power in a foreign country; it is evident that without this present expenditure, the individuals who are to live fifty or a hundred years hence, instead of standing high in the scale of national elevation and character, will be born to no other inheritance than that of the most humiliating bondage to a strange tyrant and his minions.

If then it be equally for the benefit of posterity as of the existing generation, that large portions of

capital be now expended ; it is but just and right that posterity should also bear its share of the burdens occasioned by such an expenditure. And it is surely more wise to spread a given burden of debt over a space of one hundred years, and over a population of one hundred millions, than to confine the pressure of its weight to twenty years, and to twenty millions of people ; taking the existing population of a given country to be twenty millions, and the time allotted for each succeeding generation of men to be twenty years.

For the annual *surplus produce* of the land and labor of every community, the fund which is yearly added to the capital and destined to increase the income of the people, is the fund out of which all taxes ought to be taken. And as this fund cannot suddenly be augmented in proportion to the public demands upon extraordinary occasions, the system of borrowing, that is the *funding system*, has been invented ; and this system, if kept within proper bounds, and combined with the establishment of a sinking fund, *equalises* the burdens of the state among the different successions of men for whose benefit they are imposed, and defers the actual levying of the supplies until the national stock shall have accumulated to the requisite point.

2dly. As to the funding system needlessly annihilating national capital, without re-producing any equivalent for its loss. This objection is founded on Doctor Smith's division of the people of every

community into two classes of laborers, the productive, and the unproductive. No one is allowed, by this justly eminent writer, to be a productive laborer unless he re-produces the capital which he employs in any given operation, together with the gradual accumulation of profit or revenue, arising from the employment of that capital. This definition of productive labor manifestly confines the application of the term to merchants, to manufacturers, and to farmers, since they alone re-produce the capital which they employ in their respective occupations, together with a profit upon it. All other classes of the community are condemned to the disgrace of being considered as unproductive laborers.

Now there can be no doubt that, admitting Doctor Smith's definition to be correct, all the capital which is borrowed by a government, and which constitutes the national debt of any given country, never re-produces itself, together with a profit, during the course of its employment, or expenditure. For the money which is consumed in paying the army and navy, the civil and ecclesiastical officers of government; and all the various expenses incident to a nation, offers no more return in the actual profits of stock, than does the capital which a man consumes in eating and drinking, and wearing apparel. In all these cases the capital employed is consumed, worn out,

annihilated, producing no return of interest or revenue.

In this very limited sense of the term, the capital of every public funded debt may be said to be annihilated ; that is to say, it does not re-produce itself with a profit, in the form of revenue or interest ; as it would do if employed in the occupations of agriculture, manufactures, or commerce.

But it by no means, therefore, follows that all the capital which constitutes a national debt is *needlesly* annihilated without re-producing *any* equivalent ; as an examination of Dr. Smith's division of a community into productive and unproductive laborers, and the application of certain well-known general principles of political science to the funding system, will demonstrate.

Doctor Smith calls those laborers productive, who, by adding to the value of some raw material, or by assisting in the increase of its quantity, realize, or fix in a vendible commodity, the effects of their exertions ; and he calls all those laborers unproductive, whose labor leaves nothing in existence after the moment of exertion, but perishes in the act of performance, without augmenting the wealth of the community. Thus, he says, the work of the farm-servant or manufacturing laborer is productive, because it is fixed in a useful commodity ; but the work of a menial servant is unproductive, because it perishes with the motion of his hands, and adds to the value of

nothing. A man grows rich by employing a number of the former ; he ruins himself by keeping a multitude of the latter.

But the case of the menial servant cannot be compared with that of the laborer employed in farming or manufactures. The menial is employed by the *consumer*, and for his own use exclusively ; the farm-servant and journeyman manufacturer are employed in the service of another party, by whom the consumer is supplied. The menial is in the predicament of a commodity bought or hired for consumption or use ; the journeyman manufacturer and farm-servant rather resemble tools bought or hired to work with.

At any rate, there is no such difference as Doctor Smith supposes, between the effect of maintaining a multitude of these several kinds of workmen. It is the extravagant quantity, not the peculiar quality, of the labor thus paid for, that brings on ruin. A man is ruined if he keeps more servants than he can afford, or employ, and does not let them out for hire ; exactly as he is ruined by purchasing more food than he can consume ; or by employing more workmen in any branch of manufactures than his business requires, or his profits will pay.

Nay, in general, there is no solid distinction between the effective powers of the two classes whom Doctor Smith denominates productive and unproductive laborers. The end of all labor is

to augment the wealth of the community ; that is to say, the fund from which the members of that community derive their subsistence, their comforts, and their enjoyments.

To confine the definition of wealth to mere subsistence is absurd. Those who argue thus admit butcher's meat and manufactured liquors to be subsistence ; yet neither of them is necessary ; for if all comfort and enjoyment be kept out of view, vegetables and water would suffice for the support of life ; and by this mode of reasoning the epithet of *productive* would be limited to the sort of employment that raises the species of food which each climate and soil is fitted to yield in greatest abundance with the least labor ;—to the culture of maize in some countries ;—of rice in others ;—of potatoes, or yams, or the bread-fruit tree, in others ;—and in no country would any *variation* of employment whatever be consistent with the definition.

According to this view of the question, therefore, the menial servant, the judge, the soldier, the statesman, the physician, the lawyer, the minister of religion, (all of whom, together with many others, are industriously ranked by Dr. Smith as *unproductive* laborers,) are to be arranged in the same class with the husbandmen and the manufacturers of every civilized community. The produce of the labor is in all these cases calculated to supply either the necessities, the comforts,

or the luxuries of society; and that nation has more real wealth than another which possesses more of *all* these commodities.

If this be not admitted, then we compare the two countries only in respect of their relative shares of articles indispensably requisite, and produced in greatest abundance, considering the soil and climate of each; and as nothing which is not necessary is to be considered valuable, a nation abounding in every species of comforts and enjoyments is to be deemed no richer than a community fed upon the smallest portion of the cheapest grain, or roots and water, which is sufficient to support human life.

But it is maintained, that admitting the wealth of a community to be augmented by the exertions of those whom Dr. Smith denominates unproductive laborers, still they are in a different predicament from the productive class, inasmuch as they do not augment the exchangeable value of any separate portion of the society's stock; neither increasing the quantity of that stock nor adding to the value of what formerly existed.

To this we answer that it is of very little consequence whether the wants of the community are supplied directly by men or mediately by men with the intervention of matter; whether we receive certain benefits and conveniences from those men at once or only in the form of inanimate and disposable substances.

Doctor Smith would admit that labor to be productive which realized itself in a stock, though that stock were destined to perish the next instant. If a player or a musician, instead of charming our ears, were to produce something which, when applied to our other senses, would give us pleasure for a single moment of time, their labor would be called productive; although the produce were to perish in the very act of employment.

Wherein, then, lies the difference? merely in this; that we must consume the one produce at a certain time and place; and may use the other in a little more extensive latitude. But this difference disappears when we reflect that the labor would still be reckoned productive which would give us a *tangible* equivalent, though it could not be carried from the spot of its production, and could last only a second of time in our hands upon that spot.

The musician in reality affects our senses by modulating the air; that is, he works upon the air, and renders a certain portion of it worth more than it was before he manufactured it. He communicates this value to it only for a moment, and in one place; where and when we are obliged to consume it. A glass-blower prepares some metal for our amusement or instruction, and blows it up to a great volume. He has now fixed his labor in a tangible commodity. He then exchan-

ges it, or gives it to us, that we may immediately use it; that is, blow it till it flies to shivers. He has however fixed his labor in a vendible commodity. But we may desire his farther assistance; we may require him to use it for our benefit; and without any pause in his process of blowing he bursts it.

This case approaches as nearly as possible to that of the musician; yet Dr. Smith maintains that the labor of the musician is unproductive, while that of the glass-blower is productive; even if he spoil the process, and defeat the end of the experiment, by pausing and giving into unskilful hands the bubble before it bursts. And if he perform the whole of that instructive operation, by contemplating which Sir Isaac Newton was taught the nature of color, his labor must be stigmatized as unproductive.

Neither is it fair to deny that the class of laborers called unproductive ever fixes its labor in some existing commodity. No labor, not even that of the farmer, actually *adds* to the stock already in existence. Man never creates; he only modifies the mass of matter previously in his possession. And the unproductive as well as the productive class, does actually realize its labor in an additional value conferred upon the stock formerly existing; only instead of working upon detached portions, it operates upon the general stock of the community.

Thus the soldier renders every portion of the stock more valuable by securing the whole from plunder; and the judge also increases its value by securing the whole from injury. Dr. Smith calls that man a productive laborer who manufactures bolts and bars for the protection of property. Is he not also then a productive laborer who protects property in the mass, and adds to every portion of it the quality of being secure? So those who increase the enjoyment of society add a value to the stock previously existing; they furnish new equivalents for which it may be exchanged; they render the stock worth more, that is, exchangeable for more; capable of commanding more enjoyments than it could formerly command.

The stock of the community consists of that part which is consumed by the producer, and of that part which he exchanges for some object of desire. Were there nothing for which to exchange the latter portion of the stock, it would soon cease to be produced. Hence the labor that augments the sum of the enjoyments and objects of desire for which this portion of stock may be exchanged is indirectly beneficial to production. But if this portion destined to be exchanged is already in existence, the labor which is supported by it, and which returns an equivalent to the former owner by the new enjoyments that it yields him, must be allowed to add a value directly to the exchangeable part of the stock.

In every point of view, therefore, the position of Dr. Smith is untenable. He has drawn his line of distinction between productive and unproductive labor in too low a part of the scale. The labor which he denominates unproductive has the very same qualities with a great part of the labor which he allows to be productive. According to his own principles, the line should have been drawn so as to cut off on the one hand, the labor which *apparently* increases the quantity of stock; and to leave, on the other hand, all that labor which only modifies, or in some manner induces, a beneficial change upon stock already in existence.

There is alike an inaccuracy in drawing a line of distinction between the different channels in which capital and labor may be employed, whether we separate, with Doctor Smith and his followers, the operation of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, from those arts where nothing *tangible* is produced or exchanged, or we place, according to the French economists and their disciples, the division somewhat higher, and limit the denomination of *productive* to the pursuits of agriculture alone.

All those occupations which tend to supply the necessary wants, or to multiply the comforts and pleasures of human life, are *equally productive* in the strict sense of the word; and tend to augment the mass of human riches; meaning by riches all those things which are necessary, or convenient, or delightful to man.

The progress of society has been attended with a complete separation of employments originally united. At first, every man provided for his necessities as well as his pleasures, and for all his wants as well as all his enjoyments. By degrees a division of these cares was introduced ; to supply the subsistence of the community became the province of one class ; to provide its comforts was the business of another ; and to procure its gratifications was the office of a third. The different operations subservient to the attainments of each of these objects were then intrusted to different hands, and the universal establishment of barter connected the whole of these divisions and subdivisions together ; enabled one set of men to manufacture for all without danger of starving in consequence of not ploughing or hunting, and another set of men to plough or hunt for all without incurring the risk of wanting tools or clothes in consequence of not manufacturing.

It has thus become as impossible to say exactly, who feeds, clothes, and entertains the community, as it would be impossible to say which of the many workmen employed in the manufacture of pins is the actual pin-maker, or which of the farm-servants produces the crop. *All* the branches of useful industry work together to produce one common end ; as all the parts of each branch co-operate to effect its particular object.

If you say that the farmer feeds the community,

and produces all the raw materials upon which the other classes of society work ; we answer, that unless those other classes worked upon the raw materials, and supplied the farmer's necessities, he would be forced to allot part of his labor to this employment, whilst he forced others to assist in raising the rude produce. In such a complicated system *all* labor has the same effect, and equally increases the whole mass of wealth. Nor can any attempt be more vain than that which would define the particular parts of the machine that produce the motion which is necessarily the result of the whole powers combined, and depends on each one of the mutually connected members.

Yet so wedded is Doctor Smith to his position, that certain necessary kinds of employment are unproductive, that he actually ranks the capital sunk in a *public debt* in the same class with the property consumed by fire, and the labor destroyed by pestilence.

But the debts of a country are always contracted, and its wars entered into, for some purpose either of security or aggrandizement ; and stock thus employed *must* have produced an *equivalent* ; which cannot be asserted of property or population absolutely destroyed. This equivalent may have been greater or less ; that is to say, the money spent for useful purposes may have been applied with more or less prudence and frugality. Those purposes too may have been more or less useful ;

and a certain degree of waste and extravagance always attends the operation of funding and of war.

But this is only an addition to the necessary price at which the benefits in view must be bought. The food of a country, in like manner, may be used with different degrees of economy, and the necessity of eating may be supplied at more or less cost. So long as wars exist, it is absurd to denominate those expenses unproductive which are incurred by defending a country ; or which amounts to the same thing, preventing an invasion by a judicious attack of an enemy ; or, which also amounts to the same, avoiding the necessity of war by a prudent system of foreign policy.

And he who holds the labor of soldiers and sailors and diplomatic agents to be unproductive, commits precisely the same error as he who should maintain the labor of the hedger to be unproductive because he only protects, and does not rear the crop. *All* these kinds of labor and employments of stock are parts of the same system, and *all* are *equally productive* of wealth.

Yet Dr. Smith gravely remarks how *much richer* England would now be if she had never waged certain wars. With equal justice we might calculate how many more coats, waistcoats, and breeches we should now have if we had always gone naked. The remarks stated above, apply equally to a circumstance in the theory of the balance of trade. In stating the proportion of exports to

imports, no notice can ever be taken in custom-house accounts of money remitted for subsidies, or for the payment of troops and fleets abroad.

But it is very inaccurate to assert that these sums are so much actually sent out of the country *without an equivalent*. In point of fact the equivalent is great and obvious ; although of a nature which cannot be stated in figures among the imports.

The *equivalent* is all the success gained by foreign warfare and foreign policy ; the security and aggrandizement of the state ; and the power of carrying on that commerce, without which there would be neither exports nor imports to calculate and compare.

An examination of the principles of the funding system will demonstrate the policy and wisdom of having recourse to such an expedient.

In every prosperous community the yearly produce of the land, labor, and capital of the inhabitants makes a certain clear addition annually to the whole stock or wealth of the country. At first, the amount of the capital is small, the profits of stock high, and the yearly augmentation considerable. By degrees, the rate of this increase becomes smaller ; that is to say, the profits of each separate portion of capital are diminished by competition ; but the whole clear gain is always increasing ; so that although individuals make a smaller average gain upon a given portion of stock each ten years than they did on the same

portion of stock the ten years immediately preceding, the whole gains of the community are greater during the second than they were during the first of these decennial periods.

This is evident from the manner in which capital makes its returns. Suppose the stock of a community like Holland engaged almost entirely in commerce, and a little agriculture, to consist of eighty millions in trade, ten millions in manufactures, and ten millions in agriculture ; and that the average rate of profit in all these branches of employment is ten per cent. A sum of ten millions is netted the first year ; of which say five go to support the inhabitants, and the other five are stored up so as to increase the national capital to one hundred and five millions.

Employment must be found for this additional capital. A part of it will go to the land, a part to the manufactures, and the rest to the commerce of the country. The increased competition in each branch will diminish the average rate of profit, and only nine and three quarters per cent. will be netted upon the capital next year. The activity and ingenuity of the people being now constantly at work to maintain a struggle with the diminution of profits, and to keep up the total income in spite of the lowered rate of gain, new lines of trade are struck out, new improvements made in the fisheries, new machinery invented, and waste lands cleared.

Thus the stock of the community goes on increasing, and the part added gives an additional revenue, in spite of the diminished rate of gain, until all the land is made the most of, all the manufactures improved as far as possible, and all the branches of commerce are filled with capital.

But new capital is still accumulated ; and it is the invariable tendency of new capital to push its way into new employments. Yet in a country like Holland there is a limit to this expansive power of stock in the nature of existing circumstances ; and every increase of capital augments the difficulty of vesting it. At first the surplus goes to the distant trader, the round-about trader, and the various branches of the carrying trade ; then it makes its way into the colonies or foreign settlements of the state, by loan to the colonist, or by investment in the colonial commerce ; next, it emigrates thither in purchases, and perhaps carries along with it the proprietor himself.

When impolitic regulations, or foreign conquests, or colonial dissensions and insecurity obstruct its progress in this line, it goes into the service of foreign states, by loans to the governments who give the best security ; next it is vested even in loans to individuals ; it then goes over in purchases, and probably carries along with it the proprietor ; last of all, it finds its way into foreign colonies. When all these channels are full, if they *can* be filled, the capital must cease to be accumu-

lated ; the habits of the people must be changed ; they must spend instead of heaping up, and the nation will become stationary ; or more probably will fall into decay.

Such is the natural progress of national opulence. Holland has gone through all the stages of this process, and perhaps has reached the last stage some time since.

There is a striking analogy between the progress of wealth and the progress of population in every part of their history. At first when land is plentiful the numbers of a people double in fifteen or twenty years ; by degrees the rate of increase becomes slower ; but still the numbers augment in a geometrical progression. Emigration to the colonies begins to take place ; the overflowing numbers then find vent in other countries ; and last of all they remove to foreign and distant colonies.

Still a boundary is fixed by nature ; and that change of place will not prevent the full development of this principle is evident, when we reflect, that if we take the whole population of the earth for the subject of calculation, the effect of emigration ceases to modify the result, while the principle applies with the same force as before. What the increase of wealth has produced in Holland, the increase of population has produced in China. These two countries, the one from physical, the other from political and moral causes, offer to our contemplation the instructive spectacles of extreme cases in these important inquiries.

But the evils of increasing capital, like the evils of increasing population, are felt long before the case has become extreme ; and a nation is much more likely, at least in the present state of commercial policy, to suffer from increasing wealth than from increasing numbers of people. Are there no checks provided by the constitution of human nature, and the construction of civil society, for the one as well as for the other of these evils ?

Mr. Malthus has pointed out the manner in which the principle of population is counteracted ; and causes nearly analogous will be found to check the progressive increase of capital. Luxurious living and other kinds of unnecessary expenditure ; above all, political expenses, and chiefly the expenses of war, furnish those necessary checks to the indefinite augmentation of wealth, which there was reason *a priori* to suppose would be some where provided by the wise regulations of nature.

In a wealthy state of society, therefore, much less mischief is to be apprehended from the conversion of a certain portion of capital into revenue, by means of the funding system, while the accumulation of national capital is going on, than men in general have been disposed to believe.

Suppose that the nature of man were not warlike ; that no such expenses had been necessary as those which Britain has been forced to incur during the last century ; and that consequently

she had contracted no public debts. It is not easy to calculate the amount of the capital, over and above the national stock that she now possesses, which she would have accumulated during that period. The sum of six hundred millions, the nominal capital of her national debt is not enough; every pound of that enormous sum would have been laid out at compound interest, and have accumulated so as probably to double during the period in question; even allowing for a vast augmentation of yearly expense occasioned by a more rapid increase of population; making a total of British national wealth, amounting to *three thousand nine hundred millions*, instead of her present national capital of two thousand seven hundred millions.

With perhaps half as many more inhabitants, a thing no ways desirable on any account, Britain would now possess nearly a third more than her present fixed and realized national stock, a thing to be deprecated on many accounts. If it be difficult for her in the present state of her wealth to find vent for her existing capital, how could she invest an additional sum of twelve hundred millions with a return of profit.

The cruelties and other immoralities and miseries of war are out of the question; we speak now of money, not of men; and as numbers of people are generally admitted to be no great blessing, abstractedly considered, it is no strained inference

from the preceding statements to doubt if immense quantities of capital be of themselves a great national good; and to suggest the possibility of a nation so circumstanced falling back, since no community *can* be stationary for any length of time; (for every nation, like every individual, *must* from the very necessity of its nature and condition, either improve or deteriorate)—or of becoming a prey to poorer neighbors, and to the worst of foes, its own internal seeds of putrefaction and decay.

Let us attend now to the specific mode in which the indefinite accumulation of national capital is obstructed or retarded by the different kinds of financial policy that have been adopted in the different stages of society.

In the earlier periods of civilization, when only a small portion of stock has been accumulated, wars, the great article in the extraordinary expense of every nation, are carried on at little cost; for these are the ages in which the numbers of mankind are very limited, and labor is but little subdivided. Each man of full strength therefore contributes his share to the public defence by actual service; and the season of warfare is confined to a particular season of the year. A country is indeed now and then ravaged, and useful hands are always cut off. The consequence is, that many lives are lost, much misery occasioned, and a great deal of partial poverty produced. The

whole body of the nation however suffers only in this topical manner; and those members which escape disease or amputation are perfectly sound.

One of the first effects of accumulated national stock is a division of labor, and personal service gradually wears out. Taxation is introduced, and money, that is, revenue, is required to defray the ordinary, and still more the extraordinary expenses of the state. These steps are gone through by different belligerents, that is, different neighbouring nations, in the same or nearly the same periods of time; for the nations which form, as it were, federal commonwealths, linked together by the relations of peace and war, are always running with equal pace the same career of improvement.

By degrees, wars become perhaps less frequent, but certainly much more expensive; in the same manner that all other articles of expenditure, public and private, increase in costliness, as subsistence, luxuries, education, government, judicatures, embassies, &c. &c. and the ordinary revenue of the state becomes less and less adequate to defray the extraordinary expenses occasioned, and suddenly occasioned by the breaking out of hostilities. Thus a government which expends ten millions a year in its government and public works during peace, will be forced at once to spend perhaps thirty millions in a single year of war.

How shall this sudden augmentation of expenses be provided for ? It can be only in one or in all three of these ways ; either by saving so much out of the ordinary articles of expenditure, or by levying three times the ordinary taxes ; or by borrowing money to the amount of the additional sums required.

If any great saving out of the ordinary expenses were practicable it would be highly impolitic ; it would instantly diminish the revenue of the nation and of the government, and injure the wealth as well as the happiness of the community for many succeeding generations.

These lamentable effects would be produced in this manner ; by diminishing the ordinary expenses of a nation we lessen the demand for, and in consequence the quantity of productive industry in all its branches ; which would also lessen the annual accumulation of national capital, from whose income alone the public revenue can be effectually and permanently drawn.

For instance, say a whole nation consumes less food, less clothing, less of the conveniences and comforts of life, than it has hitherto done ; the inevitable effect must be, that less land would be cultivated, as less would be sufficient to supply the diminished demand for food ; thus would agriculture be discouraged ; less manufacturing industry would also be put in motion, because less would be wanted to furnish the diminished demand

for clothing; thus would manufactures languish and decay; less commercial enterprise would also be afloat, since less would be needed to supply the contracted demands of a narrower market for its commodities; thus would trade be curtailed in its operations.

And when a nation once becomes retrograde in its three great branches of productive industry, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, it rapidly hastens to destruction; the sources of public revenue are dried up, the population diminishes, the government loses its energy, the spirit of the people evaporates into indolence and weakness; and the whole community silently and unresistingly sinks into the arms of a foreign foe, or of domestic despotism.

The late and present condition of Holland is a full and striking illustration of the truth of this position.

The only question, then, is between the comparative merits of the other two systems of finance, namely, a taxation which shall raise the supplies within the year, or a contract which shall procure the extraordinary sums by loan; which of these is the safest, the easiest, and the most consonant to the natural order of things?

The expenses of every individual are proportioned to the *ordinary* state of society in which he lives. He squares his enjoyments by his common rate of gain, and by the common amount of the

contributions which he must pay to the public service. The bulk of the community, the middle orders, on whom the chief weight of all taxes must ultimately fall, are peculiarly unable to increase their contributions on any sudden emergency. The man who could hardly pay fifty pounds last year, would have nothing to live upon if you took from him one hundred and fifty or two hundred pounds this year. He must either leave the country, hide his property, encroach on his capital, or run in debt.

If he encroach on his capital, he is less able to pay taxes next year even to the ordinary amount, and no prudent government would listen to a scheme which should make all the individuals of the community run in debt on their own separate accounts, admitting that they could all give such security as would induce money-holders to trust them. Besides what becomes of the large class of annuitants in every country, laborers of every sort who have little or no stock on which to encroach and can give little or no security to the lenders ; and traders on commission whose gains are so little proportioned to their capitals, but whose contributions ought to bear some proportions to their gains?

The proper fund of all taxation is *not* the general capital of the community, and consequently not that part of the revenue which is necessary for the support of the proprietor and his capital,

and which if touched must ultimately throw the burden on the capital. The only fund from which taxes can be safely drawn is the revenue reserved for consumption ; and the question is—*How* shall this be effected so as to increase at will the public revenue without injury to the wealth of the nation, or injustice to individuals ?

The immediate effect of every war, civil or external, and in a less degree of all those other emergencies which happen to a nation, is to obstruct the ordinary employment of capital ; to throw a quantity of stock which was formerly profitably invested out of its place, and to prevent the new accumulations of stock from finding new channels of employment. A great mass of capital is thus collected in the hands both of the mercantile and manufacturing part of the community, shifting and floating about, ready for any speculation, or any profitable use whatever.

This is the part of the national stock which naturally seeks the service of the public ; it can be employed in no other way, and should be used by the state. The owners are always willing to give the use of it to government for a certain premium ; and when the crisis that occasions the extraordinary expenditure is past, they have the opportunity of re-investing their capital in trade ; partly as it may be gradually paid back to them by the state ; and partly as they may transfer their securities to a class of proprietors always increasing in

every wealthy country, namely, the monied interest, who are constantly drawing together floating capital by profitable speculations, and have no means of employing it but in loans.

The best creditor for all these descriptions of persons is the government ; at least in ordinary cases its security is the most tempting and the most transferable ; so that upon any sudden call for the stock they can transfer the security and use their capital.

In every country arrived at a great degree of wealth, changes are perpetually taking place in the channels of employment for capital, and in the situations of the capitalists. A tract of waste land at home is parcelled out for improvement ; a new colony is added by conquest or bargain ; a new line of trade, or a new art is opened. All these kinds of changes produce a demand for stock, and cause it to be drawn from the floating mass of capital above described, or from the public funds which have arisen from that mass.

But at the same time other changes of an opposite description are going on. The accumulation of capital at home and abroad is always filling up certain channels of commerce, of agriculture, and of manufactures ; changes of mode and of taste are checking or destroying the demand for certain articles ; not to mention the direct tendency of national calamities, wars, plagues, fires, famines, shipwrecks, &c. to produce similar effects. And changes of this latter kind, are by much the

most numerous and extensive of the two kinds, after a nation has reached a certain pitch of wealth.

Hence the *public funds* afford a sort of entrepot for capital, a deposit where it is naturally collected in an useful employment, (in as much as wars are necessary evils) ready at the same time for other services, and capable of being transferred in a moment to fill those blanks which accident may occasion. The natural order of things prescribes this arrangement ; it is the mode of raising large sums least noxious to the state ; and it throws the expenses of the emergency entirely upon the *surplus revenue* of the community ;—first, by the yearly interest paid for the use of the money borrowed ; and secondly, by the provisions for gradual payment which a wise nation will always make part of its funding system.

There is a striking similarity in the mode in which wars affect the capital of a country and the effects produced by them upon its population. The same analogy holds here which was traced above between the numbers and the wealth of a nation. The emergencies of public affairs produce the very men required by their demands, and the very sums of money with which those men may be hired by the state. The same capitals now continue to employ the same men as during peace. Formerly they were employed in manufactures and trade ; now those channels of employment are obstructed, and the stock is thrown into the public

service, together with the men no longer useful in the peaceable arts.

From this consideration may be deduced a proof of the absurdities of the militia system ; and the same view of the subject which prescribes the recruiting system as the only safe means of filling the army, prescribes the *funding system* as the *only safe* mode of supplying the money which is to pay that army. It does not follow that, if no war existed, both the men and the money might not be more productively employed ; but it has been already shown that both population and capital in the more refined stages of society have a tendency to overflow ; and that greater evils may arise from the superabundance than from the deficiency of both.

To conclude, then, the arguments which go to prove the necessity, policy, and wisdom of adopting the funding system, we say, that as the wants of the state whatever be their extent must be fully supplied ; and as this can only be done by contributions levied on the internal resources of the country, the skill of the financier must be displayed, not in removing, but in palliating the evils of taxation ; not in really lightening a load which must be borne, but in rendering it more tolerable by a more equal distribution of its pressure.

This must be done either by borrowing money, or by paying debt. It is quite chimerical there-

fore to expect that any real saving can accrue to the public from those arrangements of finance which consist merely in blending, or in combining these very simple operations ; whose object is not to save, but to modify and regulate ; either to relieve the existing generation by drawing on the more ample resources of a future age ; or to relieve posterity at the expense of the existing generation.

If the expenditure of a state be at any time increased much beyond its usual rate, from the frequent occurrence of war, or from any other unforeseen emergency, it would be obviously most unjust to load one generation beyond its strength, and entirely to relieve posterity from burdens which are imposed as much for their benefit and security as for the welfare of their forefathers. It would also be very inexpedient, because the weight which, if laid all at once, would crush the prosperity of a country, may be so divided and lightened by being gradually increased as to allow its growing resources freely to expand, and the fund from which future exertions must be made to be proportionally enlarged, so as to meet with ease the pressure even of heavier demands.

It is the great and distinguishing excellence of the *funding system* that it enables the statesman to levy contributions on future ages, and thus furnishes him with ample resources for the execution of great designs ; and though in its excess it may

degenerate into an intolerable grievance, and may even strike at the root of national prosperity, yet in its milder operation it does not in any great degree retard the advancement of a thriving country. It lops off only the redundant branches, while the massy trunk, untouched and unimpaired, is left to renew for a future age its fresh and more abundant foliage.

It is evident, however, that if the debt of a nation be regularly and rapidly increasing, so that in each successive year it becomes necessary to mortgage a greater portion of its annual revenue, the period must arrive sooner or later when it will be impossible to make any further addition to its burdens. In these circumstances no measure, however strongly recommended by considerations of public utility, can be adopted without the imminent hazard of national bankruptcy.

The most effectual, and indeed the only method of guarding against this calamity, is to establish, at the period when the debt is first contracted, *a sinking fund* for its final redemption ; and thus, while the resources of posterity are freely anticipated, to provide at the same time the certain means of their future relief. The design of the funding system is to lighten the burden of an uncommonly heavy expenditure by extending it over a succession of generations ; while the system of sinking funds fixes a period for the discharge of these incumbrances, and thus prevents any

one generation from being overwhelmed by the consolidated debt of ages.

By invariably combining the expedient of borrowing with the practice of establishing a sinking fund for the redemption of the debt, the extremes of two opposite systems are in a manner tempered and balanced ; we are enabled to avoid the inconveniencies peculiar to each, and to avail ourselves of all their advantages without any of their evils.

3dly. As to the funding system *weakening* the hands of the government which resorts to it. This objection appears to have, if possible, less foundation in reason and in fact than the other two which have been already examined ; for,

1st. the very pressure of necessity, and the burden of taxation incident to the funding system, stimulates the industry of a people to a greater and more constant degree of exertion than where no such pressure exists. A far greater quantity of labor is produced by a given number of people in Britain, under the stimulus of taxation, than is produced by the same number of people similarly employed in the United States, whose inhabitants are industriously taught to believe that all taxation is tyranny and folly.

It is admitted by Mr. Hume, in his Essay on Taxation, that where taxes are moderate, laid on gradually, and do not affect the necessaries of life, the poor increase their industry, perform more work, and live better than before ; in a word, be-

some more laborious and more opulent than others who enjoy the greatest advantages. He infers, that since some natural necessities or disadvantages are favorable to industry, artificial burdens may produce the same effect; and quotes with applause the following remarks from Sir William Temple's account of the Netherlands, where the laborious industry of the Dutch is contrasted with the incorrigible idleness of the Irish.

“In Ireland, by the largeness and plenty of the soil, and scarcity of the people, all things necessary to life are so cheap that an industrious man by two days labor may gain enough to feed him the rest of the week, which I take to be a very plain ground of the laziness attributed to the people. For men naturally prefer ease before labor; and will not take pains if they can live idle; though when by necessity they have been inured to it they cannot leave it, being grown a custom necessary to their health, and to their very entertainment. Nor perhaps is the change harder from constant ease to labor than from constant labor to ease.”

It is a well known truth that when the wages of journeymen manufacturers are very high, much less work upon the whole is done by them than when their wages are moderately low. It is common in such cases for the men to work three days in the week, and to be drunk the other four.

Now if the pressure of necessity incites the indi-

viduals of a community to greater and more constant exertions of labor, it is evident that the annual accumulations of national stock or capital will be greater also ; since the collective wealth of the public must be acquired by the productive industry of individuals.

I mean to say, that the annual accumulations of national stock or capital would be greater in *proportion* than the taxes. For since taxation, as here qualified, must be in a moderate proportion to a man's clear gains ; if the doubling of a tax doubles his industry and its produce, he must grow richer. For instance, if he pays two pounds upon a revenue of forty pounds, his own share is thirty-eight pounds. But if he works only half his time to gain these forty pounds, and the doubling of his tax frightens him into regular labor, he earns eighty in the same time that he used to earn forty pounds ; then double his tax, that is, deduct four pounds from his revenue of eighty, and he has seventy-six instead of thirty-eight pounds for his own share ; leaving the laborer a clear profit of one hundred per cent.

And if the national wealth be augmented, the strength of the government which has the disposal of that wealth, and annually draws to itself a portion of it in the form of taxes, must be also increased ; in so far as it has a wider field of influence and power over which to exert its control. Other things being equal, that is to say, the ex-

tent and compactness of territory, the fertility and culture of the soil, the amount of population, the industry, enterprise, courage, virtue, and intelligence of the people being equal, that government is the strongest which has the command of the greatest wealth; a rich nation always being more powerful than a poor one, if the other circumstances of the inhabitants of the respective countries be the same, or nearly so. Britain by her immense wealth has extended her power far beyond what the mere circumstances, physical and moral, of her condition, without that wealth, could have enabled her to do.—But,

2dly. The funding system most materially strengthens the hands of government by attaching to its support a vast number of individuals by the strongest of all human ties, namely, self-interest. For the stock-holders, whether to a large or to a small amount, feel it their interest in every extraordinary emergency to rally round that government whose fall would destroy their property. And where a debt is very large, the stock-holders and their immediate dependants are very numerous, and being spread over every part of the community constitute a very powerful guarantee to the stability of government.

Accordingly, during the war which began in 1793 and ended in 1802, when the efforts of jacobinism, foreign and domestic, were all directed with the most deadly aim, by violence and fraud to

overthrow the British government, the stockholders in Britain immediately took the alarm, and hastened to the defence of their king and constitution.

From all that has been said, we apprehend the springing up of three great national evils to Britain, from the entire liquidation of her public debts: namely,

1st. That it will very considerably reduce the influence of the crown, by the gradual but at length total reduction of the immense patronage which the British monarch now possesses in the appointment of all the officers and servants employed in the collection of the taxes and the management of the monies relating to the national debt. And the contemplation of the horrible events which, for these last twenty years, have been covering the fairest portions of Europe with blood and desolation, does by no means reconcile a prudent and judicious mind to the adoption of any measure which has the least tendency to curtail the power of the British Executive.

2dly. The entire liquidation of the national debt will weaken the hands of the British government, by taking away that common bond of union which now exists between itself and the public creditors. A farmer, a merchant, or a manufacturer, is naturally less attached to and feels himself less dependent upon the government than does a stockholder whose interest is identified with that of the state. And it would not be diffi-

cult to demonstrate that no government *can* be strong for any great purposes of national enterprise and character, unless it have at its command a vast funding system, or be in itself a new-born military despotism. Which of the two is better fitted to promote the happiness of its own people, and the welfare of the other nations of the earth, let the present examples of Britain and France tell.

3dly. To these evils may be also added that of greatly deranging the whole internal economy of society in Britain. In the course of eight years from the present period, that is by the beginning of the year 1818, the annual income of the sinking funds will amount to twenty-two millions seven hundred and twenty thousand pounds.

When this fund was first established, the evils of its excessive increase were foreseen and provided against. By a subsequent arrangement, however, the sinking funds of 1786 and 1792 were consolidated, and no limit was fixed for their accumulation. The mischief it was thought could be guarded against when it drew nigh, and the great accession of debt, occasioned by the enormous expenditure of the war beginning in the year 1793, had removed to a distant period the dangers which were to be apprehended from the future increase of the sinking fund.

When we consider, however, not only its present amount, but how rapidly it must accumulate, independent of the strong claims of the present gene-

ration for relief from their burdens, we may well look to the period when it will be expedient to limit its operation ; and thus, by rendering the reduction of the debt more gradual, to guard against the effects of too sudden a change.

The collecting of that immense revenue which is at present required for the payment of the public creditors, and for the service of the state, together with the whole body of laws, regulations, and complicated establishments necessary for this purpose, has effected a great, though imperceptible, change in the structure of society in Britain. To this artificial state of society, however, the views, habits, schemes, and commercial arrangements of the British people are accommodated ; and any great or sudden alteration, even although it might remove one evil, would undoubtedly produce extensive mischief.

The abstraction of a certain portion of the revenue of a country is not the only inconvenience of taxation. The increase in the price of the commodity taxed, the consequent diminution of its consumption, and perhaps the stagnation of the manufacture, produce fully as much confusion and evil as the mere privation of national revenue occasioned by the tax. But the business of society adapts itself to a change fairly accomplished, and goes on with the same regularity as before.

In these circumstances, if things were suddenly reinstated in their original condition, the evil of

taxation would no doubt be removed; but this benefit would be accompanied by all those incidental evils which the *sudden* reformation even of acknowledged grievances, never fails to produce. The redemption of the national debt is in general considered as the mere prelude to relief from taxation; but it never seems to be imagined that the repealing of taxes to the enormous annual amount of twenty or thirty millions, which are now required to pay the interest of the public debt, will be a work either of difficulty or of delicacy.

Yet the same skill and contrivance which were called forth when those taxes were imposed, will be required to guard against the evils that may be produced by their repeal. Perhaps, there is no business of finance in which a departure from the line of considerate caution would produce such extensive evil.

There is not the same risk in imposing taxes, because an exceptionable tax may be repealed, and the imposition of a new tax raises the price of the commodity on hand, and so far is an advantage to the dealers in it; but by rashly repealing a tax on any commodity to a great amount, the dealers in it might be all ruined by the sudden fall which would take place in the value of their stock on hand. By relieving one particular article from a tax, its consumption might be greatly increased, and it might drive from the market all other rival commodities on which the taxes were still continued.

The repeal of one tax might thus render various taxes unproductive, and what would be a still greater evil, it might diminish the demand for other commodities, and produce a stagnation in their respective manufactures. It would perhaps be impossible without great inconvenience to repeal in one year taxes to the amount of more than two millions sterling.

The great importance of collecting and skilfully managing an ample public revenue is displayed, with all his accustomed superiority of talents, by Mr. Burke, the great father of political philosophy in Britain, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, written in the year 1790. London edition, 5th vol. p. 403.

The revenue of the state *is* the state. In effect all depends upon it, whether for support or for reformation. The dignity of every occupation wholly depends upon the quantity and the kind of virtue that may be exerted in it. As all great qualities which operate in public, and are not merely suffering and passive, require force for their display, I had almost said for their unequivocal existence, the *revenue, which is the spring of all power*, becomes in its administration the sphere of every active virtue.

Public virtue being of a nature magnificent and splendid, instituted for great things, and conversant about great concerns, requires abundant scope and room ; and cannot spread and grow under confinement, and in circumstances straitened, narrow, and sordid. Through the *revenue alone* can the body-politic act in its true genius and character ; and therefore it will display just as much of its collective virtue, and as much of that virtue which may characterize those who move it, and are, as it were, its life and guiding principle, as it is possessed of a just revenue.

For from hence not only magnanimity, and liberality, and beneficence, and fortitude, and providence, and the tutelary protection of all good arts derive their food, and the growth of their organs ; but continence, and self-denial, and labor, and vigilance, and frugality, and whatever else there is in which the mind shows itself above the appetite, are no where more in their proper element than in the provision and distribution of the public wealth.

It is therefore not without reason that the science of speculative and practical finance, which must take to its aid so many auxiliary branches of knowledge, stands high in the estimation not only of the ordinary sort, but of the wisest and best men ; and as this science has grown with the progress of its object, the prosperity and improvement of nations has generally increased

with the increase of their revenues ; and they will both continue to grow and flourish, as long as the balance between what is left to strengthen the efforts of individuals, and what is collected for the common efforts of the state, bears a due reciprocal proportion, and they are both kept in a close correspondence and communication with each other.

And perhaps it may be owing to the greatness of revenues, and to the urgency of state-necessities, that old abuses in the constitution of finances are discovered, and their true nature and rational theory come to be more perfectly understood ; in-somuch that a small revenue might have been more distressing in one period than a far greater is found to be in another ; the proportionate wealth even remaining the same.

The objects then of a financier are to secure an *ample* revenue ; to impose it with judgment and equality ; to employ it economically ; and when necessity obliges him to make use of credit, to secure its foundations in that instance, and for ever by the clearness and candor of his proceedings, the exactness of his calculations, and the solidity of his funds."

If then the facts unfolded to view in the preceding pages demonstrate that the agriculture, commerce, and manufactures of Britain are now more extensive and flourishing than ever ; that her national capital and national revenue is far greater

and the condition of all her people far better than at any former period of time ; and that her public finances are built upon a solid, and indestructible basis of permanent strength and of progressive improvement ; and above all, that her annual accumulations of capital from the yearly produce of her land and labor and the profits of her stock, greatly exceeds the amount of all her annual expenditure ; it must be evident to all calm and impartial observers that the British empire is now less liable to national bankruptcy than at any preceding epoch of her history.



THIRD DIVISION.



CHAPTER I.

THE supposed recent annihilation of the Austrian empire by the arms of Bonaparte seems to have struck the minds of men in the United States from off their usual poise of steadiness and discretion ; and they in general now conclude that Bri-

tain must speedily pass under the yoke of France, because the Corsican tyrant has beaten the Archduke Charles upon the banks of the Danube.

Before entering upon the inquiry as to the power of Britain to stand up alone, and single-handed against her formidable adversary, I shall examine the probable results of the subjugation of the British empire; in regard to the condition of its own people; of the world at large; and more particularly of the Federal Republic of America.

This investigation is the more necessary, because many respectable politicians in this country openly avow their conviction that the reduction of Britain into a province of France will materially increase the wealth, prosperity, and commerce of the whole world, by breaking down the present trading monopoly usurped by England; (as if *all* monopolies were not invariably losing concerns,) and above all will enrich the United States by throwing a large share of the plunder into their lap; in consequence of their strict attachment and unalterable friendship to France through all the changes of her government. And that even if Bonaparte should happen to prove ungrateful to his most faithful allies, and endeavor to subdue them also under his dominion, their valor and wisdom would effectually defeat all his efforts, although he should come to the invasion of these States with all the military population of Europe at his heels.

The effects which such a calamity would produce upon the British people themselves, I choose to depict in the words of the Edinburgh Reviewers, not merely on account of the magnificent display of talent and of information which they uniformly exhibit upon every great subject of national policy ; but more particularly because they are the great literary champions of the whig-party in Britain ; and that party, during the last twenty years, have always guarded themselves with most especial caution against gliding into any exaggerated account of the resources and comforts of their own country ; or into any depreciation of the terrible power and matchless political wisdom of France.

In the 10th volume of the Edinburgh Review, p. 3, 406, we are told “ that so far from being a country, the measure of whose sufferings is full, and to which every change must be gain, it is obvious on a very slight consideration, that Britain has attained a greater portion of happiness and of civil liberty than have ever before been enjoyed by any other nation ; and that the frame and administration of her polity is with all its defects the most perfect and beneficial of any that men have yet invented and reduced to practice.

Her people have perfect liberty of person and security of property ; they have an administration of law, both civil and criminal, that is not only impartial, but unsuspected ; they have freedom of

speech and of publication beyond what any other people ever experienced; they have wealth, and police, and morality superior to any other country; and they have no privileged orders possessing a monopoly of the honors and dignities of the state.

These advantages they have attained under their present system of government, and under it there is no reason to doubt that they will be preserved to them unimpaired. It is plain therefore that so far from having little to lose by conquest or revolution they have infinitely more than was ever possessed by any other people; and that as the good which they already have, greatly exceeds that of which they are deprived, it would be in the highest degree criminal and imprudent to expose it to the desperate hazard of increasing it by the uncertain issue of a revolution.

The country which enjoys these advantages must be worth fighting for, whatever may be the defects of its government. This is our first position. Our second is, that the government *cannot* be utterly bad and detestable, under which these advantages have been obtained and secured for so long a period.

Without dwelling on the horrors of the conquest itself, or on the proscriptions and confiscations with which it would infallibly be attended, suppose the great work of subjugating Britain to be finally consummated by France; and then estimate the

changes which would be produced in the condition of the surviving population.

The first would be the transfer of the British sceptre to the hands of some creature of the conqueror ; or the total suppression of the national independence of Britain by its conversion into a province or department of his empire. The last change is the most probable, because the insular situation, maritime habits, and untractable character of the British might otherwise give them an opportunity of recovering their freedom, and converting a nominal into a real independence.

In either event, the free constitution of England would be annihilated. It is this freedom, more than the commercial prosperity, or the national influence of Britain, which excites the alarm and jealousy of Bonaparte ; it exhales a vapour unhealthy to the constitution of despotism, and while England is free the master of France must be uneasy. Britain might still have parliaments, however, and mock elections ; but we may infer the measure of power which would be left to those assemblies, from that which we have seen intrusted to the senates of France and Holland.

The consequences of conquest, however, would first come home to *individuals* in the destruction of their laws and personal privileges. No one can be so extravagant as to imagine that a French government would allow a *habeas corpus*, a jury, or a goal-delivery to its English subjects. They can-

not hope for more than it indulges to its own people. The liberty of the press in France, too, may be safely taken as the measure of what it would be in England; and in comparison with the tyranny now exercised there in this respect, the policy of the inquisition, the Sorbonne, and the Bourbons was perfect freedom. Their interference was merely restrictive or prohibitory; but the present governor of France compels its journalists to publish as well as to suppress whatever he pleases. He has personal quarrels too with the English press, which could not be settled by mere prospective regulations. There are more than Peltier who might meet with the fate of Palm.

The next thing which the British would lose would be the security of personal liberty. They must then lay aside that high sense of personal inviolability which they now cherish so fondly; and what is justly prized still more, the sanctity of their homes. The Englishman's house must be his castle no more. Instead of their humble watchmen to wish them respectful good-night, when returning to their abodes in the evening, they would be challenged at every turning by military patrols, and be fortunate if they met no pert boy in commission, or ill-natured trooper, to rebuke them with the back of his sword, or with a lodging in the guard-house, for a heedless or a tardy reply.

And after all when they arrived at their homes, instead of that quiet fire-side at which they expect-

ed to sit in domestic privacy with their wives and children, and relieve their burthened hearts by sighing with them over the sorrows of their country, they might find some ruffian familiars of the police on a domiciliary visit; or some insolent young officers who have stepped in unasked to relieve their tedium while on guard by the conversation of the wives and daughters of the neighboring British house-holders. It would be dangerous, however, to offend such unwelcome guests, or even not to treat them with all the respect due to brave warriors, who have served under Napoleon the Great.

But should the English escape such intruders for the evening, still they must lie down uncertain if their dwellings would be left unviolated till the morning. A tremendous noise would at midnight rouse the father of a family from his sleep, and he would hear a harsh voice commanding him to open the gate, through which its hapless master must pass to return no more.

The most disastrous effect of conquest, however, would be the annihilation of national and individual opulence. The mere destruction of the funds would beggar an incredible multitude; but the trade and the riches of England would infallibly perish with the destruction of its security for property, its equal laws, its colonies, and commanding navy. It is only necessary to consider how much greater and more powerful Britain is

at this moment than her population or extent of territory would naturally have made her; to see how much more she would lose in losing her independence than any other nation could possibly lose.

She would fall like Tyre or Carthage if the foundation of her commercial greatness were once withdrawn. The quantity of domestic misery which would be produced in such a population as that of Britain, by this vast and general impoverishment, surpasses all calculation. This point ought to be well considered by all those who think that industry is secure of its reward in every civilized society, and that it is mere romance for people in the middling condition of life to fight for political privileges, or for the choice of their rulers.

The rigors of a suspicious provincial military government, would be also displayed in full force over the politicians of conquered England. Her mobs and her clubs, and even her coffee-house conversations would be effectually broken up by the sabre and the bayonet. Sanguinary punishments would repress the newly invented crimes of *suspected* disaffection and sedition; and the happy invention of military conscription would take off the turbulent part of the British youth to recruit the legions of their master, and to extend his conquests in another quarter of the globe.

Add to all this the destruction of religious liberty, and the compulsory restitution of popery in Britain, as an immediate consequence of her subjugation; because the universality of that faith would be very convenient for an emperor who keeps the pope at his own disposal; and the constitution and doctrine of many of the protestant churches would be peculiarly offensive to an absolute sovereign.

The last great evil incident to Britain from her bondage to France, would be the general dissoluteness of manners, resulting partly from the debasement uniformly produced by loss of liberty, but chiefly from the contagion of that profligate and licentious soldiery which would be quartered over all the land, and would naturally take the lead whenever their example could be seducing or pernicious.

Such are the obvious and tremendous evils that must inevitably fall on Britain if she yield to the fate which has overtaken the greater part of the continent of Europe, and be subjugated by the arms of France. There is no fancy, unfortunately, and no exaggeration in this statement; every article of it is supported by precedents; every tint is coloured from the life. It is even a softened delineation; for no allowance is made for the peculiar rancor and hostility with which Bonaparte has always avowed himself to be actuated towards England more than toward any other of his opponents."

CHAPTER II.

NEVERTHELESS, say our advocates for universal benevolence and the general good, although Britain will undoubtedly suffer all, and more than all these evils, by her being reduced to a state of slavery by France, yet in the first place she richly deserves it on account of her long continued maritime superiority and commercial monopoly ; and secondly, the world at large and the United States in particular will become more opulent and prosperous in consequence of the entire annihilation of the present mistress of the ocean. This point requires examination.

How far the world at large is likely to be enriched by the destruction of Britain, and the consequent perdition of all that living labor, that productive industry, which she now puts in motion over every region of the globe, by the security which she affords to property, and the certainty of reward which she holds out to all kinds of useful exertion ; and by the substitution of Bonaparte's bloody military despotism in the room of her commercial policy—may be inferred from the following character of the French and of their government, drawn by one who knows them well, who has had the most favorable opportunities of studying them intimately, and is fully competent to offer to the public the result of his information.

“ As to morals, which in the absence of all positive legal institutions, supply their place by a very powerful influence, the people of France and the government of France are totally without any system. They are the first nation in the world which has rendered variable what nature intended to be eternal ; which has converted virtue into sophistry, and brought under disputation and logical scepticism the first elements of truth, and the most sure securities of social peace.

Morals, in the eye of Frenchmen constitute a taste, a fashion, a mode, varying according to the circumstances of the day. All moral obligation is gone ; it is not acknowledged in practice. At the very best, the first principles of morality are regarded merely as simple truths ; as totally unimportant and without value in action. Even honor, the best gift of the feudal system, in many points a sufficient, in almost all a useful substitute of natural morality, does not exist in the system of France. In a word, the three great principles of human action ; the three great restraints on vice and passion ; namely, religion, morality, and honor, have all perished in France.

The system of jacobinism has been followed by that of military despotism. The principles of action have taken the same course. France as a nation, and every Frenchman individually, has the morals of a soldier, a slave, and a sophist ; of one who believes nothing with sufficient faith to

induce him to adopt it as a principle of action ; of one who systematically trusts his reason, and servilely obeys his fears, his passions and his immediate interest, who *would* trust such an individual ? who *could* confide in such a nation ?

As to the manners of the present race of Frenchmen the picture is still more abhorrent. The manners of a nation are its minor morals ; or rather perhaps its action through the daily intercourse of morals in life and domestic society. The manners in France, therefore, at the present day are such as are suited to its morals. The shadow is as deformed as the substance from which it is projected. Their private is at least as bad as their public virtue. They are as bad husbands, fathers, friends, neighbors, masters, and dependants, as they are citizens.

Break their general character into all possible fragments, and every component atom will be found of the same precise quality as the general mass. Nor is this state of things temporary. There is an action and a re-action which tends to continue it. The state corrupts the individual ; and the individual supplies the stock of corruption to the state. Each mutually feeds and is fed. The minor streams, corrupting as they flow, return to swell the grand national reservoir, which overflows in its turn with an augmented force of venom, and assimilates to itself whatever it touches.

Such is the *civil* despotism of the French government. The five means of control, and securities of a moderate exercise of the sovereign power, namely, constitution, an aristocracy of privileged classes and acknowledged corruptions, long usage, morals, and manners, have no existence. *One* supreme will governs every thing. Treaties are without sanction; and the public faith is the private virtue of one who has effected every thing by his contempt and disregard of truth.

Regarded in its second point of view, as a *military* despotism, the French form of government is still more worthy of attention. Bonaparte is the Genghis Khan of Europe. He knows no law but the sword, no legislative assembly but the camp. The sword is his sceptre, the camp is his cabinet. Uniting the military simplicity of the Tartar conquerors with the military science of Europe, he rests not a moment from his martial habits; he is ever in a state to take the field in the very instant of his necessity.

In peace as in war he is in a state of encampment; and the whole resources of his nation are as ready at his call as is the sword which hangs suspended in its sheath by his side. He is in every sense of the word a conqueror and a military-monarch. His system of rule is that of the feudal system purged of its ancient weakness. He is an emperor, and an emperor in the strictest sense of the word, as employed in the lower Ro-

man empire; an emperor at the head of confederated officers, all connected with their chief and with each other by a common interest;—an emperor elected by his fortune and his guards, governing his people with military despotism, and retaining his army by military discipline.

His prefects and officers are but so many Cæsars who govern the distant provinces under their patron and political father, the great Augustus. This system of empire, as it is founded, so it must be retained by conquest. Like the principle of motion it ceases to exist when it ceases to proceed. It has moreover a still more fatal characteristic. The adage ancient as the world, *mole ruet sua*, it will rush into perdition by its own immensity of bulk, does not apply to the present empire of France. It easily admits of accession. If another kingdom be added, it requires but another prefect.

The history of mankind is as uniform as are the materials of human action. This empire must sooner or later be overturned by the jealousies of the confederate princes. But from its present and immediate energy it will in time overthrow every thing around it. Kingdom after kingdom will fall into its mass, until, having destroyed every thing about it, it will terminate by preying on itself. A new system will then succeed. The present monarchs of Europe are the fragments of

the feudal system. When the military system, under which Europe must now suffer for some ages, shall in its turn become split and shattered, our posterity will behold new forms of empire, and modes of rule, which political prophecy, vainly endeavoring to pierce through the mists of time, cannot even dimly discern in the distance.

From the personal character of Bonaparte, the human imagination, accustomed to the ordinary course of nature, averts with incredulous abhorrence. Every age has its standard of vice and of virtue. The atrocity of the age of Tiberius was not to be expected in the nineteenth century. Human reason, as it was supposed, and is still asserted by our philosophers, had made great progress in the lapse of successive ages; had kept pace at least with the precession of the equinox; had advanced with the maturity of nature.

And if this even admitted of a doubt, the immediate gift of Providence himself, his last best gift to man, the *spirit of Christianity*, had passed over the surface of the moral world, and had softened the venom of original malignity and primeval sin. It was not therefore to be expected, that the course of time, returning by a backward current, should re-produce in the nineteenth century all those combinations of perfidy and violence, which distinguished and deformed the periods that have long been known by the emphatical appellation of *the dark ages*. This prodigy of another age, however, has appeared amongst us."

It is very remarkable that so early as the year 1790, when all the ordinary statesmen, all the vulgar politicians on the earth, were hailing the revolutionary struggles of France as the harbingers of a bright and a lasting day of freedom to Europe and to the world, Mr. Burke, standing upon the vantage-ground of superior political wisdom, should have left upon record, as an eternal monument of instruction to all posterity, an intelligible prediction, that the wild disorder of Gallic democracy would terminate in the most horrible and unrelenting military despotism which ever sported with the happiness of human beings.

“The legislators who framed the ancient republics, knew that their business was too arduous to be accomplished with no better apparatus than the metaphysics of an under-graduate, and the mathematics and arithmetic of an exciseman. They had to do with men, and they were obliged to study human nature. They had to do with citizens, and they were obliged to study the effects of those habits which are communicated by the circumstances of civil life.

They were sensible that the operation of this second nature on the first, produces a new combination ; and thence arises many diversities amongst men, according to their birth, their education, their professions, the periods of their lives, their residence in towns or in the country, their several ways of acquiring and of fixing property, and ac-

ording to the quality of the property itself ; all which rendered them, as it were, so many different species of animals.

From hence they thought themselves obliged to dispose their citizens into such classes, and to place them in such situations in the state, as their peculiar habits might qualify them to fill ; and to allot to them such appropriated privileges as might secure to them what their specific occasions required, and which might furnish to each description such force as might protect it in the conflict caused by the diversity of interests, that must exist, and must contend in all complex society. For the legislator would have been ashamed, that the coarse husbandman should well know how to assort and to use his sheep, horses, and oxen ; and should have enough of common sense not to abstract and equalise them all into animals without providing for each kind an appropriate food, care, and employment ; whilst he, the political economist, disposer and shepherd of his own kindred, subliming himself into an airy metaphysician, was resolved to know nothing of his flocks but *as men in general*.

It is for this reason that M. Montesquieu observes very justly, that in their *classification* of the citizens the great legislators of antiquity made the greatest display of their powers, and even soared above themselves. It is here that our *modern* legislators have gone deep into the negative series, and sunk even below their own nothing.

As the ancient legislators attended to the different kinds of citizens, and combined them into one commonwealth; the modern, the metaphysical and alchemistical legislators have taken the direct contrary course. They attempt to confound all sorts of citizens into one homogeneous mass, reducing them all to the dead level of democracy; and then they divide this their amalgama into a number of incoherent republics. They reduce men to loose counters, merely for the sake of simple telling; and not to figures whose power is to arise from their place in the table.

The elements of their own metaphysics might have taught them better lessons. The roll of their categorical table might have informed them that there was something else in the intellectual world besides *substance* and *quantity*. They might learn from the catechism of metaphysics that there were eight heads more in every complex deliberation, of which they have never thought; though these of all the ten are the subjects on which the skill of man can at all operate.

But so far from this able disposition of some of the old republican legislators, which follows with a solicitous accuracy the moral conditions and propensities of man, the *French* politicians have levelled and crushed together all the orders which they found even under the coarse inartificial arrangement of their old monarchy; in which mode of government the *classing of their citizens*

is *not* of so much importance as in a republic. It is true, however, that every such classification, if properly ordered, is good in *all* forms of government ; and composes a strong barrier against the excesses of despotism, as well as it is the *necessary means* of giving *effect* and *permanence* to a republic.

For want of something of this kind, if the present project of a *French republic* should fail, *all securities* to a moderated freedom fail along with it ; all the indirect restraints which mitigate despotism are removed ; insomuch that if monarchy should ever again obtain an entire ascendancy in France, under this, or under any other dynasty, it will be, if not voluntarily tempered at its setting out by the wise and virtuous counsels of the prince, the *most completely arbitrary power* that has ever appeared on earth. This is to play a most desperate game."

From all this it might be readily inferred how much the industry and wealth of nations would be promoted and increased by diffusing the domination of Bonaparte over all the civilized world. It is sufficiently natural for the present tyrant of France, and for his partisans, to exclaim incessantly, that if Britain were but destroyed the other nations of the earth would be enriched by dividing that wealth which her monopolizing spirit now engrosses ; because it is the first desire of Bonaparte's heart to destroy the British empire, as

the only obstacle between him and universal dominion ; and because it is equally the expectation of his partisans that they shall be permitted to share in the plunder acquired by their master.

But it is strange that men, even of ordinary reflection, do not perceive, that if Britain were to be destroyed, the aggregate of the whole world's wealth, industry, spirit, enterprise, intelligence, morality, religion, and every thing which conduces to human prosperity and happiness, would be dreadfully diminished ; because they derive material aid from the superior freedom, virtue, talent, and knowledge of the British nation under its present form of government.

Now foreign conquest would infallibly bring along with it slavery, vice, and ignorance, which would immediately dry up the springs and sources of agriculture, of manufactures, of commerce, and of every species of productive industry ; would immediately palsy all the physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual energies of Britain, who is now the great central pivot upon which all the labor that can have any tendency to meliorate the condition of human society in the whole world turns ; and would thus convert the universal earth into one vast wilderness of death.

This subject is treated at considerable length, and with great ability by M. Gentz, late counselor of war to the king of Prussia, in a work entitled "*De l'état de l'Europe avant et après la Révolution*

Française, pour servir de response a l'ecrit, intitulé, De l'état de la France, a la fin de l'an. 8." But as some positions of the Prussian Statesman are not sufficiently developed, and the whole book is written with somewhat of Germanic tediousness and minuteness, I prefer having recourse to the superior political intelligence of the Edinburgh Review. Vol. 2, p. 6, 19, 25.

M. Hauterive asserts that the destruction of all order and prosperity in Europe is caused by the vast increase of *British* commerce and colonies during the last century.

"But the increase of commerce is a necessary consequence of that salutary development of national wealth and prosperity, to which human society naturally tends under any system of just administration; it is beneficial to the country where it begins, and harmless at least to all its neighbors. It affords them not only example and encouragement, but the means of imitation and improvement; and can never be viewed with jealousy or resentment, except by that envy which despairs of emulation, or that barbarous pride which had rather that its associates should fall, than be indebted to them for its own elevation.

Besides, the increased resources that have been derived from the extension of the commercial system have been in some degree common to all nations, and have rather bettered the condition of the whole, than altered the relations of its parts.

That some have been outstripped by others in this free and honorable competition, ought no more to be made the subject of resentment or complaint, than that one nation has amended its laws, or reformed its constitution, with greater diligence and dispatch than its neighbors.

In point of fact, the advantages that may be ascribed to the extension of colonies or commerce, *never have been monopolized by any one nation of Europe* ; but have belonged in a great degree to all the maritime states, and in particular, to France, England, and Holland, in pretty equal proportions. When we consider indeed what France was both in America and in India, within half a century, and the prodigious advantages which she still had until very lately in the Levant trade, and that of the West-Indies, it is surprising that a French writer should inveigh with so much bitterness against colonies and commerce, and represent the balance of power in Europe as *in danger from the preponderance of England*, merely because she possesses a part of those advantages which were formerly enjoyed with safety by the continental kingdom of France.

The maritime powers, too, form a sort of secondary balance among themselves, and will in general throw their united force into the scale, to prevent the disturbance of the greater system to which they adhere. Their chief interest on the continent of Europe must always be to maintain

that general balance; and if their commerce has increased their weight and authority, this is a circumstance which only tends to make that balance more secure. Had it not been for the maritime resources of Holland and England it is not easy to perceive in what way the European continental powers could have resisted the attacks of Louis the fourteenth.

With regard to the foreign relations of Britain, they may be all referred to the head of commercial regulations; and she has in fact no permanent connection with the continent of Europe either in military or strictly political affairs. As a maritime nation, she can never be led away by views of continental conquest; and as a commercial power, she must be interested in the maintenance of that general peace, by which alone the great markets of the world can be kept open to the produce of her industry.

Yet M. Hauterive represents her as constantly engaged in fomenting dissensions among the European continental powers; bribing them into hostility by her subsidies; and holding their industry and commerce in subjugation by the arbitrary and oppressive exertions of her naval power.

A sufficient refutation of this assertion is to be found in the history of the last hundred and fifty years, which will show that all the wars in which Britain has been engaged have either been wars in support of the balance of Europe, when endan-

gered by the ambition of France ; or wars in which the quarrel was particular to the two nations, and arose from some misunderstanding as to the regulation of their trade or their colonies.

In the wars for the support of the balance of Europe, the exertions of England have been beneficial to all her neighbors ; and in the quarrels peculiar to the two nations, her efforts have been altogether indifferent to the other powers, and can afford no pretext for invoking the general vengeance on her head.

The wars against Louis the fourteenth require no explanation, nor does the conduct of Britain in the course of them demand any apology. The war of the Austrian succession was undertaken by England upon the same general principle of preventing the undue humiliation of that ancient monarchy ; and the generosity with which she gave up every thing at the peace, by which her private interest might have been promoted, demonstrates by what liberal motives she had been induced to enter into the contest.

The seven years war, commonly called Lord Chatham's war, on the part of Britain, was partly a war in defence of the general system of balance, then exposed to such manifest danger by the coalition against the king of Prussia ; and partly a private quarrel between France and England on account of their North American colonies. It turned out gloriously for Britain, and France has never

forgiven her for the humiliation and loss to which she was obliged to submit ; although that loss and humiliation, which related merely to her colonies and her marine, had no effect upon her power and influence over the continent of Europe.

In the succeeding war of America, the cause of contest was peculiar to the two countries, France and England, and indifferent to the rest of Europe. Here the success was on the side of France ; she retorted on her adversary the loss of her American colonies, and proved that her maritime resources were in no respect inferior to those of her industrious rival.

As to the charge of fomenting wars by subsidizing the weaker continental powers of Europe, it is a most contemptible vulgar prejudice, which could only originate in ignorance or in animosity. No subsidy ever paid the third part of the mere expense which was occasioned by a war, to the nation that received it ; and if any valuation could be put upon the loss of lives and of happiness, on the prosperity and opulence, both general and individual, that it must necessarily have intercepted, we might justly say, that no subsidy ever replaced one hundredth part of what the war had taken away.

Subsidies may facilitate the operations of war, but can never give occasion to it. They form a natural and salutary part of those arrangements by which allied nations equalise their contribu-

tions to the common cause ; but the statesman who could be tempted by them to engage in a war, when he might have remained in peace, must know little of the nature of war, and nothing of the duties of his station."

For a very full and clear exposition of the nature and intention of the *balancing system*, and the most conclusive arguments to prove its vast importance in preserving the civilized world from destruction ; the reader will do well to consult, and to study the first section of the third book of Mr. Brougham's masterly "*Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European powers*," vol. 2d. p. 192, 285, both inclusive.

"The whole substance of the abuse which M. Haunterive heaps upon Britain on account of her maritime superiority, may be reduced to these three heads:—1st. That by her *Navigation Act*, she has excluded all other nations from the benefits of her trade:—2dly. That she has usurped the possession of all the commercial establishments of the world, and after having put fetters on the industry of every other nation, has established over them a most tyrannous and oppressive monopoly : and 3dly. That she has invented a new code of maritime laws, by which the rights of neutrality are violated, as often as she is at war."

I shall altogether decline entering upon any discussion of the third head at present, because I shall shortly have occasion to treat at large upon the

great question of neutral rights in another publication, where I shall endeavor to develop the whole system of policy, foreign and domestic, of the United States. Only the first two heads, therefore, of M. Hauterive's accusations against Britain, will be now examined.

“ 1. M. Gentz, at great length, but with much force and clearness, explains the origin and design of the famous statute of Charles the second, commonly called the *English navigation act*, of which the European continental politicians have spoken and written so much in all the bitterness of resentment and complaint, without in the least understanding its nature and aim. He then proceeds to show upon the clearest and most generally admitted principles of political economy, that the operation of this act has been directly *detri- mental* to the *commerce* of Britain; and that its continuance on the score of policy, can only be justified from its tendency to promote the *naval strength* of the country, upon which its security so immediately depends, and to which every thing else ought therefore to be subordinate.

The commercial greatness of England, therefore, has arisen in spite of this law, and not in consequence of it; and the jealousy which that greatness has excited is erroneously directed against this famous statute. And even if its consequences were prejudicial to other nations, they have no right to complain of its injustice. It is

not an international law in which they have any intermediate concern; but a private regulation of internal police, with which France has as little concern as England could have with a French statute requiring all Bonaparte's soldiers to be natives of his own territory."

M. Gentz explains the effects of the *English navigation act*, in p. 295, 308, of his important work. I have only leisure to avail myself of a very few of his observations.

"It is, generally speaking, true that laws are prejudicial when they impede or restrict the natural course and free expansion of human industry; when they forcibly impel it into new channels, or direct it where it would not naturally have flowed; when they urge its progress at the expense of its freedom.

The *navigation act* is a law of this nature. It compels the inhabitant of Britain to fetch the products of foreign countries in his own vessels, or to remain entirely or nearly without them. It obliges him, therefore, to devote a *larger* portion of capital and labor to foreign trade than he would have done in the natural course of things; if other nations had participated without restriction in the importation. It positively forbids him to employ the industry of a foreigner, even when it might suit his interest better than to employ his own industry. It prevents him from purchasing certain articles abroad cheaper than

he can get them at home. It prevents him from making use of foreign shipping, even in those cases where the freight is cheaper than that of his countrymen, and where he would consequently import the goods at a lower price.

But circumstances sometimes render it the duty of a government to depart in particular cases from general principles of state economy ; when a temporary or a permanent interest urges considerations of more importance than any of the common maxims of administration. To circumstances of this imperious nature the English *navigation act* owes its being. In order to form a counterpoise to the powerful states of continental Europe ; to protect her insular territory, and maintain her independence, England was obliged to use every effort to raise and support a powerful marine.

The importance of the object justified even coercive laws ; and the *navigation act* is indirectly coercive in its nature and operation. The English were compelled to cultivate with their own vessels, their own sailors, and their own capitals, many branches of foreign trade which would have otherwise remained, partly or entirely, in the hands of strangers. This was a powerful stimulus to the commercial marine of Britain, which was thus rendered a nursery for her navy, and an important instrument of the security and power of the state ; accomplishing these objects more rapidly and more effectually than if left to the natural course of things.

But according to the genuine principles of political economy, the navigation act which secures these important objects, is far from benefiting the *industry* of the nation, which indeed it *restrains*. In commerce the true interest of every nation requires an extensive competition, and the unrestrained liberty of buying and selling to the greatest advantages afforded by its industry and situation. The navigation act infringes this liberty and diminishes that competition. Whence, so far from being directly beneficial, it is indirectly detrimental to the foreign trade of Britain.

This law then is *not* the *foundation* of English commercial greatness, which has arisen in spite of, and not by means of, the operation of this act. If such a law had been passed in any other country, destitute of the natural advantages, character, and resources of Britain, it would have been the signal for the immediate *annihilation* of commerce; the suppression of all industry; the destruction of every incentive to enterprise and activity.

This famous act was passed in the year 1651, during Cromwell's protectorate, and confirmed by Charles the second in 1660; its chief provisions are:—1st, No ship, unless it be British property, commanded by a British captain, and having at least three-fourths of its crew British, shall trade with the British colonies, or on the coast of Britain:—2dly. No foreign vessel shall bring any goods to England, unless they are the produce of

the country, to which the owner, the captain, and, at least three-fourths of the crew of such ship belong. 3dly. The importation of certain articles of foreign merchandise is prohibited both in British and foreign ships. 4thly. No sea-fish, unless caught by British fishermen, and freighted on board British vessels, shall be imported into England."

"As to the *monopoly* which Britain is accused of usurping or enjoying, in all the colonies and all the markets in the world, the advantages to which these odious names have been applied, are nothing more than the natural and fair rewards of superior skill and industry; and it would be an injury to the world at large if they were to be intercepted or withdrawn. They are prizes won in a free and honorable competition, where the success of the victor affords instruction to those who are left behind, and advances the general interest together with that of the individual.

In point of fact, however, it is not true that Britain has engrossed all the trade and wealth of the world for this last century. In India, indeed, her influence has preponderated over that of France, ever since the war of 1756; yet Holland still holds possessions in that quarter of great extent and value; and the establishments of France were rather neglected than insignificant, up to war of the Revolution.

In the West-Indies both Spain and France were in possession of settlements far more valuable

than those of England; and Holland and Denmark had also their share in that lucrative commerce. On the continent of America England retained nothing but Canada, Nova-Scotia, and New-Brunswick, while Spain and Portugal monopolized the trade of a whole quarter of the globe; and France shared largely with them in that of the northern division of that quarter.

In that part of the world Britain was only a power of the second or third order. In her colonial possessions, therefore, it is plain that she has enjoyed no great or decided superiority; and it is equally plain, that in a political point of view, the possession of these colonies adds scarcely anything to her power. The richest of them all brings in no *direct* revenue to the government; they pay no taxes; and it is only in their subserviency to her industry and trade that they have any value.

The real source of the commercial greatness of England then is to be found in that *honest industry* and *distinguished skill* which will scarcely be imputed to any nation as a crime; and which her rivals should rather imitate than decry. Nay, it is very evident that they themselves constitute and support that monopoly of which they so loudly complain. Who forces the nations of Europe to buy the manufactures of England, and to neglect their own?

If it be a crime in Britain to sell, it must be doubly a crime in the other European powers to

buy ; and if the European states have been enthralled by the commercial policy of England, it is evident that they have formed the fetters for themselves, and put them on deliberately with their own hands.

As to the charge of Britain having exerted herself to depress and discourage the industry of all her neighbors, it is confuted by the absurdities which it involves. The rude and the beggarly can never be good customers ; and they who have nothing to sell, will not long have any thing wherewith to buy. England outstrips her neighbors in mechanical inventions and commercial activity ; and by means of these keeps the advantages of her pre-eminence ; but she can never desire to see her neighbors unskilful and indolent ; because she sells only to buy with advantage ; and could not continue to subsist, if the surrounding countries did not supply her with commodities as valuable as those which she furnishes to them in return.

If any part of British prosperity be referrible to the neglect and carelessness of other countries, who might have divided a part of those advantages which she now enjoys alone, this is their fault and their loss, and nothing but the profit and the praise is hers. They would not be better, although her enterprising spirit had not opened the sources of wealth which they overlooked ; and all the rest of the world would have been worse ; nay, they themselves also would have been worse ; since her suc-

cess must awaken their emulation and her discoveries direct their undertakings.

What is called the *monopoly* of England, therefore, is nothing else than the preference which good and cheap articles will always obtain in the market over those that are dear and defective. It is not imposed upon the other nations by England, but conferred by them upon her ; and as they thus contribute to it, in spite of violent prejudices, and in the midst of the most outrageous clamors, it may be presumed that they find their own advantage in its continuance. In fact, it promotes their present prosperity, by supplying them with commodities at an easier rate than they could otherwise procure them ; and subserves their future greatness, by setting before them the most perfect patterns of manufacturing ingenuity, and of commercial wisdom.

In addition to these permanent and inherent sources of British prosperity, the war itself has given birth to another very important aid to her national strength. The naval power of England, and the excellent regulation of her convoys, render the seas safe to her while they are impracticable to any other belligerent power. Nearly all the *carrying trade*, therefore, that was in the hands of Holland, Spain, and France, naturally fell into her's when the ships of those nations were confined to their harbors ; and thus became a new source of revenue to answer the exigencies of her new situation.

And as this was a benefit arising from the attempts of her enemies to injure her, and obtained in a great measure at their expense ; it is natural to suppose that their disappointment and vexation would make it the object of clamor and detraction. But at the same time, it is perfectly evident, that it is an event for which Britain cannot possibly be censured upon any principle either of equity or reason.

For it was not brought about by any act of her usurpation or injustice ; but resulted spontaneously from the interested wisdom of the neutral powers, who, until very lately, sought their safety in her protection ; and it has plainly been of advantage to all Europe, because it has given, up to the time of the issuing of Bonaparte's Berlin Decree in December, 1806, a security and a freedom to her general commerce, which was scarcely to have been expected during the raging of a war so universal and so active.

The few following considerations, and many more might be enumerated, will show the grounds of distinction between a naval and a military power ; and also afford reasons for defending the maritime supremacy of Britain, while we look with an eye of jealousy and apprehension on the military ascendancy of France.

1. It is obvious that a maritime power can never endanger the *independent existence* of any other community, nor deprive it of its natural and inherent influence among its neighbors ; it can

only intercept its commercial greatness by cutting off its *foreign* trade. A maritime power therefore is formidable in a much less degree, and is a less reasonable object of general distrust and apprehension.

2. But a maritime power can scarcely have any interest in cutting off the foreign trade or possessions of its neighbors. The ruin of their trade would be the ruin of its own commerce. Their possessions could not be occupied or retained without land forces ; and their mere destruction could produce no other effect than that of diminishing the supply of those articles, the want of which would be felt more by a commercial than by any other country.

Besides, the habits of a commercial country must generally be pacific ; and war will usually be more injurious to a trading, than to any other state. Now no maritime power can render a nation absolutely invulnerable, or ensure its superiority against a combination of its enemies ; and the risk to which it would be exposed in such a contest is so terrible that it may fairly be presumed that it will not provoke general hostility by any wanton act of usurpation.

3. It ought to be remembered, as the great ground-work of all these distinctions, that maritime power is the natural, peaceful, and necessary result of great commercial prosperity ; and that it cannot be effectually diminished without checking

that great career of improvement, the benefits and blessings of which are far more important than any other with which they can be put in competition. The naval strength of a nation consists primarily in the number and the skill of its seamen; and these again depend immediately on the extent of its trade.

The trade, therefore, must be diminished before the power can be repressed. But it may well be questioned, if any apprehension of problematical and contingent danger can justify a measure attended with so great and immediate evil. Power acquired by trade, should be as sacred among nations, as riches acquired by trade among individuals; and the fear of abuse from some occasional excess in either, can never afford an excuse for defrauding industry of its reward, or imposing a check upon that salutary spirit of commercial enterprise, which is the main source of all permanent improvements among mankind.

Naval power is not naturally a weapon of offence, but an implement of industry; and the emergency must be great and urgent indeed, that could justify the destruction of so invaluable an implement, because it is capable of being converted into an engine of war. More benefit is derived to the world at large from the commercial prosperity in which a maritime power has its origin, than would be compensated by the additional security which some of its rivals might possibly

acquire from the abolition of this power, and the overthrow of its foundations.

To aim at the humiliation of such a naval power, therefore, is to resist the development of general prosperity ; to discourage industry and all peaceful improvement ; and to conspire against the felicity of all future generations in every quarter of the world."

In a word, it must be allowed that those men have very singular powers of perception and of reasoning, who really believe that the industry and wealth of the world would be increased by the reduction of Britain to a province of France ; and the consequent introduction of a most atrocious and bloody military despotism, into the room of a free and popular government ; the substitution of idleness for diligence ; of fraud for honesty ; of ignorance for intelligence ; of stupidity for skill ; of universal profligacy and iniquity for sound and upright morals ; of the most unblushing atheism and impiety for pure religion.

Fortunately, for our direction on this subject, Bonaparte has not left it to conjecture whether or not he *designs* to *augment* the industry and wealth of the world when he shall have subjugated it to his domination. For in the year 1808, to a petition of the Bordeaux merchants, praying for a relaxation of his Berlin, Milan, and Bayonne decrees, lest they should totally destroy the little remainder of French commerce, he replied, " that it was the

emperor's will *not* to have any commerce, but to restore Europe to the condition of the *fourth* century."

What *that* condition was, the reader may in some measure learn by perusing Mr. Gibbon's very elaborate dissertation, in the 3d. vol. of his "History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," p. 30—98. Indeed, if the extremes of the most unqualified despotism on the part of the monarch, and the most abject slavery on the part of the people, together with the general decay of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and the consequent penury and wretchedness of the great mass of the community, be desirable objects of restitution, we may pray for the destruction of Britain, and the universal jubilee of French domination.

The mode of *taxation* in this enlightened fourth century, would be particularly interesting to the people of the United States, a large body of whom actually broke out into an open and armed rebellion against their government for laying a small tax upon whiskey. In addition to all the various customs and duties on merchandises, which are imperceptibly discharged by the apparent choice of the purchaser, the policy of the great Constantine, which Bonaparte avows it to be his ambition to imitate, had recourse to a simple and *direct* mode of taxation, more congenial to the spirit of an arbitrary government.

“The obscure millions of a great empire have much less to dread from the cruelty than from the avarice of their masters ; and *their* humble happiness is principally affected by the grievance of excessive *taxes*, which gently pressing on the dignified wealthy, descend with accelerated weight on the meaner and more indigent.

M. de Montesquieu, indeed, as before observed, has calculated the universal measure of the public impositions by the degrees of freedom and of servitude ; and asserts that according to an invariable law of nature, the weight of taxation must always increase with the augmentation of liberty, and diminish in a just proportion to the increase of despotism. But this assertion is not verified by the experience of the ancient Roman, any more than by that of the modern French despotism ; for the same tyrants that despoiled the senate of its authority, robbed the provinces of their wealth.

The name and use of the imperial *indictions* were derived from the regular practice of the Roman tributes. The emperor subscribed with his own hand, and in purple ink, the solemn edict, decree, or indiction, which was fixed up in the principal city of each district, during two months previous to the first day of September. And by a very easy association of ideas, the word *indiction* was transferred to the measure of tribute which it prescribed, and to the annual term which it allowed for the payment.

This general estimate of the supplies was proportioned to the real and imaginary wants of the government ; but as often as the expense exceeded the revenue, or the revenue fell short of the computation, an additional tax, under the name of *superindiction*, was imposed on the people, and its amount committed to the discretion of the prætorian prefects, who, on some occasions, were authorized to provide for the unforeseen and extraordinary exigencies of the public service.

The execution of these laws consisted of two distinct operations ; the resolving the general imposition into its constituent parts, which were assessed on the provinces, the cities, and the individuals of the Roman world ; and the collecting the separate contributions of the individuals, the cities, and the provinces, until the accumulated sums were poured into the imperial treasury.

The *whole* landed property of the empire was the object of ordinary taxation ; and every new purchaser contracted the obligations of the former proprietor. An accurate *census*, or survey was repeated every fifteen years. The lands were measured by surveyors, sent into the provinces, in order to report distinctly their nature, whether arable or pasture, vineyards or woods ; and an estimate was made of their common value from the average produce of five years.

The numbers of slaves and of cattle constituted an essential part of this report ; an oath was ad-

ministered to the proprietors, which bound them to disclose the true state of their affairs; and all attempts to prevaricate, or elude the intention of the legislator, were severely watched, and punished as a *capital crime*, which included the double guilt of treason and of sacrilege.

A large portion of the tribute was paid in money; and of the current coin of the empire, gold alone could be legally accepted. The remainder of the taxes, according to the proportions determined by the annual indiction, was furnished in a manner still more direct and oppressive. According to the different nature of lands, their real produce in the various articles of wine or oil, corn or barley, wood or iron, was transported by the labor, or at the expense of the *provincials*, to the imperial magazines, from which they were occasionally distributed for the use of the court, of the army, and of the two capitals, Rome and Constantinople.

The commissioners of the revenue were so frequently obliged to make considerable purchases, that they were strictly prohibited from allowing any compensation, or from receiving in money the value of those supplies which were exacted in kind. This method, in a corrupt and absolute monarchy, must necessarily introduce a perpetual contest between the power of oppression, and the arts of fraud.

In consequence of this arbitrary and oppressive

system of land taxes, the *agriculture* of the Roman provinces was insensibly *ruined*, and in the progress of despotism, which invariably tends to disappoint its own purposes, by willing the end and always destroying the means, the emperors were obliged to derive some merit from the forgiveness of debts, or the remission of tributes, which their subjects were incapable of paying.

According to the new division of Italy, the fertile province of Campania extended between the sea and the Appennine from the Tiber to the Silarus. Within sixty years after the death of Constantine, and on the evidence of an actual survey, an exemption was granted in favor of three hundred and thirty thousand English acres of *desert* and *uncultivated* land; which amounted to *one-eighth* of the whole surface of the province. And as the barbarians had not yet made their irruptions into Italy, the cause of this amazing desolation, which is recorded in the laws, can be ascribed only to the mal-administration of the Roman emperors.

To this tax or capitation on the proprietors of land, the emperors imposed a distinct and *personal* tribute on the trading part of their subjects, in order to share in that species of wealth which is derived from art or mechanical labor, and which exists in money or in merchandise. Every branch of commercial industry was affected by the severity of this law.

The honorable merchant of Alexandria, who

imported the gems and the spices of India for the use of the western world ; the money-broker who derived from the interest of his property a silent profit ; the ingenious manufacturer, the diligent mechanic, and even the most obscure retailer of a sequestered village, were compelled to admit the officers of the revenue into the partnership of their gain ; and the sovereign of the Roman empire, as does the worthy master of the present French territory, at once tolerated the profession and shared in the infamous profits of the public prostitutes.

This general tax upon industry was collected every fourth year, under the name of the *lustral contribution* ; the fatal approach of which was uniformly announced by the tears and terrors of the citizens, who were often compelled by the impending scourge to embrace the most abhorrent and unnatural methods of procuring the sum at which their property had been assessed. From the very nature of this tribute it could not but be arbitrary in its distribution, and extremely rigorous in the mode of its collection.

The secret wealth of commerce, and the precarious profits of art or labor, are susceptible only of a discretionary valuation, which is seldom disadvantageous to the interest of the public treasury ; and as the *person* of the trader supplies the want of a visible and permanent security, the payment of the imposition, which in the case of a land-tax

may be obtained by the seizure of property, can rarely be extorted by any other means than those of *corporal punishments*.

And accordingly, the cruel treatment of the insolvent debtors of the state is attested, and perhaps was mitigated, by an edict of Constantine, who, disclaiming the use of *racks* and *scourges*, allots a spacious prison for the place of their confinement.

These general taxes were imposed and levied by the *absolute authority* of the monarch; but in addition to these, the occasional offerings of *coronary gold* still retained the name and semblance of popular consent. It was an ancient custom that the allies of the republic, who ascribed their safety or deliverance to the success of the Roman arms, and that even the cities of Italy, who admired the valor of their victorious general, should adorn his triumph by their voluntary gifts of golden crowns, which, after the ceremony, were consecrated in the temple of Jupiter.

The progress of zeal and flattery soon multiplied the number and increased the size of these popular donations, which, after a while, were made in the current gold coin of the Roman empire, and exacted as the debt of duty, being no longer confined to the rare occasion of a triumph; but expected to be granted by the several cities and provinces of the monarchy as often as the Emperor vouchsafed to announce his accession,

his consulship, the birth of a son, the creation of a Cæsar, a victory over the barbarians; or any other real or imaginary event which graced the annals of his reign.

The peculiar free-gift of the Senate of Rome, the *auri oblatio*, was fixed by custom at sixteen hundred pounds weight of gold, about sixty-four thousand pounds sterling, more than two hundred and eighty-four thousand dollars. The oppressed subjects celebrated their own felicity, that their Emperor should graciously condescend to accept this feeble but voluntary testimony of their loyalty and gratitude!"

Such is a very faint outline of the condition of Europe in that *fourth* century, to which Bonaparte declares he will again reduce the world. How far such a state of things is calculated to augment the industry, wealth, civilization, comfort, and happiness of the various nations of the earth, let every honest man judge.

CHAPTER III.

THE next subject of inquiry is what effect the destruction of the British empire would have upon the national and individual interest of the United States?

Say then that Britain is conquered, and incorporated with the other dominions of Bonaparte ; who in consequence immediately prepares to subdue the United States also. Do we doubt this immediate consequence ? Do we really imagine that the tyrant of Europe will permit the infant democracy of America to share the empire of the world with him, who has swallowed up and destroyed all the ancient republics of Europe ? Is it in human nature to be satisfied with conquest while aught remains to be subdued ; does not ambition, like love, grow by what it feeds on ; did a military conqueror ever yet *voluntarily* stop short in his career of power ; and do we expect that all human experience is to be falsified in our favor by the interposition of a miraculous and unheard of continence and self-denial in the gentle, sympathizing Bonaparte.

Is such confidence, said Mr. Wyndham in his admirable speech in the House of Commons on the deplorable peace of Amiens,—Is such confidence to be placed in the general nature of ambition ? Is it in the nature of French ambition ? Is it in the nature of French revolutionary ambition ? Is it in the nature of French revolutionary ambition as matured and concentrated in the bosom of Bonaparte ?”

A plain man would imagine that all these idle dreams of the French not molesting the United States if Britain were but once annihilated, might

readily be dissipated by the very *intelligible hints* which the Corsican robber now, at this moment in 1809, is giving us of his real intentions towards this country, whenever he shall have an opportunity of ripening his plans into execution. I mean his perpetual piracies upon American commerce; his burning the vessels, confiscating the property, imprisoning the seamen, insulting the ambassador, and dictating to the government of the United States of America.

And all these compliments are paid to the free and independent Americans, while the British navy presents an insuperable obstacle to his passage across the Atlantic, and most effectually renders abortive any attempts on his part to subjugate this country. But remove that obstacle, give to Bonaparte that naval ascendancy, mount "the tyger of the land upon the shark of the ocean," and then smile at the improbability of our receiving a domiciliary visit from the retinue of the great Napoleon.

Bonaparte will come then, or, which amounts to the same thing, will send one of his trusty generals, to fraternize the United States. But the French will not come in the first instance to the New-England or middle states, where they might expect some hard fighting on their arrival. They will prefer sailing up the Chesapeake, and landing in Virginia; from which as a central point they will be able to diverge in all directions, and take

most effectual measures for the speedy subjugation of the Federal Republic.

In order merely to show that the French are very well acquainted with all the most favourable points of attack upon the United States, I shall here insert the instructions contained in a French national newspaper, which at that time was the organ of the French Executive Directory; in like manner as the *Moniteur* is now the organ of Bonaparte, and the *National Intelligencer* that of Mr. Jefferson; that is to say, all these papers are merely the echoes of the opinions and sentiments, which their respective masters see fit to have spread abroad among the vulgar.

I desire it to be distinctly understood, that I do not quote the following piece, as showing the strict and intimate connection between the democratic party in the United States, and the French government.

A French national newspaper called "*Le Bien Informè*," published in Paris, and dated 26th Fructidor, 6th year of the Republic (1798), a time when the Executive Directory were grievously displeased with the Federal administration of the United States for not immediately declaring war against Britain, and becoming the vassal of France, contains the following denunciations of vengeance.

"He who speaks ill of John Adams (then President of the United States), shall pay a fine of two

thousand dollars, and be shut up for two years ; he who writes against the government, shall pay five thousand dollars, and suffer five years imprisonment. Bache is arrested, and his paper (the *Aurora*, published at Philadelphia) is prohibited. So much for the liberty of the press. If George the Third was driven from England he would go to America, where he has invested money ; and what you would not expect, he would be a king there ; yes they would make him king there.

“ *All Europe* will have a representative government, but America, ungrateful and without energy, will have a king ; not in form perhaps, but in fact.

“ If France had an army to land in the United States, she ought not to send it there. Cornwallis and Burgoyne were conquered by having advanced into the interior. It is true that France has neither a fleet nor an army which she can dispose of in the new continent ; what ought she then to do with respect to the *animosus infans* of America ?

“ Not to be so imprudent as to *declare war* against them ; for this would be also to declare it against all the *republicans*, (the democrats, then in opposition to, and now possessing the administration of the government of the United States,) and *planters*, and even against the savages, whom we respect. It must be made against the *mercantile* clan, devoted to George the Third.

“ And how shall it be made, you will say, this war of exception ?

“ A fleet of light vessels, not drawing at the most above ten feet water, some gun-boats and bomb-ketches, will go into the river Savannah in Georgia, as far as Tybee, and from Tybee to the town of Savannah. It will take possession of the magazine of stores, and *burn* the *farm-houses* on the right and left to the mouth of the river.

“ The same operation at Charleston in South-Carolina. It passes the bar, and by the same operation burns Johnson’s Island, and the buildings on Sullivan’s Island. The same operation at George-Town, South-Carolina, and Wilmington, North-Carolina ; go into *Chesapeake bay*, and it is by that, perhaps, by which the operation must be begun ; from Norfolk, Alexandria, the capital of Maryland, (Annapolis) and Baltimore.

“ Care must be taken, my friends, not to let one’s self be enveloped in the Chesapeake, where one would be annihilated, if the English by sea, or the English-Americans by land, had time to advance.

“ The operation of the Chesapeake is an affair of eight days, and must begin at the most distant place, that is Baltimore, whence may be drawn a large contribution : Savannah, Charleston, and Norfolk, have near them little earthen forts, which can be taken without great danger from the rear. Have a care then to advance yourselves into the

Deleware. One can burn on the left Lavingston. If one was sure, however, that the English were at a distance from it, one can at the same time *burn Philadelphia*. It is an affair of eight days.

“ Between Sandy-Hook and New-York there is a fort in a much more respectable state ; but they will bombard it. Long-Island, covered with houses, and also Nantucket, to be burned in an hour ; and Boston to be bombarded.

“ The master blow would be to finish at Halifax or Nova-Scotia, where the English winter in returning from the West-Indies ; not believing you to be in force there, they keep none in the neighborhood. If the expedition were co-operated in by a fleet from Canada, convoyed by a signal frigate, the operation would be brilliant. One might send the most part of your emigrants to Canada.

“ Enter New-Orleans with the consent of Spain, take possession of the port of Natches, call on the friends of liberty in the back parts of the United States, from *Kentucky* to the southern limits of English America. It will be necessary to make some presents to the savages ; send back by way of Spain, General Melcourt, chief of the Creeks ; put in motion General Clark of Knoxville ; call to the French standard the legions of Florida and America raised by *Genet* and Mangourit ; proclaim the *liberty* of the *black slaves* in the United States ; and give equality of rights to the people of color.

“ It is in fine, the inhabitants of the *confederate ports* who Anglicise the United States. To destroy their elaboratories is to fix them for ten years in the interior of the country ; it is to put them in opposition with the *planters* who will accuse *them* for the disasters of the war ; it is to destroy the leopard who at this moment feigns a union with the eagle to devour her.”*

The French then would probably land in Virginia, where they would be likely to be well received by their friends, the democratic planters ; and if not, it would be of no consequence ; they would proceed to emancipate, and to organize into an army the negroes of the southern states. Meanwhile a vast body of jacobin-rabble, already established in the United States, but originally imported from France, and the French West-Indies, from Ireland, from England, from Scotland, from Holland, from Germany, from Geneva, and from other places, the scum and refuse of the world, the blast of anarchy and taint of crime, would all crowd to the gallic standard.

With all the population of Europe at his command ; with all the West-India islands under his control ; with Halifax as an excellent naval station ; with Canada girding the union on the north ; and Louisiana and Florida, and the Spanish colonies hemming her in on the south ; how long would Bonaparte and his myrmidons be kept at bay by the few *real* Americans who might dare to

resist the mandates of the conqueror of the world?

It is too prevailing a fashion among the writers of newspapers, the authors of pamphlets, and the speakers of speeches, in the United States, incessantly and gravely to inform the public, that the *American militia*, composed of a virtuous, enlightened, hardy, brave, and independent yeomanry, would speedily put to flight the French veteran troops, to whom all the regular armies in Europe, led on to battle by experienced generals, have yielded after the most obstinate and bloody fighting in large masses of fifty, of a hundred, and of two hundred thousand men, gathered together upon the field of carnage.

I by no means intend to offer the least shade of disrespect to the *individual valor* of the men who compose the militia of the United States; for I do firmly believe that these men contain as good *materials* for a fine army as any men in any other country in the world; that is to say, their personal courage, bodily strength and activity, discernment and intelligence, are at least equal to those of any other people on earth.

But these raw materials of an army make but a sorry show when opposed to experienced veteran soldiers, unless they be previously worked up into the requisite manufacture by constant discipline, and superior military tactics. Upon this very important question of the best means of na-

tional defence, I have only time to make a few observations. He who wishes to see the whole subject of the best means of forming and using an adequate military force, may consult the following works : namely, *Caractere des Armées Européennes dans la Guerre actuelle, avec une paralelle de la Politique, de la puissance, et des moyens des Romains et des Français* ; Londres ; T. Eger-ton, 1802. Doctor Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Book 5, chap. 1, 3d vol. p. 69—94, both inclusive ; 5, Burke, p. 374—402, both inclusive ; 8, Burke, 307—375. *Edinburgh Review*, 5th vol. p. 10—15 ; 8th vol. p. 294—311 ; 15th vol. p. 427—462 ; and a letter to Mr. Wyndham from a gentleman in Edinburgh on the English volunteer-system, published in *Cobbett's Political Register* for February 1805.

It is of no consequence whether we call men by the name of militia, or volunteers, or armed peasantry, or by any other appellation, they are all alike ineffectual for the purposes of national defence, unless they be kept in constant discipline, and follow the separate trade of a regular soldier, *altogether* distinct from, and unmingled with, the pursuit of *any other* calling. I shall endeavor by the help of the great lights to which I have just now referred, to show that all *such* soldiers, whom we will call militia, for the sake of distinction and perspicuity, are quite ineffectual to defend a country against for-

eign invasion ; because they are incapable of acquiring the requisite military discipline ; are enormously expensive ; are productive of great and general immorality. These positions will be supported by an appeal to the most incontestible facts.

A militia-army is for the most part composed of men taken from the midst of orderly and decent families ; and when encamped at a distance from home, their minds are perpetually lingering upon the scenes of their fondest recollections ; upon the spot in which they first drew breath ; the hill, the dale, and wood, where they sported in the hours of infancy and childhood, or followed the more robust pursuit of their game in the days of their youth ; upon their parents, their brethren, their friends, and the objects of their softer affections.

These men are not easily reduced to that strict discipline and subordination which are indispensably necessary to the preservation of an army, and to the rendering it effectual in opposing an enemy. And by the time that they begin to learn a little of the duties and functions of a soldier, they are disbanded and give way to new recruits, with whom the officers have to pace the same dismal round of ineffectual contention against all the difficulties and embarrassments of insubordination and unmilitary habits, so essentially and vi-

tally connected with enlistments for a short period.

It is however urged by many well-meaning people in the United States, as a conclusive argument to prove the superiority of militia over regular troops, in effectually repulsing an enemy, that militia men have to fight for their wives and children; and if any thing on earth will make a man brave, say they, it is seeing his wife in danger of being dishonored, and his children of being massacred by a relentless foreign foe.

Now admitting the full force of this argument; admitting that a man will fight more vigorously in the sight and in the defence of his wife and children, than for any other object;—what then? soldiers cannot always, nay, they can very seldom have it in their power to fight immediately before their own doors, and within the full sound and hearing of the shrieks and screams of their affrighted wives and children. And when absent from these endearing and endeared objects the minds of our militia-men would be incessantly recurring to the scenes of their domestic happiness; and the perpetual yearning of the soul to revisit their wives, and children, and property, would unstring their nerves, sicken their hearts, and palsy their arms, at a distance from home; and like the Swiss, when the well-known air of the *Ranz des Vaches* afflicts them with the *maladie du pays* in foreign service, they would desert in

crowds, and in whole regiments ; leaving the general and his officers to face the enemy alone ; as the Spanish militia did lately, when they deserted Don Joachim Blake at Belchite.

Fear of death, and a desire to avoid bodily danger and pain, are essentially interwoven into the very nature of the human heart. But it is precisely the business of a soldier to despise pain and danger, and always to carry his life in his hand, ready to be given up at a moment's call, in obedience to the directions of the commanding officer.

Now the great counteracting forces of the fear of danger and of death in military men, are found by universal experience to consist in a dread of shame, and a desire of glory. The dread of shame is generated in the army by the unavoidable punishment and infamy at all times inseparable from cowardice, which is justly deemed the greatest of all possible crimes in a soldier, whose business it is to die at the word of command.

The desire of glory which leads to acts of heroism and of voluntary valor, is created and fostered by a frequent intercourse with danger ; by continual association with comrades of disciplined courage ; by the universal applause and homage which mankind lavish upon military prowess ; and by the love of power, which constitutes one of the most essential parts of human nature.

The basis of all military perfection is prompt and unqualified *obedience* to the commands of the

superior officers ; without which neither the intellect of the general, nor the courage of the soldier, can ever have its full field of exertion. To secure a real army the officer must be first and last in the eye of the soldier ; first and last in his attention, observance, and esteem.

That physical courage, the most essential property of the soldier, very much depends upon habit and discipline, appears from this well known fact ; that a veteran soldier, who has served many campaigns on land, has often marched up to the breach made by the terrible battery of the cannon, and displayed frequent evidences of the most indubitable and determined courage, has yet been often seen to tremble with terror on board a ship at a cap-full of wind. For under such circumstances, his accustomed associations, springing from long habits of prompt obedience to, and reliance upon the orders of his commanding officer, are broken ; and the essential qualities of his nature, fear of death and of bodily danger, are allowed to resume their full power, by the withdrawing of the artificial and counteracting forces which resulted from military discipline.

And the love of glory itself, which burns in the bosom of many soldiers, both officers and privates, and which prompts men to perform such astonishing deeds of hardihood and valor, is kept alive by the habitual courage that is for the most part created by military discipline. It is also cherished

by the *esprit du corps*, the spirit of the military body, not only as distinguished from the other classes of society, but also as marking out peculiar bodies of military men who signalize themselves above their fellows ; a spirit which has often converted a herd of cowards into a band of heroes : by the peculiar splendor of the soldier's garb, the accompaniment of martial music, the enthusiasm of an imagination heated by the frequent recital of heroic exploits, and by all the pomp, pride and circumstances, attendant upon the preparations for war ; all so peculiarly calculated to throw a dazzling lustre upon the career of the warrior.

It might be observed in passing, that the splendid garb of the soldier produces an *aggregate* effect upon himself and his opponents. The militia in their diversified clothing produce no general and united impression ; all is broken down into detail, and minute, individual, feeble fragments. The mind does not receive that aid which a regular uniform furnishes to concentrate the valor of the individual into one great, *general* and terrible impression.

But this prompt and unconditional obedience to military discipline can never be infused into a body of militia-men, who are gathered together only for a short time, and know that they shall soon be freed from the power and control of their commanding officers. This is in effect, holding up a high bounty to debauch the soldiers from their of-

ficers. It is touching the central point about which the component particles of armies are at repose. It is destroying the principle of obedience in the essential, critical link between the officer and the soldier, just where the chain of military subordination commences, and on which the whole military system depends.

The militia soldier in the United States is industriously informed that he is a citizen, and possesses the rights of a man and a citizen, as the privilege of his free birth. The right of a free and independent man, he is told, is to be his own governor, and to be ruled only by those to whom he delegates that self-government. And it is very natural for him to think that he ought most of all to have his choice where he is expected to yield the greatest degree of obedience. Accordingly, the militia officers in many parts of the union are obliged to be perpetually on their good behavior, and be especially cautious not to deviate into any authority or discipline; lest they should offend the majesty of that portion of the sovereign people which condescends to enrol itself in the *paper lists* of the military defenders of their country.

An army of militia consequently never can be rendered effective in the field or in the camp; because the men are never trained to those habits of patient toil, of cool indifference to all danger, and of that steady, unshaken valor, so conspicuous

in a well-disciplined soldier, and so all-important to the success of a campaign, whether it be employed in offensive or defensive warfare. And whatever may be the courage of individuals, it is well known that undisciplined valor is fatal to the possessor, and useless to the community, in direct proportion to its activity and force, which only expose it to more certain and speedy destruction when set in array against the steady and well-directed machinery of military tactics.

If we try these general principles by a variety of illustration, and of particular facts, we shall find that they are uniformly correct and just.

“In the progress of human society war becomes one of the most complicated sciences. The state of the mechanical, and of some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines indeed the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any given period. But in order to carry it even to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the *sole* or *principal* occupation of a particular class of men; and the division of labor is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art.

Into other arts the division of labor is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interests better by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a great number of different vocations. But it is the wisdom of the *government*

only which can render the calling of a soldier *a particular* trade, separate and distinct from all others.

A private citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater portion of his time in military exercises, might doubtless render himself an expert parade-soldier, and highly entertain himself; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the government only which can make it his interest to give up the greatest part of his time to this peculiar occupation; and governments have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had become such as to rest their only hope of national safety upon a regular military institution.

A husbandman, in the ruder condition of agriculture, has some leisure; but an artificer or manufacturer, in a civilized state of society, has none. The farmer, therefore, can afford to employ a small portion of his time in military exercises; but the manufacturer or artificer cannot consume a single hour in them, without incurring loss; whence his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether.

Besides, those improvements in agriculture which the progress of arts and manufactures naturally introduces, leaves the farmer as little leisure as the mechanic. Military exercises are then as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country

as by those of the towns, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. And that wealth which always follows the improvements of agriculture, manufactures and commerce; and which in reality is nothing more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their neighbors.

An industrious, and upon that account, a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless the government take some measures for the public defence, the natural habits of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves."

It is true that *militia* exercises are not altogether neglected by the American agriculturists; but these, in addition to America being yet in her national infancy, will presently be seen to be quite inadequate for defending a country against foreign invasion.

"In such circumstances there are but two modes of making provision for public defence; either, 1st. by means of a very rigorous police, which, in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforces the practice of military exercise, and obliges either all, or nearly all the citizens of the military age to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to follow. This mode is adopted in the United States.

Or, 2dly, by maintaining and employing a cer-

tain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, to render the trade of a soldier a particular calling, distinct and separate from all other employments.

Men raised and used according to the first method, are called militia: men embodied under the second mode, are denominated regular troops. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of regular soldiers; and the maintenance or pay which they receive from government is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of militia-men, and they derive their chief means of support from some other employment than that of arms.

In a militia, the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; but in a regular army the character of the soldier predominates over that of every other calling.

Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which in modern armies are of more importance towards determining the fate of battles, than the skill and dexterity of the individual soldiers in the use of their arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be said to be commenced, must render

it very difficult to maintain any considerable degree of regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in the beginning of a battle. These habits can only be acquired by troops which are continually exercised in *large bodies*.

A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, must always be much inferior to a well-disciplined and well-exercised standing army.

The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a month, or still less frequently, can never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised every day, or every other day. Nor can the soldiers who are expected to obey their officer only once a week, or once a month; and who at all other times have full liberty "to manage their own affairs in their own way," without being in any respect accountable to him, be under the same awe in his presence, and have the same disposition to ready obedience, as those soldiers whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by him; and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders.

In discipline, or the habit of ready obedience, a militia must be always still more inferior to a regular army, than it may sometimes perhaps be in the manual exercise, or the management and use of arms. But in modern warfare, the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater

consequence than a considerable superiority in manual exercise.

A militia of any kind, however, which has served for several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a regular army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in regular armies. What they were before they took the field is of little importance. They necessarily become in every respect a regular army after they have passed a few campaigns in actual service.

This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages will be found to bear the most unequivocal testimony to the irresistible superiority of a well-disciplined regular army over a militia.

The soldiers of a regular army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops ; and in the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face the hardest and most experienced veterans. In the year 1756, when the Russian army marched into Poland, the valor of the Russian soldiers did not appear inferior to that of the Prussians, then reputed to be the hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. But the Russian empire had enjoyed a profound peace for nearly twenty years

before that time; and consequently could then have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy.

And when the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had reposed in profound peace for eight-and-twenty years. Yet the valor of her soldiers, so far from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first exploit of that war. In a long peace, perhaps the generals may sometimes forget their skill; but where a well-regulated standing army is kept up the soldiers never forget their valor.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by an invading regular army. A regular army can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, which can only be defended by such an army from inevitable subjugation in the event of foreign invasion. It is only therefore by means of a regular army that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable time."

Another military theory which pervades the union is, that *a numerous peasantry* is the only sure and safe defence of a great country. Nay, a senator of the United States, and by far the ablest of all the leaders of his party, openly declared in Congress, during the winter of 1808—9, "that Britain could never have an efficient army,

because she had so small a proportion of her population employed in agriculture; and so great a mass of her people occupied in manufacturing and mechanical operations, which entirely unfitted men for the hardy and robust calling of a soldier; by enervating their bodies, weakening their minds, extinguishing the generous love of liberty," &c. &c.

We are continually informed by men of great respectability, both as to talent and information, that "the proprietors of the soil, the independent yeomanry, of all classes of the community, have the most real and immediate interest in the permanent prosperity of the country. They and their brethren, the peasantry, are of all men the most attached to liberty and independence; they are the natural supporters of the union; they are its effective guardians, and justly stand at the head of all the other orders of society. From among them *alone can a safe and efficient military force be raised.*

"The militia is made up of a high spirited, generous race, who have wives and children to love and guard, landed property to preserve, and defend. They alone are the natural defence of a nation, the only source of a military power. They are not such *military machines* as were broken by the French at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Pultusk, at Elsinghen, at Wagram;—no, before their manly prowess all the legions of Europe would bite the

dust ;" and much more in the same soothing strain.

"This doctrine, to be sure, has found multitudes of converts among the retailers of sentiment, as well as among speculative politicians. The peasantry are always represented in this country to be so very "virtuous, hardy, spirited, free-born," &c. that we are invited to believe that there is neither worth, strength, valor, nor freedom in any other classes of the community. But the slightest acquaintance with history will inform us, that the most eminent instances of slavery are to be found in myriads of bondmen, the only name for peasants in most of the countries of Europe ; and that the progress of freedom has uniformly been co-eval with the multiplication of the other orders of society, more particularly of the mercantile and manufacturing classes.

To render the cultivators of the soil still more interesting, they are termed "simple, natural, happy, ignorant," and the like. Most of the theories and declamations in favor of barbarism which is softened down into "the rude state of society," are advanced to prove the utility of the militia-system, and the superiority of the tillers of the soil to the inhabitants of the town.

And to crown all, every opprobrious epithet is lavished upon the artisan, as a dweller in cities, a consumer of spirituous liquors, and other dainties, a well-educated, and a civilized being. He

is represented as sickly, weak, ugly, puny, dissipated, sedentary, and seditious.

But notwithstanding all this eloquence, sentiment, and authority, the *facts* lie altogether in the opposite scale. If the bodily strength of artisans be less than that of ploughmen, they possess in a much greater degree that manual dexterity and skill so necessary in the evolutions of modern war. Their health, impaired perhaps by sedentary labor, is speedily restored by the exertions of discipline, and the practice of the field.

Modern warfare consists in reducing men to a state of great mechanical activity, and combining them as parts of a great machine. For this use which of the two is most fitted by his previous habits; he who has been all his life acting the part of a mechanical implement in a combination of movements; or he who has been constantly employed as a thinking independent, separate, and insulated agent?

Obedience is the first requisite in a soldier, who for his pay must give up every faculty of body and mind to the will of another. Is such discipline enforced more easily on those who have roamed the woods, and spent their days in a vaunted freedom and self-control; or in those who have never known the use of their natural independence; but have lived, worked, and almost breathed at the will of their employers?

It should also be remembered that of all troops the most expensive are those levied from agricultural occupations; that artisans are naturally thrown idle by every war, but the peasantry must work constantly, or the community will starve; that the husbandmen can only be drawn into military service during certain seasons of the year; and that hired troops naturally composed of manufacturers can be retained in service all the year round." The consideration of *expense* however will be taken up hereafter.

"It appears from the most careful survey of historical evidence, that a *well-disciplined* army has in all ages been a sure foundation of political power and importance; and that such armies have been the immediate and efficient instruments in producing all those great revolutions in the affairs of men, which are recorded in authentic history. It is therefore of importance to inquire what are the peculiar qualities which characterize soldiers; and in what manner those qualities arise out of the peculiar constitution which armies have in all ages invariably assumed.

This inquiry is the more necessary, because the fundamental principles of an army are grounded on the unchangeable qualities of the human mind; and have on that account remained stationary amidst the varying fashions, manners and improvements of mankind. The constitution of an army has grown out of the nature of society, and has been found by the universal experience of man-

kind to be well calculated to fit those who are trained under its regulations for the purposes of war.

The perfection of a military force consists in an instant and complete *obedience* to command ; not merely on a parade, where any man may easily obey orders, but in braving every mode of peril and of death in prompt submission to the directions of the superior officer. It is therefore the object of discipline, not only to establish authority on a solid foundation, by training men to a constant familiarity with the peremptory decrees of martial law ; but also to facilitate and secure obedience, by forming and maturing those habits of mind which enable them bravely and cheerfully to confront danger.

There arises also in all armies when engaged in the operations of war, and exposed to its perils, a peculiar system of manners which greatly aids the effect of positive institutions. From the ardor of zeal, emulation and honor, naturally produced by the situation of the soldiers, men are animated to unusual exertions of valor ; and they rejoice and glory in scenes which the mind in its natural state contemplates with horror.

It is only also in the perilous emergencies of real service, that a commander has an opportunity of securing the confidence, and conciliating the affections of his troops ; by displaying courage, capacity, and presence of mind in the midst

of danger ; by an unwearied attention to the comforts of the soldiers ; by showing on all occasions a zealous attachment to the military character and profession ; and by cheerfully participating in all the dangers and privations to which they are exposed.

By these means all great generals have contrived to communicate to their troops an extraordinary portion of heroic zeal. By operating on their minds with peculiar incentives, they have given new energy to all those principles on which the excellence of the military character depends, and have called forth in their service all those enthusiastic feelings which, in the hour of danger, animate the passions, and fortify the heart.

Men who have been accustomed to this sort of training very soon acquire all those moral habits, which teach them fearlessly to encounter danger, and it is altogether *in these qualities of the mind*, that we are to look for that grand distinction which exists between soldiers and men employed in peaceful occupations ; and for that superiority in the field, which has always enabled armies to discomfit and disperse every species of irregular force that has been rashly exposed to their attack.

It is therefore highly dangerous and impolitic in any country to rely for its security on the efforts of men who are not soldiers, who employ themselves only occasionally in acquiring mechanical dexterity in the use of arms, and devote the

chief portion of their time and attention to wholly different pursuits. It is impossible that men so circumstanced can ever acquire the characteristic habits and feelings of soldiers ; and it has been found by universal experience that they have never been able to withstand the shock of a regular army.

Whenever, therefore, the military force of any state is formed, *either wholly or in part*, of the unwarlike population of the country, who may, no doubt, be very easily assimilated to soldiers in external appearance, but who never can acquire their real character, very great inconvenience and danger must be the inevitable result. For in case of *invasion* militia-men, or any other species of undisciplined troops, can only resort to a system of defensive warfare, which in an open and level country can never be ultimately successful, except through the misconduct of the enemy ; and which even in a country abounding in strong positions, must be of very doubtful issue.

With a force imperfectly disciplined to check veteran troops by a judicious combination of scientific movements ; to choose positions so excellent as to bid defiance to the efforts of the most enterprising enemy ; and so to fortify and secure them, that superior gallantry should be only a passport to destruction ; requires such skill and talents, and such a series of prosperous events,

that it would be quite unsafe for any country to hazard its security on so rare a conjunction.

The invading army might, by rapid and daring hostility, render nugatory a system of defensive tactics; might force its enemy to a battle in defence of some capital object; and the issue of such a contest would not be long doubtful, if success depended on the persevering valor of inexperienced troops. It appears to be self-evident, that an invader who possesses an army excellently trained and disciplined, and who is opposed by a force of inferior character, must ultimately succeed in his views, if he be sufficiently rapid and enterprising in his movements, so as to prevent both the spirit of adventure from languishing among his followers, and the invaded country from concentrating its physical strength.

The events of war are determined by the united influence of discipline and tactics, and consequently the perfection of the military art is produced by a combination of skilful tactics with a high state of discipline. A general may have brought his troops to the highest possible degree of discipline, but may not have matured a system of tactics to a corresponding degree of perfection; or an unskilful general may be intrusted with the command of excellent troops, and may be opposed by a more skilful commander with an army inferior in discipline; and the superiority of tactics on the one side may more than counterba-

lance an inferiority of discipline. But can we thence infer that troops imperfectly disciplined are a match for veteran forces, or that discipline has not a most important influence on the decision of battles? It would be equally correct to say, that in military operations, superior numbers are not a very material advantage, because they have been frequently more than counterbalanced by the talents of a skilful general.

The object of a great commander who is well acquainted with his troops, and who has gained their confidence, is generally to bring his enemy to battle on fair and equal terms, and if that cannot be done, to attack even at a disadvantage. His decision must be guided entirely by the existing circumstances, and in forming a correct estimate of the comparative advantage of the enemy's position, and of the superior discipline of his own troops, the event of the battle, and his own character for prudence and judgment, must wholly depend.

Marlborough seems to have united in his character all the qualities of a great general; to have combined skilful tactics with the most admirable discipline; not only to have excelled in perfecting his instrument, but to have been equally dexterous in using it with the best possible effect. His troops appear to have possessed in the greatest perfections all those qualities, which in the hour of peril, render the heart impregnable to panic or

dismay, and they were led on to contend for victory and for fame, by commanders of tried courage and capacity, who exalted by their own example the ardor of their troops to the highest possible elevation of heroic zeal.

It was particularly remarked in the battle of Ramillies, how conspicuously every officer of rank distinguished himself; and even the Dutch general, Monsieur Auverquerque, forgetting his years and infirmities, was seen every where in the hottest of the fire, encouraging and animating his men to prodigies of valor.

Malborough did not waste the energies of such troops in feeble and indecisive hostility; his mode of warfare was entirely adapted to the nature and character of the force which he commanded, and was admirably calculated to display the effects of superior discipline; he hazarded every thing and depended in the day of battle on the tried fidelity and courage of his soldiers; and on the sure resources of his own genius for a glorious result.

He was fettered at the outset of his career by the timid caution of the Dutch generals; but with such forces, and such a commander, it was prudence to attempt the boldest and most adventurous designs. The superiority of Marlborough's troops in steady and desperate valor was recognised by his enemies, who felt themselves unable to withstand them in the field, and frequently deserted their strongest positions at his approach.

Indeed, the whole history of his campaigns illustrates strikingly, so far at least as respects the relative discipline of the troops engaged, the theory of offensive and defensive war ; and shows plainly how difficult it is to defend the strongest positions against an army very highly disciplined, and led on by a bold and enterprising commander.

As it appears, therefore, that the success of military operations so materially depends upon the discipline of the troops employed, nothing can be more impolitic in any country than to rely for its defence on any force of inferior quality, and thus voluntarily to relinquish one of the requisite conditions either for acting offensively, or for ensuring the speedy discomfiture of an invading army. The independence of such a country, when attacked by a regular army, must rest on a very insecure foundation. Its defence perhaps may be rendered possible, by a strong barrier of fortified towns ; by the nature of a country abounding in strong positions ; and by the unskilful management of the invading army.

If a commander with a force trained and disciplined, after beating his enemy in the field, does not push his advantages with rapidity and vigor ; if he allows them to recover from the consternation of his first victories ; to recruit and re-animate their broken and disheartened troops ; to secure their strong holds ; and to consolidate the physical

strength of the country against him, his ultimate ruin is certain.

He should never allow his men to rest in pursuit of a routed foe ; nor should he stand wavering and deliberating before passes and strong positions ; but appal his enemy by the rapidity of his movements and the boldness of his designs ; always considering that the most sanguinary and desperate hostility is his surest policy ; and that the blindest temerity does not lead more surely to destruction in the end, than a system of protracted and indecisive warfare.

Since then a regular army skilfully commanded has always effected the ruin of a country defended by a less effective species of military force, a nation ought to rest its security *solely on a regular army.*"

But in addition to being incapable of arriving at any perfection of discipline, the militia is more *expensive* than the regular system. In the United States they profess to have a million of militiamen, who used to be exercised *three times* in a year, in order to render them expert and serviceable soldiers ; but within these six months, orders have been issued, and laws passed, that they shall be called out on the parade no less than *eight times* a year, for the purpose of enabling them to beat the French veteran troops, whenever they may see fit to pay us a visit.

Say, these million of men would earn on an ave-

rage a dollar each per day ; that the work which they might perform is worth twice as much as their wages, according to the average value of profit on trading and farming stock ; and that they spend in idleness and drunkenness as much as their wages are worth, and we have the following rate of annual expenditure for keeping up an ineffectual military force :

Eight days' wages for a million of men	\$ 8,000,000
The value of eight days' work of these	
men,	16,000,000
The money spent by them in idle-	
ness on those days,	8,000,000

Total annual cost, 32,000,000

For which sum, or half the sum, if we take the wages of labor at half a dollar a day, a very respectable regular army might be maintained, and the rest of the population be permitted to follow their respective employments.

Indeed, the introduction of regular armies is one of the greatest improvements in the science of politics ; for by them a nation is more effectually protected, and at a much smaller expenditure of the public money, than can be effected by any organization of militia ; because the loss of time and labor occasioned by withdrawing the citizen from his peaceful occupation to become a temporary and an awkward soldier, actually wastes more of the nation's capital, by stopping the progress

of productive industry, than would be consumed by maintaining regular bodies of troops, whose only business it is to acquire and preserve habits of military obedience, and to fight when necessary.

In the progress of society, and of the division of labor, it is necessary that the calling of a soldier should become a distinct and separate trade of itself, in order that the other classes of the community might be left at liberty to pursue their respective employments; by the operation of which the whole society is rendered wealthy and prosperous. So that the weaver should not be drawn from his loom, nor the farmer from his plough; but that the land may continue to be tilled, and the necessary arts of life be still prosecuted amidst the clashings of national conflicts; and war itself be reduced to a game of military skill, and of financial calculation, instead of becoming a calamity big with the inevitable ruin and desolation of the contending countries.

“ The expense of raising and maintaining an agricultural militia is most enormous to the prosperity and wealth of the community. In every thriving and prosperous country, there is a certain mass of the inhabitants, whose circumstances are uncomfortable: whose fortunes are precarious; who are attached to no regular profession, but ready to shift about in order to answer any temporary demand for labor that might occur; or to supply any blank

in the other bodies, which may leave a vacancy in the ordinary channels of industry.

This class of the community is in every respect least valuable. Its members are persons of bad character, and idle habits; men who generally owe their misfortunes to their follies or their vices; or who are driven by more inevitable calamities into idle and criminal habits. They are a congeries of out-casts from the sound branches of the population, and have a tendency to corrupt the rest of its members; they are the scum and off-scourings of society; or those parts, which are, from being thrown off, in a progress towards this impure and noxious state.

Their numbers are continually varying with all the changes in the fortunes of the community; with the wisdom of its internal administration; the encouragements which its police affords to industry or to idleness; the changes in its domestic prosperity, and in its external security and power. They abound in commercial and manufacturing communities, and more particularly in those districts which supply the more capricious desires of mankind, and are most liable to sudden variation of demand.

In almost all the large cities of the United States however, notwithstanding the abundance of land, and monopoly-price of labor, in this country, we have by far too large a floating mass of this noxious shifting population; consisting indeed

chiefly of imported Europeans ; but their number is annually increasing to a formidable amount by the facility with which their breed is promoted and encouraged.

The natural destination of this class of men is the naval and military service of the state. Discipline will excite industry, or at least exertion, in those whom habits of idleness have rendered callous to all the temptations of hire. Strict government will reform the manners, or at least restrain the conduct of those whom a life of lawless dissipation had corrupted. It is highly beneficial to the sounder parts of the community that such rotten members should be separated from contact with the rest ; even if they cannot be cured by a strongly alterative regimen.

Above all, it is highly beneficial to the state, that its pressing demands for soldiers and sailors should be supplied easily and suddenly, without disturbing in the slightest degree the arrangements of the community. War thus creates the very means of supplying its demand, without conclusion or derangement of the society. It furnishes men to the army and navy without disturbing the loom and the plough, or drying up the sources of national wealth ; from which its expenses are to be provided. It carries off the bad humors formerly secreted in the body-politic, without any danger from their contagious influence to the sounder parts of the system.

But the militia being raised compulsorily from all the orders of the community alike, is formed of the soundest, as well as of the floating population ; and consists of the industrious laborer as well as of the idle and profligate vagrant. An army so raised, takes away both that part of the people which should remain at their looms and ploughs, and that part which ought to be enlisted or impressed. It confounds in one indiscriminate levy, the persons least fitted for military pursuits, and those who are formed for the army by all their previous habits. It falls alike on those who are benefited and on those who are ruined by the change of life ; and drains those parts of the country where no fit subjects are to be found, as well as those which abound in materials for the recruiting service.

The regular army, recruited by voluntary enlistment, draws off precisely those who ought to enter, and leaves all those free who can be better employed as citizens than as soldiers. It is supplied by the districts where a floating population abounds, and does not grow at the expense of those which are full of industry and morals. It is supplied by the very circumstances which render its existence necessary ; and instead of greatly aggravating, it eminently alleviates the evils of a state of warfare.

The benefits of this system in military policy are exactly analagous to those of the funding sys-

tem in finance. The practice of raising money by loan, enables capital to find an investment, when it is shut out from all the ordinary channels of employment, and gives the government the benefit of sudden assistance, without cramping the commerce which the war may still allow to exist. It forces nothing, it avails itself of circumstances; it turns an evil into a benefit; and prevents the shocks of war from falling on the most delicate parts of the political machine.

But admitting the expense, that is the loss attendant upon the two systems of raising troops, were precisely equal, yet they fall with very different degrees of justice upon the community. While the army can be recruited at the proportional expense of the whole nation, the *militia* must be raised from the *poorer* classes as rigorously as from the rich; so that a man not paying taxes at all, a pauper, is liable to pay as much, or to be as much harassed for the public defence as one who possesses a hundred thousand pounds a year.

It has, therefore, all the evils of a poll-tax. Nay worse; on the rich it falls as a tax which they can easily pay; on the poor it falls as a compulsory levy of personal service. On the rich it operates as a light fine; on the poor as imprisonment, hard labor, or exile. It is then a burden imposed with the most severity on those orders of the community, which are least able to bear the load.

It is at least as absurd to defend the country in this equal manner, without regard to means, and to the stake which each citizen has in its preservation, as it would be to make every man pay an equal income-tax, whether he be rich or poor. To let the burden fall indifferently on various classes, is as unjust as it would be to make all the wealthy orders pay a trifling contribution, and force all the poor to be servants of the public."

Nor is this all; for men who have been ever so little accustomed to a militia life, or playing at soldiers, generally contrive to learn the habits of profligacy and licentiousness, which are for the most part intimately connected with the military calling; although they do not learn the habits of military obedience and discipline, which in some measure restrain the evil tendency of those habits. And thus they carry a continual stream of pestilence and immorality into the bosom of their families, with which they either live constantly, or to which they return after a short absence spent in militia service; whence in process of time they convert nearly the whole community into one universal mass of dissoluteness and corruption.

And no statesman, even of ordinary experience and discretion, will doubt, that a nation cannot possibly long possess either freedom or independence, after the morals of its people are once thoroughly tainted with the pollution of infamy and vice.

Now, no such evil can accrue from the formation of a regular army, which is generally composed for the most part of the refuse of society, men of lawless and disorderly habits, whose separation from the other orders of the community, leaves the remainder of the population more healthy and virtuous. These men live mostly in barracks, distinct from the other classes of citizens; they have few or no ties to bind them to society; they generally remain in the army during life; and the comparatively few that are disbanded have in general no decent families into which they can return, and carry disorder and vice with them; they can only go back to that refuse of society, that floating population, from which they were taken to become soldiers; and even here their actions can be restrained in their tendency to evil by the salutary vigilance and vigor of a well-regulated police.

Whoever desires to see how utterly ineffectual an ill-disciplined militia or soldiery is to resist the attacks of a regular army, will find an abundance of facts related by *M. Lacretelle, junior*, in his "*Precis Historique de la Revolution Française: Assemblée Legislative*," published in Paris, in the year 1804, p. 178, 190. *Ibid.* "*Convention Nationale*," published in Paris, 1806, vol. 2nd. p. 136, 156. *Ibid.* "*Directoire Executif*," published at Paris, in 1806, vol. 1st. Introduction p. 137, 147, and vol. 1st. p. 194, 220.

I shall merely glance rapidly at one or two of the facts which M. Lacretelle relates.

“In the mean time the French expected with extreme impatience the issue of the expedition into Belgium, projected by Dumouriez, who acted with extreme precipitation. General Rochambeau, however, did not give way to these unfounded hopes: he demanded time to exercise his troops; or at least to bend them to a little subordination. In truth, the want of discipline in this army was extreme.

In every garrisoned town the soldiers attended democratic clubs, and deliberated upon what might be the best mode of discipline in the army for themselves; that is to say, they set all discipline at defiance. This licentious conduct was mistaken for an auspicious enthusiasm. After reiterated orders from the war-minister, the advanced guard made a sortie from the walls of Lille; at the distance of a few leagues it encountered the Austrian army, which was far inferior to itself in number.

The French were so disorderly in the disposition of their battalions that they suffered themselves to be attacked. A panic terror spread itself universally among them, and the first shock put them entirely to the rout. On all sides was heard the cry of treason among the French soldiers, who ran away, abandoning their cannon and baggage. General Rochambeau sallied from the

walls of Lille to cover the flight of these valiant democrats; who were no sooner within their walls than they accused their commander Theobald Dillon of having betrayed them, and instantly murdered him, a brave and loyal chief, whom they had with so much cowardice abandoned.

A second attack, led on by General Biron, was still more disgraceful to the French arms. It was directed against Mons; the enemy showed itself at a little distance, and immediately the same cry of treason pervaded the ranks of the French, who all ran away as before. This defeat was even less bloody than the first, because they did not approach so near to the Austrians as before. Two or three *regular* regiments protected their disorderly retreat, with a steady and well-directed valor. In the mean time general Biron's camp was abandoned to the Austrians, and the French retired within the walls of Valenciennes.

The news of these checks withered the sanguine and premature hopes which the democrats had entertained of the irresistible valor of the French raw conscripts, &c. &c.

The Girondins, drunk with the delirium of a new revolution, were eager for a war, and they obtained both the one and the other of these scourges. The anarchy which preceded the fall of the throne was such that the allied kings and the emigrants of France flattered themselves with realizing the most chimerical hopes; and the

House of Brandenburg united itself with the House of Austria.

The invasion of the king of Prussia took place. Was it caused by the day of the tenth of August? But the immediate effect of this day was to favor a very rash undertaking, by spreading tumult and discord among the French armies, and discontent in the towns and villages. Was it caused by the day of the second of September? I will only answer by one fact to this odious question.

Fifteen thousand French soldiers fled ten leagues because they perceived *fifteen hundred* Prussian hussars advancing towards them. These runaways were some of the soldiers levied at Paris during the massacres. *Twenty-two thousand* French, commanded by Kellerman, at the affair of Valmi, stopped the progress of *seventy thousand* enemies; but these were old, regular, well-disciplined troops, who had manifested the greatest horror at the crimes committed by the democrats.

Of all the five tyrants who, as masters of the Committee of Public Safety, were also masters of the Convention, and of all France; namely, Robespierre, Billaud-Varennes, Collot d' Herbois, Saint-Just, and Couthon; not one had the least acquaintance with military affairs, or with grand views of policy. Their extreme ignorance saved them from the faults of presumption. These most iniquitous of men divided the whole power of the republic into two parts; they reserved for themselves the ex-

ercise of oppression and massacre, and they confided the uncontrolled domination of all the military power of France to the genius of Carnot.

And from that hour, by the introduction of the *severest and most undeviating discipline*, the French soldiers became every where victorious, and carried the terror of the Great Nation over all the continent of Europe. Carnot created a new epoch in the military art. The German tactics employed the soldiers as so many machines ; the new tactics of France employed them as men.

The French generals, exempt from prejudices, and many of them endowed with extraordinary genius, had no other care than to meditate upon all the causes which had concurred to produce their first victories ; to push onward to still more glorious conquests, with smaller armies and with less sacrifices ; and to render themselves formidable even in the day of their defeat. By degrees, and by the most rigorous enforcement of military discipline, they converted their bands of raw, disobedient, disorderly soldiery into the best and the most terrible infantry of Europe.

The Austrian cavalry however preserved their superiority over that of France even to the end of the war ; but this was for them on a thousand occasions only a barren advantage. They already perceived with humiliation how inferior was their artillery to that of the French. They came, but

with tardy steps, at length to a more fortunate rivalry in this respect.

The corps of engineers and of artillery afforded a multitude of well instructed men, fitted to direct the inexperience of the new armies of France. Carnot, who had himself belonged to the first of these two corps, protected them ; and they contributed to preserve France. This corps had a commission attached to the Committee of Public Safety ; or rather to Carnot, who in concert with it combined those plans of campaigns, vast and bold, which far surpassed even the most celebrated military combinations of Louvois. These military councils were composed of men whose reputation and valor recommended them to proscription ; such men as d'Arcon, Marescot, Dupont, Montalembert, yet notwithstanding their eminent services to their country they escaped the guillotine.

Dugommier had retarded the invasion of Spain only to prepare the means of ensuring conquest. He knew that he should have to force fortresses which had been the wreck-rocks of the most illustrious generals. He had provided himself with an immense besieging artillery, and had combined the means of transporting them across the Pyrenean mountains.

He correctly appreciated the courage of the Spaniards ; and foresaw that the circumspection which makes all their military operations so fatal

to them after they have gained a victory, would be advantageous to them while they acted upon the defensive. He applied himself to teach the officers of his army how to form the grand combinations of military tactics ; so that the school of Dugommier was fertile in distinguished generals.

But above all, he perceived the importance of bending into the *severest subordination* an army, which, formed amidst the civil troubles, and hitherto destined only to act against the helpless inhabitants of the defenceless villages of France, had become nothing more than one universal mass of that dark and tumultuous agitation which so peculiarly belongs to the fanaticism of democracy.

He was about to penetrate into a country where the most determined superstition had brooded in the midnight of successive centuries. The irreligion, the vain and ordinary boasting of the French soldiers, had already manifested the ebullition of their zeal in the most obscene and abominable pleasantries, and in the most blasphemous profanations, at the very first aspect of the Spanish superstitions. Dugommier at length made the discipline of his soldiery ensure their future discretion.

Lastly, that I might finish my selection from so great a mass of the most conclusive facts, proving the all-importance of steady discipline to render an army effectual for the accomplishment

of all its purposes, offensive and defensive, every part of the service of the French army found in Bonaparte a vigilant inspector, or rather a creator of new resources. The infantry acquired a mobility, more active, and more scientifically calculated. The cavalry was incessantly trained to perfection in all their manœuvres, upon the excellent horses which the plains of Lombardy furnished.

Bonaparte never rested from his efforts to perfect one of the most precious inventions of his military genius ; I speak of the companies of guides ; a troop, whose inconceivable velocity surpasses all the services that have ever been performed by the light-armed soldiery. The artillery, the first object of his studies, received also from him new and vast improvements.

One might see in all the soldiers of his army a rare mixture of the most passive obedience with an ingenious curiosity that prompted them to present their plans of military operation to their general. Bonaparte, while he applauded this disposition, sometimes experienced its inconvenience. One day a chasseur, at the approach of an action which promised to be very difficult, advanced towards his general, and pointed out to him as a necessary operation the very same measure upon which he had himself determined : "wretch ! be silent !" replied Bonaparte, who feared nothing more than the being betrayed by the sagacity of

his own soldiers. After the battle was over, he sought in vain for the chasseur, whom he wished to make an officer.

The subordination of all the generals, of all the superior officers, to a young man only twenty-six years of age, who commanded them, redounded less to the splendor of his glory, than to the energy of his character. The most lively emulation reigned among his generals, Joubert, Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, Dallemagne, Guyeux, Vau-bois, Murat, Lannes, Rampon, and others, which of them should be the best of the lieutenants of Bonaparte, but not one of them ever dreamed of becoming his rival. General Berthier, who aided him with all his military talents and intrepidity, was his most constant and intimate companion.

The deplorable want of all discipline in the Spanish armies at the beginning of the revolution in the Peninsula, and their consequent shameful flight at the very first charge of the French troops, are fully developed in a very interesting "*Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain, commanded by his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, K. B. &c. authenticated by official papers and original letters ; by James Moore, Esq.*" (brother of the late gallant and ever to be honored General Moore,) published in London, during the autumn of 1809. I shall merely avail myself of one or two facts on this point ; referring for

further information to Mr. Moore's work, p. 128—188.

My motive, says colonel Symes, in a letter to Sir David Baird, bearing date Leon, 14th December, 1808 ; for doubting if the aid which the Marquis de la Romana might bring, would be of *any* importance, arises from a sense of the *inefficient* state of his army, and the want of *discipline* in the men. It is morally impossible that they *can* stand before a line of French infantry.

At least one third of the Spanish muskets will not explode ; and a French soldier will load and fire his piece three times before a Spaniard can fire his twice. Men, *however brave*, cannot stand against such odds ; as to charging with the bayonet, if their arms were fit for the purpose, the men, though *individually* as *gallant* as possible, have no *collective* confidence to carry them on, nor officers to lead them ; they will therefore disperse probably on the *first* fire, and can *never* be rallied, until they voluntarily return to their general's standard ; as in the case of the Marquis de la Romana's present army, almost wholly composed of *fugitives* from the battle of the north.

A striking instance of this is given by the Marquis himself, who assured me that the Spaniards did not lose above *a thousand* men in their late actions with the French ; a proof, not of the weakness of the French, but of the *incapacity* of the Spaniards to resist them. In fact the French

light troops decided the contest; the Spaniards *fled* before a desultory fire; they saved themselves, and now claim merit for having escaped.

By a repetition of such flights and re-assembling, the Spaniards may *in the end become soldiers*, and greatly harass the enemy; but as the British cannot pursue that mode of warfare, their Spanish allies are not much calculated to be of use to them on the day of battle, when they must either conquer or be destroyed.

I do not mean to undervalue the *spirit* or *patriotism* of the Spaniards, which I highly respect, and which in the end may effect their deliverance; but they *are not now*, nor *can they for a long time be sufficiently improved* in the art of war, to be co-adjutors with the British in a general action; the British therefore must stand or fall through their *own* means; for if they place any reliance on Spanish aid for success in the field, they will find themselves egregiously deceived."

A letter from the Duke de l' Infantado to Mr. Frere the British minister in Spain, dated Cuenca 13th December 1808, gives the following miserable account of the condition of the army under his command.

"I have been obliged by the generals, and forced by circumstances, to take the command of this army, until I receive the decision of the Junta. Unfortunately a spirit of *insurrection* and *discontent* among the *soldiery* has placed me at my present post: and it is most assuredly, a very disagreeable

situation for me to have to correct inveterate evils, and to take the necessary measures to re-establish *order and discipline so totally neglected.*

I cannot describe to you the condition in which I found this body of troops ; nearly famished, without shoes, a great part without uniforms, without ammunition, and most part of its baggage lost ; reduced to about nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry ; and above all, having *totally lost all confidence in their officers.*"

But to come a little closer to the point ; what has the American militia itself ever done to justify the pompous elogium so lavishly heaped upon it, "that all the veteran troops of Europe would soon melt away, like the dews of the morning, before the superior prowess and freedom-strung vigor of the hardy yeomanry of the United States?"

The militia of this country, both during the revolutionary war and since, has always run away without fighting whenever it has had an opportunity. General Lee was so well aware of this propensity of the militia-men, that he used to ride along the lines, on the verge of an expected battle, and say, "now my lads of the militia, let me beseech you to fire *once* before you run away." But even this modest request of the general was very seldom granted.

The pages of General Marshal's Life of Washington bear ample testimony, that during the revolutionary war the whole interests of America

were several times on the point of being sacrificed to a blind and infatuated perseverance in the scheme of militia, and of short enlistments ; both of which amount to the same thing, namely, the substitution of an undisciplined rabble in the room of a well-ordered and well-appointed regular army, General Washington repeatedly pressed upon Congress the necessity of embodying a regular army, without which it was impossible to save the country, as the militia was not to be depended upon, either for its courage in the field of battle, or for its obedience to discipline in the camp.

In Marshal's Life of Washington, vol. 2d, p. 245—265—279 ; 3d. vol. 2—26 ; 4th vol. 55—80 ; numberless facts are recorded to prove the pitiful inefficacy of the militia-system for any purposes of service or of fighting. It should be particularly noted also that the *yeomanry*, the farmers of the United States, uniformly submitted, *without fighting*, to the British wherever and whenever they appeared ; and that all the hard fighting with the enemy throughout the whole war was performed by the American REGULAR army.

“The people of New-England were incomparably better armed than those of any other part of the union. But as all the American troops had been raised, not by Congress, but by the colonial or state governments, each of which had a different establishment, no uniformity existed among the regiments. In Massachusetts the private men

had chosen their own officers, and felt themselves no way inferior to their commanders. Animated with the spirit of liberty, and collected for its defence, they were not sensible of the importance of discipline, and would not be subjected to its regulations.

The army was consequently in a state of entire disorganization; and the difficulty of establishing the necessary principles of order and subordination, always considerable among raw troops, was greatly increased by the short terms for which enlistments had been made. The time of service of many was to expire in November, and none were to continue longer than the last of December. The early orders issued by General Washington evidence a loose and unmilitary state of things even surpassing what might reasonably be inferred from the circumstances under which the war was commenced.

The high spirit and enthusiastic ardor which had brought such numbers into the field after the battle of Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate, and alacrity for the service very materially diminished. Many were unwilling to continue in it, and others annexed special conditions to their further engagement. Very many insisted on stipulating for leave *to visit their families* at the expiration of their present term of service; and others, suspending all decision, neither gave in their names to retire from, or to continue in the army."

The truth is, that, if the British generals had not been pre-determined to make no use even of the small regular army which they had under their command, America must have given up the contest, almost without a struggle ; for her militia and short-enlistment men, could never be depended upon in the hour of danger ; and none of the American generals ever made any head against the enemy, excepting the desperate action of Bunker's hill, where the Americans fought in sight of their wives, children, and dearest connections, until they had been allowed sufficient time to form a regular army, with which they could fight steadily and desperately ; the people of the United States furnishing the most excellent materials for a fine army, by their being in general, active, able-bodied men, and possessing great individual valor and intrepidity.

A letter from General Washington to Congress, dated 19th January, 1776, is conclusive as to the miserable inefficacy of all militia-men, or troops enlisted only for a short period of service ; he says :

“ That this cause precipitated the fate of the brave and much to be lamented General Montgomery, and brought on the defeat which followed thereupon, I have not the most distant doubt ; for had he not been apprehensive of his troops *leaving him* at so important a crisis, but continued the blockade of Quebec, a capitulation, from the best accounts I have been able to collect, must inevita-

bly have followed ; and that we were not obliged at one time to dispute *these* lines, (where Washington was then posted) under disadvantageous circumstances, proceeding from the same cause, to wit, the troops disbanding of themselves before the militia could be got in, is to me a matter of wonder and astonishment ; and proves that General Howe was either unacquainted with our situation, or restrained by his instructions from putting any thing to hazard until his reinforcements should arrive.

The instance of General Montgomery, (I mention it because it is a striking one, for a number of others might be adduced,) proves, that instead of having men to take advantage of circumstances, you are in a manner compelled, right or wrong, to make circumstances yield to a secondary consideration. “ Since the first of December I have been devising every means in my power to secure these encampments ; and though I am sensible that we never have since that period been able to act on the offensive, and at times not in a condition to defend, yet the *cost* of marching home one set of men, and bringing in another, the havoc and waste occasioned by the first, the repairs necessary for the second, with a thousand other incidental charges and inconveniencies which have arisen and which it is scarcely possible either to recollect or describe, amount to near as much as the keeping up a respectable body of troops

the whole time, ready for any emergency, would have done.

To this may be added, that you *never can* have a well disciplined army.

To make men well acquainted with the duties of a soldier requires time. To bring them under proper discipline and subordination, not only requires time, but is a work of great difficulty ; and in this army, where there is *so little distinction* between officers and soldiers, requires an uncommon degree of attention. To expect then the same service from raw and undisciplined recruits, as from veteran soldiers, is to expect what never did, and perhaps never will happen.

Men who are familiarized to danger, approach it without thinking ; whereas troops unused to service, apprehend danger where no danger exists.

Three things prompt men to a regular discharge of their duty in time of action ;—natural bravery—hope of reward—and fear of punishment. The two first are common to the untutored and the disciplined soldier ; but the last most obviously distinguishes one from the other. A coward taught to believe that if he breaks his ranks and abandons his colors, he will be punished with death by his own party, will take his chance against the enemy ; but the man who thinks little of the one, and is fearful of the other, acts from present fears, regardless of consequences.

Again, men of a day's standing will not look

forward ; and from experience we find that as the time approaches for their discharge, they grow careless of their arms, ammunition, camp-utensils, &c. nay, even the barracks themselves have felt uncommon marks of wanton depredation ; and we are laid under fresh trouble and additional expense in providing for every fresh party, at a time when we find it next to impossible to procure the articles of first necessity. To this may be added the seasoning which new recruits must have to a camp, and the loss consequent thereupon.

But this is not all. Men engaged for a short limited time only, have their officers too much in their power. To obtain a degree of popularity, in order to induce a second enlistment, a kind of familiarity takes place which brings on a relaxation of discipline, unlicensed furloughs, and other indulgencies, incompatible with order and good government ; by which means the latter part of the time for which the soldier was engaged, is spent in undoing what it required much labor to inculcate in the first.

To go into an enumeration of all the evils we have experienced in this late great change of the army, and the expense incidental to it, to say nothing of the hazard we have run, and must run, between the discharging of one army and the enlistment of another, unless an enormous expense of militia is incurred, would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. If Congress have any reason

to believe there will be occasion for troops another year, and consequently for another enlistment, they would *save money* and have *infinitely better* troops, if they were, even at the bounty of twenty, thirty, or more dollars, to engage the men already enlisted until January next, and such others as may be wanted to complete the establishment, for and during the war.

I will not undertake to say that the men may be had on these terms ; but I am satisfied that it will never do to let the matter alone, as it was last year, until the time of service is near expiring. In the first place, the hazard is too great ; in the next, the troubles and perplexity of disbanding one army and raising another at the same instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, is scarcely in the power of words to describe, and such as no man, who has once experienced it, will ever undergo again."

" Unfortunately, Congress did not then feel so sensibly as their General, the utter incapacity of temporary armies to resist those which are permanent. Nor were his officers of high rank as yet sufficiently sensible of this fact. In a council held previous to the new modelling of the army, they were of opinion that the enlistments might be for only one year.

But this cardinal blunder of relying on militia, and the consequent short enlistments of the regular troops, ought to be remembered, however the

dangers and inconveniencies which it produced might now be forgotten. Militia were not merely depended upon as auxiliaries, and as covering the country from the sudden irruptions of small parties, for which purposes they might perhaps be competent, but they were also relied on as constituting the main body and strength of the army.

Their absolute incapacity to maintain this station in the military arrangements of any country, when engaged with an enemy of nearly equal strength, and employing a regular army at all times capable of being used to its utmost extent, was at length demonstrated even to the conviction of scepticism itself; and under the weight of this conviction, every effort was made by Congress, though almost too late, to remedy the very extensive mischief which this fatal error had already produced. And not the least of these evils was the difficulty attending all attempts to cure it.

For men unaccustomed to submit their actions to the control of others, bear impatiently that degree of authority, and submit reluctantly to that subordination, so indispensably necessary to their own safety; and without which, said General Washington, an army is only *an armed mob*, incapable of being applied to the purposes of its formation.

Raw soldiers too can seldom be induced to pay that attention to cleanliness, to their persons, their lodgings, their food, and to many other minute

circumstances, on which the health of a large body of men collected together materially depends. They are therefore found to be much more exposed to disease, and to be swept off by sickness in much greater numbers, than those who have been taught by experience the value of attending to those circumstances which the young recruit never sufficiently appreciates. Of this the unexampled mortality of the northern and middle armies of America, at the beginning of the revolutionary war, furnished evidence the most melancholy and conclusive.

The total change also in their situation, their duties, and mode of living, contributes greatly to render the military life in the first instance, unpleasant to those who engage in it.

Habit conquers these impressions, and removes many of the exciting causes. Whence the veteran soldier is generally attached to the camp. But regulars engaged only for a short, and militia engaged for a still shorter time, receive all these unfavorable impressions, without remaining long enough to permit them to wear off. They consequently acquire a distaste for the service, and on their return home, generally spread among their kindred, friends and neighbors, the prejudices which they have themselves imbibed."

Nor have the militia of the United States conducted themselves with greater gallantry or attention to military discipline *since*, than they did du-

ring, the revolutionary war; as will evidently appear from the following testimony, adduced in a court-martial held on Brigadier-General Josiah Harmer, to investigate his conduct, as commanding officer of the expedition against the Miami Indians in the year 1790. The court of inquiry was held at Fort Washington, September 15th, 1791.

September 16th. The court met agreeably to adjournment; and Major Ferguson being called in and sworn, deposed as followeth:

That some time about the 15th of July, 1790, it was determined to carry on an expedition against the Miami villages. One thousand militia from Kentucky, and five hundred from Pennsylvania, and what could be collected of the First United States regular Regiment, and one company of artillery was to form the army.

The militia from Kentucky began to assemble at Fort Washington about the middle of September; they were very ill equipped, being almost destitute of camp-kettles and axes. Their arms were generally very bad, and unfit for service; sometimes a rifle was brought to be repaired without a lock, and sometimes without a stock. The owners were asked how they came to think that their guns could be repaired at that time? They replied that they were told in Kentucky, that all repairs would be made at Fort Washington. Many of the militia-officers said that they had no

idea of their being half the number of bad arms in the whole district of Kentucky, as were then in the hands of their own men.

As soon as the principal part of the Kentucky militia arrived, General Harmer began to organize them ; in this he had many difficulties to encounter. Colonel Trotter aspired to the command, although Colonel Hardin was the eldest officer ; and in this he was encouraged both by men and officers, who openly declared, that unless Colonel Trotter commanded them, they would return home. After two or three days, the business was settled, and they were formed into three battalions, under the command of Colonel Trotter ; and Colonel Hardin had the command of all the militia.

The last of the Pennsylvania militia arrived on the 25th of September. They were equipped nearly as those of Kentucky, but were worse armed ; several without any arms.

Among the militia, both of Kentucky and Pennsylvania, were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old infirm men, and young boys ; they were not such as might be expected from a frontier country, namely, the robust, active woodmen, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to revenge the injuries done to themselves and to their connexions. A great number of them were substitutes who probably had never fired a gun. Major Paul of Pennsylvania said, that many of

his men were so awkward, that they could not take their gun locks off to oil them, and put them on again ; nor could they put in their flints so as to be useful, and even of such materials the numbers came far short of what was ordered.

On the 17th of October, the army arrived at the Miami village ; here were evident signs of the enemy having quitted the place in the greatest confusion. Indian cows and dogs came into their camp this day, which induced them to believe the families were not far off. A party of three hundred men, with three days provision, under the command of Colonel Trotter, was ordered to examine the country around their camp ; but *contrary* to the General's orders, returned the same evening.

This conduct of Colonel Trotter did not meet with General Harmar's approbation ; and Colonel Hardin, anxious for the character of his countrymen, wished to have the command of the same detachment for the remaining two days ; which was given to him. This command marched on the morning of the 19th, and was the same day *shamefully defeated*. Colonel Hardin told him, that the number of Indians which attacked his men did not exceed *one hundred and fifty*, and that had his people fought, or even *made a show* of forming to fight, he was certain the Indians would have run. But on the Indians firing, which was

at a great distance, the militia ran away, numbers throwing down their arms; nor could he rally them; Major Ray confirmed the same.

Question by the court. What were your reasons for thinking punishment for neglect of duty out of the question?

Answer. The state of the army being such, that it obliged the General not to do any thing which might tend to irritate the *militia*.

Lieutenant Hartshorn was sworn and deposed thus:

Question by the court. In what manner did you oppose the enemy when you were attacked on the 19th of October?

Answer. By endeavoring to form the line to charge them.

Question. What troops came within your notice that *attempted* to form when charged?

Answer. Not more than *thirty* federal troops, and *ten* militia.

Question. What became of the *rest* of the *militia*?

Answer. They *gave way* and *ran*.

Question. Do you think that if the *militia* in that action had been properly formed, and in time, they were sufficient to beat the enemy?

Answer. *They were*.

Question. What was the result of the action of the 19th, were the continental troops and the *ten* militia defeated?

Answer. They were cut to pieces except six or seven.

Question. From the conduct of the *militia*, do you think that the General had a right to expect *any support* from them, if he had been attacked.

Answer. *I don't think he had.*

Ensign Morgan being sworn, deposed, thus :

Question by the court. Do you think that the party of *militia* that were attached to Major *Wylly's* detachment on the 21st of October, were sufficient to defeat the Indians if they had done their duty ?

Answer. If they had been together, I think they were.

Question. What was the disposition of the *militia* after you returned to the army, in the evening of the 21st of October ; were they well-affected to the service and orderly ?

Answer. They were *very disorderly*, and very inattentive to their duty ; and some appearances of *mutiny* among them, with both officers and men ; and they *turned out* upon one occasion particularly, to *oppose* a punishment that had been ordered by the General.

Lieutenant Denny being sworn, deposed, thus :

That on the 15th and 16th of September the *Kentucky militia* arrived ; but instead of seeing active riflemen, such as are supposed to inhabit the frontiers, they saw a parcel of men, young in the country, and totally unexperienced in the busi-

ness they came upon ; so much so, that many of them did not know how to keep their arms in firing order. Indeed, their whole object seemed to be nothing more than to see the country, without rendering any service whatever.

Kentucky seemed as if she wished to comply with the requisitions of government as *ineffectually* as possible ; for it was evident that two-thirds of the men served only to swell their numbers. On the 19th September, a small detachment of Pennsylvania militia arrived ; and the remainder on the 25th. they were similar to the other, too many substitutes. The General lost no time in organizing them, though he met with many difficulties ; the Colonels were disputing for the command, and the one *most popular* was the *least* entitled to it.

On the 18th of October, Colonel Trotter was ordered out with three hundred men, militia and regulars, to reconnoitre the country, and to endeavor to make some discoveries of the enemy ; he marched but a few miles, when his advanced horsemen came upon *two* Indians and killed them ; the Colonel was contented with this victory, and returned to camp.

Colonel Hardin was displeased because Colonel Trotter did not execute his orders, and requested the General to give him the command of the party ; it was granted, and accordingly Hardin marched next morning ; but he believed he had not *two-thirds* of his numbers when two miles from

camp ; for to his certain knowledge, *many of the militia* left him on the march, and returned to their companies.

Colonel Hardin came at length upon a party of Indians not exceeding *one hundred*, but was worsted, owing entirely to the scandalous behavior of the *militia*, many of whom never fired a shot ; but ran off at the *first noise* of the Indians, and left the few regulars to be sacrificed ; some of the militia never halted in their flight until they crossed the Ohio.

The army in the mean time was employed in burning and destroying the houses and corn, shifting their position from one town to another. On the 21st of October the army, having burned five villages, besides the capital town, and consumed or destroyed nearly twenty thousand bushels of corn in ears ; took up the line of march on the route back to Fort Washington, and encamped about eight miles from the ruins. About nine o'clock, P. M. the General ordered out four hundred choice men, militia and regulars, under the command of Major Wyllys, to return to the towns, intending to surprise any parties that might be assembled there ; supposing that the Indians would collect to see how things were left.

The General had felt the enemy, knew their strength, and calculated much upon the success of this enterprise ; it was the general opinion that the force of the savages was nothing equal to this

detachment; and unless by some such means there was no possibility of getting any advantage of them. But the best laid plan was defeated by the *disobedience* of the *militia*, who ran in pursuit of small parties, and left Major Wyllys unsupported; the consequence was that the Major with most part of the regulars were killed.

The General now lost all confidence in the *militia*; the regular troops were only two hundred; and if the enemy had made an attack upon the camp that evening or the next morning, the *militia* were so panic-struck, that very few of them would have stood, and the sick and wounded, and all the stores, artillery, &c. would have fallen a prey to the savages.

The *militia* on their return back to Fort Washington began to be refractory, showing great signs of a revolt, discharging their pieces in open defiance of the general orders; some of them however were detected and punished, which gave umbrage, and was afterwards the cause of many ill-natured reports, spread without any foundation, in order to injure General Harmar's reputation.

Major Zeigler being sworn, deposed, That on the 8th of October Colonel Trotter was detached with three hundred men of militia, including *thirty* federal troops, but returned the same day without bringing any information. The next morning Colonel Hardin took the command of the same party; and on discovering the enemy, his *militia-men* who

were in the rear, would *not* come up, and support those engaged in front ; and *very few* of those in front stopped, but ran, and the *militia* fled in a shameful manner ; and the few federal troops not supported, fell a sacrifice.

A sergeant of *militia* behaving very ill at that time, *could not* be brought to trial, on account of a brother of his being a captain, who *made parties* that would have been attended with bad consequences, should he be punished ; his brother declaring that he would raise some men, and bid defiance.

Question by the Court.—I think, sir, you said, that on the 15th October, at three o'clock, P. M. you arrived at the Miami village ; what did you do after your arrival there ; were the *militia* in good order ?

Answer. When we arrived we were very much fatigued ; having marched twenty-eight miles that day, I directed that my own men should not go thirty yards from camp. *The militia like a rabble* strolled into the neighbouring villages, in parties of thirty or forty after plunder ; and such was our situation that a hundred and fifty warriors might have beat us off the ground.

Question.—Did you see any desire in the *militia* to return to the ground where Major Wylls was defeated ; or do you suppose they would have gone had they been ordered to go ?

Answer. I supposed they would *not* have gone ; they appeared to be panic-struck.

Captain Doyle being sworn, deposed, That he was in the detachment of the 14th of October; that the behaviour of the *militia* in that detachment was very disgraceful; they ran from town to town in pursuit of plunder, *contrary* to orders; and on the arrival of General Harmar at the town, two thirds of them dispersed in the same manner.

On their return home the militia showed great signs of revolt; and General Harmar would have been justified in arresting one or two of their most popular field-officers, and sending them home with disgrace; but a thing of that kind would have broke up the army. No part of that General's conduct during the whole campaign could be censured, except his showing too much lenity to the militia, and thanking them for their conduct when they merited punishment.

Captain Armstrong being sworn, deposed, That he was in the action of the 19th, that after he had discovered the enemy's fires at a distance he informed Colonel Hardin, who replied that they would not fight, and rode in front of the advance, until fired on from behind the fires when he retreated, and *all the militia ran away*, except nine, who continued with the colonel, and were instantly killed, together with twenty-four of the federal troops. The Indians did not amount to *one hundred* men; some of whom were mounted, others armed with rifles, and the advance with tomahawks only.

Captain Armstrong was of opinion, that if Colonel Trotter had proceeded on the 18th, according to his orders, having killed the enemy's sentinels, they would easily have surprised their camp and defeated them; or if Colonel Hardin had arranged his troops, or made any military disposition on the 19th, they would have gained a victory. Their defeat was owing to two causes, the un-officer-like conduct of Colonel Hardin, who was a brave man, and the *cowardly behavior of the militia*; many of whom threw down their arms loaded, and none except the party under his, Captain Armstrong's command, fired a gun. What he saw of the conduct of the militia on that day, and what he felt by being under the command of a man who wanted military talents, had determined him not willingly to fight with the one or be commanded by the other.

Ensign Gaines, (who was Captain of Horse in General Harmar's expedition) being sworn, deposed, That he had served on a number of expeditions against the savages, undertaken by the militia of *Kentucky*, and that he never saw in any of them the like good order and military arrangement which accompanied General Harmar's expedition. The people in Kentucky never alleged any charge against General Harmar, until Colonel John Hardin had acquitted himself before a Board of Inquiry of several charges exhibited against him, respecting his conduct on that expedition; when the populace, finding that nothing which they could say to the preju-

dice of the Colonel would be believed, levelled their malice at General Harmar; even against whom nothing would have been said in that country, if a *Baptist Preacher's* son in Kentucky had not been whipped in the militia for disobedience of orders.

Question by the Court. I think you say you have been in several expeditions against the Indians; did the *militia* who were with General Harmar *conduct* (themselves) better or worse than those in other expeditions?

Answer. Much better, Sir.

Question. Was you in the action of the 19th of October?

Answer. I was.

Question. Is it your opinion, that if the militia had been properly arranged in the action, and would have fought, they were sufficient to defeat the Indians?

Answer. Yes, for the Indians were surprised, and if Colonel Trotter had not returned on the preceding day, he must have been in their camp, and completely defeated them.

Question. Do you think that, if General Harmar had ordered the army back, after the action of the 21st, the *militia* would have gone?

Answer. They would not have gone willingly. I think in that case there would have been danger of mutiny. When the *militia* of Major Wylls' detachment were ordered to march, they were unwilling to go; and some so much so, *as to cry*.

As a contrast to the total want of all discipline and subordination in the American militia, I shall adduce a single instance of the high state of military discipline which Bonaparte keeps up in his army.

In the year 1804, Bonaparte went to Boulogne to review what he called the army of England. He saw a single soldier straggling from his ranks; he ordered him to fall into his place, the soldier refused; he instantly ordered a serjeant's company to shoot the soldier; the company refused; he then ordered a captain's battalion to shoot the company; the battalion refused; he then ordered the regiment to shoot the battalion, the regiment refused; he then ordered a brigade to shoot the regiment, the brigade obeyed, and the whole regiment was mowed down to a man with grape-shot and musquetry, for a breach of military discipline in disobeying the orders of their general.

In acting thus Bonaparte displayed at once his energy and wisdom; for the commander of an army, or the government of a nation, that ever suffers his or its orders to be disobeyed with impunity, can never be effective to any great or good purpose; but becomes justly the object of contempt at home, and of scorn abroad.

I should not have dwelt so long on this head; but unfortunately the same prejudice in favor of the militia-system prevails in England, as much as in the United States.

I would now ask if the American militia would

be *quite* sufficient to defeat the veteran troops of Bonaparte; seeing, that if Britain be destroyed, the enemy will have powerful fleets commanding every sea, river, creek, and bay, from which the United States can possibly be annoyed and harassed. Surely, whoever is acquainted with the quickness and activity of the French; their intelligence in a strange country; their skill, their ardor, and extraordinary success in desultory warfare; will never advise any nation to act against them with an undisciplined, disorderly militia.

But lest I should be considered as biassed or misinformed on this subject, I refer the reader to the decisive opinion of the late celebrated Fisher Ames, (a man to whom few ages or countries have produced an equal,) as to the result of Britain's ruin to the United States: see Mr. Ames's works, page 368, written in March 1808, published at Boston in Massachusetts, in the year 1809.

“ Mr. Jefferson knows that there is but *one* obstacle to the progress of French power, and that is the *hated* British navy. Suppose that navy destroyed, would our liberty survive a week? The wind of the blow that destroys British independence would strike our own senseless to the earth. Boastful and vain as we are, the very thought of independence would take flight from our hearts. If Britain falls, will not America fall? shall we not lie in the dust at the conqueror's foot, and with servile affected joy receive our chains without resistance?

It will ever be fashionable to boast of the invincible spirit of freemen, as long as power is to be won by flattery. We remark that some speakers in Congress assume it as a thing *impossible*, that an invading foe could make any progress in our country. Others, in party-opposition to them, either blind to the truth, or afraid to speak it, assent to the assertion, that the United States are unconquerable. Thus a dangerous delusion acquires not only a plausible authority, but it seems to be a violation of the sanctity of the national faith to expose it.

But if Britain were conquered, Bonaparte could have her fifteen hundred ships, and the ships of all the rest of Europe, to transport an army under one of his lieutenants to our shores, as numerous as he might think necessary to ensure conquest. Power seldom long wants means. He could send over twenty thousand, and more if wanted, of his dismounted horsemen, with their saddles, bridles, and equipments. He would not fail to secure horses from our islands, such as Long-Island, and the extensive necks and promontories, which could not be defended against him.

Being master of the sea, he could make large and frequent detachments from his camp to defenceless regions, which he would strip. To this let it be added, that the American army, if we should have an army, being concentrated to some well chosen mountainous place, would of course leave the cities a prey.

Thus it cannot be doubted, that he would have horses to remount his cavalry. Suppose a numerous French army, having two-fifths of its force cavalry, with all the formidable thousands of light artillery that brought Austria, Prussia, and Russia to his feet in a day—would the American *militia* face this army? Suppose they do not; then our cities, our whole coast, and all the open cultivated country are immediately French. Would the millions on and near the coast take flight to the mountains? could they subsist, or would they remain long unmolested there? Mountains, when no equal army was in the field, never did stop the soldiers of Bonaparte.

Let us come back then to our *militia army*, since we are obliged to see that the French would effectually conquer our country, if our army should not be able to check their rapid progress. *Could* we collect an army? On all the coast would be terror, busy concern to hide property, and to shelter women, helpless age, and infancy. The sea-ports would not only retain their own men, but call in those of the neighbouring country to defend them. Probably they would ask an addition of troops from government.

It would therefore be a very difficult and slow work to collect a militia-army equal in *numbers* to the French. Nearly fifty thousand men were sent to Egypt, and as many more to Saint Domingo. Had either of those armies landed here, could we have faced them with an equal force, equal in *numbers*? We think not.

Let Mr. Jefferson ask any old, skilful, continental officer, if our army of *militia*, would push bayonets with the French? No military man would say, that our militia would stand the tug of war, and defeat the French.

Did we not, cries some wordy patriot, contend with the British? The answer would be long, to make it as decisive as we think it is. The British were cooped up in Boston a year. In 1778 Sir William Howe had only five hundred cavalry; and he always moved as if he was more afraid of our beating him, than resolved to beat us.

At Long-Island Washington was totally defeated, owing to the militia giving way, and might have been easily made prisoner with his whole army. But he was *not* pursued. In the third year of the war, his troops, and even the militia of the states in the scene of the war, had become considerably disciplined.

It is not denied, that with three years' preparation we could have an army; but we make *no* preparation; and unless we *enlist* our men, the parade of militia is a serious buffoonery. When Sir William Howe forced our men from the field, he had no cavalry; and our men could run away faster than his could pursue. But the French, experience has shewn, that when they win battles they decide the war. Myriads of cavalry press upon the fugitives, and in half a day the defence of a na-

tion is captive or slain. Defeat is irremediable destruction.

Would our stone-walls stop their horse? Then the pioneers would pull down those walls. Shooting from behind fences would not stop an army; nor would our militia venture upon a measure that would be fatal; the numerous and widely-extended flanking parties would soon cut off all such adventurers to a man.

With an army less than two hundred thousand men, but with double the common proportion of cavalry, Bonaparte has overrun the German empire, Austria, Prussia, and all continental Europe, from the Adriatic to the Baltic; rich, populous, and computed formerly to arm a million of soldiers.

The democratic gazettes have uniformly maintained that Bonaparte's unvaried success was owing to the real, irresistible superiority of the French arms; to their newly-improved tactics, and to the impetuosity of their attacks. All this we believe. We firmly, though unwillingly, believe, that as the old Romans were superior to their enemies, so the French are at least as much superior to their enemies, *by land*. The vast extent of both empires, Roman and French, grew out of this superiority.

Hence we conclude, that if our *militia-army* should fight a battle, they would lose it. They would inevitably lose it, and the loss of the battle would be the loss of their country. The French would hold the coast by their fleet, and the interior

by their army. Be it remembered too, that Canada would be French if Britain should be subdued; and that the Floridas and Louisiana are French already.

Where then would be the security of the mountains? Much dreadful experience, and more dreadful fears, would follow the conquest, till at length, like the rest of the world, we should enjoy the quiet of despair and the sleep of slavery. Popularity, as dear perhaps as liberty, will be sought no more; and we shall place our happiness, if slaves may talk of happiness, in the smiles, or still better, in the neglect of a master.

We have purposely omitted an infinity of proofs in corroboration of our melancholy conclusion, that in case of a French invasion, the country would be literally conquered. We should tamely accept a Corsican prince for a king, and in virtue of our *alliance* with France, agree by treaty to maintain French troops enough to keep down insurrections.

Far be it from us to believe that our fellow-citizens in the militia are not *individually* brave. Their very bravery would ensure their defeat; they would dare to attempt what militia cannot achieve. Nor let the heroic speech-makers pretend that our citizens would swear to live free or die; and that they would resist till the country was depopulated, or emancipated.

There is no foundation in human nature for this

boast. The Swiss were free, and loved their liberty as well as men ever did ; yet they are enslaved, and quiet in their chains. Experience shows that men are glad to survive the loss of liberty. They must be mad to continue to oppose that power, which on trial has been found to be superior and irresistible. Myriads of persons we see are glad, on pecuniary encouragement, to go into the army, where every democrat will insist there cannot be liberty, because there is restraint.

It is self-evident, in spite of the groundless, and perhaps treacherous pretensions of faction, that our country is *absolutely defenceless* against Bonaparte, when master of the sea. The French troops have marched through countries having three or four times as many people as the United States, with the quietness of a procession. Does not Bonaparte confidently calculate upon the conquest of Britain, if he can only reach the shore with his troops ? Yet Britain has twice our population, and in a narrow compass too ; and nearly one hundred times our military force.

With so many proofs, after such decisive experience of the resistless march of the French, is it not presumption, folly, madness, to suppose that we could be free if France had the British fleet ? To our minds the proof is demonstration.

We do not urge this fearful conclusion because we despise our countrymen, or wish to see America dishonored. Far, far from our hearts are such

abominable wishes. Look, look, fellow-countrymen, as we do, to your dear innocent children. Ask your hearts, if they can bear so racking a question, if a shallow confidence in our *unarmed* security against Bonaparte, in case Britain should fall, does not tend to devote them to the rage of a restless, unappeasable tyrant? We tremble at the thought, that our own dear children will be in Bonaparte's conscription for St. Domingo, in case the *Gallican* policy of our government should be pursued till its natural tendencies are accomplished.

We would ask all sober citizens, whether or not, if the danger of an invasion be considered as really impending, we ought not to have an army to meet it? Would a raw army, raised when the foe is on the shores, be fit to oppose him? Would you stake the life of our liberty upon the resistance that paper could make against iron? No, every man would say, if we are to fight an invading enemy, sixty thousand strong, in 1810 or 1812, we have no time to lose in raising an army *by enlistment*, stronger than that of the invaders, and training them to an equality of subordination, discipline, and confidence in themselves and their officers. Such an army, with cavalry, artillery, engineers, &c. would be too expensive for our means, or for the temper of our citizens, who have been studiously taught to hold *all taxes* as grievances and wrongs. The thing, we grant,

is impossible. To depend on a militia not *enlisted*, nor disciplined, is madness.

It follows then, demonstratively, that our *single* hope of security is in the triumphs of the British navy. While *that* rides mistress of the ocean, the French can no more pass it, to attack us, than they could ford the bottomless pit.

Hitherto we have designedly avoided all party topics. We have gone upon the supposition that the democrats do not wish their children to become the slaves of Bonaparte. We take it for granted, that it is of more national importance to be free, than to carry coffee to Amsterdam.

If then we have so great interests depending, we cannot but wonder that Mr. Jefferson should endanger them for the sake of minor interests, which are in comparison but as the small dust of the balance. He professes to aim all his political measures at what he calls "*the destruction of the British tyranny of the seas*," and exults in the conviction that his plans are adequate to their end.

God forbid that they should be ! God, of his mercy forbid, that after having led our fore-fathers by the hand ; and as it were, by his immediate power, planted a great nation in the wilderness, he should permit the passions or the errors of our chief to plunge us into ruin and slavery ! Shall this French magog be allowed to pluck our star from its sphere, and quench its bright orb in the sea ?

It is well known that Mr. Jefferson is entirely convinced that Britain is now making her *expiring* efforts. He holds it to be *impossible* that she can resist Bonaparte *two years longer*; (that is to say, from the 18th day of December 1807, when Mr. Jefferson publicly, at his own table, made this declaration; "*that Britain would cease to be a nation in less than two years.*") Then let him wear sackcloth. Let him gather a colony, and lead them to hide from a conqueror's pursuit in the trackless forests near the sources of the Missouri. Frost, hunger, and poverty will not gripe so hard as Bonaparte.

But since he expects the *speedy* destruction of Britain, *what* motives has *he* to strain every nerve as he does to hasten it? He knows mankind; he knows Bonaparte too well to hope that the tyrant's hand will be the lighter for that merit. That bosom, so notoriously steeled against pity, will not melt to friendship.

Among the infinite diversity of a madman's dreams, was there ever one so extravagant, as that a republic might safely trust its liberty to the *sentiment* of a master? Every moon-beam at Washington must have shot frenzy, if *such* a motive among politicians could have influenced action. If liberty should fall, *as it undoubtedly will*, if France prevails, let us at least have the consolation to say, that *our* hands have not assisted in its assassination.

Why do our public men wilfully blind themselves, and regard no dangers but such as they apprehend from the hostility of party? The earth on which we tread, holds the bones of the deceased patriots of the revolution. Will the sacred silence of the grave be broken? Will the illustrious shades walk forth into public places, and audibly pronounce a warning to convince us that the independence for which they bled is in danger? No, without a miracle, the exercise of our reason must convince us, that *our* independence is in danger from France; and if Britain falls by force, *terror alone* will bring us into subjection.

We do not love nor respect our country less than those, who foolishly, and perhaps wickedly, boast of its invincible strength and prowess. As *the destroyer of nations* has enslaved Europe, and as only one nation, Britain, has hindered his coming here to conquer us, they have no ears to hear, they have no hearts to feel for our country, who wish to break down that obstacle, and let him in.

This is not a party-effusion; it proceeds from hearts ready to burst with anxiety on the prospect of the political insanity that is ready to join the foe. It is republican suicide, it is treachery to the people to make them an innocent sacrifice to the passions of our rulers.

Let Mr. Jefferson avail himself of the power that his weight with his own party gives him, and

stop the progress of *our* fate. We do not ask him to go to war with France. Consult prudence, and renounce the affectation of that false honor, which has been of late so much upon our lips. He will find that the *federalists* love their country better than their party. Let there be peace, merely peace; we say nothing of alliance with Britain; and if our champion falls in the combat, let us not, when we perish, deplore the fatal folly of having contributed to hasten his and our own destruction."

So far the patriotic and eloquent Fisher Ames.

It might perhaps be allowable just to notice one of the *immediate* evils which must unavoidably result to the United States from the destruction of Britain; I mean the instantaneous cutting off of all supply of British manufactures to this country. The ruin of Britain would be accompanied with the annihilation of her commerce and manufactures; and the United States have not now, neither can they have for several years to come, a sufficient capital, nor a sufficiently reasonable rate of labor-wages to enable them to manufacture many even of the prime necessities of life; such as woollen-clothing, a vast variety of articles in hardware, and many other commodities which might easily be enumerated.

Where then could they get a supply of these necessary articles? From the European continent? No, that is too much destroyed by the

ravages of a long and bloody warfare, to be able for many years to come, to supply even itself with manufactured goods. Add to which, the continent of Europe, and more particularly that part of it called France, *never can* become extensively employed in manufactures, because it has not a sufficient quantity of *coal-mines* at command. It surely can require no argument, to prove that a nation whose fuel grows *above* ground, can never push its manufactures to any great extent.

The *immediate* result then of the destruction of Britain to the United States, would be the depriving a large body of the American people of many of the necessities, and more of the conveniences of life. How much this would tend to breed discontent among our citizens, and effectually diminish our population, I need not now consider; as the whole subject of *American manufactures* will be discussed at length in my view of the moral and political condition of the United States; of which, at least one-third portion, (including a consideration of the agriculture, trade, manufactures, general and state-governments of the Union) is already prepared for the press.

CHAPTER IV.

BUT Britain is not yet fallen ; and a very slight and rapid glance over the positive and relative condition of continental Europe, will convince us that she is not about to fall, or even to bow her lofty head beneath the menaces or the violence, the craft or the courage, of her enemies.

Russia, “like a tall bully that lifts its head, and lies,” appears to be much more formidable at a distance, than when the enemy approaches near, and grapples with his strength. She possesses indeed an immense empire, extending over a superficies of territory, full, three millions of square miles ; but her very great extent renders her population of forty millions comparatively feeble and ineffectual. Other things being equal, a country is more powerful than its neighbours, precisely in proportion to its having a numerous population crowded into a compact territory ; so that it can speedily and at all times, gather together its people in large masses for the purposes of offensive or of defensive operations.

Accordingly Russia has never been able to call forth any large proportion of her population at one time, and to send numerous armies into the field to contend with her European enemies.

Her soldiers, undoubtedly, possess that bodily strength, and that steady, desperate, persevering valour, which are all effectual in the hands of a skil-

ful general. But her officers are not sufficiently versed in military tactics on a large and a comprehensive scale, to encounter the armies of Europe, led on by well-educated and experienced commanders ; although she appeared to be enormously great and powerful in her conflicts with the rude and barbarous Turks, Tartars and Persians. Whence her inability to cope with France, and her consequent entire defeat at the battle of Austerlitz in 1805 ; and in the succeeding combats of Pultusk and of Gotzmolin, in the year 1807.

Her maritime power is small, and is not likely to be increased by her tamely and foolishly quarrelling with Britain, at the haughty bidding of her imperial master Bonaparte.

Her finances have long been in a most disastrous and disorderly condition ; nor has she taken precisely the most correct method of relieving her embarrassment in this respect by her present war with Britain. M. Ricard in his “ *Traité General du Commerce, tome troisieme*, p. 36—62, published at Paris, in three volumes quarto. *An. 7, de la Republique Française*, tells us that the ordinary trade between Russia and England nets a balance of three millions sterling annually in favor of Russia ; and that nearly the whole of these three millions used every year to find their way into France in the purchase of the finer French manufactures, knick-knacks, toys, and frippery. So that in this instance at least Bonaparte and his subjects gain nothing by

making Russia quarrel with Britain, in pursuance of the Corsican's scheme of anti-commercial policy.

English capital first made the Russian pot-ash, and then paid for it : English capital bought the Russian hemp-seed, paid for ploughing the land, and then bought the hemp ; English merchants used to advance the capital many months before the produce of Russia appeared at the market. This process is so well understood, that the merchants of the United States, while America had any trade, used to send a purchasing capital a year beforehand into Russia to get hemp and cordage.

Indeed, all countries half settled, and not half civilized must ever be dependant upon countries, whose equitable administration of government incites and secures the steady progress of productive industry. Hence the present war of Russia against Britain is the absurd, pitiful effort of poverty against the very wealth, which alone can lighten the penury, by employing its labor, and opening a ready and constant market for its produce.

Such egregious blunders in policy cannot fail of receiving, as they richly merit, the most signal chastisement. It is impossible for Russia not to suffer evils of very extensive magnitude, in consequence of her absurdly quarelling with Britain. The sale of her rude produce to Britain enabled her boors to pay their *obrok*, or vassal-money to their lords ; and her nobles to attend the court of their sovereign. The great check to the efforts of Rus-

sian agriculture occasioned by the sudden cessation of so large a demand for the rude produce of the soil is too obvious to require noticing minutely.

But ignorance is the proper receptacle of French principles, and of course Russia imbibes them greedily; and cowering under the wing of Bonaparte's despotism (for Alexander is merely the tool of the Corsican) bends the whole of her unwieldy strength to distress the naval power of Britain, which is essentially necessary for the prosperity of Russia; and to augment the territorial greatness of France, which has an invariable tendency to subvert the Muscovite throne.

Add to all this, the very great want of political talents in the Russian government; there is not a single counsellor round the Muscovite throne, that is entitled to the appellation of statesman. Indeed, Russia has all the corruption and despotism of France, without the energy of its talents and information.

From the movements, military or political, of Russia, therefore, Europe has little to hope or fear. A rude, ignorant, barbarous people, oppressed by a weak, corrupted, stupid government, can never dictate the law to other countries possessing any considerable force, but must receive it from them. Whence Russia will follow the course, and shape her destiny according to the career, of the primary nations of the world.

“ But *Austria*,” say the whole host of democrats

in the United States, "Austria is annihilated, for ever subjugated beneath the dominion of France—we sincerely rejoice," continue these zealous and enlightened patriots, "we sincerely rejoice that the Austrian empire is destroyed : not only because she *dared* to oppose France ; but because she was an original party to the treaty of Pilnitz ; because she is now, and long has been, an ally of *Britain*, by whose *speedy destruction* alone can the world find repose, and the United States in particular gain wealth, and power. Britain, the grand corruptor of the world, the common robber, the tyrant of the ocean, the dastardly plunderer of defenceless nations, the most cowardly of all people ; Britain, whose *speedy* and *inevitable* destruction is *now* laid open to the arms of the sagacious conqueror ; of Napoleon, who has always treated these United States with the most perfect *friendliness*, and *magnanimity*," &c. &c.

This precious paragraph is copied from the leading print under the auspices of the cabinet of Washington, in order to show how correctly the political bearings and relations of Europe, and of the whole world, are appreciated by a very large body of politicians in the union. The question itself is of sufficient importance to demand the most serious consideration.

To us, in these United States, so very far removed from the seat and centre of all intelligence, information respecting the actual condition of Europe

comes in such scanty and uncertain streams, through the tardy and occasional channels of the British and French presses ; that, from the total impossibility of acquiring that vast body of facts, which can illumine and guide the researches of the *Diis melioribus nati* of the other hemisphere, we shall be obliged in the following inquiry into the positive and relative condition of continental Europe, to rest chiefly upon the application of general principles to the known and experienced course of human affairs.

The Austrian soldier is steadily and systematically brave ; he knows neither intimidation nor despondency ; he will not forsake the field of battle until ordered by his general, and he meets death with the most perfect constancy and indifference.

Nor are these excellent instruments of offensive and of defensive warfare thrown away as useless, for want of experienced and able officers. In the late battles of Elsinghen and Wagram, Bonaparte, aided by the military talents of his most accomplished generals, little if at all inferior to himself in genius and skilful tactics, put forth his whole strength, and stretched the sinews of his utmost resources, and in the first conflict, after long and obstinate fighting, was beaten ; and in the second, after a still more severe and bloody contest, gained a doubtful victory.

Now although every encomium is justly due to the determined intrepidity, and the comprehensive military genius of the illustrious commander in chief of the Austrian army ; yet the Archduke Charles must have been well seconded by the extraordinary talents of his Generals, as well as by the devoted heroism of his troops ; or he alone, single, unaided, could never have conducted the operations of such immense armies in successful opposition to Bonaparte and his still more numerous followers.

A conclusive proof that Bonaparte has been very roughly handled in these terrible battles, and that the Austrian empire is yet unsubdued, is to be found in the armistice of a month granted after the deadly encountre at Wagram, in the tardy, protracted negociations for peace, and in the rumors strong and frequent, blown in upon us in this *ultima Thule*, by every breeze that wafts a vessel from Europe to these shores, of a speedy renewal of hostilities between the two contending powers.

After the battles of Marengo, and of Austerlitz, Bonaparte, immediately prescribed the terms of peace, and dictated the treaties of Luneville and of Presburgh, to the humiliated House of Austria. Why has he not prescribed the terms of peace, and dictated a treaty to the emperor Francis now, after the more bloody and obstinate battles of Elsinghen and of Wagram ? Is he not

equally desirous now of acquiring universal domination, as he was in the years 1800 and 1805 ? Yes ; but Austria must feel herself still able to cope with her insolent and perfidious foe, and is willing once again to dare him to the encountre of the bayonet and the sabre.

Report says that the Archduke Charles has retired from the Austrian army, and that Prince John of Lichtenstein has succeeded him as commander in chief. The cause of the Archduke's resignation is unknown here ; but wherever he goes, he must carry with him the homage and veneration due to his transcendant military talents, and exalted heroism, from every honest and every feeling heart.

His successor is reputed to possess a very extraordinary military genius, and to be idolized by the Austrian soldiery ; and as he is known to be the bosom friend of the Archduke Charles, it is to be inferred that no serious misunderstanding has taken place between the emperor Francis and his brother. May the good providence of God prosper the cause of Austria, under whatsoever general she opposes the common enemy of mankind ; and preserve her empire from bowing its ancient head, white with the hoar of successive centuries, beneath the iron yoke of an unprincipled, upstart usurper.

Nevertheless, it must not be dissembled that the cabinet of Vienna has not of late years displayed

a political wisdom worthy of the attachment of its people, or the resources of its empire. The weakness of Austria has been confessedly only in her government. May her recent severe lessons of misfortune teach her to eradicate the pernicious errors of her administration.

The natural resources of Austria are all sufficient, if well managed, to ensure her permanent rank among the primary nations of the world; and if her external commerce were more extensive, and her system of internal policy towards her own subjects more enlightened, she would be able to stand up alone, and single-handed against the whole military force of France, directed by the genius and activity of Bonaparte and his generals.

Upon the authority of the late Mr. Fox, and the present Mr. Brougham, two statesmen to whose genius and political information every homage of respect is due, I shall state a very few of the lamentable errors of government into which the Austrian monarchy has fallen.

“The extent and natural fertility of her dominions, particularly of Bohemia, of Gallicia, and above all of Hungary, open to a wise and energetic government, inexhaustible sources of national defence and national aggrandizement. But these noble kingdoms lie almost in a state of nature, unreclaimed from the wilderness and waste.

The long and melancholy catalogue of her political blunders which have stopped the growth

of her hereditary provinces, would form a volume, by no means uninteresting to the political economist, who wishes to contemplate the errors of statesmen ; or to the practical politician, who might be warned by the example of his predecessors.

In some parts of the empire the peasantry are greatly oppressed by their landlords ; in others they pay too small rent, and consequently through their indolence the land is neglected. Thus in Austria and part of Styria, the feudal services were commuted for a fixed sum yearly, above thirty years ago ; it was reckoned too small a compensation then ; and now it is almost a nominal rent. In Hungary, on the other hand, the abolition of villenage has been legally effected by the famous *Urbarium* of Maria Teresa ; but the lords retain in practice, especially in the remoter parts, a most exorbitant power over their vassals.

All over the Austrian monarchy, except in Hungary, the system of military enrolment presses very severely upon the people. Every person, not noble, or exempted by his office, is liable to serve ; if a person leaves the country and returns at any distance of time, he is stopped in his passage through it, and sent to the army, because he had missed his turn of service during his absence. When Joseph the second wished to encourage settlers in Poland from other parts of Europe, he thought he gave them a great exemption by

promising the fathers of families and their eldest sons a freedom from military service.

The Austrian government not only carries on, upon its own account, a great variety of extensive, (it is needless to add) ruinous speculations in trade and manufactures; but has also some of the most oppressive monopolies of useful or necessary articles. In the towns a license must be bought to sell almost every article of commerce; and for entering a new line of business, a high price must be paid. Except in Styria and Gallicia, salt is every where a royal monopoly, and except in Hungary, tobacco is strictly subjected to the same oppressive restriction.

The effect of these monopolies on the prosperity of the state, and their trifling utility to the revenue, may be estimated from the price to which they raise the articles in question, and the amount of net income which they yield to the government. The fossil salt, which forms nine-tenths of the consumption in Hungary, and is yielded in such abundance, that in the neighborhood of the mines it costs but two pence a hundred weight to the government, it is sold in the market for nearly forty times as much, or about six shillings and six-pence. The yearly consumption of this article in Hungary exceeds a million of hundred weight; yet this oppressive monopoly yields the government no more than two hundred thousand pounds a year.

The effects of the monopoly of tobacco are nearly similar ; but we may judge more accurately of them by remarking, that in Hungary, where the restriction does not exist, the best tobacco is sold ten times cheaper than the vile tobaccos of Austria and Bohemia are in those provinces ; and that when the whole profit of the monopoly was farmed, it yielded only one hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year.

Tobacco, on the Hungarian frontier, is not seized ; but the person attempting to bring it into Austria is fined above two hundred times the price of it ; and the search for tobacco is accordingly as strict as for diamonds at the mines of the East-Indies. Foreign tobacco may be imported for use on paying sixty per cent. duty, but not for sale. All the manufacture and sale, without exception, is carried on upon royal account. The degree in which Hungary is oppressed by these strange regulations may be estimated from this, that she only exports annually seventy thousand pounds worth of tobacco, all of which goes to the emperor's account. The Austrians use much more of that herb than the French, and yet the total importation of tobacco into France, before the revolution, used to exceed ten times that sum.

Hungary indeed, the finest of all the provinces, and sufficient, if well managed, to render Austria the richest country in Europe, is studiously oppressed, because its free constitution prevents the

government from laying on arbitrary imposts, and monopolizing all its produce.

In revenge, its tobacco is prevented from being exported, except on royal account, under the severest penalties. Its excellent wines are oppressed with duties, amounting almost to prohibitions, in order to encourage the vapid produce of the Austrian vineyards; and those duties are exacted even in countries which no Austrian wine ever reached, as in Croatia. Even the grains which cannot bear the expense of carriage to Fiume, if brought round through the other provinces, are loaded with the heaviest duties, and the merchant annoyed with regulations still more vexatious.

To conclude this melancholy picture of impolitic conduct, the same jealousy of the people which delivered up the Tyrol to the enemy last war, still prevails with respect to the peasantry of Carinthia and Styria; in spite of past experience, in spite even of the success which attended a just confidence in the people of the frontier towards Turkey, who since the earlier times, have been freed from vassalage, and embodied as a feudal militia.

Add to these examples of the impolicy which has weakened Austria, the unfortunate confusion that prevails in her finances, partly from bad management of the revenue, partly from an excessive issue of paper, and the want of a bank beyond the control of the government, but chiefly

from the signal marks of bad faith, which have at different times, and even so late as the year 1805, been given to the public creditor.

The discount of the paper, which formed the only currency of Austria, was during peace from twenty-eight to thirty-two per cent. and during war much greater. The credit of the government suffered extremely from the unfair treatment of the subscribers to the Franckfort loan, in January, 1805."

"Austria, therefore, cannot possibly long maintain her national independence, even if she should outlive her present bloody struggle with France, unless she enter immediately and heartily upon a systematic improvement of her domestic economy; a gradual, but thorough melioration of her political constitution; the correction of those evils in her military system, which in the last two wars proved so fatal to the best interests of her empire; a change of conduct towards her frontier provinces, which the experience of late years has most emphatically prescribed; forwarding the progress of her rich dominions; her numerous and various population in civilized industry and wealth; and the confirmation and extension of her foreign alliances."

Nor should the main and efficient cause of the misfortunes of Austria be forgotten; namely, the great corrupting influence which *France* exercised over the *Aulic Council*, and the *officers* of the Austrian army. For a melancholy illustration of

these infamous facts, see a book entitled "*Les Nouveaux Interests de l'Europe*," published at Leipsic, in the year 1799. I have only room for the following extract :

" The emperor, (then of Germany, now of Austria) has been blamed for signing the preliminaries of Leoben, on the 18th of April, 1798. This certainly appears to have been done precipitately ; but are those who blame him aware of the *reasons* which induced him to take that step ? The emperor had been informed by his *brother* the *Archduke Charles*, of the bad disposition of a great part of the *officers* of his army of Italy. *He knew* that both at Verona and Padua *they affected to imitate the French* in their discourse, manners, and sentiments ; they only needed the *tri-colored cockade* to make the *semblance complete*. He was aware that they almost invariably *fled in the most critical moment* of an action ; whence, in spite of excellent generals, a well appointed staff, and the bravest troops, he was always obliged to retreat. He conceived that he was *betrayed* by these officers ; for it is well known that Bonaparte, in an unguarded moment, declared that the *Austrian army cost him more than his own*."

CHAPTER V.

BUT say that Austria is either subdued by force of arms, or cajoled into her destruction by a fraudulent peace, and lays herself down in bondage beneath the iron hoofs of Gallic despotism; yet Spain still undismayed opposes herself to the arms of Bonaparte.

I know that it is the general opinion of the people of these United States, that the Spaniards will be speedily bent beneath the yoke of France. I shall extract a few sentences relating to this point, from the leading administration-print of the American government, in order to show the political affections of the democratic party in the Union, and how justly they arrogate to themselves the merit of being the *exclusive* champions of individual liberty and of national independence.

“Citizens of the United States, free and independent, virtuous and enlightened republicans, be not deceived; listen not to accounts from England, the grand arsenal in which lies are forged for universal diffusion over the whole earth, respecting Spain: the *cowardly* Spaniards are bribed by that whore of Babylon, England, who has made all the nations of the world drunk with her abominations, her fests, her blasphemies, her murders, her piracies, her impieties, her cowardly monop-

lies ; the *base, fraudulent* Spaniards, I say, are bribed by England to resist the *lawful* domination of the mighty Napoleon, whose whole life and actions have been directed to ameliorate the condition of suffering humanity, to break the fetters of feudal despotism, and to enable the natural energies of man once more to walk abroad, and to render perfect in happiness the whole federal commonwealth of nations.

“ But the *vagabond banditti*, Spaniards, corrupted by the gold and the false promises of Britain, resist in vain ; Napoleon by the *chastening corrective of war* will soon subdue the whole peninsula, and purify its every corner by the presence of his numerous and invincible legions. Then will he quickly turn upon the British Isles, and with one irresistible invasion annihilate their existence for ever, and scatter all their inhabitants as outcasts and vagabonds, in the room of the Jews, who have been too long persecuted, but whom Bonaparte is now collecting together from all quarters of the globe, in order to give them a place and a nation in Britain, which is now destined to immediate and richly merited vengeance and extermination.

“ Is there an *honest* democrat—is there one real, genuine, pure republican, whose bosom does not beat high with exultation at the unparalleled successes of France, and the approaching inevitable destruction of the whole British nation. Is there,” &c. &c.

This subject also is of sufficient importance to demand our serious attention. In the 13th volume of the *Edinburgh Review* p. 218, a most decided opinion is given that Spain will undoubtedly be subdued by Bonaparte.

“ In an earlier age of European history, says the gentleman who reviews the narrative of Don Pedro Cevallos, it might have been worth while to chronicle the steps of this most profligate usurpation; and to note the shameful alternations of flattering promises, and ambiguous menaces; of bare-faced and unblushing falsehood, and open ferocious violence, by which this bold, cunning, and unrelenting conqueror accomplished the first part of his ambitious project.

Like the lion-hunters of old, he drew his victims on in the course which he had prepared for them, by cajoling and by irritation; by soothing, their appetites and exciting their spirits, till at last, by trick, and by open violence, the royal beasts were driven into his toils, and placed completely at the disposal of their stern and artful pursuer. These things however are now familiar, and it is among the most melancholy and depressing of the reflections suggested by the tale before us, that it has revealed nothing which all its readers were not prepared to anticipate: and that atrocious as it is, it harmonizes exactly with the rest of the policy, by which Bonaparte has for some time governed Europe.

We turn gladly from this scene of imperial rob-

bery, royal weakness, and ministerial perfidy, to contemplate, though with a fearful and unassured eye, the animating spectacle of that popular and patriotic struggle for independence, which the Spaniards have so unexpectedly and so gloriously displayed.

In treating of the affairs of Spain in our last number, we found ourselves obliged to express an opinion respecting the probable issue of the contest, far less sanguine than that with which the bulk of the people in Britain have been flattering themselves; and it is painful now to add, that we can as yet discover no good reason for changing that opinion.

The glorious efforts of the Spaniards have indeed in more instances than could be expected, obtained the success which their zeal and valor so amply merited. The surrender of Dupont's army; the general retreat of the enemy towards the Pyrenees, and the flight of Joseph from Madrid, have induced almost every one to view the struggle as already decided in favor of Spain.

But let us reflect what the army is which the Spaniards have repulsed, in order to find out if they have as yet come to close quarters with Bonaparte. That consummate statesman appears for once to have erred in his calculation, when he expected to take possession of Spain by the mere force of a treaty. Unaccustomed to meet with any resistance on the part of the people, he thought that his business was completed, as soon as he had gotten the royal family into his power.

He thought he had made sure of his purchase, when he had made them execute the deed of conveyance, and only sent such a force as might be necessary to take quiet possession.

When this force however arrived in Spain, it appeared that the whole work remained to be done; and the army which was sent to keep, soon found that they had yet to fight for the crown. This is the only French force which has hitherto been engaged with the patriots. The whole force of Spain has been opposed, not to an army sent by France to conquer her, but to a detachment sent for a perfectly different purpose—to do the mere parade duty of the new monarchy. That this was a large detachment we do not deny, and still less would we dispute the claims of those who conquered it to their own immortal renown. We only contend that it was not the army with which France intended to subdue Spain.

The Spaniards have not yet tried their strength against their formidable adversary. They have attacked him unawares, and beaten him by surprise. He has not even girded himself for the fight, and they have only overpowered him unarmed. He will rally, and renew the combat. The whole battle is still to begin. We have seen in reality nothing of it. Army after army will be poured through the Pyrenees, and all Spain must become a field of blood.

The zeal of the Spaniards has now to withstand the skill of the French captains, and the discipline of their veteran soldiers. The councils of the different kingdoms of which the Spanish monarchy is composed, are matched against the vigor and unity of a single, practised, absolute, remorseless man. The enthusiasm of the patriots has to contend against the regular, habitual, animal courage of professional soldiers ; and the question is, which of these two feelings is likely to prevail in the long run ; to bear up against difficulties and privations, to survive disasters, and to endure the inactivity of protracted operations ?

Such is the contest which is now beginning in Spain ; and such are the grounds of our melancholy forebodings, that it will lead to the subjugation of the most gallant people in the world."

It is with the most unfeigned diffidence, that, only furnished with the very scanty information respecting Europe, which tardily and uncertainly finds its way to this remote country, I venture to dissent from the opinion of the Edinburgh Reviewers, whose whole writings on the great subjects of national policy show, that they generally arrive at a correct and comprehensive result by a careful and accurate induction from a vast variety of particular facts.

Nevertheless, I shall beg the indulgence of the reader while I offer a few observations as to the probable issue of the present contest between

France and Spain terminating ultimately in favor of the Spaniards.

All the records of human history bear witness to the utter impossibility of subduing a *whole, undivided people*, that sets itself in determined, desperate resistance to the outrages of a foreign invading army. Many governments have fallen, and many governments may again perish, under the sword of a usurper ; but there is not one single instance in all the annals of mankind, of a whole numerous people or nation, fighting in defence of their wives, children, houses, liberty, and independence, being subjugated by a foreign foe.

In vain did the Persian monarchs assail with their whole force the petty democracies of ancient Greece ; in vain was the whole power of the Austrian empire exerted to crush the little republics of Switzerland ; in vain did the Spanish monarchy, in the best days of its power and grandeur, attempt to reduce to obedience the stubborn states of Holland ; and alike ineffectual were the attempts of Spain to subdue the narrow territory and the scanty population of revolted Portugal.

And what is more to our present purpose, the Spaniards themselves, in their rude, *divided*, barbarous state, resisted the whole military force of Rome for more than half a century after Carthage fell ; and will not Spain now, in her present united, compacted state, with her whole people devoted to her, with her immense colonies pouring their

boundless wealth into her lap, and with another and a greater Carthage, in Britain, to aid her with fleets, and armies, and ammunition, and provisions, and every thing which can contribute to her effectual defence and the annoyance of the enemy ; be able to cope with France, who possesses neither the steady desperate valor, nor the power, nor the resources, nor the full and undisputed dominion of the Roman republic in the zenith of its grandeur ?

In the years 204—196, before Christ, the Roman armies, together with their generals Cneius and Publius Scipio, were cut to pieces by the Spaniards, to the north of the Iberus, on the frontiers of the Suessetani. In the years 195—192, Scipio Africanus, partly by valor, and partly by policy in dividing the *union* of the states of Spain, and gaining the Celtiberians over to the Roman standard, succeeded in subduing the bold and ardent Lacetani, the inhabitants of the present province of Catalonia, after many bloody and obstinate conflicts.

When the republic of Carthage had fallen beneath the superior valor, and the more crafty policy of Rome, the peninsula of Spain still dared, with its various discordant and barbarous tribes, to maintain an unequal contest against the whole, united, well-disciplined military force of the Roman government. It cannot be expected that I should enter minutely into the history of the contest between Roman fraud and oppression on the

one hand, and Spanish valor and magnanimity on the other. The seige of Numantia, however, in the years 142—76 A. C. a period of sixty-six years, deserves commemoration in order to show what desperate and determined valor can perform, even against the most numerous and best disciplined armies. Consult "The History of Spain," &c. in three volumes octavo, published in London, in 1793, from which the following account is taken.

"The city of Numantia stood near the source of the Duero, a little above the situation of the present city of Soria. Her youth sallied from the gates, and repulsed in open fight the disciplined valor of a numerous Roman army. On the approach of Quintius Pompeius, at the head of thirty thousand veterans, they rejected with scorn the terms of submission offered to them, namely, that they should be deprived of their arms and fortifications, and pay a heavy contribution in money.

They therefore rushed out upon their far more numerous opponents, and, after an obstinate contest, vanquished Pompey into accepting a treaty favorable to the Numantians ; which the Roman senate, with its accustomed fraud, and disregard of the most solemn obligations, refused to ratify ; and without restoring the hostages or refunding the money, which had been given on the faith of Pompey's oath, instantly ordered the seige of Numantia to be renewed.

The Numantians beheld from their walls the

approach of the Roman army under Popilius Lænas, and disdaining the advantages of their ramparts and situation, rushed forth to an open encounter. Their valor was successful; and the remnant of the Roman army, that escaped the fury of the Spaniards, preserved during the remainder of the campaign an awful distance.

The next spring the Roman eagles again appeared beneath the walls of Numantia, whose inhabitants again sallied forth against the enemy. Twenty thousand Romans were slaughtered by four thousand Numantians, and the consul Hostilius Mancinus, with his wretched fugitives from the field of battle, were surrounded by the victors on every side. They were preserved from famine or the sword by a treaty, which was ratified by the most solemn oaths of Mancinus and his principal officers.

This treaty was violated by the Roman senate with the same facility as that which had been subscribed by Pompey. Yet the senate affected to disguise its breach of faith under the appearance of rigid justice, and delivered Mancinus in chains to the Numantians, who with their wonted magnanimity rejected the proffered victim, saying, “it is not the sacrifice of a private man which can atone for a breach of the public faith.”

The Roman historians state that the Numantians capable of bearing arms did not exceed *ten thousand*. Yet Scipio, the second Africanus, who

was now appointed to lead the flower of the Roman legions against Numentia, although he was at the head of *sixty thousand* soldiers, dared not approach the walls of the city; but suffered a whole year to elapse in restoring and confirming the discipline of his men, before he ventured to advance to the siege.

His march was retarded by the attacks of the Numantians, whose impetuous valor, however, was obliged to yield to the steady courage and the superior numbers of the Romans. When upbraided by their countrymen for having fled before those whom they had so often vanquished, they replied, "The Romans are indeed the same sheep, but they have got a different shepherd."

The Numantians saw their fields laid waste by the invaders; and their last retreat within the walls was followed by the close blockade of their devoted city. The walls of Numantia, which rose on a lofty hill, were three miles in circumference, and manned by *four thousand* brave and vigorous citizens. The intolerant spirit of Rome demanded the surrender of their arms, their city, and their persons, to be disposed of at the discretion of the senate; and the Numantians preferred an honorable death to a life of slavery.

They sallied from their walls and defied the host of their besiegers to battle. But the prudence of Scipio restrained his soldiers within their lines, and the Numantians, as they returned, look-

ed forward to a lingering fate by famine. One hope remained ;—to rouse in their defence the martial tribes of Spain. Five aged warriors, each attended by his son, undertook to penetrate the works of the besiegers ; they pierced the Roman lines ; hewed down the guard that opposed them ; and escaped before the Numidian horse could be assembled for pursuit.

But of all the numerous and powerful states of Spain, only one city, Lutia, agreed to arm for the relief of Numantia. But before their youth could buckle on their armor, they were surprised by the appearance of Scipio at their gates. The Roman general had been apprised of their design, and with a select detachment had pressed forward to surprise the city. Lutia was incapable of resistance ; and four hundred of her noblest youths were the miserable victims of Scipio's implacable cruelty. Their *right hands* were lopped from them ; and their mutilated appearance warned the neighboring *disunited* provinces of the danger of provoking the vengeance of Rome.

The Numantians hourly saw their scanty stock of provisions diminish, and the number of their enemies increase by fresh reinforcements to the Roman camp. A deputation, issuing from their gates, solicited Scipio to receive their submission on honorable terms ; or allow them to fall gloriously in battle with his soldiers. Scipio replied, that they must surrender at discretion.

The Numantians then, sword in hand, sallied forth on their oppressors, and gratified their despair by an extensive carnage of their enemies. Their strength was exhausted by the unequal conflict, but their valor could not be subdued; and they who were driven back into the city, set fire to their houses, and with their wives and families rushed on destruction. Fifty alone were with difficulty ravished from the flames to adorn the brutal triumph of the victor; and Numantia alone, unaided, after defying the whole military power of Rome for *fourteen years*, was confounded in a heap of ashes by the indignant and unconquerable courage of her inhabitants.

And if we examine the history of the present contest between Spain and France, so far as it has hitherto advanced, we shall find that the valor of the Spaniards now, is in no wise inferior to the courage displayed by their ancestors in opposing the Romans. The determined intrepidity of the defenders of Saragossa, and of Gerona, against the attacks of the French, equals the prowess of those heroes who so often repulsed the Roman legions before the walls of Numantia.

The Spanish generals also have distinguished themselves by the display of military talents worthy of the devoted valor of their soldiers; and the exploits of Palafox, of Blake, of Cuesta, of Vane-gas, and of Romana, in Arragon, in Catalonia, in Estremadura, in Leon, in Gallicia, and the Astu-

rias, have taught the experienced captains and the veteran troops of France to respect and to fear the impetuous courage of their enemy.

Of the lofty spirit, the steady constancy, the comprehensive wisdom of the Spanish Junta, but little can be said. At the moment of Bonaparte's atrocious invasion of Spain, the whole country lay supine upon the verge of unanticipated destruction ; and enveloped in that weak and defenceless state, which an entire century of feeble and corrupt government under the Bourbons had begun, continued, and consummated.

The different provinces were unconnected by any common bond. The whole royal family, together with the larger portion of the grandees and nobles of Spain were already the prisoners or the slaves of Bonaparte. In this moment of surprise, alarm, confusion, terror, ignorance, and anxiety, Murat, with a *hundred thousand* of Bonaparte's best troops, already spread over the country, and in possession of all the commanding fortresses and passes, prepared to take possession of the Spanish monarchy for his master ; while Junot, with forty thousand French veterans, marched into Portugal to secure that kingdom also, as a fief of the Corsican dynasty.

Yet under all these disadvantageous circumstances, and in spite of the supineness of the Juntas, the enthusiastic valor of the Spanish people entirely vanquished the numerous, well-appointed,

highly-disciplined armies of France. Of all the hordes of French troops that had followed Murat over the Pyrenees, by far the greater portion was slain by the Spaniards ; many were taken prisoners, and the remaining few fled precipitately towards the French frontier.

At length Bonaparte, sensible of the determined spirit of resistance which pervaded Spain, put the whole military force of his immense empire in array against the Spanish patriots. On this second invasion he carried with him, says his own official paper, the *Moniteur*, “ *four hundred and eighty thousand soldiers.*”

If he did, the question naturally arises, as to what he has done with this formidable force ? Why has he not subdued all Spain long ere this ? A few misguided rebels and insurgents, as he calls them, could surely never oppose any successful resistance against half a million of the best troops in the world, commanded by the greatest generals in the universe, with Bonaparte at their head.

But, say the democrats, Spain would have been conquered long since, if Bonaparte had not thought it more expedient first to annihilate the Austrian empire, and then return to crush the whole Spanish peninsula at one blow ; after which “ in less than three months,” (I quote their own words) “ Britain will be subdued into a province of France.”

Now Bonaparte’s *Moniteur* says, that he only

withdrew *one hundred thousand* men from Spain, in order to annihilate the Austrian empire, in concert with his German armies, and his vassal princes of the Confederation of the Rhine. If then the *Moniteur* is to be believed, he left *three hundred and eighty thousand* French troops under the command of some of his very best generals, namely, Augereau, Soult, Ney, Victor, and others, in Spain.

And what have these great commanders at the head of their numerous and invincible legions done? Accounts of so late a date as the beginning of September, 1809, have reached this country, and inform us, that Soult and all his army are driven out of Portugal; that Ney and his troops have been compelled to evacuate Galicia, and the Asturias; that Augereau is daily losing ground in Arragon and Catalonia; that Victor and all his forces have been obliged to abandon Estremadura, and have been defeated at Talavera, on the borders of the Alberche; and that all the French soldiers now in Spain are reduced to one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men.

If all this has been accomplished in *fourteen months*, reckoning from June 1808 to August 1809, by the Spaniards against such fearful odds, what result might we not expect in future when the disparity between the contending powers shall be so much lessened? Spain, in the midst of all the weakness and confusion necessarily attendant upon the formation of a provisional government, has

successfully opposed an unarmed peasantry, and a rude, undisciplined militia, against almost incredible numbers of French veteran troops, in the highest state of military discipline, and commanded by the most able and experienced generals.

The rugged nature of the Spanish territory also, full of mountains, narrow passes, deep defiles, and unfordable rivers not supplied with bridges, and above all, its being very scantily provisioned, partly from the great driness of the soil, and more especially from the very low and miserable condition of agriculture, throw serious and almost insuperable obstacles in the way of an invading army.

And now, after more than twelve months consumed in contending with so formidable an enemy, the Spaniards have had time and opportunity to learn the necessity and advantage of strict military discipline ; to organize their armies ; to wield the resources of the country with the greatest effect for their own defence, and the annoyance of their enemy.

And accordingly Spain has now numerous and well-appointed regular armies on foot, under some very distinguished generals, as Blake, Romana, Cuesta, and Vanegas ; and a conclusive proof that the state of discipline among the Spanish troops is highly improved, was shewn in Vanegas lately repulsing the attacks of a superior French force under Victor, for two successive days of hard and

bloody fighting, and then falling back to the Sierra Morena, with his troops in such good order that Victor did not venture to molest him in his retreat.

More than *two hundred thousand* Frenchmen have laid their bones in Spain since the beginning of the conflict between the two nations; and the Spaniards are far better able now to contend with their enemy than ever they were, on account of the present more efficient organization of the resources of the whole Spanish monarchy, to direct their population, their valor, their wealth and their talents in one stream of decided violence and opposition against France; who with all her gasconading about “the inexhaustible number of her people that burn with ardor to cover themselves with glory on the other side of the Pyrenees,” *cannot* afford to lose another half million of men in arms, in contending for the possession of the peninsula: the *conscription* system having (as we shall hereafter prove) very materially diminished the *effective* population, not only of France, but also of Holland and Italy.

It indeed appears to be a hopeless attempt for Bonaparte to *subdue* Spain; over-run it with his armies doubtless he may; but to subjugate the Spaniards is quite a distinct, and a much more difficult affair. The Spanish mode of warfare too, is peculiarly calculated to wear out and destroy the invaders, and ultimately to save their own country. They do not stake the whole of their fortunes up-

on the single cast of a decisive battle with a numerous army opposed to the veteran troops of France ; but cut off every individual that straggles from the enemy's camp ; so that the French in fact will never be masters of a larger portion of the country than the immediate spots of ground which their armies occupy.

Bonaparte himself seems to be aware of the improbability, not to say impossibility, of bending Spain in submission to his yoke ; otherwise he must be an idiot to *lay waste* and desolate a country which he expects to govern, and from whose resources of industry, population, and fruits of the soil alone, he can derive any accession of power and strength. The acquisition of a wilderness, without inhabitants, and without produce, will not carry him one step the nearer to the accomplishment of his great objects, the subjugation of Britain, and thence, in course, of the whole world ; but he will be so much *less able* to effect this purpose by all the blood and treasure which he expends in exterminating the Spaniards, and reducing their country to a desert.

Spain is already so devastated by the French, that not even refreshments can be found for a traveller *within a hundred miles* of Madrid, and Bonaparte's army itself subsists entirely on provisions and forage brought all the way from France. In all the Spanish provinces which the French have overrun, they have destroyed *every species* of animal

and vegetable food that they themselves could not consume. On quitting a country, after robbing the houses and cottages, they uniformly set fire to the wheat fields, olive groves, and vines; and all the flocks of Merino sheep, on which they can seize, they either kill or send out of the kingdom. Whence it would appear that Bonaparte, actuated by the most fiend-like disposition, is determined at least to reduce the peninsula to a mere barren waste, if he cannot conquer it, and also take possession of the invaluable and boundless colonies of Spain.

Are we not therefore justified in concluding that if the Spaniards be true to themselves, and *heartily united* in their efforts against the common enemy, they will ultimately defeat all the attempts of the Corsican tyrant to enslave them; and be enabled to re-assert their national independence and grandeur?

Besides, nations, like individuals, become great and powerful in proportion as they are exercised by trials and difficulties. Adversity, as some French writer observes, is a crucible in which powerful minds are refined and strengthened; but in which the spirit of ordinary characters is evaporated, and merely a *caput mortuum* is left behind.

Now occasional war is to a nation possessing considerable resources in itself, what adversity is to a valiant and unyielding individual. It calls forth and presses into action, all their means and

energies ; it makes the slothful active ; the ignorant wise ; the timid brave ; and develops all that exalted genius and spirited enterprise which are too apt to lie dormant in the time of peace.

Contrast the inefficiency and want of all influence among the other nations of that over-grown empire of China, whose perpetuity of pacific policy renders a population of three hundred millions of human beings feebler than children in all the pursuits of intellect and of active courage, with the power and energy of ancient Rome, whose chief occupation was war.

Compare the power of France now in 1809, after a lapse of twenty years, spent in carrying on and in preparing for the most bloody and wide-wasting wars, with its power in the year 1789, under the sleepy government of the Bourbons. And Britain is at this moment, positively and relatively, far more powerful, in the spirit and enterprise of her people, and in the extent and permanency of her national resources, than she was in the year 1793, when she first entered upon the conflict with the revolutionary France.

Spain has been enfeebled by the long continuance of a government badly administered, and of bondage to the views and politics of France. She requires time, and difficulty, and suffering, to call forth and to mature that energy and loftiness of character which will enable her to re-assume her ancient power and strength. A long and a terrible

contest, in which much evil must be inflicted and suffered, on her own soil, with an enemy so powerful, so implacable, so perfidious, as France, will give her an opportunity of calling into action her great political and military talents; of training and disciplining a vast body of effective soldiers; of diffusing intelligence over the great mass of her people, hitherto shrouded in the deepest midnight of ignorance and superstition; of restraining the undue and exorbitant power of the crown; of restoring the nobility to their just influence in the community; of giving to the people a proper portion of political consequence, and a legitimate share of authority in electing their own representatives. If the contest with France be prolonged for some years, Spain might probably become one of the most powerful nations in the world; in consequence of being obliged by the very necessity of her condition to use her internal resources of agriculture, her vast maritime capacities, and the boundless wealth of her colonies, in the promotion of her own national aggrandizement, and the prosperity of her people.

It might appear presumptuous in one who must necessarily from his remote situation be entirely unacquainted with the actual relation now subsisting between Britain and Spain, to offer an opinion in direct contradiction to the steps which the British Government is taking in regard to the present contest between the Spaniards and French; yet it appears to me not quite consistent with sound policy to send an army from England into the peninsula.

For, in the first place, Spain is a very badly provisioned country, and British soldiers sent there must suffer more from famine than from the enemy.

Secondly, people who speak different languages, never can cordially agree with each other. It is remarked by M. Talleyrand in his "Memoir concerning the commercial relations of the United States with England," that an insurmountable barrier is raised up between people of a different language, who cannot utter a word without recollecting that they do not belong to the same country; betwixt whom every transmission of thought is an irksome labor, and not an enjoyment; who never come to understand each other thoroughly; and with whom the result of conversation, after the fatigue of unavailing efforts, is to find themselves mutually ridiculous."

Thirdly, and above all, the two nations professing a different religion is the most insuperable obstacle to their joint and cordial co-operation. The Spaniards and Portuguese are perhaps the most bigoted of all people on earth to the most intolerant of all superstitions; and would therefore have no objection to see all the British *heretics* in their country destroyed by sword and famine. It is a remarkable fact, that after the great earthquake at Lisbon, in the year 1759, the Portuguese received the bountiful supply of all necessaries and comforts, which were sent to them by the munificence of the British Parliament and the private subscriptions of the Bri-

tish people, and immediately turned round, and cursed their preservers as heretics.

Accordingly, as far as facts have come to our knowledge, the Spaniards never have willingly and heartily co-operated with the British armies that have gone into the peninsula, to fight for them. Witness Sir John Moore's last letter in which he complains bitterly of the coldness and neglect of the Spaniards, in not furnishing him with provisions, and never joining him with their troops, but leaving him with only five and twenty thousand Britons to fight before the walls of Corunna with seventy-thousand Frenchmen, over whom indeed he obtained a signal victory.

Witness, also, how twenty-thousand of the British were suffered to contend alone at Talavera, with fifty thousand Frenchmen under Victor, whom however they compelled to retreat across the Alberche; but both Vanegas and Cuesta paid no regard to the orders or the situation of Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose army was suffered to be *four days* without any food.

Would it not therefore be more advisable to let the Spaniards contend alone in battle with the French on their own soil, and the British employ their armies and fleets in perpetually harassing the enemy's coasts, and compelling them to consume their troops in marching and counter-marching; and to capture the islands of the Grecian Archipelago, of the Ragusan republic, and every other island, that might serve as a depot of troops and ammunition, ready to act offensively at a moment's warning?

In the mean time every assistance might and ought to be given to the Spaniards in the articles of ammunition, clothing, provisions, or whatever may be necessary, in their present perilous condition.

The small extent and scanty population of Portugal must determine the fate of that kingdom according to the destiny of Spain; as it would be impossible for the British to defend that little nook of land, if all the rest of the peninsula were in the hands of the French. For this assertion I have the authority of the late Sir John Moore, who in a letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Salamanca, 25th Nov. 1808, says, "The frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain, it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military force; and from the experience of their conduct under Sir Arthur Wellesley, no dependence is to be placed on any aid *they* can give. The British must in that event immediately take steps to evacuate that country. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place whence the army with its stores can embark.

Elvas, and Almeida are the only fortresses on the frontier. The first is, I am told, a respectable work, Almeida is defective; and could not hold out beyond ten days against a regular attack. I have ordered a depot of provisions for a short consumption to be formed there, in case the army should be obliged to fall back. Perhaps the same should be done at El-

vas. In this case we might check the progress of the enemy, whilst the stores were embarking, and arrangements were made for taking off the army. *Beyond this* the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of."

If the Spaniards were left to fight their own battles, Bonaparte could not very easily conquer a country so rugged and mountainous, so full of defiles, and dangerous passes, and so resolutely defended by its hardy and desperate inhabitants. And if he should *nominally* subdue it, it would be very difficult in a region so badly provisioned, to maintain an army sufficiently numerous to keep down the insurgent spirit of a people to whom France and Frenchmen are objects of the most deadly hatred.

For a succinct and interesting account of the despicable fraud and murderous violence, by which Bonaparte conducted his plans for the usurpation of Spain, consult the "Manifesto of the Spanish Nation to Europe, dated at the royal palace of Alcazar, Seville, January 1st. 1808."

If Spain should ultimately succeed in baffling the attempts of the usurper, the benefits resulting to herself, to Europe, and to the world would be incalculable. It would permanently weaken the overgrown power of France; would erect the Spaniards into a great and prosperous people; would give to Britain a main ascendancy in the councils of Europe; would augment the aggregate of productive industry and commercial enterprise throughout the whole world.

The cause of civil liberty also would be most materially promoted, since it is impossible for the Spanish people, if they succeed in their present glorious efforts, tamely to submit as heretofore to the feeble, corrupted, despotic government of a king that ran away from them into the arms of Bonaparte, of the whole herd of courtiers and grandees who have basely joined the usurper's standard.

In all probability the absolute power of the crown would be restrained by the influence of popular representation, and the Cortes restored to those ancient privileges which prevailed in the better times of the Peninsula; before the solid principles of liberty, originally interwoven in the constitution of Spain, and assisted by the spirit of the people, were corrupted and over-come by the vast influence of the Executive, which at length swept away all the natural and civil rights of the Spaniards.

But say that Spain is finally conquered; does it therefore follow that the whole world is necessarily laid low at the tyrant's feet?—A conclusive answer to this question may be found in the 13th vol. of the *Edinburgh Review*, p. 225.

“It is manifest that the force of the example of Spain must reach over the other states of the European continent. Admitting that no farther successes should crown the Spanish arms, and that Bonaparte should, by overwhelming armies, beat down all opposition to his detestable projects; he has lost much, and must lose more before the struggle be at

an end. He has learned, and France has been made to recollect, a lesson of which she had of late years lost sight ; namely, the powers of popular enthusiasm when roused by injustice and oppression.

It is now to be apprehended that similar acts of oppression will be met with somewhat of the same resistance wherever they are attempted. There may now be other enemies to beat besides drill-sergeants and imperial guards, before armies can march over the countries of unoffending allies. The feeling of power has been communicated to the people in every part of Europe ; and any such shameless aggressions as those which first roused up this feeling in Spain, will in all likelihood, give rise to revolutionary movements elsewhere.

It can scarcely be expected that while things remain quiet the Germans will change their government ; but it is no small improvement of their condition that the enemy should have reason to dread an intestine revolution, the most formidable antagonist with which he has ever met, as often as he attempts to shake by any extraordinary efforts of usurpation the existing order of things.

Nor will the Spaniards themselves fail to reap the fruits of their valor and patriotism, however sorely they may be discomfited in their present struggle. That Bonaparte will ultimately succeed we apprehend is highly probable ; that he will succeed without great efforts and losses is absolutely impossible ; and no one can be frantic enough to suppose, that

the utmost success of his arms can subdue the people of Spain into a nation of willing and peaceful slaves.

This he knows as well as we do, and will not only offer them good terms, after the tide of fortune has begun to turn in his favor, but will finally grant them such a capitulation as their gallant resistance at once deserves, and renders it absolutely necessary for the conqueror to allow. He will rule Spain with a very light rod, if ever he rules her at all; because he knows that there is no other chance of ruling her long. We ascribe here nothing to his virtue; we only give him credit for some of that prudence, which never forsook him before the march into Spain; and of which there is too much reason to dread, he has long ere now regained possession."

To this last position I am inclined to demur, and to doubt the probability of Bonaparte's ever ruling the Spaniards lightly; because the whole of his conduct hitherto, and all the habitual tendencies of his jealous and remorseless heart, have been uniformly marked by the most unsparing, inflexible cruelty to all those over whom he has exercised dominion. Whence he will be induced rather to aim at the entire prostration of Spain, by draining her whole effective strength off in the *conscription* of all her men capable of bearing arms, than to incur the hazard of a high-spirited, fully peopled nation seizing the first opportunity of throwing off his yoke.

But another important question arises as to what

effect the subjugation of Spain by Bonaparte will have on Britain ?

In order to secure the spring-elections of 1809, in favor of democracy, our democrats issued hand-bills in all the towns and villages of the United States, announcing that Spain was entirely conquered, all the British armies in the peninsula annihilated by Bonaparte, and Britain herself on the point of being reduced under the yoke of France ; and *therefore* all honest republicans should immediately go to the poles and vote for Mr. Jefferson, and his party.

It is not my business *now* to notice how industriously the whole body of democrats in the United States seize every opportunity of *identifying* themselves and their cause with the interests and policy of France ; my only design at present is to inquire by what means Britain will be rendered *less able* to contend with France, in consequence of the subjugation of Spain by Bonaparte, than she is at this moment.

Before this nefarious attempt was made, Bonaparte had at his entire command *all* the resources of the Spanish nation ; whose blood and treasure, whose fleet and armies, he employed with the utmost prodigality in the prosecution of his plans for the destruction of Britain. Say then that he should ultimately conquer Old Spain, will he not then be *weaker* and *less able* to carry into effect his deadly designs against the British ; by all the men whom he shall lose, and all the pro-

erty which he shall dissipate in the contest ; by the determined hatred, the reluctant, constrained submission of the gallant Spaniards ; and the consequent necessity of always maintaining large bodies of French troops in the Peninsula, for the sole purpose of keeping his new subjects quiet ?

Add to all this, how is he to obtain possession of the Spanish American colonies ? Will he conquer them also by the mere terror of his threats : or win upon their affection by his virtue and humanity so signally displayed in his conduct towards their brethren in Old Spain ? He cannot possibly murder every Spanish patriot that opposes him ; and if it be seen that Old Spain must finally yield awhile to his overwhelming force, the political and military chiefs, with their families, their property, their talent, their valor, and their influence, together with a formidable Spanish fleet, will transport themselves to the American colonies, which are already prepared to receive them, by their own loyalty, and patriotism in the revolutionary cause, and by the exertions of those governors whom the Central Junta has so judiciously sent out to superintend the affairs of the colonial provinces.

Thus an immense independent empire will be reared in the new world, which, while the British navy maintains the sovereignty of the seas, may bid defiance to Bonaparte, and all his hordes. And if he cannot enslave these Spanish colonies,

will not their political and commercial alliance with Britain render her *more able* to defeat his schemes of universal domination, and to protect the world from his violence and fraud ; instead of bringing her nearer to the point of subjugation by his arms.

If Bonaparte, with Spain and her colonies under his own entire control, could make no impression on Britain, by what miraculous process is he to conquer her when he shall have drained the vital strength of France in reducing the Peninsula to an unwilling obedience, and the Spanish colonies shall have become a vast independent empire ?

Upon the great and very important question relating to the emancipation of Spanish America, a flood of light is poured out in the 13th volume of the "Edinburgh Review," p. 277, 311. The Reviewer discloses a vast body of interesting facts, respecting this subject, that could not be derived from any common source of information ; that could indeed have been obtained only by free and liberal access to Lord Grenville, and Mr. Wyndham, or some other leading statesman, who filled conspicuous offices in Mr. Pitt's administration during the first French revolutionary war ; and to whom alone, many of the transactions, now revealed, could have been imparted, in consequence of their political relations and bearings.

"The curious and interesting address, in which the inhabitants of South America, are called upon

by every consideration interesting to man, to take the management of their own affairs into their own hands, and to establish a just and beneficent government, which may at once ensure their own happiness, and open a liberal intercourse of benefits with the rest of the world, was written by a Jesuit, a native of Arequipa in the province of Peru.

This extraordinary ecclesiastic, who displays a share of knowledge, of thought, and of liberality, worthy of the most enlightened countries, died in London in the month of February 1798, and left the present tract, in manuscript, together with several other papers, in the hands of the Honorable Rufus King, at that time Minister in Britain from the United States. It was afterwards printed by means of General Miranda, for the purpose of being distributed among his countrymen.

The brilliant prospects which seem to be opening for man in the new world, and the cloud which still thickens over the fortunes of the old, offer, at the present hour, a subject of contemplation to the thinking part of the British people, than which, excepting the great question of slavery or freedom, one more interesting can scarcely be imagined.

After a tremendous struggle, to which the world has seen no parallel, the power of the despot of France now extends uncontrolled over almost every part of the continent of Europe. The hopes

of the instability of that power, which so long continued to flatter the multitude, who always draw their conclusions, not from reason, but from present feeling and inclination, have given way to the alarm which a series of tremendous success has irresistibly engendered ; and perhaps Britain is on the eve of being placed in the critical situation of near neighbor to a power, which combines against her all the resources of Europe, and cuts her off from an important branch of commercial intercourse.

To the period, too, which may elapse before the affairs of Europe assume a condition more favorable to human nature, the foresight of man can assign no definite boundary. In this new and portentous condition of Europe, Britain is called upon to look more widely around her, and to inquire if in the rest of the world barriers can be found to resist the pressure of the torrent, and resources to supply those, of which the channel is now closed against her ?

In taking this important survey, every eye perhaps will ultimately rest upon South-America. A country far surpassing the whole of Europe in extent, and still more in natural fertility, which has been hitherto unfortunately excluded from the beneficent intercourse of nations, is, after a few prudent steps on the part of Britain, ready to open to her the immense resources of her territory ; of a population at present great, and likely to increase

with most extraordinary celerity, and of a position unparalleled on the face of the globe for the astonishing combination of commercial advantages which it unites.

From the maturity for some beneficent change, which circumstances and events have for a series of years been working in those magnificent regions, and from the mighty effects which they are capable of yielding for the consolation of afflicted humanity ; it seems as if that Providence, which is continually bringing good out of evil, were about to open a career of happiness in the New World, at the very moment, when by the mysterious and inscrutable laws of its administration, it appears to have decreed a long period of injustice and calamity in the Old.

For the mighty benefits to be expected from a just and wise arrangement of the affairs of Spanish America, we are not left to the results of speculation, clear and unambiguous as they are, we can appeal to experience and to fact. We have the grand experiment of North America before us, which the inhabitants of the South are so ambitious to imitate. The States of North America were once British colonies, and had always been beneficently administered, until the occurrence of that foolish, fatal blunder about taxing an unrepresented people ; yet has their independence

been far more profitable to Britain than their subjection.

What is the result with regard to commerce alone? The very extraordinary fact that for several years past, before Mr. Jefferson put into practice his grand experiment of annihilating all the trade of the Union, Britain exported more goods of her own growth and manufacture to the United States of America than to the whole of Europe taken together.

If such be the benefits resulting from the national prosperity of the United States, how many times *greater* will be the advantages which must necessarily flow from the prosperity of South America? How many times more extensive is the country which the Spanish Americans possess? That country, from enjoying a much greater diversity of climate, compared with Europe, than North America, is much more richly provided with those commodities for which Europe presents the most eager demand.

Of the soil of South America a great part is much more favorable to cultivation, much more fruitful, and cleared by nations who had made some progress in civilization. Of all the countries in the world, South America possesses the most important advantages in respect to internal navigation; being intersected in all directions by mighty rivers, which will bear at little cost the produce of her extensive provinces to the ocean.

If the population of the United States, amounting to six millions of souls, afford so extraordinary a demand for British commodities, what may not the population of South America, extending already to no less than sixteen millions, be expected to afford? It is no doubt true, that the moral and intellectual habits of the people of South America are not so favorable to improvement as were those of the North American population. Their industry has been cramped; their minds have been held in ignorance by a bad government; hence they are indolent and superstitious.

But remove the cause, and the effects will cease to follow. So sweet are the fruits of labor, wherever the laborer enjoys them unimpaired, that the motives to it are irresistible; and his activity may be counted upon with the certainty of a law of nature. The deduction, therefore, is so very small which on this score it will be requisite to make, that a very subordinate proportion of the superior advantages in soil and climate, which the South American enjoys, will suffice to compensate the better habits with which the inhabitant of the United States commenced his career.

In respect to wants, the two countries resemble each other. From the immense extent of uncultivated soil which it will require many ages to occupy, the whole bent of the population will be turned to agriculture; and it will be their inter-

est and their desire to draw almost the whole of the manufactured goods, which their riches will enable them to consume, from other countries.

The country to which the greater part of this prodigious demand will come, is unquestionably Britain. So far beyond all other countries, in respect to manufacturing advantages, does she stand, that were the circumstances of Europe much more likely to encourage industry than unhappily they are, Britain could meet with no rival ; and as she supplies North, so could she supply South America, on terms which would infallibly draw to her the greater part of the custom of that immense continent.

With this magnificent source of industry and wealth opened to Britain, the channels which Bonaparte can shut against her scarcely deserve to be named ; since even that of the United States surpasses them all. With South America then, under a free and beneficent government, though Britain might weep for the calamities heaped upon her brethren of Europe by an insatiable despot, who with the words *liberty* and *good of mankind* on his lips, would rivet his chains on the whole human race, and expend all their blood and toil for his own momentary pleasure or caprice ; yet she might laugh the destroyer to scorn, and enjoy a widely-extended, permanent prosperity, which the utmost efforts of his power and rage could never disturb.

In enumerating the commercial advantages which would assuredly spring from the emancipation of South America, the greatest benefit has not yet been noticed ; the mightiest event, perhaps, in favor of the peaceful intercourse of nations, which the physical circumstances of the globe present to the enterprise of man ; namely, the formation of a navigable passage across the isthmus of Panama ; the junction of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

It is remarkable that this magnificent undertaking, pregnant with consequences so important to mankind, is not only practicable, but easy. The river Chagr , which falls into the Atlantic at the town of Chagr , about eighteen leagues to the westward of Porto-Bello, is navigable as far as Cruces, within five leagues of Panama.

But though the formation of a canal from this place to Panama, facilitated by the valley through which the present road passes, appears to present no very formidable obstacles, there is still a better expedient. At the distance of about five leagues from the mouth of the Chagr , it receives the river Trinidad, which is navigable to Embarcadero, and from that place to Panama is a distance of about thirty miles, through a level country, with a fine river to supply water for the canal, and no difficulty whatever to counteract the noble undertaking. The ground has been surveyed, and the facility of the work completely ascertained. In the next place, safe harbours, at the two extremities of the

canal, are supplied. At the mouth of the Chagré is a fine bay, which received the British seventy-four-gun ships, in the year 1740, when Captain Knowles bombarded the castle of St. Lorenzo; and at the other extremity is the famous harbor of Panama.

Nay, there is still another expedient for opening the important navigation between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Farther north, is the grand lake of Nicaragua, which by itself almost extends the navigation from sea to sea. Into the Atlantic ocean it falls by a navigable river, and reaches to within three leagues of the Gulf of Papagayo in the Pacific. It was the instruction of the king of Spain to the governor of St. John's castle, not to permit any British subject to pass either up or down this lake; "for if ever the English come to a knowledge of its importance and value, they would soon make themselves masters of this part of the country."

We are tempted to dwell for a moment upon the prospects which the accomplishment of this splendid, but not difficult, enterprise, opens to Britain. It is not merely the immense commerce of the western shores of America, extending almost from pole to pole, that is brought as it were to her door; it is not the intrinsically important, though comparatively moderate, branch of British commerce, that of the South-Sea whalers, which will alone undergo a complete revolution, by sa-

ving the tedious and dangerous voyage round Cape-Horn; but the whole of those immense interests which Britain holds deposited in the regions of Asia, become incalculably augmented in value, by obtaining direct access to them across the Pacific ocean.

It is the same thing as if, by some great revolution of the globe, the eastern possessions of Britain were brought nearer to her. The voyage across the Pacific, the winds both for the eastern and western passage being fair and constant, is so expeditious and steady, that the arrival of ships may be calculated upon almost with as much accuracy as that of a mail-coach.

An immense traffic would immediately begin to cover the Pacific ocean. All the riches of India and of China, would move towards America. The riches of Europe and America would move towards Asia. Vast dépôts would be formed at the great commercial towns which would immediately arise at the two extremities of the central canal; the goods would be in a course of perpetual passage from the one dépôt to the other; and would be received by the ships as they arrived, and thence conveyed to their ultimate destination.

Is it too much to hope, that China and Japan themselves, thus brought so much nearer the influence of European civilization, much more constantly and powerfully subject to its operation,

would not be able to resist the salutary impression, but would soon receive important changes in ideas, arts, manners, and institutions? If so, the most beneficial results might be expected for the whole of Asia; that vast proportion of the earth, which even in its most favored parts, has been in all ages condemned to semi-barbarism, and the miseries of despotic power.

At least, it is certain that South America, which stands so much in need of industrious inhabitants, would receive myriads of laborious Chinese, who already swarm in all parts of the Eastern Archipelago, in quest of employment and of food. This to South America would be an acquisition of incredible importance; and the connection thus formed between the two countries, would still further tend to accelerate the acquisition of enlightened views and civilized manners in that very barbarous country, China herself.

Such are a few of the results reasonably to be expected from a regulation of the affairs of South America. Never, perhaps, was an opportunity offered to a nation of effecting so great a change in behalf of human kind, as Britain, from a wonderful combination of circumstances, is now called upon by so many motives, to help South America to accomplish.

In the year 1790, the scheme of Spanish American emancipation was first proposed to the late Mr. Pitt by General Miranda; it met with the

most cordial reception from the British minister, but was soon afterwards laid aside for the present, on account of Britain and Spain coming to a good understanding with each other.

In the year 1797, Miranda was met at Paris by deputies and commissioners from Mexico, and the other principal provinces of South America, who had been sent to Europe for the purpose of concerting with him the measures to be pursued for accomplishing the independence of their country. It was decided accordingly, that Miranda should in their name again repair to England, and make such offers to the British government, as might induce it to lend them the assistance requisite for effecting the great object of their wishes.

The instrument which was drawn up, and put into the hand of their representative, as the document to the British government, of the proposals of the South-Americans, is too remarkable an evidence of the views and plans of the leading members of the South-American communities, not to deserve at the present moment the most serious attention.

1. The first article states, that the Hispano-American colonies having for the most part resolved to proclaim their independence, were induced to address themselves to the government of Britain in the confidence she would not refuse them that assistance which Spain herself, in the midst of peace, had extended to the British colonies of America.

2. The second article stipulates the sum of thirty millions sterling, which South-America would pay to Britain for the assistance required.

3. The third article states the amount of the British force which was deemed requisite.

4. The words of the fourth article are, "a defensive alliance between England, the United States of America, and South-America, is so strongly recommended by the nature of things, by the geographical position of each of the three countries, by the products, industry, wants, manners, and character of the three nations, that it is impossible for this alliance not to be of long continuance; above all, if care be taken to consolidate it by an analogy in the political form of the three governments; that is to say by the enjoyment of civil liberty well understood; nay, we may even say with confidence, that this alliance is the only remaining hope of liberty, so audaciously outraged by the detestable maxims avowed by the French republic. It is the only means left of forming a balance of power capable of restraining the destructive ambition and desolation of the French system."

5. The fifth article relates to a treaty of commerce between Britain and South-America.

6. The sixth article stipulates the *opening of the navigation* between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the isthmus of Panama, as well as by the lake

of Nicaragua ; and the guarantee of its freedom to the British nation.

7. The seventh article respects the arrangement of the commerce between the different parts of South-America itself, proposed to be left on its present footing, till the assemblage of deputies from the different provinces of the continent can arrange the terms of their union.

8. The eighth article points to some project to be devised, of a connection between the Bank of England and those of Lima and Mexico, for the purposes of mutual support, and of giving England the advantage of that command of the precious metals which the country supplying them might have it in its power to yield.

9—10. The ninth and tenth articles relate to the project of alliance between South America and the United States. The principal points are the ceding of the Floridas to the United States ; the Mississippi being proposed as the most advisable boundary to the two nations ; and the stipulation of a small military force from the Anglo-Americans, to aid in the establishment of the proposed independence.

11. The eleventh article respecting the Islands, states the plan of resigning all those which belong to the Spaniards, excepting only Cuba ; the possession of which is rendered necessary by the situation of the Havannah commanding the passage from the gulf of Mexico.

This document is dated at Paris, 22nd December, 1797. The proposal transmitted to Mr. Pitt for the return of general Miranda to Britain was acceded to with alacrity ; and the General had a conference with that minister in January following.

The proposal was that North America should furnish ten thousand troops ; and the British government agreed to find money and ships. But Mr. Adams, then President of the United States, declined to transmit an immediate answer ; and the measure was in consequence postponed."

CHAPTER VI.

IT is now time to survey the positive and relative condition of the two primary contending powers, France and Britain. The over-grown and formidable power of France, is depicted in terms of the most animated eloquence, in "An Inquiry into the state of the nation at the commencement of the present administration ;" p. 34—117—158. This extraordinary pamphlet is reputed to be the joint production of the late Right Honorable Charles Fox, and the present Mr. Brougham ; who certainly cannot be accused of *under-rating*

the terrible means of destruction which Bonaparte possesses.

“View the signal advantages of France over all her enemies in every particular ; a compact and powerful territory, impregnable to attack, and commanding its neighbors from the excellence of its offensive positions ; an army enured to war, and to constant victory, an armed people intoxicated with natural vanity, and the recollection of unparalleled triumphs ; a government uniting the vigor of military despotism with the energies of a new dynasty ; an administration commanding in its service all the talents of the state ; finances unburdened by the debts of old monarchies, and unfettered by the good faith of wiser rulers ; and finally, a military expedition of vast magnitude, at every moment prepared, and applicable to any destination which the change of circumstances might require.

The acquisition of the Venetian and Tyrolese territory, with the confirmation of the French power over Switzerland, has completed the dominion of France over the whole of Italy. From Dalmatia and the confines of Turkey, round to Strasburgh, France has drawn a line of strong possessions, by which she completely hems in Italy ; cuts her off from every communication with the rest of the world ; and opens to her the closest intercourse with herself.

Her sway being so absolute here, it is natural

that she should lose no time in exercising all the rights of sovereignty. Accordingly, she models at pleasure the kingdom of Etruria ; augments Cisalpine ; disposes at will of the Court of Rome ; and dethrones by a common regimental order the royal family of Naples.

Thus is the surrender of Italy more absolute and unconditional, and in a far greater extent, than the courtiers of Charles, of Francis, or of Louis, ever dared flatter their masters to expect. France has now become sole mistress of that splendid country from the Alps to the straits of Messina. Its position which domineers over the Mediterranean, its mighty resources ; the fruitfulness of the garden of Europe ; the bays, and rivers, and harbors, which open to its produce the uttermost ends of the earth ; the forests which variegate its surface, and only break the continuity of culture to augment its powers, by preparing for this favored land *the dominion of the sea* ; the genius and fire of its numerous people ; the monuments of art ; the remains of antiquity ; the ground on which the glories of their Roman ancestors were atchieved ; all are now in the hands of the nation of the world best able to improve them ; to combine them ; to make them aid one another ; and, after calling them forth, to the incalculable augmentation of her former forces, ready to turn them against those, if *any such* shall remain, who still *dare* to be her enemies.

The other changes of dominion effected by the

treaty of Presburgh ; the Austrian emperor's cession of his possessions in Suabia, and his submission to the further spoliation of the German empire ; though important in themselves, and sufficient in any former period to alarm all Europe for their consequences, sink into insignificance after the entire surrender of Italy.

All these changes have only one simple view, *the diminution of the Austrian monarchy* ; its separation from France by a number of petty kingdoms dependant on the French power ; the transfer of the emperor's influence in Germany to his enemies ; and his confinement to the politics of the east of Europe ; where also he is closely watched by France and her creatures.

Nor does it make any difference upon the relative situation of the powers, that the sacrifices of Austria have been made to aggrandize the dependants of France, and not France herself. That overgrown empire could not expect to keep together more nations and countries than it already counted within its limits. The only feat which the French power has not attempted, is the conciliation of the various people whom it has conquered ; the only difficulties which it has not mastered, are those which natural boundaries present.

France therefore finds it more easy to complete the incorporation of Europe by some intermediate process, which may assimilate its heterogeneous parts, and prepare them for a lasting as well as an intimate

union. In the mean time, her sway over the principalities and powers, whom she calls into existence, is absolute and certain ; her influence is hourly gaining ground. Should the course of events maintain the nominal separation of these dependant kingdoms, they may at some future period, revolt from her federal empire ; but for years to come, they are as subservient to her purposes, as if they had no separate names.

The house of Austria is completely humbled ; she must receive the law from Paris ; she has sacrificed much, but must be prepared to surrender more. Whatever the sacrifice demanded may be, she must make it ; whether treasure, or alliances, or dignities, or territory, or, what is worst of all, principles. If the enemy require her to join him in turning against Russia, or sharing the plunder of Germany, or dividing and pillaging the Turk ; she cannot now balance. *Agitur de imperio*. France has Italy and the Tyrol ; the people of Austria are crushed ; the French are exalted and exulting.

What though *public* stipulations leave to Austria the semblance of a great monarchy ; do we not know that the only extensive or durable conquests have been made gradually ; that in treating with a humbled enemy the victor only rouses him by exacting too harsh conditions ; and that the wisest policy is to take something, and by the present to pave the way for future gains ?

The new victories of France ; the actual aggran-

dizement of her empire ; the subjection of her enemies ; and the dread of her invincible arms, have now rivetted the chains of the European continent. The only hope is gone which Holland, and Switzerland, and Italy, and Germany had of once more knowing independence. Henceforth, the object of these unhappy states must be, not to oppose France, but to moderate, if possible, the violence of her oppressions.

Were the Swiss thoroughly united together as one man, and resolved to resist the power of the masters who now surround them on every side, nothing could be expected from their efforts, but new scenes of bloodshed, and an intolerable augmentation of their burdens. While France possesses Savoy and Piedmont, and while Suabia and the Tyrol belong to her dependants, who exist only during her pleasure, as by her pleasure they were created, all the exertions of the Swiss would be inadequate to prevent them from being overwhelmed long before any allies could break through the strong French provinces that surround him.

The utter despair with which the Dutch are filled of ever seeing the independence of their country re-established, so long as Belgium is in the hands of France, and their conviction that the time is yet far off when any change of affairs may reduce the French power, prevent all inclination as well as all power of resistance on the part of Holland.

The Cisalpine, and the petty states of Germany are still more dependant on France. Their disposi-

tion to revolt unhappily signifies nothing. For a long course of years, they must submit in silence, however well inclined to rebel. The petty states by whom France has surrounded herself, as well as the more powerful dominions which she has succeeded in subduing, are firmly united to her fortunes; some by their weakness, others by disinclination to exert their strength in a way which they deem hurtful to their own interest.

So that from Holland to Switzerland, and from Switzerland to Turkey, France has covered a frontier almost every where strong by nature, with dependant nations, who are not likely to revolt, and who must always bear the first shock of a war waged against her; even if they do not actively assist in her offensive operations.

If from a view of the dependencies of France, we turn to the contemplation of that prodigious empire itself, we shall find as little to cheer our prospects of the future fate of the European commonwealth. The resources which she draws from Italy, and Germany, and Holland, are trivial when compared with the mass of real and rapidly increasing power, by which she has added these states to her dominions.

A population of above thirty-two millions; a revenue of twenty-five millions sterling, in spite of the ruin of her commerce, with a diminution of only three millions and a half for the interest of debt, notwithstanding the wars in which she has been engaged; a regular army of five hun-

dred and fifty thousand men, known in almost every corner of Europe by the rapidity of their conquests, and commanded by the first generals in the world ; a force not less formidable of men whose skill in negociation has completed the victories of her troops ; a spirit the most turbulent and restless, the most impatient of peace and fearless of war, animating all ranks of her people. All these form together a foundation of military superiority sufficient to alarm more powerful states than any which yet remain in her neighborhood.

But a change has within these few years taken place in the constitution of the French nation, still more formidable in its natural consequences to the tranquillity and prosperity of Europe than any of those well-known particulars already enumerated. We allude to the system of *military conscription*, by which their forces are now recruited, and which has slowly grown up with the revolutionary government, and of late been carried into complete effect all over the country ; so that it now forms a part of the establishment, likely to mingle itself in a short time with all the views and habits of the people.

This conscription affects *all* ranks of the community ; *every* man in France, with a very few exceptions in favor of certain public functionaries, is a soldier from the age of eighteen to twenty-five, not merely by enrolment, as in Austria and

Prussia, but in actual service ; whatever be his rank, or his fortune, or his pursuits in life, he must give up every other view, as soon as he reaches his twentieth year, and devote his life for five years to the profession of arms alone.

As there are no exemptions, unless in cases of former service, a substitute cannot be procured under an enormous sum ; frequently so high as seven hundred pounds sterling, never lower than four hundred ; and if more than a very small number required substitutes, it would be altogether impossible to procure them ; so that, in fact, there are scarcely any exceptions to the rule of strict personal service.

The rigor of the police, established all over France, renders it quite impossible for any one within the specified years to escape. In every quarter the *gendarmerie* have authority to arrest all the young men whom they can find, and detain them until they can prove themselves to be exempt from conscription.

The pay of a French soldier is extremely small ; but the rich and poor all live together, and the former contribute to improve the common fare. Every one endeavors in the first place to make himself master of the military art, in order to qualify himself for being promoted ; officers are chosen from the ranks without any regard to birth or fortune ; the emulation and interest of the common soldiers are kept up by their chance

of promotion, and by the voice which they are allowed, to a certain degree, in the choice of their officers.

The Imperial Guard, which has many privileges, and is composed of persons possessing a certain fortune, constitutes a species of aristocracy of extensive influence in this system. The military schools, the only branch of public instruction which is much attended to, secure the constant supply of the higher branches of the science ; and the excellent organization of the *Etat-Major-General*, to which the victories of the French arms are perhaps more owing than to any other improvement in their military affairs, keeps alive during peace the practice of their scientific acquirements, while it prepares the most valuable collection of practical information, so essential to the success of warlike operations.

Add to this, that the great offices of the state are all in the hands of military men ; that honors, as well as power and wealth, are almost confined to this favored order ; and that all places of trust, from the command of armies to the management of negotiations, are their patrimony.

Thus, it is no exaggeration to denominate France a great military empire ; to say that the government now calls forth the whole resources of the state, and that every Frenchman is literally a soldier. Nothing like this has ever appeared since the early days of the Roman people. The feudal militia

had not the same regularity, the same science and discipline. The insurrection of Hungary, the rising *en masse* of Switzerland and America, were all confined to particular emergencies.

The national guards, and first conscriptions of France herself, which approach nearer to the new order of things, were still inferior to it in systematic arrangement, and extent of operation; yet by their aid, imperfect as they were in the comparison, she gained all that she had conquered up to the year 1803.

But her present system is, in truth, a terrible spectacle. The most numerous and ingenious people in the world have abandoned the arts of peace, not for their defence, but after having conquered all the nations around them. They have betaken themselves to a military life as their main pursuit, almost their exclusive occupation; not from impatience of a long-continued quiet, but at the end of various revolutions, and after a series of the most destructive wars.

With a government purely military, a stock of science peculiarly adapted to the same pursuits, and a species of wealth not likely to be immediately ruined by such a change, they have established a regular system of discipline, which draws every man into the service of the country, and renders the whole surface of the most compact, extensive, and best situated country in Europe, one vast camp, swarming with soldiers.

At the head of this camp stands one who combines the courage of the lion with the craftiness of the fox. Bonaparte is the most false and artful of men ; he combines the most subtle mind with the most perfidious heart. He alternately oppresses by open violence ; seduces by secret fraud ; or assassinates in midnight obscurity.

His system is to crush the weak, and beguile the powerful ; to frighten the timid, and cajole the brave. The sword is the favorite engine of his government, and is congenial to the turbulence of his temper. But he combines in his administration every species of support to himself, and of danger to his enemies. By the employment of enlightened men like Talleyrand, he makes even philosophy administer her extensive aid to his violence. He has reduced falsehood into a system : and adapts his lies with wonderful sagacity to whatever character he addresses."

In the thirteenth volume of the Edinburgh Review, p. 427, 462, the *conscription* system is amply explained, and fully illustrated ; together with such a display of knowledge of the miserable internal condition of France, as could be acquired by very few residents in Britain. I would seriously recommend the contemplation of this horror-striking picture of the actual condition of the French, and their tributary allies, to all that vast body of ingenious politicians in these United States, who so constantly furnish us with such information as the following : namely,

“ Bonaparte has abolished the feudal tyranny; he has broken down all aristocracies and monopolies; he has ameliorated the condition of *all* the nations which he has conquered; the *present* situation of *all* the allies of France on the continent of Europe, and more particularly of the *French* themselves, is *infinitely better* in liberty, wealth, food, clothing, lodging, and all personal-enjoyments and luxuries, than that of the *British people*, those *vile slaves* who are ground down to the dust by the despotism of the tyrant George the Third.” &c. &c.

After describing with great force and accuracy the contents and bearings of the conscription-code itself, the Reviewer glances at its pressure upon the French people and vassal-states; and concludes, that the victorious career of Bonaparte will only be stopped by the speedy and effectual subjugation of the continent of Europe.

“ We have thus, says the Statesman who penned this article, given a brief abstract of the law of the *Conscription*, collected from the code itself. We shall now proceed to state the nature and effects of the execution, as represented to us by an observer, who with the best opportunities, has witnessed them in almost every part of France, during the progress of three levies.

The grand characteristic of the present administration of France is *relentless inflexibility*. A host of informers secures the fidelity of the executive of-

ficers. Cases of the most signal and barbarous rigor crowd all the daily gazettes of the empire, and even the journals of Paris ; into which they are compulsively and awkwardly thrust, in order that the quickening impulse of fear may be propagated through the entire mass of servitude.

In the winter of 1807, a member of the congregation of St. Sulpice, of the name of Fressinoux, undertook to deliver, every Sunday evening, in the church of St. Sulpice, lectures on Christian morality, (*La Morale Chretienne*). His auditors were numerous, and consisted principally of young men, attracted by a well-merited reputation for eloquence. After three discourses, he was summoned before the police, interrogated concerning his views, and informed that he could not possibly continue, unless he consented to inculcate on his hearers the *sacred duty of obedience to the conscription*.

The criminal tribunals of France are almost exclusively occupied with one species of delinquency ; happily unknown to the rest of the world. They entitle it "*Escroquerie en matiere de conscription ;*" or the extortion of money from persons liable to service under fraudulent promises of procuring them an exemption. A stranger in this great nation is haunted by the spectre of the police ; but the native is attended by another foul fiend still more hideous, and threatening him with more degrading visitations.

A traveller in France frequently meets on the high roads, and particularly in the vicinity of the great cities, twenty or thirty of those miserable beings, denominated refractory conscripts, guarded by a body of gendarmerie, *and coupled together with a rope attached to a horse's tail, as a badge of disgrace.*

In the Journal de l'Empire, under the Paris head of 21st October 1807, it is stated, that a recent act of amnesty had brought back to their colors *two hundred and four* refractory conscripts, and *ninety-two* deserters, of the department of *Orne*; of which department the *whole contingent* amounts only to *six hundred and ninety-two*, in a levy of sixty-thousand men.

In the details of the conscription-system there is a semblance of tenderness towards persons whose situation is apt to rouse those indignant feelings, that *insurgent* consciousness of right, which undisguised oppression never fails to excite even among the most degraded of human beings. Hypocrisy is the defence of fear against just resentment; and may therefore be well entitled, not only the homage which vice offers to virtue, but also the tribute which despotism pays to liberty.

The provisions on the subject of *reserve*, however, are altogether *illusory*. The ostensible purpose of its creation is to supply possible deficiencies, and to assist the armies in cases of great emergency. The emergency however has always been found to exist, and the reserve is uniformly

compelled to march. Not only are all the conscripts of the current thus swept away, but those of the preceding years, who have obtained a charter of exemption under the conditions prescribed by law, are also dragged into the field by a decree of the military chief of their department.

Another flagrant breach of law, if any enormity can be so called, which is committed not only with impunity, but under the sanction of public authority, must not be omitted. In the first tumults of the revolution, the parochial registers, at no period very accurately kept, were almost wholly neglected. As therefore no official document can be produced for youths between seventeen and twenty, the recruiting officers, within the two last years, have taken advantage of this circumstance to include in the conscription numbers, whose appearance corroborated their assertion, that they were beyond the age, (namely, twenty-five) and whose remonstrances were rendered unavailing by their condition in life.

The most formidable, however, of all the evils extraneous to the conscription-code, is a practice which has prevailed for some years past, of *anticipating by law* the regular levies. The conscripts of 1810 were called out so early as December 1808; that is to say, those who in 1810 would attain the age of twenty, but at the time of anticipation, were only eighteen, were made to serve in the army.

These and other causes, connected with the abuse of unlimited power, bring into the field a numerous population of boys, in appearance scarcely able to bear the accoutrements of a soldier, and who in their preparatory exercises, are objects both of pity and amazement.

For the great majority even of the better classes of conscripts it is almost impossible to obtain proxies. When the physical requisites are not wanting in the principal, the government indeed studiously discourages substitution. The acknowledged hardships and indeterminate duration of the military service tend moreover to enhance so enormously the price of the few who are found to possess all the requisite qualifications, that they fall exclusively to the share of the rich ; the sum being far beyond the reach of multitudes, who in France, with the habits of refined society, maintain an exterior of tolerable ease.

Of this class are the *amnestied* emigrants and old proprietaries, who enjoy under the new dynasty, something of the abstract right, and but little of the benefits of *postliminium* ; and who, in the bitterness of mortified pride, and the sadness of pining recollection, struggle to uphold a decent establishment with small fragments of their former estates.

The revolution has on the whole had the effect of an Agrarian law, and the equalization of fortunes is, at this moment, among the most promi-

ment vestiges which the tempest has left behind for the instruction of the world. But it is not easy to contemplate, without feelings of strong sympathy, the numbers of impoverished families and decayed gentlemen, who, wrestling with memory and destiny, under a perpetual recurrence of painful recollections and hopeless wishes, exhibit throughout France striking monuments of the instability of human affairs.

To persons of this description, who hate and despise their government, to the great body of professional men, and of drooping merchants and manufacturers, who educate their children with care and tenderness, and who find no compensation in the splendor of the imperial diadem for the degradation of their own order, and the loss of domestic comfort, the conscription appears the maximum of human suffering, the most odious of all wrongs, and the most vexatious of all injustice.

The Lycées, or public schools, the seminaries of ecclesiastical noviciate, the universities of law and physic, are all subject to the visits of the recruiting officer, and forced to surrender up their pupils without exception of genius or taste, at a period of life when the morals are in a state of oscillation, when the character of the frame itself is scarcely determined, and the understanding is only in the first stages of its development.

Parents are not only made to suffer the pains of a separation under such circumstances, but

are condemned to the inexpressible grief of seeing the principles and manners of their children exposed to total wreck, in the infectious communion of the common soldiery; the meanest and most profligate of mankind. The scene of real distress, exhibited at the balloting of a conscription, when the parents or friends of the conscript are indulged, as is often the case, in drawing his ticket from the fatal urn, beggars all description. The piercing shrieks and tumultuous acclamations alternately uttered on these occasions, by a people of such natural vivacity of character, wholly overpower the feelings of a spectator.

The French conscription, under the garb of equality, acts with a most partial and vexatious pressure. Men of large fortune, the least respectable of the community of France at this moment, either monopolize the substitutes, or corrupt the inspecting officers, and thus disentangle themselves from the trammels of the law. The parasites of the court, by intrigue and favor, secure the same immunity to themselves and their friends. The great military and civil dignitaries of the empire are privileged *ex-officio*; and this exemption will be gradually extended to all whose zeal is useful to prop the greatness of the ruling power.

The burthen then falls with accumulated weight upon the three learned professions of divinity, law, and physic, the merchants, manufacturers, in a word, upon the middle orders of the people; and a

still greater evil is inflicted, by thus confounding them with the dregs and lees of the community. Feelings and habitudes should be consulted in every general act of legislation; and in this instance, the distress and inconvenience occasioned to the lower orders, bear no proportion to the misery inflicted on the higher and middling ranks of the people.

It is unnecessary, too, to have recourse to so comprehensive a plan of compulsion, for the creation of a force adequate to all the purposes of *ordinary warfare*. Louis the fourteenth, when at war with the whole of the north of Europe, maintained an army of three hundred thousand men, principally made up by voluntary levies; and under the last unfortunate monarch of that name, the forces of the kingdom, recruited in the same manner, amounted to two hundred thousand; of which Paris alone furnished annually *six thousand*, although it now yields only *fourteen hundred* for the conscription.

Notwithstanding the familiarizing experience of the past, and the certain expectation of the future, *every new* conscription spreads *consternation* through all the families of the empire. From the commencement of the war against Prussia, until the termination of the campaign in Poland, three several levies were raised; the last of which, proposed in the spring of 1807, created an indescribable sensation. Although *all correspondence rela-*

tive to the position of the armies was rigorously interdicted, and *no letters* suffered to pass without scrutiny, it was impossible wholly to conceal, at least from the public of Paris, the dreadful mortality which afflicted the march, and the incredible hardships inseparable from the movements of the troops, laboring under a scarcity of provisions, and the unaccustomed rigors of a northern winter.

A third conscription was generally viewed as an undertaking much too bold for the internal administration, situated as it then was; and particularly at a moment when a belief was current among all ranks, that the emperor would be unable to extricate himself from the embarrassments in which he was supposed to be involved. The government appeared sensible of the hazard, and in order to prepare the public mind for the event, caused their intention to be announced in whispers through the circles and three thousand coffee-houses of the capital.

The effect was every where visible, even to the eye of the cursory observer; an impression of terror upon the countenances of those, who either were themselves exposed to the danger, or shuddered at the prospect of new revolutionary alarms: of suspicion, and joy but half disguised, in the lowering brows of the turbulent and disaffected, constantly on the alert to improve the concurrence of opportunity, and who hailed this desperate ex-

pedient, as a confirmation of their hopes relative to the perils of the army.

The orator of the government, *Renaud St. Jean D'Angely*, shed tears of real or affected sorrow as he stated the necessity of the measure ; and the *Senate* received it, contrary to their habit, in silent acquiescence, and with every indication of reluctance and dismay. *Before* the law was passed by the Senate, the minister of police had issued orders for the appearance of the conscripts of Paris at the Registry. So securely did he rely upon the compliant disposition of that venerable body.

In order to assuage the general feeling, it was found advisable to qualify the new call for eighty thousand men, by a clause which enacted, that they were *then* to be merely organized, and retained within the limits of the empire, as a national guard. Circumstances enabled them to adhere to this condition, which would undoubtedly have been violated, if the armies had sustained a defeat, or the campaign been protracted to a more distant term.

It was the established practice of the Romans, in their foreign wars, to maintain an army in Italy, ready to march in case of disaster ; and a recourse to the same policy was indispensably necessary for the French commander, to recall victory, had she deserted his standard ; and to drive his antagonist to the conclusion of an ignominious peace, by intimidating him with the show of new and inexhaustible assailants.

It is not easy to convey a just idea of the state of Paris, during this period of uncertainty and alarm. There never has existed, with a vast majority of its inhabitants, a serious reliance on the stability of the present government ; and no doubt was then entertained of its immediate dissolution, if the armies had been broken and dispersed.

The proportion of idle, profligate, and desperate adventurers, whom the revolution has engendered, or accident collected in Paris, is truly astonishing ; and there is still to be found, among the literati of every class, and even in the deliberate assemblies, a numerous body, with a marked predilection for republican institutions. The first were and are ripe and eager for any change ; and the latter equally prepared to re-assert their favorite opinions, and co-operate in the subversion of a government, by which they are held in contempt, and reduced to a most abject and contumelious servitude.

As Paris, together with the rest of the empire, was left almost destitute of troops, the danger was only to be counteracted by quickening the vigilance, and multiplying the terrors of their *domestic inquisition*. Among the anomalies of human character that confound all general reasoning, there is none more incomprehensible than the absolute sway which *this* tribunal exercises over the whole of France. A people of all others the most mercurial in their temper ; the most thoughtless in their levity ; the most ungovernable in their fury ; under the influence of

their present system of police, lose the distinguishing features of their character ; and on subjects connected with the public weal, display the vigilance of habitual fear, and all the sobriety and reserve of consummate prudence. They know and observe, as if instinctively, the precise limits assigned to the range of language ; and conscious that a mysterious ubiquity is one of the attributes of this searching police, discipline accordingly the tongue and countenance, even in their domestic seclusion.

In the midst of all this inquietude and fear, public festivals were multiplied, in order to give an air of confidence to the administration at home ; and an unusual degree of splendor brightened the court of the empress, who remained in Paris, and took a principal share in these mummeries of despotism. Her imperial majesty was constantly glittering before the public eye, either at the brilliant *cercles* of the Tuilleries ; the numerous and magnificent fêtes of the *Luxembourg* and the *Garde-Meuble* ; or in the theatres, at the meanest of which she condescended to assist, and to inhale the incense of the multitude.

The bulletins announcing the most brilliant successes were regularly kept back for some days, and rumors of disaster intentionally circulated, that the grateful intelligence might produce the greater sensation. These, and other contrivances, however, had but little effect in quickening the sluggish loyalty of the body of the people ; who indeed, at present, for the most part, manifest a chilling indifference to the

personal exhibitions of the imperial family ; and appear to have lost, in this respect, all the characteristic fervency of their nation.

These trembling anxieties, and humble precautions, will perhaps appear strange to those who only view at a distance the gigantic frame of this tremendous government, and have not reflected on the various dangers which precipitate the fall of a power founded in force. History shows with what rapidity of descent old and deeply rooted establishments have sometimes fallen to the ground ; and the circumstances of the French capital in the year 1806, may warrant the presumption, that a system, resting only on the surface, by its own oppressive weight ; with no prescriptive authority ; with few artificial barriers ; with no titles to veneration or to love ; might have been struck down by the first gust of adversity.

The alarm which was evidently felt, while it gilds the future with a ray of hope, practically illustrates a great maxim, which cannot be too often inculcated upon the rulers of every country ; that for power there is no more perishable foundation than *fear*.

If the conscription be hateful to Frenchmen, it is still more so to the countries annexed to their empire. In Italy and the low countries, many motives conspire to sharpen the sensibility of the sufferers, and to foment that rancorous animosity, which they so generally entertain against their oppressors. Their hereditary antipathies, the incalculable

lable and *heart-struck* evils inflicted upon them by the French republic and her armies, the record of which is written in the flesh, and cannot be erased ; the ruin of their old and favorite institutions ; the defacement of their monuments of superstition and of art ; the impoverishment of all classes ; and the actual stoppage of every source of private comfort, and public prosperity ; all conspire to deepen their hatred against France.

Under the exasperation of past and present wrongs, they send forth their youth with an extreme reluctance, of which their oppressors are fully aware. In the distribution of the levies among the departments, the contingent allotted to the incorporated territories is designedly small ; but the proportion, nevertheless, of their *refractory* conscripts is astonishingly great, and the coercive measures for the punishment of disobedience, tend to increase the odium of the law itself.

The common ends of political dominion, and the purposes of fiscal regulations, of the conscription, and of espionage, have given a monopoly of all offices of profit and trust to Frenchmen, whose conciliatory manners and affected moderation are insufficient to allay the jealousy resulting from their intrusion.

As the Romans spread themselves over the provinces of their empire, these new conquerors inundate every country where the supremacy of their arms is felt and acknowledged. The Napoleon

code, and the language of its authors, are established in the courts of Westphalia, and the governments and civil employments are administered almost exclusively by Frenchmen. Clerks have been draughted from the post-offices of Paris to conduct similar establishments in Hamburgh and Dantzick ; the custom-house officers of Bourdeaux and Nantz regulate the whole Baltic coast. In the countries *nominally* allied to France, (which are treated with *less lenity* than the territories annexed to her empire) public authority is every where exercised by Frenchmen, and what the rescript of the imperial legislator spares, private rapacity does not fail to devour.

The members of the confederation of the Rhine are not subjected to the conscription ; for, like the Romans, whose policy it was, not to make their subjects or allies as warlike as themselves, the modern pacificators exact no very copious supplies of men, but extort incredible contributions for the pay and clothing of their own troops.

Mollien, the minister of the French Treasury, in the printed budget of 1807, felicitates his emperor on this subject, in the following terms :—
“ Your Majesty, Sire, has protected your people, both from the scourge and the burdens of war. Your armies have added to their harvest of glory, one of *foreign contributions* ; which has assured their support, their clothing and their pay.”

It is the object of the French, not merely to

crush the armies, but to ruin the finances of Germany, in order more completely to extinguish the means and the hope of future resistance. In Mollien's *Rationarium*, the "*Recettes extraordinaires et exterieures*" are stated at more than thirty-two millions of livres ; a sum exclusive of the exactions for the maintenance of the troops, the splendid establishment of the generals, and the gratification of private cupidity. This surplus is thrown into the list of *Ways and Means*, to give color to an idea publicly instilled, that *foreign tribute* will one day wholly exonerate the *masters of the world* from the burdens under which they now groan.

The conscripts are kept as much as possible beyond the frontiers, not merely for the purposes of conquest and rapine, but also that they may the sooner lose the qualities of the citizen, and become altogether the creatures of the general. And with a view to render this conversion more perfect, and more secure for the government, the principal leaders are frequently transferred from one corps to another, that no dangerous attachment to individuals may arise from a long continuance in the same command.

Nine-tenths of the present French officers have sprung from the ranks. Educated in distant camps they know no other country ; and habituated by long devotion to the trade of war, it has become their element and their passion. Their whole fortune is staked on the sword ; and their attach-

ment is therefore necessarily secured under the *auspicious* influence of a leader, whose indefatigable ambition occupies them in their favourite pursuits; and whose *liberal impartiality* feeds the hope of preferment, and divides the fruits of conquest. To their credit and example is due much of that spirit, which, notwithstanding the above-mentioned causes of alienation, seems to animate the whole frame of the army; and no small share of that portentous success which has attended the course of the French arms.

Of the eighteen *Marechaux d' Empire* fourteen have either emerged from the ranks, or ascended from the lowest employments. Most of the Generals of Division, and others who hold the principal commands, have the same origin, and sufficiently prove that war is an experimental science; and that military renown is not the prerogative of birth, but the harvest of toil, or the bounty of fortune.

These men, whose duties have almost wholly estranged them from the refinements and indulgencies of polished intercourse, retain all the leading features of their original department in life; a fierce and turbulent nature; a wild, irregular ambition; a total ignorance of the utility of civil laws; and a sovereign contempt for letters.

As they partake largely of the prey, they zealously co-operate in the views of him, whom necessity has led them to acknowledge as a master;

but should he be prematurely removed from the scene, probably his posthumous aims will not be accomplished with equal fidelity. If it be true that military governments are at all times hostile to regular monarchical succession, there is no possibility of a quiet transmission of power in France under her present circumstances.

The military of every description are also very unfit guardians for a legal constitution ; and more especially unfit are those imperial generals, in whose minds no idea of subordination to civil authority, or of uncontested descent in the reigning family, could ever have taken root. The same daring enterprise which has borne them forward to their present elevation, would not suffer them to remain inactive, if supreme command were placed within their reach. They would tear the sceptre from a feeble hand, and dispute the prize with the same ferocious violence, and desperate resolution, with which they are now grasping at the dominion and the treasures of the rest of the world.

During their contentions, the rest of the European continent might indeed be allowed to respire ; but independent of the established maxim, that a conquering nation must always be miserable, there is *no prospect* of amelioration for France herself. The establishment of *freedom* in that country is hopeless ; nay, the great bulk of the people are alike incapable of the temperate enjoy-

ment of liberty, and decidedly averse from the form of a popular government.

No good can accrue from the mere external frame of the Electoral Colleges and Deliberative Assemblies. They have no basis of ancient opinion to command respect, nor reputation of consistency to inspire confidence ; and have not indeed, in the view of any branch of the community, an existence or a will, distinct from that of the throne to which they are appended. Under the shadow of a constitution still preserved, their election can never take place, unless ratified by the emperor ; and depends, in practice, altogether on his nomination. The *princes of the blood*, and the great dignitaries of the state are officially members of the *senate*, and to this body the generals of division, detached from the foreign service, are regularly associated, so as to give them almost a numerical preponderance.

The civil functionaries of every class have not only dishonored the republican character by a shameless apostacy, but prostitute the dignity of human nature itself, by assuming the trade of spies and informers. In all their discourses and writings, they inculcate the speculative doctrine of oppression, with as much zeal as their oppressors propagate by conquest its practical horrors. The mere wantonness of despotism could never exact, nor could the most inordinate vanity relish a strain of adulation which would disgrace the worst periods of Roman degeneracy.

The tyrant, who is known to require this tribute on all occasions, has it in view not only to complete his savage triumph over the patriotism of France, but to bring the cause of *freedom* itself into *general contempt*, by exhibiting the base servility of those who so lately undertook to *vindicate the liberties of mankind*. This brutal feeling is strikingly displayed in Bonaparte's bulletins from Spain, which heap the most gross, unmanly, infamous calumnies upon the Spanish patriots, and their glorious efforts in the cause of national independence, and personal freedom.

There are, no doubt, numbers in France who still cherish a preference for republican institutions; many who officiously promote the measures, in order to heighten the odium of the government; and a few who submit with evident repugnance to lend their personal weight to the consolidation of the new system. But the republicans will make no sacrifices of interest to principle, and the others can have little influence, when opposed to a majority who have fortified their native dispositions by the habit of obsequiousness.

The fabric of a free state can never be reared by such hands, nor framed from such materials, as the populace of Paris, or the soldiery of the frontiers. Should the imperial seat be vacated within a short period of time, the Legislative Assemblies might, like the Roman senate in their contest with Maximin, maintain a struggle with some firmness

and vigor; but with no permanent means, and scarcely with the benefit of obtaining a choice of masters.

When we meditate upon the probable career of an army now augmented to *seven hundred thousand* men, greater than any which Rome ever maintained in the meridian of her power, and imbued with such moral and physical energies, our apprehensions for France vanish before our melancholy forebodings for the rest of the European continent.

A nation of soldiers must be occupied. Plunder is their food; and will be sought wherever it is to be found. A people *at war from principle*, says Montesquieu, must necessarily triumph, or be ruined. They will labor in their vocation, and never make peace but as conquerors. Such a temperament as actuates the chiefs and instruments of the present French conspiracy against mankind, is essentially at war with all the moral virtues and generous principles of our nature; with the gentle charities, as well as with the hoarded treasures of peace.

The time perhaps is fast approaching, when these new pacificators will embrace the whole continent of Europe in what they term their "*Grand system of federation and alliance.*" The powers already comprehended in it, will, like the allies of Rome, soon seek in avowed subordina-

tion, an alleviation of the miseries studiously attached to their nominal independence.

Their incorporation will, however, have another character, and other effects ; not of a submission assuaged by the hope of repose and of protection ; but an unconditional surrender of all that ennobles and sweetens existence, to a power with all the rapacity which stimulated, without the moderation that tempered, the conquests of Rome ; with the vices of her decline, and the fierceness of her infancy ; with her insolent carriage, without her healing arts. The genius of this dominion will be as different from that of the Antonines, as the character of the new emperor is opposite to that of Trajan, to whom it is now, among his subjects, the fashion to compare him.

In Bonaparte, although we may admire the qualities of a consummate general, and of a profound politician, we can never discover the majestic form of a mighty monarch ; but rather trace the mixed image of a Tiberius and an Attila ; the gloomy, suspicious temper, the impetuous rage, the jealous alarms of the domestic tyrant, and the immeasurable ambition, the savage manners, the stern cruelty of that barbarian, who ostentatiously proclaimed himself "*The scourge of God.*"

Secure of impunity, and careless of censure, he has at length discarded the common prevarications of tyranny, and now rests his pretensions on the avowed power of the sword. He has already

burst asunder the ties that bound Europe up in one social commonwealth, and stifled even the last sighs of freedom, wherever his influence has been extended. There is not, at this moment, throughout the whole continent of Europe, a press exempt from the supervision of his police ; nor an asylum in which an obnoxious individual could find safety.

When Cicero complains to Marcellus of the unbounded sway of Cæsar, he consoles himself that there is still security in *silence* ; although the privilege of complaint may be denied. But those who are immediately subject to the French power, have not even *this* consolation ; and are marked out for vengeance, unless they find matter for applause in every deed of their rulers.

In the French capital, even *literary criticism* is under political control ; and either frowned into silence, or forced to commend, when its objects proceed from the favorites, or minister to the views of the government. The effects which this species of violence, and the ascendancy of the military spirit, have uniformly exerted on the productions of the mind, are now strikingly visible in the rapid decline of general literature ; in the meetings and exhibitions of the second and third classes of the Institute, which are to the last degree contemptible ; and in the degeneracy of the bar and the pulpit, of which the dignity and the eloquence have wholly disappeared.

The manifest tendency of these restraints on the press, is not simply to enervate the vigor and debase the faculties of the mind ; but to stifle the censure, and pervert the evidence of history, no longer the light of truth, and the witness of ages. In the year 1808, "A History of the Roman Republic," was written at the command of Bonaparte, by *L'Evesque*, a member of the Institute, and Professor of History in the college of France. Its purpose is to *decry* the *republican* virtue of Rome ; and it is announced in the title page, as a work "destined to root out the inveterate prejudices which the world has entertained on that subject." The preface concludes with the following phrase : "Is it then for the French to bow the knee before Roman grandeur ? All grandeur abases itself before that of our nation ; before that of our hero."

"Compared to this state of things, the former condition of Europe, with all its lumber and frippery, and its manifold and fatal abuses, appears not only tolerable, but happy. We would rather see the balance of Europe bandied through the hands of the Plenipotentiaries of the Hague or of Ratisbon, than in the custody of the Protector of the Rhenish Confederation.

From the scene before us we turn, with an eye of regret, to the progressive though imperfect arrangements of the last century ; when the two extremes of Europe were connected by ties, not merely of ge-

neral humanity, but of domestic feeling ; when the improvement, the lights, and the pleasures of each member of this great family were common and accessible to all ; when the excesses of political tyranny were restrained by the dread of reproach, and the weaker states protected from the strong by mutual vigilance, or rather by imaginary fears.

The dissolution of a charm so salutary to all parties was first occasioned by that profligate policy of Russia, Austria and Prussia, which *dismembered Poland*. The dismemberment of Poland first broke the spell of mutual trust and apprehension, and roused the slumbering genius of conquest, by showing to every ambitious state, that there was no insuperable impediment in the jealousy or justice of their potent rivals.

After this there remained but one serious obstacle to the subjugation of the European continent ; the *Germanic constitution*, that huge body, without strength or grace, which possessed neither ability nor inclination for conquest, and stood in the centre of Europe, maintaining an uneasy, fluctuating equilibrium, counteracting the intrigues, and repressing the prurient ambition of the south. As long as this power, with all its weaknesses and vices of construction, stood erect, the equipoise could not have been entirely lost ; nor the continent of Europe *cantonized* into dependant principalities.

It was therefore assailed with an indiscreet precipitation, which but too clearly indicated the object

for which it was sacrificed. A finishing stroke was put to the liberties of the north of Europe by the system introduced in its stead ; and the languid indifference with which this substitution was viewed or resisted, afforded a melancholy presage of the universal wreck that was to ensue.

It is not to mere ignorance of their danger that the supineness of the northern powers is owing. They are not only bewildered in the stupor of fear, but overwhelmed by a sense of weakness. The corruptions and abuses of their internal government have shaken all trust in the allegiance of the subjects ; and the experience of mutual treachery has extinguished all confidence in their external relations. Having wrestled with their enemy, they know their unfitness for another rencountre ; and seeing no hope but in his forbearance, suffer themselves to be lulled into inaction, by professions and promises which can deceive those only who have no resource if violated.

In the mean time, well assured of the adequacy of his means, both of fraud and of force, *he* makes war at the time and in the manner most suited to their development. He grants a truce to *Austria* ; and when the work of destruction is accomplished in another quarter, will return to satisfy, at one blow, all the old animosities and new antipathies of France against her hereditary rival.

Russia, without resources or courage to face this athletic antagonist ; disheartened and broken by

her late heavy fall, and debauched by the profligate expectation of sharing the spoil, will probably exult over the disasters of her neighbor, and *obstetricate* at the birth of those affiliated kingdoms that are to be extracted from the bowels of the Austrian monarchy. Her turn will inevitably come, when the *intermediate* powers are rent into *fragments*; or, as the French term it, *unravelled* (*effilés*;) a circumstance which lays her completely open, and renders the great pillar of her security, her distance, of little or no avail.

The progress of the French, during the contests of 1806—7, in the north of Europe, in the accomplishment of this object, has done *more* to facilitate the subjugation of Russia, than could have been effected by ten times her loss of blood and treasure. Austria, if it had pleased the conqueror, might have been annihilated at Austerlitz, and Prussia soon after the battle of Friedland; but the surer policy was that which was more patient and cautious. To break down all their outworks however *Prussia* was to be immediately sacrificed, whose exemplary fate might inspire terror, but could not excite odium; and whose troops were in fact the best constituted, and the most formidable in Europe.

Whoever follows in thought the extension of the Roman arms over the states of Italy, and the distant countries brought under their yoke, may here trace a curious similarity, both of cause and effect; and upon a general survey of the history of mankind

will not be surprised if Francis and Alexander experience the fate of Antiochus and Mithridates.

As to Spain, the imbecility of the government, the corruption of the nobles, and the long habits of slavery and superstition among the lower orders, hold out but a feeble hope for a nation which has to contend against such fearful odds, in the character and the means of the usurper, in numbers, discipline, and preparation. And it now appears that the curtain is about to drop upon the long and disastrous tragedy of the subjugation of continental Europe.

England, however, remains, the *last* obstacle to the establishment of universal dominion, and the richest prize for the avidity of rapine. To Britain, therefore, from appetite and principle, the eye of this hydra-headed monster is steadily directed, and the whole energy of his increasing means must be ultimately applied. What might be safely inferred *a priori*, is confirmed, not only by open threats and declarations, but also by every *domestic* expression of feeling indulged in the French metropolis.

In all the diplomatic audiences, and in the private associations of the leading members of the government, the sentiment towards Britain betrays itself in every word and gesture, and exerts an influence more like that of *passion* than of the ordinary calculations of interest, or of national antipathy. The public functionaries universally, and the speculative politicians of every class,

either from the force of imitation, the compliance of servility, or the instinct of plunder, manifest the same spirit in all their reasonings and discourses, through which it filtrates in invective or menace, or more frequently bursts forth in the overflowings of exultation, as they measure their approaches to the goal.

The liberty of the seas, and commercial peace, are held out to delude the famished multitude both at home and abroad ; but the military and civil departments are taught to despise these objects, and to look to more congenial and substantial rewards. Power and booty are the excitements employed to quicken their zeal in fostering and disseminating those rancorous antipathies and jealousies which are to reconcile all parties to the indefatigable prosecution of a war, that is to terminate only with the ruin of England. They employ the parallel of Rome and Carthage ; not as a rhetorical comparison, but as an encouraging and a certain analogy.

The plan of *universal conquest*, imputed originally to Louvois, but with more truth ascribed by Mr. Burke to the French Executive Directory, is now not merely digested into a regular system, but is actually in a course of execution, and proceeding with a steadiness and success, which must strike alarm into the most confident and unthinking.

The *world*, in the opinion of all Frenchmen, is to be again subdued by the discipline and the arts of Rome. *Folard's Polybius*, *Machiavel on Livy*, and *Montesquieu on the Grandeur et Declination*, are more than ever the *manuals* from which they draw their lessons of perseverance and cunning. The reading classes of France have always been fond of historical research. Their republic made them passionate admirers, and *enlightened imitators* of antiquity; and their government, availing itself of this predilection for the victorious commonwealths of Greece and Rome, soon taught them to overlook altogether individual interests and tastes, and enjoyments, both in their foreign politics, and in the details of their internal economy.

They admit no balanced advantages, or diverging claims. All the capacities, and energies, and habitudes of private life, are unrelentingly wrested to the production of force, for the *subjugation of the globe*; or as co-ordinate with this object, for the aggrandizement of the reigning family. The changes of form in their government have occasioned no remission in this pursuit. It has always been spoken of among them with confidence and zeal. Events have recently brought it more into notice; and nothing now remains but to atchieve the ultimate object, "*la grand pensée*," as it is emphatically styled in the coteries of Paris."

But the parallel between ancient Rome and France, and between Carthage and Britain, however gratifying it might be to the vanity of the

great nation, is by no means correct. For the French have neither the steady, desperate, valor of the Roman soldiers, nor is France now so powerful relatively to the rest of the world, as Rome was just before Carthage fell.

And still less correctly does the parallel hold between Carthage and Britain. For Carthage was merely a sordid gatherer of pelf, without civilization or learning ; a peddling, trading country, without military talents or courage ; cowardly, fraudulent, cruel ; worsted in perpetual conflicts even with the petty island of Sicily. Nay, so intrinsically weak and spiritless was she, as to yield, with all her maritime and commercial experience, to the first rude naval armaments fitted out by the Romans.

Duillius, the Roman consul, gained a naval victory over the Carthaginian fleet with a body of mere landsmen, stowed in awkward, clumsily constructed vessels. The ships of war were rowed alongside their antagonist, and being held firmly together by the grapling irons, the men on each side fought hand to hand ; and the steady, determined valor of the Roman soldiers of course prevailed over the feeble resistance of the *mercenary* troops of Carthage.

Add to this, the comparatively small extent and scanty population of Carthage, which was also weakened by the beggarly, ignorant democracy of her government ; whence she was so constantly

torn by party-factions as to be unable to afford any of her *own citizens* to serve as soldiers in the infantry. She therefore *hired strangers* to fight her battles. Her cavalry indeed, consisting of the Numidian horse, and *not* made up of hired strangers, was so superior, as uniformly to beat the Romans when engaged in an open champaign country. These troops, after the conquest of Carthage, were incorporated into the Roman cavalry.

It was no very great wonder then, that Rome, having *no other* enemy to contend with, and being mistress of nearly all Europe, should be able to vanquish Carthage, whose fleet was ineffectual; whose population was scanty, factious, and cowardly; and above all, whose government was democratic; it being absolutely impossible in the nature of things, that a democracy can be either lasting, or powerful, or free.

“ But Britain, from her geographical position; her insular situation; her well-balanced and free government; the virtue, talent, enterprise, skill, and spirit of her people; her unparalleled local advantages, both natural and acquired; has obtained an extensive political influence in all the quarters of the world, and the now undisputed dominion of the sea. Hence her power to support her friends, and to annoy her enemies; while she is herself secure against every attack from without.

So superior are the British to the French sea-

men ; so little now comparatively depends upon the number of men, and so much upon naval tactics, that the crowd of Frenchmen on board their vessels serve no other purpose than to increase their own slaughter. There is scarcely a single sea-fight in which the French escape being vanquished, however superior they may be to the English in number of men, and in weight of metal.

Britain also in this most essential point enjoys a *permanent* superiority. Extensive commerce *alone* can produce good seamen ; and a stable, free government, *alone* can create an extensive commerce. National industry can never flourish under the rapacity of military despotism. Ages must pass away before France will cease to be ground down to the dust by her warlike chiefs ; and until she can respire in peace, her external prosperity will be precarious, and her naval power never again lift its head. Military despotism cannot, by any prodigal waste of blood and treasure, produce the extensive industry and commercial enterprise, which can only take root and grow under the equitable protection of a free and popular government.

In the present state of the world also, when long and uniform experience has shown what immense sources of national power an extensive commerce invariably opens, a naval power cannot fail of exercising an incredible influence over the rest of the world ; because almost all nations are vulnera-

ble in their trade or their colonies; the ruin of which dries up the springs of revenue, and the means of effectually prosecuting a long-continued war.

Britain possesses likewise many local advantages and conveniences in the number of her navigable rivers and canals, which communicate with all her principal manufacturing towns, and facilitate the transport of bulky articles of commerce from one sea to another. In the advantages of internal navigation she surpasses all other nations. No one of her midland manufacturing towns is more than seventy miles from the sea, or the port where commodities either for the home or foreign market, are shipped.

National strength must always consist in a population proportioned to the extent of territory, and excelling in courage, wealth, and industry. Britain, in proportion to the extent of her territory, is more populous than any other country in Europe, excepting, perhaps, Holland. The exploits of the British armies in Egypt, in Portugal, and in Spain, prove conclusively, that in valor and military talent, they are every way equal to their insolent and over-weening antagonists of France.

The industry of Britain surpasses that of every other country in the world. And her public and private wealth, at this moment, exceeds the aggregate property of all the rest of Europe. The im-

mense capitals of her merchants employed in commerce; the small profits of stock and its quick returns; the low rate of interest; the skill and enterprise of her manufacturers and farmers; incontestibly prove her to be in an unparalleled state of national prosperity and strength.

The credit and stability of the Bank of England renders all the payments by post-bills, or bank-notes, rapid and certain. The comparatively small extent of Britain, the continual communication of her trading towns with each other, London being the great emporium of the world, where all the operations of exchange with foreign countries are concentrated, the unshaken confidence of the people in the public funds, the peculiar form of the government, the habits and manners of the population, all contribute to render the circulation of the national capital active and rapid.

The annual produce of the loans and public revenue which is dispersed in every direction to defray the nation's expenses, passes rapidly among all the classes of the community, and in its rotation soon returns into the hands of the monied men, who, when required, lend it again to the government; so that at length, together with the produce of the yearly taxes, it is again accumulated in the exchequer. This return in Britain is accomplished in the course of one year.

The force of a given quantity of capital is compounded of its sum and the rapidity with which it

circulates. If twenty millions sterling are returned in any given country with three times the velocity that forty millions are circulated in another country, the force of the twenty millions to put industry in motion, and consequently to augment the national wealth and strength, will be to that of the forty millions, in the proportion of three to two.

Commerce most essentially constitutes the strength and happiness of a nation, under any form of government; because it introduces that industry and those arts without which the manners of a people cannot be civilized. It is not the number of passive, but of useful, active citizens, which makes a commercial state powerful; and in proportion to the internal trade, the demand for its manufactures, and the extent of its foreign commerce, are the capacities of a nation for permanent and effectual maritime power and strength."

Whoever wishes to see this subject more amply examined and illustrated may consult the instructive pages of Mr. M'Arthur's Political and Financial Facts, &c." p. 178—206, from which the foregoing observations respecting the permanent sources of British power are taken.

So much for the parallel between Britain and Carthage. It is natural however that Bonaparte should anxiously seek the destruction of the British empire, as the only barrier to his scheme of universal domination. The earnest insatiable craving after power is the *instinct* of every great mind; and no-

thing but the most invincible necessity can check its constant progress towards dominion. Perhaps he is not in reality more base and cruel than Robespierre, or Marat, or the butchers of the Executive Directory ; but having more talent, and a greater physical force at his command, he is an object of more extensive alarm and terror ; and cannot possibly be prevented from laying the whole world waste in blood and desolation, but by the determined and effectual resistance of Britain.

“ Besides, the ambitious designs of France are not of a recent date ; nor do they result merely from the towering mind of the warrior who now wields the sceptre of her ancient monarchs with uncontrolled sway. The French have always been naturally an ambitious people, and passionately enamoured of military glory. The desire of universal dominion is as essentially the character of France, as the love of national independence and personal freedom is the character of Britain, and a sordid craving after gain is characteristic of the Dutch.

The views and disposition of Bonaparte exactly harmonize with the prevailing military passion of his people ; and to this, accompanied with his extraordinary genius and success in war he owes his ascendancy to the imperial purple upon the ruins of the old monarchy, and the destruction of the recent republic of France. But his schemes of conquest are not original ; neither has he alone rendered them familiar to the French people.

Under the Bourbons France uniformly endeavored, whenever an opportunity occurred, to spread destruction around her, and to execute her plans of plunder and aggrandizement on every side. The restless ambition, the perfidy, and the insatiable spirit of the French blazed out to their height under Louis the Fourteenth, who over-ran and ravaged countries; ruined and dethroned sovereigns; fraternized and deceived the people of foreign countries, and measured his steps rapidly onward to the subjugation of Europe, until he was first checked in his progress by William the third, at the head of the grand alliance, and afterwards beaten into becoming weakness and submission by the Duke of Marlborough.

It should be remembered, that wherever Louis went, he *revolutionized* the countries that he conquered. Whenever he came into a new territory he established his *chamber of claims*, by which he inquired if the conquered country or province had any dormant or disputed claims any cause of complaint, any unsettled demand upon *any other* state or province, upon which he might wage war upon such state, and thus discover again new ground for devastation, and gratify his ambition by new conquests. He actually went to war with Holland, because, as he said, she had *not treated him with sufficient respect*.

His overgrown power was ably but unsuccessfully resisted by the allies during the war that ter-

minated so favorably for France at the peace of Nimeguen. After that treaty, the insolence of the Grand Monarque knew no bounds, and scarcely a month passed without some new aggressions by France on the continent of Europe.

This principle of universal domination has never been extinct; nay, it has never slept in France, except perhaps for a few years, during the administration of Cardinal Fleury. At the breaking out of the French revolution, indeed, this object was prosecuted with greater ardor than it had been before; and her regicide chiefs then entertained the same designs of ambition in the subjugation of the European continent, which Bonaparte has, of late years, so glaringly manifested and carried into execution.

The plan of aggrandizement which has so lately been realized by Bonaparte, in humbling the Northern powers of Europe, and partitioning Germany, was laid *as early as the year 1793*. Publicola Chaussard, Commissioner of the Executive power, then said, "It is the interest of France to raise herself to the rank of a first-rate power in Europe; thus covering with her shield the second-rate powers, and protecting them against the boundless ambition of the Northern powers. A war *ad internecionem*, to extermination, is declared between the republic and *all* monarchies. *Austria being once subdued*, the Germanic body

may become a colossus of *Federative Republics*, and change the system of the North.

For federative republics, let us only substitute the *Confederation of the Rhine*, and we see precisely pointed out the career which Bonaparte has since followed ; and the object distinctly marked, which, after a long series of efforts, he has at length secured.

In a word, the French have always been a vain, ambitious, fraudulent people ; and have always abused success with the most wanton insolence, under every form of government. While they consider themselves as conquerors, no nation on earth is free from their aggressions ; the only possibility of any country obtaining tranquillity in peace is to impress France with a fixed conviction of the hopelessness of continuing the war with any beneficial effects ; which can only be done by continued hard fighting, and harassing her on all occasions, and in every direction."

"The history of Europe during the last century amply proves the truth of this assertion. The peace of Ryswick was favorable to France, and led to a renewal of hostilities in four years. Defeated and humbled at the peace of Utrecht, she allowed Europe to enjoy tranquillity nearly thirty years. Victorious at Aix la Chapelle, her encroachments were so frequent and outrageous, as to necessitate a recurrence to hostilities in less than seven years. Disappointed and van-

quished, in the celebrated (Lord Chatham's) war which succeeded, it was with the utmost difficulty that, after a peace of fifteen years, she yielded to the temptation of separating America from Britain. The peace of Amiens belonged to her list of triumphant negociations ; and it produced its accustomed results ; an unsettled truce, rapid and violent aggressions, and a precipitate rupture."

CHAPTER VII.

BUT are there no *drawbacks*, no *counterchecks* to the overgrown, formidable, power of France ; is there no canker-worm gnawing at the heart's core of this horrible despotism, and threatening to destroy ere long its vitality ? We apprehend this to be the case. We apprehend the existence of certain sources of weakness and decay, both internal and external, which, if properly managed, and aided by steady, determined, perpetual resistance, may yet shatter down this colossal empire into its original fragments, and once again restore the balance of Europe.

1. The *conscription system* itself appears to carry the germ of death within its own bosom to every nation that has recourse to so unjust and

desperate a measure. For a *time* indeed it cannot fail to render the country which adopts it terrible to all its neighbors, on account of the vast superiority of numbers which it every day drags into the field. But what are the ultimate results of such a system?

The strength of every country consists in its *effective* population; that is to say, the portion of its people which can bear arms, or perform any other service and labor requiring the strength of matured manhood. But nearly the whole of this effective population has been cut away in France by the short-sighted system of conscription, which has taken away almost all the males arrived at man's estate, in regular annual succession, ever since the year 1791; the first conscription being levied in 1792.

The yearly average of conscripts taken from the years 1792 to 1810, both inclusive, amounts to *one hundred and fifty thousand*; making a total of *two millions eight hundred and fifty thousand* men used up in warfare alone, independent of the *civil* massacres of the revolution, in the course of nineteen years. I say, all used up; because Bonaparte is now clamoring for the levy of the conscripts for the year 1811.

The almost incredible *mortality* of the French soldiers may be inferred from the following observations of the author of "*Caractere des Armées Européennes*:"—"When we see these volunteers of

liberty dragged to the army with an iron collar fastened to their necks; when we consider that they are in great part composed of enemies to the government; when we reflect on the disorder, the waste, the misery, the maladies, and the state of the hospitals, which consume *six times* the number of men that perish in battle; when we see the soldiers incessantly on the point of mutinying, and sometimes freely indulging themselves in it; their officers, some of whom cannot even read; their generals, many of whom are grossly ignorant; while several who have risen to the rank of commanders in chief, were originally dealers in thread and needles, (Jourdan) monks, (Pichegru) physicians, (Doppet) barristers, (Moreau) common soldiers, (Massena) dancers, (Muller, Victor) carmen, (Brune) quack-doctors, (Massot) painters, (Cartaux) fencing masters, (Augereau) cooks, (Championet) &c. &c. when we see soldiers of uncouth appearance, and in rags, we cannot but ask ourselves, how has it been possible that such an assemblage of ragamuffins could atchieve military exploits of so distinguished a stamp?"

The *proofs* that the *conscription-system* has very materially drained France of her effective population, are manifold and conclusive.

The very circumstance of being continually obliged to *anticipate* the conscription by at least two years, and thus dragging boys of only *eighteen* years of age into the field, shows that France

does not possess, nor can supply, full-grown men in sufficient numbers to feed the gaps made in her soldiery by the perpetual waste and havoc of Bonaparte's murderous career.

In the reign of Louis the sixteenth, Paris alone by *voluntary* levies used to furnish annually to the French army *six thousand* men ; but now the conscription, which sweeps away *all* the males from eighteen to twenty-five years of age, raises only *fourteen hundred* soldiers yearly in Paris. Whence can this enormous *deficit* arise, unless the conscription-system has most fearfully diminished the effective population of France ?

Bonaparte, in all the pride of his power, when he marched into Spain, towards the close of the year 1808, had actually levied his conscripts for the year 1810 ; that is, two years in advance ; and yet so exhausted and drained of its effective population was his extensive empire, that he was obliged to withdraw his French troops from the frontiers, and send them over the Pyrenees into the Peninsula ; to garrison his vassal German towns with Russian troops, and to bring a hundred thousand mercenary Germans from the Rhenish confederation into the heart of France, in order to keep down the insurrection of his own oppressed and famished subjects.

Would this sagacious conqueror have recourse to such a forlorn expedient, if he had any great numbers of disposable Frenchmen at his com-

mand? Would he, if he could possibly avoid it, thus trumpet to the whole world the weakness and the inefficiency of his own immense empire to furnish him with sufficient bodies of troops, and masses of men to enable him to carry into full effect his plans of individual aggrandizement, and family ambition?

We may be well assured, that now in the fall of 1809, a whole year's bloody warfare in the yet unsubdued Spanish Peninsula, together with the wide-wasting campaign against Austria, have not lessened his difficulty of raising men in France; have not tended to heal the deadly breaches made in the effective population of France by the oppressive and impolitic system of conscription; the pernicious and debilitating effects of which the great nation will feel in her most vital interests for at least a century to come.

It cannot be doubted that Bonaparte and his statesmen and generals are to the full as able in all military and political expedients and manœuvres now in 1809, as they were after the battles of Austerlitz and of Friedland, and altogether quite as eagerly desirous of obtaining universal dominion as they were in the years 1805 and 1807. Yet after the battles of Austerlitz and of Friedland the French ruler covered all the circles of Germany with his conscripts, and speedily dictated to the humbled Houses of Austria and of Russia, the treaties of Presburg and of Tilsit; whereas now,

after the still severer and still more bloody battles of Elsinghen and of Wagram, the negociations for peace go tardily onward, and the Austrian armies continue to maintain an imposing front, and a menacing attitude.

It is true, that Bonaparte asserts in his thirtieth bulletin, dated at Vienna, July 30th, 1809, that—
“ the house of Austria took the field this campaign with sixty-two regiments of the line, twelve regiments of cavalry, twelve regiments of grenadiers, four free corps or legions, making in the whole three hundred and ten thousand men ; one hundred and fifty battalions of militia, (landswhrs) commanded by ancient officers, exercised ten months ; forty-thousand men of the Hungarian insurrection, and fifty-thousand horse-artillery and miners, composing in the whole from *five to six hundred thousand* men. With this force the House of Austria supposed herself to be sure of victory. She entertained a hope of shaking the power of France, if ever her whole force were united. But her armies are notwithstanding reduced to *one fourth* of their original strength ; while the French army has been increased to *double* the number it consisted of at Ratisbon.”

But it is no unusual affair for the French government to lie. If it were true, as Bonaparte asserts in his bulletin, that Austria has lost above *four hundred thousand men* during this campaign, and that France has *doubled* the number of her

armies in the same period, the question irresistibly occurs—*why* then has not Bonaparte immediately dictated the terms of peace, and prescribed a treaty to the prostrate House of Austria, as he did after the battles of Marengo and of Austerlitz; when the treaties of Luneville and of Presburg proclaimed at once to the world the complete triumph of the victor, and the unconditional submission of the vanquished?

Whence can it possibly happen, that since the battles of Elsinghen and of Wagram, the negotiations for peace between the two contending powers have gone so slowly forward; unless it be that Bonaparte *cannot* raise conscripts from the diminished population of France in sufficient numbers to terrify and compel Austria into a surrender at discretion of all her national strength and independence.

And finally, if the *conscription* system has not materially exhausted the effective population of France, why has not Bonaparte sent a *sufficient* number of troops into Spain to beat down all possibility of resistance on the part of the people of that country? Why has he suffered the Peninsula to wage war against the *whole* military force of his immense empire for nearly a year and a half, and now to be farther off from submission to his iron yoke than they were in the month of May 1808, at the moment when they first raised the standard of resistance to his foul and profligate usurpation?

All the intelligent Americans, of whatever political party or calling in life, whether federalist or democrat, lawyer, physician, merchant, or man of letters, who have lately returned from the continent of Europe, concur in stating that, in France and in Holland, you can scarcely meet with *any young men* ; you will see old men, and boys ; old women, young women, and girls ; but all the French and Dutch young men have been consumed by the system of conscription.

When the day of retribution comes, when the rest of the continent of Europe, whose effective population has not been cut away by the inexorable, sweeping conscription-scheme, begins to *re-act* upon the intolerable tyranny and oppression of France, how ill-fitted will that overgrown empire of *old men* and slender *boys* be to encounter the rude shock of those iron times ?

2. After the world has witnessed for so many years the brilliant and unparalleled victories of the French arms, it might perhaps appear a childish paradox, to say that the people of France are deficient in *natural courage* ; in that steady, cool, determined intrepidity, which finally triumphs over all opposition, and is terrible, even in the midst of disaster and defeat.

Nevertheless, I do consider it a material drawback upon the real strength of France, that her population does *not* possess this steady, desperate, *Roman* valor and fortitude.

A very celebrated French general, now resident in the United States, laid down and maintained lately in conversation, this broad and sweeping proposition, namely, that fear of death, and the desire of self-preservation are instinctive in all animals, and in *man* are the foundation of individual cowardice ; so that *no* men of *any* nation can ever be brought to face death coolly, particularly in large masses, except by the force of a discipline, which is more terrible than the instinctive fear inherent in human nature ; or, in other words, by counteracting one species of fear by a stronger degree of terror ; and subduing the *fear* of death in battle, by the *certainty* of death for declining to fight. Whence he concluded, that with the exception of some very few individuals, who might be inflamed with ambition or vanity, or stimulated by the dread of shame, or fortified by deep reflection, *all nations* of men are *naturally cowards*.

This position was denied to be correct in all its unqualified latitude ; and several nations were adduced, as possessing naturally, both collectively and individually the characteristics of determined courage ; namely, the Americans, particularly, the people of the New-England states, who are particularly cool, self-collected, and intrepid, in the hour of danger ; the British, the ancestors of these New-England-men, who are naturally brave and undaunted ; and the distinction of old Sir Eyre Coote, the celebrated Irish general, who so signally distinguished

himself in the East-Indies, was cited : Sir Eyre Coote used to say, “ my countrymen the Irish, as well as the Scottish and the Welsh, are too hot and eager for action ; they rush rapidly to the charge, but never can be brought off from the field, never can be made to hear the signal for *retreat*, however necessary or prudent it might be to fall back ; give me the *English* as the best soldiers, for they will always go steadily and coolly forward into the hottest action at the tap of a drum, and retreat in the most perfect order and regularity, under the heaviest and most destructive fire, at the tap of a drum.” The Russians, the Germans, the Swiss, the Prussians and the Spaniards were also instanced as being nations of brave men ; the Dutch, the Italians, the Portuguese, the Chinese, and the Asiatics generally, were given up as being for the most part very sufficient cowards ; but above all, the *French* themselves were adduced as the most conclusive proof of the unsoundness of the general’s position in its full extent ; the French were quoted as a nation of brave and invincible warriors, before whose prowess the whole world must inevitably yield.

No, replied the general, whatever may be the case with other nations, my countrymen, the *French*, are a cowardly people ; I have had very conclusive and numerous proofs of that ; one of which I will give you ; it was one day necessary to break the Austrian line, I therefore ordered my general of——division to lead his men to the charge

with the bayonet in the first instance, and on no account to suffer them to fire ; to my great astonishment, instead of obeying my orders, the whole of the division fired before they charged with the bayonet ; the Austrians however were thrown into disorder, and finally routed. After the battle was over, I inquired of the general why he had disobeyed my orders ? he answered, as I led my men up to the charge with the bayonet, I perceived that they looked pale, changed color, staggered in their gait, and shewed every disposition to run away, while the Austrian line presented a firm, steady, unmoved front, bristling with bayonets ; I therefore immediately ordered my men to fire, in hopes that it might disorder the Austrians, and inspire the French troops with courage ; it did both ; the Austrian line was broken by the fire, and my men then rushed on with their accustomed impetuosity to the charge.

If this be so, how then, it was asked, has it come to pass that the French not being naturally a brave people, have every where vanquished their enemies ? It was answered, they have vanquished their enemies *not* by superior courage : but by the superior genius and military tactics of their generals ; the immense superiority of their numbers ; the greater skill and intrigue of their negociators ; the weakness and corruption of the governments of Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Holland, Italy, Spain, &c. whose ministers and place-holders, and generals, were generally bought up by French money, and

whose lower orders of the people were almost universally debauched by the principles of jacobinism ; and therefore opposed no hearty resistance to the arms of France. Over Britain, whose statesmen she cannot bribe, and whose seamen and soldiers she cannot beat, France after nearly twenty years of hard fighting has not gained a single advantage ; but has lost an immensity of blood and treasure in the annihilation of her fleets, and the reduction of her colonies.

Now I firmly believe every syllable of this to be true ; and have no doubt that the French generals are all well aware of the want of natural courage in their men ; not only from the perpetual gasconading and childish boasting of their bulletins and dispatches, which is incompatible with real valor, but also from their constant anxiety always to engage the enemy with the advantage of an immense *superiority of numbers* on their own side.

And not contented with fighting the enemy in more numerous bodies than are opposed to them, they generally contrive to post a fresh army a few miles in the rear of their antagonists, who are thus inevitably destroyed if they happen to be routed by the attack of the French in front. Bonaparte practised this manœuvre with the most fatal success at the battle of Jena, where with more than double the number of his opponents he, after a very hard-fought conflict, succeeded in putting the Prussians to the rout, and the fugitives were nearly all slain, or taken

captive by the French army stationed about twenty miles in the rear of the field of battle ; and the Prussian monarchy was extinguished at one tremendous blow.

The same experiment was tried by Marshal Victor lately upon the British at Talavera ; he attacked with sixty-thousand Frenchmen Sir Arthur Wellesley who had only twenty-five thousand men under his command ; while Marshal Soult was posted about eighteen miles in the rear with twenty thousand men. The manœuvre however failed, because the British beat the French, and drove Victor back beyond the Alberche ; and when Sir Arthur Wellesley fell back for want of provisions, Marshal Soult finding that the English army, instead of being in full and disorderly flight towards Lisbon, after sustaining a thorough defeat, were regularly retreating to a better provisioned part of the country, he carried his troops off out of the British line of march as fast as possible, and made a junction with Victor.

It would be absurd and childish in the extreme, to deny the meed of most extraordinary and transcendant talents to Bonaparte and his generals ; for nothing less than very superior genius and courage could possibly have borne them upwards to their present "bad eminence," amidst the crowds of competitors for power and rapine, at a period when all the intellect of a numerous and ingenious people was let loose by the French revolution to struggle for mastery and dominion.

And these astonishing talents have more than compensated the want of natural courage in their men.

A conclusive proof of the *reluctance* of the French to join the armies of their imperial tyrant, is found in the following observations taken from the very interesting and important Review of the "*Code de la Conscription*," so abundantly indebted to on a former occasion.

"It is impossible even to glance at this volume without being struck with the extreme anxiety which these statutes betray, to enforce conformity, both in the executioner and the victim. The enumeration of cases is so complete as to preclude the possibility of evasion. The public functionaries have their respective provinces most accurately marked out; and are furnished with distinct *formulæ* for every act of office. The severest and most unrelenting punishment is inflicted upon all, who from negligence, or corruption, or pity, give countenance to the slightest relaxation.

The diseases which give right to exemption, are detailed with a jealous and disgusting minuteness. Precautions are multiplied without number, to secure the persons of the conscripts; and while they are decorated with the title of "*Defenseurs de lapatrie*," the uniform tenor of these laws, and the tone of bitter reproof which pervades them, afford conclusive evidence of a *general aversion*

from the trade of war ; and serve to convince us that these Achilleses are *not easily* roused to arms, whatever enthusiasm they may afterwards display in the field.

The eighty-first page of the *Code de la Conscription*, contains a proclamation, dated in the year 1800, of General *Le Febre*, commander of the fifteenth and seventeenth military divisions. It commences in this way.

“ *To the Conscripts.*

“ The proclamations, the invitations, which have been made, to induce you to *re-enter* the path of honor, have not produced the effect which might have been expected. You have been deaf and insensible to the paternal measures of the government in your behalf. I forewarn you, on its part, that those which it will in future take, will be *terrible*. The conscripts who shall not have *returned* to their post by a time about to be prescribed, will be punished *as cowardly* deserters ; plunderers of the military stores ; enemies to their country. The public force will drag them from their most secret hiding-places. It will make it a duty to expel from society *vile* men who dishonor, &c. &c.”

Le Febre is now Duke of Dantzic, and employed in the work of blood in Spain. The style of his proclamation reminds us of a letter addressed to the *Commune of Paris* in 1794, by one of

his co-adjutors, General *Laval*, who then commanded a body of French troops at Manheim, and is now at the head of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine.

“ I command before Manheim. We continue to ravage the rich country of our enemies. We leave them *nothing* but their eyes, to weep. *Live the Republic.* We are all *sans-culottes* generals in name and effect. We adore Thee, O Saint Guillotine, who hast performed miracles ; and art more effectual than a hundred thousand men ; *ça ra, ça ira ! Live the Mountain !*”

Some few provisions are introduced into the conscription-code, on the subject of voluntary enlistments ; but as *no bounty* is allowed, it is evident that they do not enter into the serious consideration of the government. The old compromise between the military exigencies, and civil constitution of the state ; between the effeminacy of the rich, and the wants of the poor ; between the ambition of the sovereign, and the rights of the subject, is rejected with disdain by the imperial republic ; and the student is relentlessly dragged from his closet, and the peasant from his hiding-place, by an indiscriminating and unqualified coercion.

But habit soon renders submission, if not cheerful, at least easy ; rapine furnishes sources of munificence and conciliation ; *courage* becomes a virtue of *necessity* ; strength is acquired by dis-

cipline ; military ardor kindles with competition, and experience too fatally proves, that from *such* elements armies may be compounded, alike formidable for discipline and valor."

To the truth and correctness of all this we most cordially assent ; but although discipline may compel, and the intoxication of frequent success inflame cowards to fight ; yet in case of a *reverse* of fortune, the feelings of nature will return, and the fear of death, and the desire of avoiding pain will triumph over all the exhortations of their generals to fight. And accordingly no nation bears successive defeats so ill as the French, who ran like sheep on every occasion, after the first few conflicts in Italy, before Suvarof and his intrepid Russians.

Unfortunately for the repose of the world, of late years, the soldiers of France, particularly when commanded by Bonaparte in person, have not been accustomed to defeat, although they are at present occasionally receiving lessons in that salutary school, under some of his best generals, from the Spaniards and the British in the Peninsula.

3. In addition to these two sources of internal weakness, France labors under another still more alarming evil, namely, the decay, the rapid destruction of her *productive industry*, which is cut up by the roots under the despotism of her tyrant.

Until lately, that is to say, until Bonaparte, by his blockading edicts of Berlin, Milan, and Bayonne, compelled the British government to *retaliate* upon him with their Orders in Council, France enjoyed the benefit of an uninterrupted communication with every part of the world, by means of neutral conveyance, and sent all her manufactures and staple commodities to the most advantageous markets without let or hinderance.

This vast source of internal prosperity and wealth is now dried up. She *exports* as well as imports nothing. And if her manufacturers can find no foreign vent for their goods, they must cease to manufacture, and be reduced to extreme distress. If the cultivators of her soil can find no foreign demand for their produce : if their wine, brandy, corn, and oil, remain unsaleable, the tenant will be unable to pay his rent to the landholder ; and both tenant and landlord will be alike unable to contribute their accustomed quotas to the exigencies of the state.

Her agriculture, thus discouraged and diminished, is left to be languidly carried on by the feeble hands of old men, of little boys, and of women, whose sons, fathers, husbands, and brothers, the rapacity of the conscription has dragged to slaughter in the army. The manufacturers thrown out of employ have no other resource than quietly to starve and perish in honor of their imperial master Bonaparte the Great. The merchants whose occu-

pations are also destroyed, must live upon their little capitals, and then, when they are consumed, likewise perish.

The total darkness and ignorance of all moral duty, and of all general knowledge, together with the universal misery and penury, which are every where so industriously spread over the whole surface of this immense empire, must not only render the inhabitants barbarous, but materially check the progress of population, by curtailing the means of subsistence, and thus dry up the fountains, whose streams are perverted to supply the incessant cravings of the Corsican for men, to execute by the prodigal waste of human life his projects of ambition.

How then is France to continue to raise funds with which to carry on her extensive schemes of subjugation? Hitherto she has wrung her supplies from taxes on her own people far more oppressive than those borne under the old monarchy; from requisitions on her friends and allies; from the pillage and rapine inflicted on the countries which she has vanquished, and from withdrawing the scanty pittance, which in the early days of the revolution had been allowed to the hospitals in lieu of their estates which she had confiscated and sold.

France, while she withholds the *interest* of her debt, even of that *third* portion of it, which was all that she would allow to be national, is forced

every year to confess enormous *deficits* in her annual revenue below the amount of her annual expenditure. The continuance of this tyrannical system must necessarily dry up the channels of revenue; for plunder and rapine lay waste the soil, instead of reaping the present and providing for future harvests.

I purposely omit now all consideration of the public revenue being diminished by the resistance of oppressed, or the despair of ruined provinces. I merely ask, from *what* sources her finances are to be supplied, provided even that she experience no great and sudden reverse of fortune?

The inexhaustible mines of South America are no longer at her disposal; the objects of taxation in France herself are few, precarious, and unproductive, on account of the drooping and decayed condition of her agriculture, manufactures, and commerce.

But, say a very large portion of politicians,—“while Britain totters on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin; while she is loathsome in her manifold corruptions; and humbled by her fears and her frequent defeats; France is *renewing* her youth and vigor, happy under the *auspicious* dominion of her mighty emperor, invincible in arms, and commanding *all* the wealth of Europe to flow in exhaustless streams into her public treasury.”

No doubt France has, from the first, used the most unjust and oppressive means to acquire

property; and has always made cruelty and extortion the two main pillars of her financial system. She began very early to seize the *capital* of her happy people, and after it had been sold to revolutionary purchasers, the next crop of French rulers seized it a second time, under pretence that the buyers were royalists; or in fact, because they themselves chose to take the property. In a word, every change of government in France brought a vast portion of the *capital* of the nation into the public exchequer.

This new and ingenious system of finance, our modern political philosophers consider as the perfection of human wisdom, the ultimatum of all dexterity in the art of government; and consequently, to use their own words, "France is of all nations the richest in resources," because she can spend all the stock of the country; and then seize the new holders of property; and spend and confiscate, and confiscate and spend, as often as the exigencies of the state or the will of the government might require.

By a formal decree all the property and all the men in France have been declared to be in a state of requisition, and disobedience to this decree has been punished with the death of the offender, or the confiscation of his property. But violence can never be more than a temporary resource. It destroys the means of *reproduction*, so that plunder cannot yield a long succession of crops. France

is now destitute of credit and of revenue ; she cannot get property in sufficient abundance to supply her enormous expenditure, from her *own* subjects. And if she looks abroad to Holland, to Italy, to Germany, they can yield her little or nothing, because she has already gleaned and raked those fields of rapine clean, by her long continued extortion, and recent contributions.

The French government is fond of holding out to its people the example of Republican Rome, who maintained her armies by the plunder of foreign states for more than one hundred years, without taxing the Roman citizens ; whence the French people are desired to infer, that they also shall soon cease to pay taxes, when their emperor can wholly subsist his troops upon the pillage of the remainder of the world.

But, in the first place, the Roman armies at that time were less numerous and far less expensive than those of France are now ; and secondly a great part of the plunder found its way into the public treasury, which was carefully and parsimoniously administered by the government of Rome. Whereas the present French armies are not only far more numerous and expensive, but also very little pillage of the European continent can escape through the gripe of the numberless generals, princes, governors, ministers, commissaries, and all the countless hordes of public and private harpies of France, into the imperial exchequer.

France plunders Europe, and Bonaparte plunders France; and the whole pillage of exhausted and famished Europe cannot satisfy the rapacity, or supply the prodigal waste of his minions, and subordinate tyrants. How is he to bear the enormous expenditure of keeping an army of seven or eight hundred thousand men on foot; besides all the charges of his civil government, his public functionaries, his police, his myriads of spies at home and abroad; and all the long catalogue of expenses necessarily incident to a jealous and despotic government always liable to the huge destruction of fraud and confusion?

The expedients to which France has already resorted, prove her extreme difficulty to raise money sufficient to meet her expenditure. She has issued paper, which speedily became of no value; she has sponged her old debt, and stopped payment of her new debt; she has sold above a hundred millions sterling of confiscated property; she has pillaged all her own banks; she has squeezed the Jews and money-brokers; she has robbed all the churches of popish Europe; she has plundered the Dutch, the Swiss, the Italians, the Prussians, the Germans generally, the Austrians, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese; and is at this moment unable to find funds even nearly sufficient to supply her expenditure.

Bonaparte may now, like Augustus, send forth a decree ordering all the world to be taxed; but all that part of the world which is under his dominion

has not wherewithal to pay taxes. For they can only rise from the yearly reproduction of income, in consequence of agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial industry, which the ravages of war, and the oppression of French despotism, have nearly destroyed all over the continent of Europe.

The Corsican is committing the old solecism of tyranny, in willing the end, and destroying the means necessary for the accomplishment of that end. The plundering system prevents the means of reproduction by the great waste of property which it occasions; and also by deterring industry from all exertion, owing to the cutting away of all security of person and property. Bonaparte, by destroying all commercial and manufacturing industry, only incapacitates the European continent from supplying itself with the necessaries and conveniences of life; and, thus creates an increased demand for British manufactures, which must be bought and used within his own dominions, or a very large portion of his own loving subjects must become, and continue in name and effect, veritable sans-culottes.

Add to all this, that despotism has uniformly a tendency to grow continually weaker by its own corruptions. Already the throne of Bonaparte is surrounded by parasites and flatterers, minions, and court-favorites of all descriptions. The men of gigantic talents, who have forced themselves upwards during the revolution, must after a while disappear; and the jealous exclusive policy of the Corsican is

not likely to appoint any very able successors to their offices of trust or profit.

From the *Literary Panorama*, a work extremely valuable for the purity of its religious tenets, the soundness of its political principles, and the variety of its information ; the following facts respecting the *internal* condition of France are taken. I refer to the number for August 1809, p. 1006—1011, which has just now reached this country.

“ Things are greatly altered in France since Bonaparte’s late unprincipled attack upon Spain and its royal family. His first progress to Bayonne was marked by at least some *shew* of joy and respect ; as it was supposed both in France and Spain, that he merely intended to overthrow the detested authority of the prince of peace. But after the massacres of Madrid, and the imprisonment of the royal family, his remorseless treachery became glaring ; his most intimate associates, even Talleyrand and Joseph, are reported to decidedly disapprove of his conduct ; the gloom which pervaded the whole French nation, convinced him that he had outstepped the limits even of his military despotism, and that the people only wanted the courage and liberty to vent their execrations aloud.

On his first return to Bayonne from the castle of Merac, whence had issued his dark and bloody mandates, he was struck with the *gloomy silence* which made itself to be every where felt ; and *was heard* to exclaim repeatedly with violent agitation,

“ *On diroit que j’entre dans une ville Espagnole !*
“ One would think that I am entering a *Spanish* town.” The same reception awaited him at Bordeaux ; and indeed along the whole road leading back to his capital.

The violent measures, and the ruinous consequences which have attended the Spanish and German wars, have added much to the general disaffection. Lampoons, placards, and pamphlets, exposing all his crimes are industriously circulated every where, even in churches and in schools ; and the police is more active in suppressing the works than in *ostensibly* seeking the authors ; but *nightly arrests* are more numerous *now* in Paris, than at any time since the reign of *Robespierre*.

Even rumors, though in themselves idle, tend to discover the general opinion entertained respecting the *virtue* of the Corsican, and glance at the probable duration of his power. For instance, it is generally reported that the infants of Spain have been poisoned ; that Bonaparte’s temper is becoming every day more and more irascible ; that the fits of epilepsy, or *falling sickness* or *morbus comitialis*, to which he (in common with his great predecessor in the career of victory Caius Julius Cæsar) is subject, now return twice a week ; and that he himself is convinced of his fortune being on the wane.

We do not however infer from all this that *the French* are ready to break the yoke from their own necks ; they are completely tamed into servitude ;

they have been so long sunk to the very dregs of insensibility, it is so long since they have enjoyed philosophical liberty, that threadbare cloke of the most loathsome slavery, that fetters alone can fit their limbs.

But should fresh misfortunes occur, perhaps some opposition might be made to that administration of government which entails curses, and only curses upon the whole empire of France.

The *conscription* doubtless is the greatest evil which presses upon the French : a fresh levy is daily expected. In the mean time, young men who have already *furnished substitutes*, are compelled to march, with that accustomed violation of all faith, which so conspicuously distinguishes the present government of France. To avoid the rigor of the conscription, in the first instance, is almost impossible ; but the conscripts *desert in large bands* from the army to the interior whenever opportunity offers ; particularly from the *army of Spain*.

The Pyrenean mountains, and the *Landes*, at this time swarm with French conscripts, who prefer living as outlaws, until they can find an opportunity of re-entering their country unnoticed, to serving in Bonaparte's army. To such extremity of wretchedness can men be reduced by despotism, that *natural infirmities* are *improved* down to the standard fixed by law, as a security against *conscription* ; among other instances, weakness of sight is *purposely* matured into *purblindness*, by the gradual and constant use of magnifying glasses of high powers.

These repeated drafts upon the most precious part of the population of the country, have been already severely felt in various branches of its political economy ; and have materially depreciated the value of *landed property* in France, which from the draining of the effective population, want of a market, and of capital, weight of taxes, and other causes, is now reduced to *one-third* of the value that it commanded during the short peace of Amiens ; both in the price which it fetches and the produce which it yields.

The measure of corn which at that time sold for *twenty-four livres*, scarcely now finds a purchaser at *ten livres* ; although *no* augmentation has taken place in the quantity produced. The situation of the proprietors of vineyards, especially in the south, is truly deplorable. Not one crop since the year 1802, has paid even the expense of cultivation ; and the present owners cannot possibly maintain their estates much longer. Bonaparte tendered them a loan of *three millions of livres* ; but this money costs them *eight per cent.* interest, which their imperial broker requires for the *use* of his property ; and their wines are pledged for the payment ; are taken from under their management, and lodged in the government ware-houses, where they are mostly spoiled from mismanagement, and are *then* sold by the government agents for what they can fetch.

The produce of the *following* year, and after-

wards the *land* itself, are answerable for any deficiency. These are intolerable hardships upon the *individuals* aggrieved ; but they form *a part of the plan* which Bonaparte pursues, namely, to effect, by the total ruin of thousands, a temporary cheapness of corn, to supply with ease, his numerous armies ; and also by the distresses of the ancient land-owners, to throw the landed property more entirely into the hands of the revolutionary upstarts, who are naturally devoted to his fortunes ; and who, by the low prices of land, are induced to make considerable purchases ; and thus, through the desire of preserving their newly acquired estates, to become an additional guarantee of his ill-gotten power.

The *taxes* of France are also enormous ; the landed property, though so much reduced in value, is burdened with a *direct tax* of *one-sixth* part of the *supposed revenue* ; this of course is paid whether or not any revenue has been received, and it is at present, in most instances, *a tax upon landed capital*. This proportion is to be considerably augmented when the *Cadaastre* is completed. The *Cadaastre* is an invention of the French *economists* ; it is a survey by measurement of the whole surface of the country ; fixing the boundaries of property ; and specifying the nature and value of each plot of ground.

Considerable progress has been made in this immense work, which is intended as a guide to the

land-tax ; and in some districts, where it is actually completed, lands have been rated according to the value which they bore in 1789 ; that is to say, at *three times* their present value.

Besides this, *indirect* taxes have been *augmented* both in the amount of duty laid, and in the number of objects subjected to taxation. Indeed few articles have escaped an impost. The *Gabelle*, or salt duty, one of the great grievances complained of at the beginning of the revolution, which was then only *partial*, is now extended throughout the *whole* of France, to its full amount.

The augmentation of turnpike duty ; the establishment of a toll on all boats of every size, plying up and down navigable rivers ; and the augmentation of the duties paid on *country-produce* upon its introduction into towns, the only markets, have tended still farther to beat down the progress of agriculture, by impeding the circulation of its produce.

By all these absurd and oppressive means, however, the French government raises a considerable revenue ; and also gains at least the *outward* attachment of a vast number of individuals who are employed in collecting it. In the general wreck of fortunes, these places are eagerly sought by men who regret the loss of better days ; and who have now no other means of keeping out starvation, than by accepting a beggarly pittance, earned in the service of the usurper.

The *commerce* of France is reduced to mere dealings with the government, and to some bold adventures, mostly by shares, in the East and West-India trades, and in privateering. Even *internal* commerce is at a stand, from the bustle of war, the requisition of beasts of draught and carts for the armies, the state of the roads, and the various duties on land and water-carriages. Notwithstanding the scarcity of colonial produce, its price has lately been reduced, owing to the want of demand occasioned by *actual penury*.

Refined sugars sell now for *five livres* a pound; brown, of inferior quality, for *fifty-five sous*. As a succedaneum for this article, in some of the wine districts, they make a kind of syrup by boiling down the unfermented juice of the sweet grape; which sells as high as *twenty sous* a bottle. The root of the wild endive, notwithstanding its bitterness, furnishes a substitute for coffee; the bark of the horse-chesnut tree replaces the want of Peruvian bark, &c. &c. Indeed the remembrance of Robespierre's reign of terror will reconcile the French to *any* misery short of death by actual famine.

Those who have still some capital left, and which cannot be employed in trade, vest it in *Monts de Piété*, which are extensive pawn-brokers' shops, authorized by the government in all large towns; and in which money brings *twenty per cent.* at least: *all other* kinds of money-lending

are completely at an end. The discount of bills is a mere matter of accommodation, confined to a very few monied men ; and the rate is accordingly *very low* ; generally *under five per cent*.

The combined operation of all the causes which destroy the other branches of productive industry in France, cripples also the progress of its *manufactures*, namely, the universal pressure of despotism ; the total insecurity of person, property, and life ; the deficiency of mercantile capital ; the conversion of the *learning hands* into soldiers ; and all the other injurious effects of tyranny and war. The *conscripts*, taken from the reputable as well as the lower classes, fill the ranks of the army.

Whatever of skill, taste, or refinement, the youth of this order of society may possess ; whatever of science they may have acquired superior to the knowledge of the merely operative laborer ; all perish with them in the field of blood. Whence the prodigious losses sustained by France on the banks of the Danube, and in the Spanish peninsula, must be estimated far above the mere *numerical* loss in lives, although that be indeed immense ; it cuts away persons and families who might be justly deemed the strength of the nation, in *intellect*, as well as in exertion ; and if their commercial or manufacturing capital fall to their *mothers* and *sisters*, of what use will it be, in *such* hands, to the state ?

Nevertheless, the *manufactures* have suffered

comparatively less diminution than most other departments of industry in France; owing chiefly to their having the *exclusive* supply of the home-market; whence their produce, of whatever quality, always finds a ready sale. Substitutes have also been found for the principal foreign raw materials; as for the dyeing drugs, and cotton.

Extensive plantations of *herbaceous* cotton have succeeded well in Italy, particularly in the kingdom of Naples; although the want of seed has somewhat checked their progress. These plantations are all under the management of Frenchmen, who receive every kind of encouragement; the cotton is bought before hand by the principal French manufacturers; the staple is finer than was expected, and spins to no. 150.

Yet manufactured goods of every kind are *enormously dear*; the necessities of the population, though lessened by misery, are only scantily supplied; nor need Britain fear the rivalry of French manufacturers, while they labor under their present want of capital; and are liable to the drafts of the conscription. They now vegetate on a hot-bed, with a melancholy luxuriance, rendered conspicuous by surrounding desolation; but could not stand a single moment before the rough blasts of a free trade.

Nothing can more pointedly prove the present wretched state of France, than the eagerness with which people of the middle classes of society seize

the opportunity of leaving it. Bordeaux now scarcely reckons *fifty thousand*, instead of a *hundred thousand* inhabitants, its number in the year 1789. At the first news of the partial raising of the French embargo, a few weeks since, people, gathering together the little, miserable wrecks and remnants of their fortunes, in all the sea-ports, applied for passports, which are not refused except to young men liable to the *conscription*. They principally come to these United States, the only country at present free from the calamities of war. A single American vessel, *the Hope*, a few days after its arrival in the Garonne, had collected upwards of forty passengers, half of whom were women."

4. In addition to these *internal* checks to the formidable power of France, may be reckoned the *external* drawbacks to her force, from the deadly hatred which is borne against her by all the nations whom she has vanquished and oppressed; namely, all the immense population that is spread over the rest of the European continent, amounting to more than a hundred millions of souls.

No one in his senses will assert that France possesses the same *permanent* power and influence over the countries whom she has vanquished, as she exercises over her own ancient dominions. Germany, Prussia, Austria, and Italy, whom she has humbled, but not subdued, exceed her in the number of people and of soldiers. Their humiliation has roused in their hearts every passion of

pride, hatred, and vengeance ; terrible emotions, which the rapacity and insolence of Bonaparte will perpetually fan into a fiercer flame. The difference of habits, manners, character, language, and condition, oppose insuperable barriers to their union with, and incorporation into, one and the same people with the French, all obeying one sovereign lord.

“ In Italy more particularly the incorporation of the people into the same mass with his other subjects, is irresistibly opposed by the universal hatred of the inhabitants against the French ; the obstacles to all improvement in the prejudices, the indolence, the ignorance, the cowardice of the natives ; the headstrong and injudicious nature of Bonaparte’s civil administration ; his own tyranny ; the rapacity of his officers ; the embezzlement of the public property in every department of the French government ; and a general system of arrogance, rapine, and oppression, which condemns to misery the population of this delightful country, and imposes silence by the bayonet on the just complaints of the oppressed victims.”

These countries, therefore, instead of cheerfully aiding France in the farther prosecution of her schemes for universal dominion, will continually hang as a dead weight, an immense drag-chain round her neck ; and be always earnest to seize the first opportunity of re-asserting their national

independence, and inflicting signal vengeance upon their oppressors.

It is the natural tendency of every separate nation to press onward to the furtherance of its own power and aggrandizement; and in the present condition of Europe, the now humbled and oppressed nations will necessarily bind themselves together in one common bond of suffering, rage, and hatred; and the moment that they can command any resources of power and resistance, will direct them in deadly opposition against France.

These attempts will be very much forwarded by the debilitating effects unavoidably entailed upon the Great Nation by her present *unnatural* state of society, which cannot possibly be permanent. The very attempt to prolong this pernicious state of things; the sacrifice of all peaceful prosperity, and all individual comfort; the annihilation of agriculture, and commerce; the substitution of an armed nation in the room of a regular army; would infallibly in a short time reduce France to a wilderness.

It should also be remembered, that if Bonaparte happens to be defeated in his plans of personal and family aggrandizement, he cannot look for aid to the *loyalty* and *affection* of the French people whom he has cruelly oppressed. They, wearied by their enormous burdens, and exasperated at the individual, the selfish ambition of their tyrant, may possibly prepare for him that fate, which awaited

the late Great Idiot of all the Russias, and is now, perhaps, preparing for his no less infatuated and feeble successor.

How far the *alliance* of France blesses a country may be seen in the following picture of the present condition of *Holland*, drawn by the hand of an illustrious British statesman, who at this moment strengthens and adorns by his energy and wisdom the councils of his sovereign.

“ Having had the means of very accurate information, I feel justified in expressing a decided opinion on this important topic. My reasoning is the result of experience and observation. *Holland* exhibits in every feature of her national character the effects of long commercial habits. Accustomed for ages to pursue trade and reap its comforts, her people possess the care, temperance, and regularity, consequent upon the discipline of industry ; but they are devoid of energy or enterprise.

Her soldiers, and even her sailors, are raised only in a *small* proportion from her *own* population. *Westphalia*, and the other adjoining parts of Germany, supply recruits for her army, and the landmen of her navy. Even the seamen, whether in the public or private shipping, are *not* in general, *native* Dutchmen, but from the north of Germany, from Denmark, and from Sweden. Of the men who fought off Camperdown, and so bravely maintained the former fame of *Holland*, only a small proportion were Dutch.

With respect to the army, Guelderland, a province comparatively inconsiderable, is the only source of supply. There exists not a nation *more destitute* of military habits, or possessing less aptitude to acquire them. The Dutch would not rise in active opposition to an invading foe, from a greater dread of the horrors of internal war, than of their present subjection. Whatever be their expectations from a force sent to deliver them, or whatever the tyranny of their oppressors, *they* will act a neutral part. •

“ *Individual safety* is a Dutchman’s object ; and from that no consideration, except downright compulsion, can make him depart. The people of Holland are divided into two political parties, apparently so equal in numbers and influence, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to decide which of the two really possesses that superiority which is claimed by both. The highest and lowest classes are in general devoted to the Orange family ; while the middle ranks constitute the popular party. The middle orders are attached to the French ; the higher and lower classes as far as commercial jealousy will allow, to the English.

This division has subsisted nearly two hundred years. Its spirit is hereditary ; imbibed from the earliest period of life ; and retained with the characteristic pertinacity of the Dutch. So rooted is attachment to the Orange family in the minds of its adherents, that while that House possesses a repre-

sentative, no succession of revolutions, no variety of new constitutions, will eradicate it from their breasts.

Yet such are the habits and disposition of the people, that, notwithstanding this strong predilection, *no active* co-operation in the work of their deliverance is to be expected from them. In the year 1794, when the French approached their frontier, and threatened the overthrow of all that was dear to the Orange party, there was made *no exertion* of individual patriotism; no voluntary levies; no pecuniary subscription. The *hired* troops of the Republic, (Swiss and Germans) were left to fight, *unaided*, the battles of the state.

And in the year 1799, when the successes of the campaign had been entirely on the side of the allies; and the prince's party had the strongest motives, from the prospect of success, as well as congeniality of feeling, to co-operate with the invading army, it is notorious that they afforded *not the smallest* assistance.

The republican party partakes equally of the national apathy. Their leaders however have the benefit of whatever movement can be communicated to this languid mass by the machine of government. In the year 1795, after the French invasion, a number of the citizens attached to the democratic side were formed into volunteer corps. These, in the event of invasion, would be marched out against the assailing force. They would take the field from the

necessity of obeying orders ; but although numerous, they are so inefficient, in a military point of view, that it is not under-rating the measure of their exertions to say that the addition of *five-thousand* regular soldiers to the invading army would be an adequate provision against the whole annoyance to be expected from the collective body of Dutch volunteers.

The foreign commerce of Holland is at its lowest ebb of diminution and decay. A war with England is the signal for the Dutch flag to disappear from the ocean. Their West-India colonies fall an easy conquest to the British arms ; and their trade with the east, formerly the pride of Holland, and the admiration of the universe, is carried on by the limited and hazardous system of neutral flags. That portion of intercourse which the Dutch still maintain with other countries in Europe, is transacted in the same precarious manner. Their internal trade and manufactures are in a state of correspondent ruin ; and the whole country is undergoing a most serious diminution, not only of wealth, but also of *population*.

In the first book, and ninth chapter, of that invaluable work, “ The Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations,” Doctor Smith lays down this important principle ; namely, “ the diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, as it lowers the wages of labor, so it raises the profit of stock, and consequent-

ly the interest of money." The profound and luminous author quotes, in support of this principle, great fortunes suddenly acquired in the *ruined* countries of Bengal, and the other British settlements in the East-Indies.

This principle also receives an exemplification in the present state of Holland. It was easy formerly to borrow money there at an interest of four, but now it is nearly impossible to procure it at five per cent. Yet the increased profits of stock do *not* tend to alleviate the burdens of the few Dutch capitalists that are still left, owing to the greater profit on capital augmenting the *whole* income of the capitalist.

For the diminution of stock in all societies is attended with the *most ruinous* consequences to the country at large. The capitalist sustains his share in the general calamity; he obtains a higher rate of interest, but his capital is less secure; he therefore dares not in prudence either lend or employ the whole. The hazards of trade are multiplied by the increased number of failures. He suffers from this cause directly, if he trade himself; or indirectly, through the instability of his debtors, if he lend his capital to others; he therefore does not employ the whole, either in trade or upon loan.

Upon the invasion of Holland by the French, a large proportion of capital was hoarded. The practice of *general* hoarding, indicates a situation the reverse of prosperous, both in the individual

and in the country. By a total loss of profit, therefore, on a part of his stock, the capitalist, notwithstanding the increased rate of interest on the remainder, derives much less income from his whole property in times of public calamity.

In speaking of Bengal, Doctor Smith mentions, "that the great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in it, and the other British settlements in the East-Indies, may satisfy us that as the wages of labor are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In Bengal money is frequently lent to the farmers, at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent."

If this was the state of India thirty or forty years ago, it is *now* materially altered. The usual interest of money there at present is from *ten* to *twelve* per cent. The fortunes said to have been made in that country have, both in Dr. Smith's days and our own, been much over-rated. If their origin be investigated, it will be found more frequently in the *official* situation of the individual in the East-India Company's service, than in the legitimate profits of trade.

These fortunes have generally been acquired by men who were strangers equally to the principles and the habits of commerce; *presents from the natives*, or the possession of monopolies, will be found in the history of British India to have been a more fruitful source of fortune than industry.

The nature and progress of such acquisitions, therefore, have been regulated by causes very different from the rules of political economy.

It must be apparent that the state of society in Bengal and Holland is extremely different. In Bengal, property was formerly very insecure, and trade confined to a small number. In Holland, property was sacred, and trade the universal occupation. No two countries can differ more widely in the gifts of nature. The fertile soil of Bengal supplies, with the returning season, a harvest abundant both for the industrious husbandman and his rapacious master. But Holland, bereft of commerce, would lose that which alone renders her territory valuable. Her coast would be reduced to a barren asylum for fishermen; and her interior would become a dreary marsh.

The ruinous effects of diminished capital would therefore be far more grievously felt in Holland, where commerce was both so generally prosecuted, and so indispensable to the prosperity of the country. There, as in Britain, and in every trading country, a great part of business was transacted upon *credit*, which is so important an instrument in mercantile operations, that in many branches of trade the amount of stock or capital ceases to be the criterion of the extent either of business or of profit.

In Britain a longer or shorter term is taken for the payment of almost every purchase, and

credit is as essential to trade, in its present state, as the atmosphere to our existence. The Dutch, farther advanced in their commercial career than the English, more abundant in money, and less accustomed to speculative enterprise, transacted more business by immediate payments. But even in Holland, credit was the soul of commerce.

A foreign conquest, a revolution, but above all, their wars with England, have exceedingly lessened the mutual confidence of the Dutch merchants. By the interruption of her intercourse with the East and West-Indies, Holland is deprived of the most extensive and lucrative branches of her trade. The ruin of almost all the public funds of Europe, except the British, is also a fatal blow to the Dutch who had lent out a large portion of their stock to foreign powers. Their internal trade suffers under a universal diminution of consumption.

This complication of disasters has continued to press upon Holland for about fifteen years. And the consequences have been, the emigration of a large proportion of her population ; and despondency in those who have remained. Peace alone can preserve to them what they still possess, and peace is the prayer of every Dutchman. But in the present state of Europe there is no prospect of any pacification which can restore the national independence of Holland. It may procure a little partial relief from her burdens ; but it will also

confirm her degradation, and rivet upon her neck the chains of French despotism.

The late and present *taxes* of the Dutch bear a very large, but *not a uniform* ratio, or per centage upon their property. The ratio varies in different years; and instead of being more easily paid by the remaining capitalists, in consequence of the ruin and emigration of their countrymen, its pressure is by that cause exceedingly augmented. The measure of taxation in Holland has long been, not a just regard to the inhabitants, but the unavoidable necessities of the state.

The French prescribe to the Dutch the maintenance of an extensive military and naval establishment; or the payment of a direct contribution to themselves; for these, and the interest of their immense funded debt, provision *must* be made. It is therefore the amount of their burdens, not the ratio of taxation which is certain. The ruin and emigration of a number of capitalists, and the consequent diminution of the national stock, increases very much the proportion of taxation on the remaining individuals. A sum certain, and of large amount, must be paid; the smaller the national property, the fewer the contributors, so much greater must be the ratio of contribution."

The following official document will also show the *manner* in which the French display their protection and kindness to their friends and allies.

Note from Count Wintzingerode, Minister of

State and Conferences to his Serene Highness the Elector of Wirtemberg, to his Excellency, M. Didelot, the French Minister, dated 30th September, 1805.

“ The undersigned is under the necessity of giving to M. Didelot official communication of an event the most unexpected, and of an outrage the most unheard of, against the capital of his Highness, the Elector, by Marshal Ney.

“ Having appeared before the gates of Stutgard, not only with the intention of passing through it, but of taking up his quarters there, General Hinzl, the commandant, went himself to the gates, and endeavored by the strongest representations, showing at the same time the positive orders to that effect of his Highness, the Elector, to prevail on him to follow the conducting officers posted on all the roads, made to preserve the communications round the town, and to facilitate the march of the French troops to all quarters to which they were destined.

“ But Marshal Ney, rejecting all proposals of the kind, and refusing to accept of any compromise, ordered his guns to be pointed against the gate leading to Louisburg, compelled it to be opened, entered the capital of his Highness, the Elector in a hostile manner, with a force so considerable that the town was not capable of containing it. He ordered the magistracy to assemble for the purpose of communicating to them that

two regiments of hussars and five battalions of infantry would arrive there the same night ; for which he made an immediate and peremptory demand of one hundred thousand rations of bread.

“ The undersigned is at a loss for expressions to convey the deep regret of his Highness, the Elector, as well as the just indignation which he must necessarily feel, at the grievous and unheard of insult which has been offered to him in his own capital, at the moment that the Emperor Napoleon makes *professions of friendship* to him ; and flatters him with the prospect of soon seeing him at his palace.

“ P. S. At this instant, the undersigned has received official information from Baron De Taubenheim, first Equerry to his Highness, the Elector, that some hussars, acting as body-guards to General Dupont, have forced open the doors of the principal stables of the Elector, and wounded with a sabre one of the servants who endeavored to prevent this violence. One of the Elector’s coachmen, dressed in *his livery*, and driving M. Didelot, attached to the French Embassy, received also some blows with the flat of a sword. Upon complaint being made of the breaking of the stable doors, by Baron De Taubenheim to the aid-de-camp of General Dupont, the only answer he received was, “ It is all the same to me.”

I had almost forgotten to mention that the practice of hoarding *specie* prevails very generally

among the *Dutch* farmers in the union, and more especially among those who reside at the town of Bergen, in New-Jersey. The head of a family scrapes together all the silver dollars which a life of industry and parsimony enables him to accumulate ; these he locks up in his strong box, where they remain until his death, when they are brought to light and divided equally among his children, if there be more than one ; and each of these children puts his or her share into a separate strong box, to remain until his or her death shall make another division. If there be only one child, the strong box remains in its place unopened, and receives constantly fresh accessions of dollars, until its possessor is quietly entombed, and a division of the spoil among a new race of Dutch people is called for.

But this custom among our Dutch farmers is no objection to the position above laid down : “ that the *general* practice of hoarding is indicative of want of national prosperity ; as particularly applicable to the present state of Holland.” For our Dutch farmers who hoard, make only a very small portion of the community, and do it through mere ignorance of the benefit which would accrue to them from *using* instead of *burying* their money ; and as the American community is protected by equal laws, and an upright administration of justice, the small quantity of specie which is thus withdrawn from circulation is easily sup-

plied by the issues of bank-paper, which commercial credit at once requires the banks to emit and enables the trader to obtain. Whereas in Holland, where there is *no* security for property, and *no* upright administration of justice, the practice of hoarding is made general through fear of being plundered, and the inability of advantageously employing capital in the investments of trade, or in loans; and the money thus withdrawn from circulation is *not* supplied by any increased issue of bank-paper, for which there is little or no demand, on account of the almost entire annihilation of commercial credit, together with the ruin of trade.

CHAPTER VIII.

BUT, without peradventure, the greatest and most effectual check to the destroying career of France, is to be found in the resources and the power of Britain. Of her industry and wealth, her public credit, and all the vast resources of her collective and individual property, we have taken occasion to speak; it only now remains to make a brief inquiry into the state of her population; as

to its capacity of intelligence, and of courage to keep the common enemy of mankind at bay.

A very strange notion is entertained by many persons in these United States, that the population of Britain is *very scanty and limited*. One would be led to infer, from their discourses and writings, that Britain could number no more inhabitants within her territory than are to be found within the precincts of our little states of Delaware or Rhode-Island. A very respectable gentleman, in this city of New-York, very gravely informed me yesterday, "that Britain could not afford to part with any of her population; and that if they were to lose *ten thousand* men, she would feel it severely *for many years*."

The population of Britain was returned in the year 1801, in pursuance of an act of Parliament, 41 Geo. 3d, as amounting to *sixteen millions, five hundred and ten thousand*.

England and Wales,	10,710,000
Scotland,	1,500,000
Ireland,	3,800,000
Maritime and military population, exclusive of India and foreign corps,	500,000
<hr/>	
Total population of the British Isles,	16,510,000

But this return very materially *under-rates* the population of Britain. The truth is, that owing to the novelty, and the difficulty of taking an exact census, the returns to Parliament were very defective. A belief had been very industriously propagated by the British Jacobins, that an enumeration of the people was about to be made, for the purpose of laying a heavy poll-tax on all the inhabitants, and of drafting all the males capable of bearing arms into the militia, or regular troops.

This belief, or some other cause, operated so powerfully as to induce almost every district in the kingdom to give in a much lower estimate of its population than the actual amount. At that time I had occasion to travel through many of the counties of England and of Scotland ; and I was peculiarly struck with the uniformly careless manner in which the assessors collected their account of the number of people within their respective districts.

In Edinburgh and Glasgow, it is not uncommon for several distinct families to live upon the separate *flats*, or compartments under the same roof. An assessor would go to the door of the lowest flat, and ask how many people lived in it ? Whatever was the answer, down he wrote it, without farther inquiry. He then proceeded to ask who lived upon the second flat, and how many there were in the family ? the answer sometimes was, I dinna ken ; well, how many do you *guess* ?

the guess was made at random, and forthwith written down as a correct return. A very judicious and respectable gentleman of the city of Edinburgh asked several of his neighbors why they had given in some only *half*, others *two-thirds*, and others different proportions of the whole number of their inmates? The reply invariably was, why they tell me that all the young men are to be taken away for soldiers.

Throughout the country the same carelessness in taking the census prevailed. It is notorious that the population of Ireland, instead of being *under four*, is nearly, if not quite, *six* millions. I am therefore inclined to rate the people of Britain at nearly *one fourth* more than the returns in 1801 gave; proportioning them thus:

England and Wales,	12,000,000
Ireland,	5,800,000
Scotland,	2,200,000
<hr/>	
Total British population,	20,000,000

The *quality* of these twenty millions of population is also known to be far superior to that of most other countries in Europe. The testimony of Mr. Malthus in his incomparable Essay on Population, vol. 2, p. 512, is conclusive as to this point.

“ The *effective* population in Britain, compared

with the whole, is *considerably greater* than in *France*; and she not only can, but does employ a *larger* proportion of her population in augmenting and defending her resources, than her great rival. According to the *Statistique générale et particulière de la France*, lately published, the proportion of French population under twenty, is almost *nine-twentieths*; in England it is not much more than *seven-twentieths*.

Consequently, out of a population of ten millions, England would have a million more of persons above twenty than France; and would have at least *three or four hundred thousand* more males of a military age. If the population of Britain were of the same description as that of France, it must be increased numerically by more than a million and a half, in order to procure from England and Wales the same number of persons above the age of twenty as at present. And if she had only an increase of a million, her *efficient strength* in agriculture, commerce, and war, would be in the most decided manner *diminished*; while at the same time, the distresses of the lower classes would be dreadfully increased.

Can any rational man say, that an additional population of this kind would be desirable either in a moral or political point of view? And yet this *is* the kind of population which *invariably* results from direct encouragements to marriage; or from that

want of personal respectability which is occasioned by ignorance and despotism."

It should be remembered that the population of Britain has suffered very *little diminution* on account of the war, because, until very lately, her fighting has been chiefly confined to the ocean; a mode of conflict in which she seldom loses many men, although she generally sweeps the quarter-decks of her enemies clean. Indeed, her population for the last twenty years, has been considerably augmented; her births having averaged a much greater proportion than her deaths.

The British population, from being better fed, clothed, and lodged than that of any other country in Europe, is more hardy and robust; stronger and more active; and will endure more fatigue and hard fighting than any other Europeans. This is peculiarly exemplified in the seamen of Britain, who will manage their ship, and work their guns, with more dexterity, strength, and speed, than any of their enemies can do.

Indeed, the naval exploits of courage, strength, and skill, displayed by the British for the last fifteen years, more nearly resemble the achievements of romance, than the ordinary exertions of human valor; and the names of Howe, of Duncan, of Jarvis, and of Nelson, will shine with increasing lustre in the annals of fame "to the last syllable of recorded time." There are, now, and always will be, in

the British fleet, while its present admirable system of discipline remains, many Howes, Duncans, Jarvis, and Nelsons, who only wait for an opportunity of exhibiting their genius and heroism at the expense of the enemies of their country.

Nor are the British soldiers inferior in valor to their naval brethren; although it is the common belief that they are defective in that discipline, and those military tactics, which are all-important to render courage effectual. It is supposed that Britain does not sufficiently exercise her land-armies in actual warfare; at least we have two great leading authorities as to this point, namely, the author of "*Caractere des Armées Européennes*," and Mr. Burke.

The French writer repeatedly maintains the position that "the *English* are undoubtedly the *most intrepid* people in Europe."—"Les *Anglois* sont indubitablement le peuple le *plus intrepide* de l'Europe; celui qui affronte la mort, et la voit approcher, avec le plus de sangfroid et d'indifference." But the British army is not sufficiently attended to by the government, which adopts no regular system for its formation, and the disposition of the forces employed in actual service; whence the military department can never acquire consistency or uniformity.

The cavalry of Britain is better equipped and more terrible in its charge than that of any other nation. Her artillery is equal to that of the

French themselves. Indeed nothing but able commanders are wanting to make the British the best troops in Europe. The British officers however are not considered as inferior to those of any European army, in courage, in talents, or in military ardor; but only in military tactics, for want of practice.

In France military knowledge has always been widely diffused, and in consequence she has triumphed over all her enemies. The French writers upon military subjects are the best in the world; but in England not one author of any talent in this department has appeared. If proper encouragement had been given to military studies in Britain, she would no doubt have shone in that as she does in other great intellectual pursuits. There is no one department of science or of art, which both nations have cultivated, in which the British have not excelled the French."

I think Voltaire, somewhere in his hundred volumes without an index, observes that the climate of England produces men of more physical strength of body, and of minds more patient than the natives of France, in like manner as the soil produces better horses and better hunting dogs.

Mr. Burke, in the 8th volume of his works, London edition, p. 369—375, strenuously insists upon the necessity of Britain's employing her land-army more frequently and more extensively than she has of late years done; and thus giving

the bravest people in Europe the fair and free use of their valor.

“ In turning our view from the lower to the higher classes of Britain, it will not be necessary to show at any length that the stock of the latter, as to numbers, has not yet suffered any material diminution. There is no want of officers for the ships which she commissions, or the new regiments which she raises. In the nature of things it is not with their *persons*, that the higher classes principally pay their contingent to the demands of war. There is another and not less important part which rests with almost exclusive weight upon them. They furnish the means

—————How war may, best upheld,
Move by her two main nerves, iron and gold,
In all her equipage.

Not that they are exempt from contributing also by their personal service in the fleets and armies of their country. They do contribute in their full and fair proportion, according to their relative numbers in the community. They contribute all the *mind* that actuates the whole machine. The fortitude required of them, is very different from the unthinking alacrity of the common soldier or common sailor, in the face of danger and death.

Their fortitude is not a passion ; it is not an impulse ; it is not a sentiment ; it is a cool, steady, deliberate principle, always present, always equable ; having no connexion with anger ; tempering honor with prudence ; incited, invigorated, and sustained by a generous love of fame ; informed, moderated, and directed by an enlarged knowledge of its own great public ends, flowing in one blended stream from the opposite sources of the heart and the head ; carrying in itself its own commission, and proving its title to every other command, by the first and most difficult command, that of the bosom in which it resides.

It is a fortitude which unites with the courage of the field the *more exalted and refined* courage of the council ; which knows as well to retreat as to advance ; which can conquer as well by delay as by the rapidity of a march, or the impetuosity of an attack ; which can be, with Fabius, the black cloud that lowers upon the tops of the mountains ; or, with Scipio, the thunderbolt of war ; which undismayed by false shame, can patiently endure the severest trial that a gallant spirit can undergo ; in the taunts and provocations of the enemy ; the suspicions, cold respect, and mouth-honor of those from whom it should meet a cheerful obedience ; which undisturbed by false humanity, can calmly assume that most awful moral responsibility of deciding, when victory may be too dearly purchased by a single life ; and when the safety

and glory of their country may demand the certain sacrifice of thousands.

Different stations of command may call for different modifications of this fortitude ; but the *character* ought to be the *same* in all. And never in the most palmy state of Britain's martial renown did it shine with brighter lustre, than in the present sanguinary and ferocious hostilities, wherever her arms have been carried.

But in this most arduous and momentous conflict, which from its nature should have roused the British nation to new and unexampled efforts, she has never put forth *half the strength*, which she has exerted in ordinary wars. In the fatal battles, which have drenched the continent with blood, and shaken the system of Europe to pieces, Britain has never had any army of a magnitude to be compared to the least of those by which, in former times, she so gloriously asserted her place, as protector, not oppressor, at the head of the great European commonwealth.

She has never manfully met the danger in front ; and when the enemy, resigning to her, her natural dominion of the ocean, and abandoning the defence of his distant possessions to the infernal energy of the destroying principles, which he had planted there for the subversion of the neighboring colonies ; drove forth by one sweeping law of unprecedented despotism, his armed multitudes on every side, to overwhelm the countries and states that had for cen-

turies stood the firm barriers against the ambition of France; Britain *drew back* the arm of her military force, which had never been more than *half raised* to oppose him.

From that time she has been combating only with the other arm of her naval power; the right arm of England, I admit; but which struck with blows almost unresisted, that could never reach the heart of the hostile mischief. From that time, without a single effort to regain those outworks, which ever till then she had so strenuously maintained, as the strong frontier of her own dignity and safety, no less than of the liberties of Europe; with but one feeble attempt to succor those brave, faithful, and numerous allies, whom for the first time since the days of her Edwards and Henrys, she then had in the bosom of France itself, Britain has been intrenching, and fortifying, and garrisoning herself at home; has been redoubling security on security, to protect herself from *invasion*, which had *then first* become to her a serious object of alarm and terror.

I believe that any person, who was of an age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago, would hardly credit his senses, when he should hear from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in England, and in the neighboring island at least fourscore thousand more.

But when he had recovered from his surprise on being told of this army, which has not its parallel; what must be his astonishment to be told again, that

this mighty force was kept up for the mere purpose of *an inert and passive* defence; and that in its far greater part, (the militia) it was disabled, by its constitution and very essence, from defending her against an enemy by any one preventive stroke, or any one operation of active hostility?

What must his reflections be on learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed, and to the full as ably commanded as Britain ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in carrying on the same system of *unenterprising* defence? What must be the sentiments and feelings of one who remembers the *former energy* of England, when he is given to understand that the British Islands, with their extensive and every where vulnerable coast should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town?

What would such a man, what would *any* man think, if the garrison of so strange a fortress should be such, and so feebly commanded, as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all which has been hitherto seen in war, an infinitely inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, ill-found, and ill-manned, may with safety besiege this superior garrison; and without hazarding the life of a single man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack?

Indeed, indeed, I look upon this matter of Britain's *defensive* system, as much the most important of all considerations. It has oppressed me with many

anxious thoughts, which more than any bodily distemper, have sunk me to my present enfeebled condition. But I only mean here to argue, that *this* mode of conducting the war on the part of Britain, has prevented even the *common havoc* of war in her population; and especially among that class whose duty and privilege of superiority it is, to lead the way amidst the perils and slaughter of the field of battle."

"And surely, after such an elaborate display of the injustice and insolence of an enemy, who seems to have been irritated by every one of the means, which had been commonly used with effect to sooth the rage of intemperate power, the *natural* result would be, that the scabbard in which Britain had in vain attempted to plunge her sword, should have been thrown away with scorn. It would have been natural, that rising in the fulness of their might, insulted majesty, despised dignity, violated justice, rejected supplication, patience goaded into fury, would have poured out all the length of the reins upon all the wrath which they had so long restrained.

"It might have been expected that the British Minister, at length convinced that there is a *courage* of the *cabinet* full as powerful, and far less vulgar than that of the *field*, would have changed the whole line of that unprosperous prudence which hitherto had produced all the effects of the blindest temerity.

On that day, it was thought he would have assumed the port of Mars ; that he would bid to be brought forth from their hideous kennel, where his scrupulous tenderness had too long immured them, those impatient dogs of war, whose fierce regards affright even the minister of vengeance that feeds them ; that he would let them loose in famine, fever, plagues, and death, upon a guilty race ; to whose frame, and to all whose habits, order, peace, religion, and virtue, are alien and abhorrent.

“ It was expected that he would *at last* have thought of *active* and *effectual* war ; that he would no longer amuse the British Lion in the chase of mice and rats ; that he would no longer employ the whole naval power of Britain, once the terror of the world, to prey upon the miserable remains of a peddling commerce, which the enemy did not regard, and from which none could profit. It was expected that he would have re-asserted the justice of his cause ; that he would have re-animated whatever remained to him of his allies ; and endeavored to recover those whom their fears had led astray ; that he would have re-kindled the martial ardor of her citizens ; that he would have held out to them the example of *their ancestry*, the asserter of Europe, and the scourge of French ambition ; that he would have reminded them of *a posterity*, which, if this nefarious robbery, under the fraudulent name, and false color of a government, should in full power be seated in the heart of Eu-

rope, *must be for ever* consigned to vice, impiety, barbarism, and the most ignominious slavery of body and mind.

“ In so holy a cause it was presumed that he would have opened all the temples; and with prayer, with fasting, and with supplication (better directed than to the grim Moloch of Regicide France) have called upon the British nation to raise that united cry which has so often stormed heaven; and with a pious violence forced down blessings upon a repentant people. It was hoped that when he had invoked upon his endeavors the favorable regard of the Protector of the human race, it would be seen that his menaces to the enemy, and his prayers to the Almighty, were not followed, but accompanied with correspondent action. It was hoped that his shrilling trumpet should be heard, not to announce a show, but to sound a charge.”

Since the time that Mr. Burke preferred this indignant and most eloquent complaint against the military inactivity of Britain, her armies have been called, by circumstances, or the superior energy of her government, or by both, into more extensive and more active service. And the conduct, both of her commanders and of her men, has amply justified Mr. Burke's eulogium on their skill and valor, and has sufficiently vindicated the soundness of his political wisdom. The recent achievements of the British arms in Egypt, at Maida, in Portugal, and in

Spain, incontestibly prove, that the descendants of those heroes who covered themselves with laurels on the fields of Cressy, of Poitiers, of Agincourt, of Blenheim, of Ramillies, and of Malplaquet, have in no wise degenerated from their ancestors, either in military genius, or determined intrepidity; and that the names of Abercromby, of Stuart, of Moore, and of Wellesley, shall be inscribed on the tablet of honor to the latest posterity, with those of Edward, of Henry, and of Marlborough.

I cannot deny myself the gratification of making one little extract from Mr. Moore's very interesting and important account of his heroic brother's campaign in the Spanish peninsula in 1808—9; for a full description of the battle of Corunna on the 16th of January, 1809, in which the British so conspicuously displayed their *superiority* in military tactics and cool determined intrepidity, over Bonaparte's ablest generals, and the choicest veteran troops of France, see p. 204—224 of Mr. Moore's work.

“ The British army thus arrived at Corunna entire and unbroken; and in a military point of view the operation was successful and splendid. Nearly *seventy thousand* Frenchmen, led by *Bonaparte*, with a great superiority of cavalry, had endeavored in vain to surround or to rout *twenty six thousand* British. *Two hundred and fifty miles* of country had been traversed; mountains, defiles, and rivers had been crossed, in *daily contact* with their enemy.

Though often engaged, even their rear-guard was *never* beaten, nor thrown into confusion; but was *victorious* in every encounter.

Much baggage, undoubtedly, was lost; and some three-pounders were abandoned; but *nothing* was taken by force. What was left was owing to the death of waggon-horses and mules, and not to their escort ever being defeated. The courage and menacing attitude maintained by the cavalry and reserve, were sufficient always to repel and over-awe the advanced guard of the enemy; and at Lugo *battle* was *offered* by this handful of British to three divisions of French, commanded by their marshals. This challenge was *declined*; and the impression which it made, enabled the British to terminate their march almost undisturbed.

In fine, neither Napoleon nor the duke of Dalmatia won a piece of artillery, a standard, or a single military trophy from the British army."

Then follows a most interesting account of the battle of *Corunna*, to which I have only leisure and opportunity earnestly to refer the reader. It is also but barely justice to notice that the conduct of Sir Arthur Wellesley, now Lord Wellington, in Portugal and in Spain, both before and since his splendid victory at Talavera, over more than double the number of French assailants, has been such as to rank him among the very greatest captains of this military age, so fruitful in distinguished generals. For a

most dignified encomium on the great military genius and heroism of Lord Wellington, and of the officers and men under his command, see the *General Order* on this subject, published by command of his Britannic Majesty.

It is indeed most earnestly to be desired that Britain will from hence forward keep *an army perpetually afloat* ; and either carry offensive and deadly hostility into the heart of the enemy's country ; lay waste his long line of sea-coats, and reduce it to a barren wilderness ; will strip him of all his foreign possessions, and capture every island in the seas, and rivers, and creeks, and bays, from which troops may be continually detached to harass and annoy his dominions ; and give him the full benefit of obstinately protracting a war with the greatest naval power that the world ever saw.

But if Britain ever again coops herself up in a narrow, paltry, merely *defensive* system, she may bid an eternal adieu to the martial glory of her ancestors ; she will lessen the power and lower the spirits of her brave and loyal people ; and will be ultimately obliged to tamely submit to the most degrading terms of surrender which her insolent and unprincipled enemy may think fit to dictate.

For nearly twenty years past it has been the fashion with the French to deny *all* talent of *any* kind to Britain ; and a very large body of politi-

cians in these United States, in whose opinion all the assertions of France are the decrees of oracular truth and wisdom, make no scruple of daily and hourly avowing, in discourse and in print, that "the whole British nation are a set of *drivellers* and *idiots*, feeblers than children in their understanding, and weaker than women in their *cowardice*; at once the scorn and hatred, the contempt and the detestation of every *civilized* people upon earth," &c. &c.

I have, however, a much more formidable antagonist to cope with on this subject than the *illuminated* statesmen just quoted. In the tenth volume of the *Edinburgh Review*, p. 10—27, it is argued with great force and ingenuity, that *not enough* of the real talent which Britain possesses, is ever called into the service of the government, owing to the extreme monopoly of power by the great leading families of the aristocracy of rank and wealth. The consequences of this monopoly of office I shall state in the words of the Reviewer.

"In the first place, all the great and important offices of the state are virtually monopolized by a few great families. Provided there be any member of those families possessed of talents to discharge their duties in a decent and passable manner, a claim is sure to be made in their behalf; and from the nature of the government that claim is almost sure to be successful. The nature of the government indeed, and the weight of

the opposition by which it is always confronted, renders a certain degree of talent in these privileged candidates indispensable.

In this respect Britain has the advantage of the continental governments of Europe. Her chief places cannot be given away to persons utterly incapable of their duty ; but still the qualifications required by her in a candidate properly recommended, are undoubtedly very slender, and beyond all question, much lower than might be required, and could be obtained, if the competition were free and general, and if success were the sure reward of superior qualification.

The second bad effect is, that persons whose natural genius and dispositions would ensure the very highest excellence in many important departments, are deterred from cultivating those talents, or bringing them forward into public notice, from the consciousness that they do not possess that political influence which is necessary to give them effect ; or from despair of obtaining those recommendations, without which no success is to be expected. Much admirable talent is thus suppressed for want of encouragement ; and minds that might have redeemed or exalted the age or the country to which they belonged, have wasted their vigor in obscure and ignoble drudgery.

The last consequence is, that those who possess the power of nominating to high offices, being

thus habitually beset with applications from quarters to which they are forced to pay attention, cease to think of any other functionaries than those who come so recommended, and make no exertion to discover or bring forward those talents by which alone the exigencies of the country can be supplied in seasons of great difficulty.

These reasons are nearly sufficient to account for the fact, that Britain, though containing in the mass of its population *a far greater* proportion of intelligence and just principle than any other that ever existed, has not generally conducted herself with any extraordinary or consummate wisdom as a government, but has often committed, or persisted in the errors, which a narrow and a vulgar policy had imposed upon the least enlightened of her neighbors.

It is natural to think that the highest talents should be found where there is the greatest reward, and the greatest field for their exertion; and in a free country especially, it seems necessary to explain how a system should have arisen, which precludes the state from availing itself of the genius and the wisdom of its subjects; and prevents the people from interfering to save themselves by the fair application of the talents and the sagacity they possess.

France has triumphed by the free and unlimited use she has made of the talents of her people; but the people of England are at this moment *much*

more enlightened and ingenious, and capable of affording more efficient service to their government than those of France, or of any other country. If a similar field was opened for competition; if the same high rewards were held out for excellence; and the same facilities afforded for its publication and display, we are perfectly satisfied that England would in a very short time exhibit more splendid instances of successful genius, in *every* department of the public service, than have yet been produced among *those* (the French) who have risen to such a height by their multiplication."

I can readily imagine that the gentleman, who is capable of writing such an able state-paper as that from which the above extract is taken, must, amidst the ordinary occupations of life, and amidst the daily intercourse of ordinary men, whether professional or not, "droop like the melancholy eagle amidst the meaner domestic fowls;" (to use an expression of Mr. D'Israeli.)

"With ruffled plumes, and flagging wing,
Quench'd in dark clouds of slumber lie
The terrors of his beak and lightning of his eye."

For no one possessed of primary and commanding talents, can long remain unconscious of their power; they must be every moment forcing themselves upon his notice, either in common collisions of intellect with men around him, or in silent, solitary study, when he compares the writ-

ten labors of others with his own more profound and comprehensive reflections. It is therefore no wonder that a man so gifted with exalted genius, so armed at all points with information, should sigh at, what *must* indeed appear to him, wasting his vigor in obscure and ignoble drudgery ; no wonder that he should earnestly desire to guide the helm of State, as much better fitted for his nervous grasp than the pen of a Reviewer.

Yet with the most unfeigned respect, I in some measure venture to dissent from the conclusions of this admirable writer.

1. That a high bounty is perpetually offered for the greatest talents in general science, arts, and literature, speculative and practical, by the vast patronage, both private and public, of wealth and honor in Britain ; and that this demand, in consequence, has produced the most splendid exertions of genius and knowledge in these intellectual pursuits, is not disputed. But it is urged that *not enough* of this great talent finds its way into the actual service of the government.

Now a *very large* portion of talent and information *must always* be employed in carrying on the administration of such a very complicated system of government as that of Britain ; which unites great energy of action in itself, with a very ample extent of personal liberty to its subjects ; in directing the vast naval and military departments ; in managing the Parliamentary troops, and the estab-

lished national church ; in guiding the landed, manufacturing and commercial interests ; in contending with an incessant and formidable opposition of wealth, rank, influence, and talent, against *all* its measures, right or wrong ; from the most important, down to the least significant of its transactions.

2. It is easier to guide a machine already made, and the uses of which are known, than to make the machine and set it in motion. A *well-established* government, like that of Britain, does *not* require *all* its highest talents to be crowded into the administration. Having grown up in the habits, affections, and feelings of the people, its business can be regulated and energetically carried onward by the superintending genius of a few great men to guide its primary movements, and men of decent respectable talents to execute its subordinate functions.

The residue of its greatest and most commanding talents would be most advantageously employed in diffusing the lights of science, of art, and of literature over the whole community. . I should be very sorry to see the whole vast body of talent which now guides the career of the Edinburgh Review, pressed into the actual service of the British government, unless the writers could appoint adequate successors to spread the same great flood of metaphysical and economical light over Britain and the world, which their genius and knowledge

have hitherto done. But as talents are not transferable, nor hereditary, it is to be feared that if Elijah were again to drop, another Elisha could not be found to receive and to wear, his mantle.

In a *new* government indeed, like that of France, *all* the great talent of the nation is necessary to bind together the discordant elements of a revolutionary chaos, and force the career of government onward, in direct opposition to the feelings, habits, manners, affections and inclinations of the people; all whose political and social establishments are yet to form. A new dynasty, whose internal mal-contents must be overawed, and whose foreign enemies must be subdued or silenced, necessarily requires a greater proportion of talent to carry on the operations of its rule, so as to produce an *equal* effect of power, than is demanded in a well-established government, where each department has its fixed rules of action; and where the *hearts* as well as the heads of the people aid the accomplishment of all its efforts. A ship with a favorable breeze goes steadily onward with less seaman's help than under the pressure of an hurricane.

3. It should also be noticed, that in a settled order of things the using all, or nearly all the great talents of a country in the administration, would be productive of great evil and confusion; not only by withdrawing too large a portion of high intellect from "the calmer occupations of the pen and of the page," and thus leaving the regions of science to be explo-

red only by the feebler light of secondary minds ; but also, by introducing perpetual intrigues and clashings of contest into the cabinet itself, and consequently weakening instead of strengthening the hand of supreme power.

For great and aspiring minds cannot possibly be induced readily to obey ; they naturally and instinctively seek to command ; and if all order, and none submit, the business of the nation must be very badly managed. When Lord Chatham presided absolutely over the British cabinet, which was filled with his colleagues in office, men of respectable understanding, but certainly far inferior to himself, the public affairs of the nation were carried on with unparalleled energy and force, and Britain sprang speedily upward to the first rank in the commonwealth of Europe. But afterwards, when his administration was composed of a greater number of extraordinary men, who disputed, instead of obeying his commands, every thing was quickly disordered ; Chatham retired soon after, and Britain fell into that stupor and lethargy, which uniting insolence with weakness, and tyranny with cowardice, drove her American colonies into rebellion, and independence.

And if Bonaparte shall ever settle down in peace, and establish a regular order of government, in France, he will find himself very grievously thwarted and annoyed by that great phalanx of formidable talent which he has assembled round his throne ; owing to the restless and unmanageable nature of ge-

nus when unemployed. At present all their activity is engaged in conducting the great schemes and enterprises, civil and military, which are necessary to guide France through her contests, and usurpations of dominion. But in peace these turbulent spirits, nursed in blood and long accustomed to power and rapine, will have sufficient leisure to employ their courage and talent in plans for their own aggrandizement and the disturbance of their master.

I am therefore inclined to think, that a wide field for the production and display of great talent is opened in Britain, by always calling a respectable portion of high intellect into the service of the government; by occasionally raising up powerful minds from the middle and lower orders to the great offices of state, and thus perpetually fanning the flame of competition, and by encouraging the exertions of genius in every department of science, art, and literature, by rewards and honors.

Perseverance in study, and a regular adherence through successive ages, to the great fixed principles of moral and political science, have raised and maintained the British spirit, and rendered its government, intelligence, agriculture, manufactures, commerce and marine, at once the envy and admiration of the surrounding world.

Great talents always follow the demand for them; and no effectual bounty can be offered for their *general* appearance and exertion, except in a *free* country, whose civil and military institutions are

on a large and magnificent scale ; holding out the only great and adequate incitements of wealth, rank, influence, honor, and power, for the full development of exalted genius. A *despotism* only demands one species of talent, the military ; and that only for a short time ; because a despotism soon sinks naturally by its own corruption into the slumber of feebleness. And a *democracy*, when once established, actually *proscribes* all great talent, by the nature of its institutions, which only require the efforts of ordinary intellect in their management ; and consequently whatever high talent may be produced in a *democracy* in time of peace and freedom from national peril, it is suffered to sleep away its existence in idleness and inactivity, never being matured by employment on a great scale, fit to rouse and to develop its powers.

The following remarks are taken from that profound and luminous work, Mr. Brougham's "Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers," vol. 2. p. 247.

"In fact, the foreign affairs of nations are much less apt to be influenced by accidental events, than is generally imagined. The death of a civil or military chief, who had supported the greatness of a state by the vigor and wisdom of his councils, or the glory of his arms, is seldom, if ever, a cause of great change in the relative importance of that country. Great men rise in certain circumstances ; they are disciplined in par-

ticular schools; *they train up successors* for themselves; they are called forth by certain emergencies in public affairs.

This is more particularly the case in *great systems*, either civil or military, in the *extensive* governments, or vast regular armies of modern times; all the operations of which are combined, and mutually dependent one upon another. As these can only be carried on by the united exertions of many persons, of the same habits and cast of talents, their success must always depend on the union of men whose abilities and experience in their arts are extensive.

If the general or the statesman falls, his place will be filled by some of those whose talents have assisted him in subordinate branches of employment; and the *constant demand* for merit, in a certain department, will generally excite men to apply their attention to the acquisition of the excellence so much wanted, and *so splendidly rewarded*.

Great occasions draw into public life such men as have long been laboring to fit themselves for their station, and new talents, new powers frequently spring up in a man's mind, when he is placed in a situation of pre-eminent difficulty and splendor *sufficient* to call them forth. The great object of every nation should be, to remove every impediment or check that may prevent such men

from rising into the stations for which their natural or acquired faculties render them fit.

Under a *free* government the restrictions upon the rise of real merit are much fewer than under a despotism ; and the chance of preferment is extended to a much wider circle. In those countries then much less consequence may be attached to the existence or to the loss of a particular man."

It is also strongly objected against Britain, by the most respectable men of all parties in the United States, that she so constantly sends out to this country *feeble* ambassadors.

To this very grievous charge I confess the British government must plead guilty. For whatever might be the qualifications of unimpeached honor, or of gentlemanly address and manners, in the several ministers which Britain has sent to these United States, it certainly cannot be deemed harsh and uncharitable to say, that they have not been very profoundly, or very comprehensively furnished with those various natural endowments, and acquired information, which are essential to the constitution of that rare and exalted character, a political economist, and a practical statesman.

That an ambassador *ought* to be a statesman ; that he ought to be intimately acquainted with the internal resources and foreign relations of his own country, in order to enable him to learn

with more exactness the political condition and the national character of the people to whose government he is sent as envoy, few who have examined the importance of the subject will be disposed to deny.

And as the points of political contact between the United States and Britain are many; and as the commercial relations of the two countries are various and extensive, and without doubt highly beneficial to both; it is of considerable importance that Britain send out to this country public functionaries who might be able and willing to discover the habits and dispositions of the American people; to develop the bearings and tendencies of their government; to fathom their national resources; to comprehend and to appreciate the complicated interests, the multiplied relations, the ever-varying political aspect of a country, whose institutions are all founded on the basis of popular authority and universal suffrage, under one general federal head, and no less than eighteen separate, independent, sovereign, republican states.

It is too true, that for several years past, Britain has not been sufficiently careful in her choice of men to represent her sovereign at the seat of the other governments of the world; considering what important consequences are involved in the execution of an ambassador's very delicate and difficult functions. By the institution of envoys is

kept up a direct and constant intercourse between the governments of different nations ; and opportunities are offered of discovering, and often of preventing, the full accomplishment of those schemes and measures, which, if not thus seasonably counteracted, might eventually lead to aggression and to war, with all its horrible train of calamity and desolation.

France, the common enemy of the human race, has generally shewn herself to be fully aware of the extensive political benefits resulting from the employment of able and active envoys at foreign courts. By means of her diplomatic agency she has always exercised a very extensive influence over the cabinets of other nations ; and has generally outwitted the British ambassadors in transactions involving the most essential interests of Britain.

Two very important questions, as naturally connected with this subject, occur, which I have neither leisure nor capacity to break up, and trace to their remoter consequences. I shall therefore merely state their outlines, in the hope that some minds of greater opportunity and talent might be induced to treat them in a manner becoming their great political weight and moment.

1. Is not *vanity*, or self-consequence, or self-esteem, the primary moving spring of all governments, as it is *naturally* of all individuals ? And is it not by perpetually appealing to the vanity of

secondary nations, that France is uniformly able to cajole and influence, in order to plunder and destroy them? While Britain, by eternally wounding their vanity, and irritating their self-consequence, excites their hatred and disgust; although all her great national measures have a direct tendency to preserve these minor countries from destruction?

So an artful, unprincipled demagogue flatters and deceives the multitude into its own ruin, in order to forward his own base purposes; and the multitude is vastly delighted with their worthy compatriot, who picks their pockets, and subverts their liberties; while an upright, honorable statesman, who never stoops to lying and baseness, but really labors for the public weal, is always feared and hated by the mob, whose vanity is wounded, and whose envy is excited by his superior integrity and wisdom.

Will not the application of this principle to the affairs of governments explain, why secondary nations always lean favorably towards the most unprincipled primary nation, and in consequence inevitably perish? In Holland a French officer would receive the petition of a Dutchman courteously; compliment and flatter him on the jolly rotundity of his person; send him away pleased; and then throw the petition into the fire: while an English commander would be reserved and distant, grant the petition, and offend the petitioner.

Is it thus, that the French please and influence all the minor nations of the world; while Britain generally offends them by her loftiness and pride? Mankind, perhaps universally, prefer him who tickles their vanity, and flatters their self-consequence, to him who confers upon them the greatest and most permanent benefits, without at the same time doing homage to their importance. The affections of men are generally won by little attentions, not great kindnesses.

2. *Can* people resident in a primary nation, as in France or Britain, possibly learn how such a nation acts, and is acted upon by other both primary and secondary nations; seeing that their attention is chiefly confined to the operations of the primary power, how it shall act upon, and influence the rest of the world? Is this the reason why Britain and France are so ignorant of each other's actual condition and resources?

Does not a resident in a secondary nation see how the primary nations operate upon all the world, because all the exterior political movements of the secondary are directed by the measures of the primary nations? Witness the anti-commercial decrees of France and Britain in the years 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, by which these United States, and all the other secondary nations of the world are thrown out of their ordinary course; whereas, no measure of a secondary nation can ever possibly throw a primary power off its balance; for instance the American

embargo of 1807, 1808, 1809, has almost beggared and destroyed the Union, but has not even perceptibly affected either Britain or France.

Is this a sufficient reason to account for M. Gentz, the Prussian war counsellor, living at Berlin, in the heart of a secondary country, having in his answer to M. Hauterive, given a more accurate and comprehensive view of the positive and relative condition of France and Britain, than has ever been done by any Frenchman or Englishman?

But to return. In this awful crisis of the world, when Britain, almost alone and single-handed, maintains the cause of liberty, of all social virtue, and civilized enjoyment, in dreadful conflict against the combined force of the greater part of Europe and its dependencies, it behoves the British government to consider well how they shall play for the few foreign stakes, now left in their hands; lest they unwittingly throw them also entirely into the arms of France; a measure, as far as relates to this country, which a very powerful party in these United States, known by the name of the anti-federal, democratic, or jacobin faction, strain every nerve to accomplish.

And perhaps, it might be expedient for Britain to alter very generally the course of her accustomed diplomacy, and send out to other governments, and particularly to these United States, ambassadors who would think more and talk less; who would carefully study, develop and manage the national

feelings and habits of the people among whom they reside ; and who would be capable of advancing the real and permanent interests of their own country, in all their various diplomatic transactions.

It ought to be a matter of deep and serious import to Britain always to keep in this country a *resident minister*, able to comprehend the relations and interests of the two people ; and of sufficient magnanimity to endeavor to unite them in the closest bonds of amity, by promoting all those measures of policy and commerce which would redound to their mutual advantage ; and thus, by conjoining in the ties of friendship the only two people who enjoy even the semblance of freedom, and an equitable administration of justice, might raise a firm and an effectual barrier against that unrelenting despotism which is rolling together as a scroll the kingdoms and the empires of the civilized world ; which is even now flooding out a tide of desolation, that has already swept away the ancient boundaries and land-marks of the fairer and the better portion of the globe, and threatens to deluge the remainder of the earth with the waters of bitterness and of death.

When it is recollected that ambassadors furnish the intelligence which directs all the movements of their respective governments, as to their relations with foreign powers ; perhaps, it will not be thought that too much stress has been laid upon the great importance of a cautious and prudent selection of men, fit and able to execute the very important and arduous duties of an envoy.

In some instances Britain has shewn herself thoroughly sensible of the vast consequences resulting from the employment of capable ambassadors. She has availed herself of the great diplomatic talents of a Temple, a Marlborough, a Walpole, and a Malmesbury. And if she would oftener have recourse to such negociators, she certainly would not be so frequently over-seen by France in her diplomatic transactions and treaties; nor be so constantly exposed to the perilous necessity of standing alone against the armed combinations of other powers, who have been blinded to their own best interests, and duped into hostility against her by the more dexterous management, and the more subtle policy of French envoys.

A very acute and able living writer, (Mr. Stephen, author of "War in Disguise," "The Dangers of the Country," &c. &c.) objects this general want of foreign policy to the British government, and considers it as not confined merely to carelessness in the choice of ambassadors: he says,

"A magnanimous, but not very prudent contempt of the popular voice in foreign countries, or at least of the *means* of obtaining its suffrage, has been long displayed by the Cabinet of England. The British fight, pay, and negotiate; but except in a formal manifesto, do not *reason* to the European or American public. They *abandon to their enemies the influence of every foreign press*; even where the fear of French arms does

not preclude a competition. This is perhaps a natural, though accidental consequence of the peculiar form of the British government. The rights and the interests of the nation, the grounds of its wars and its treaties, are copiously discussed in Parliament; and the British statesmen forget that foreign politicians do not always read their debates."

It should not, however, pass unnoticed that in other countries, ambassadors transact their business, and come in contact chiefly with the ministers and leading men about the court to which they are sent; and which men pursue some measures of *fixed, permanent* policy. But in the United States, where the people bear so much sway, and are perpetually *changing* their public officers, and consequently their public measures, a British ambassador is exposed to greater difficulties in his proceedings; and finds it almost impossible to conciliate the favor, or to gain the confidence of the many contending factions in this country, so as to obtain any very liberal or *permanent* arrangement for the mutual benefit of both nations.

Add to which, he is continually exposed to a multitude of blunt and awkward questions in a country, where democracy is so much the prevailing fashion as to break down all the wholesome distinctions of rank and order; and liberty and equality are carried to such a height, that the political importance of the meanest, the most ignorant

and factious citizen, is put upon the same level with that of the most elevated and enlightened.

All these difficulties, however, are only so many additional arguments to strengthen the necessity and importance of Britain's sending out able *resident ministers* to the United States.

But I am also well aware of the difficulty of prevailing upon great and primary talents to come out as ambassadors from Britain to this country; which being only a minor and a secondary nation, holds out no inducement to such men. To reside in the midst of a rude and unformed state of society; to receive a scanty and beggarly salary; and to find every opening of the avenues to high political rank and honor in Britain shut against them; can never become objects of ambition to men of elevated minds, and extensive information.

According to the present system of British diplomacy, while these men were wasting their best years in an inglorious obscurity at Washington, "that desert called a city;" (as Colonel Pickering terms it) and reaping nothing but a harvest of suspicion from America, and of forgetfulness from Britain; their compeers in age and talents would be pressing forward to the highest stations of political excellence in their native land. Men, conscious of their own intellectual strength, cannot consent to sacrifice every prospect of honorable advancement, in order to attend for a while upon the minute movements of a feeble fluctua-

ting, unpurposed cabinet ; and then to sink into the nameless obscurity of mere private gentlemen.

While the greater nations of the earth, therefore ; while France, and Spain, and Austria, and Russia, open wide and ample fields of diplomatic exertion to the ambition of Britain's abler men ; the United States invite and receive only those ordinary talents, which, indeed, enable their possessor to bow at a levee, and to preside with easy decorum at a dinner ; but can never qualify him to discern the great interests of a nation ; to sound the depths and shoals of political intrigue ; to uphold the dignity of his own country ; and at the same time to conciliate the esteem and affection of a foreign nation.

Yet precisely *such* men, of rare and exalted endowments, are indispensably necessary to come out from Britain as resident ministers in these United States. The British government has too long *under-rated* the importance of America. It is now high time to distinguish between an unprincipled and desperate French jacobin faction, and the highly valuable national character of the *native* American people ; and also to appreciate the inexhaustible resources, physical and moral, of this country.

Unless Britain send out men of exalted and comprehensive minds, in a word, *sagacious* and *prudent statesmen*, to represent their sovereign in the United States, the mutual interests of the two

countries *never can* be understood; and French influence will always continue to predominate in the Union, and to sow the seeds of discord between two nations whose reciprocal prosperity would be very greatly promoted by living together on terms of amity and affection.

In order to effect this desirable purpose, the British government must offer a bounty sufficiently high to induce men of primary talents to relinquish the physical conveniences and comforts, the intellectual enjoyments, all the refinements of taste that are fostered in the polished society of Europe; and to encounter the rude shocks of uncivilized life, of democratic vulgarity and insolence, of infant science, and of unformed art, in the United States. The salary of the British minister resident in America must be greatly enlarged; and above all, his appointment must be made the broad and direct road to high political honor, rank, and power in Britain.

If it be an object of importance that America should co-operate with Britain in defending the last remains of political freedom against the ravages of Gallic tyranny, the British government must send out to this country a Sir William Temple, or a Horace Walpole. But if it be advisable for her to continue in perpetual broils and misunderstandings with her American brethren, she will do as she has hitherto done.

It must not however be dissembled, that the

British government is not altogether to blame in omitting to send out able men as ambassadors to foreign countries. For the men of primary talents in Britain had rather go into the House of Commons, where their great intellect has an immediate opportunity of displaying itself, so as to make a powerful and permanent impression upon the whole British community, and thus lay open for them a broad and ample road to the posts of influence and honor, than enter upon an embassy to a foreign court, where they are more out of sight of their own countrymen, and consequently, being little seen and felt, are apt to glide down the stream of life into forgetfulness.

The French, on the contrary, have no great theatre at home for the display of popular talents, and therefore willingly go abroad to seek objects on which to execute their schemes of political intrigue ; and by their collective efforts of fraud and flattery, as ministers, ambassadors, agents, and spies, obtain more power and influence in foreign cabinets, than their own government ever effects by the wisdom and energy of its administration at home.

Nevertheless, the British government has it in its power to create a bounty of honor and ambition sufficiently high to induce men of exalted talents to become the representatives of their sovereign in foreign countries. And until this be done the exterior relations of Britain will always be so

lamey conducted, as to produce much trouble and serious detriment to her best and most essential interests.

It is perhaps necessary to say a few words respecting Mr. Jackson, who has very lately come to the United States as the British resident minister. This gentleman in early life accompanied Lord St. Helens as Secretary of Legation to Madrid, where he conducted himself so ably, and so satisfactorily to both the British and Spanish governments, as to be appointed ambassador, on the return of Lord St. Helens home on account of ill health; which took place within two years after his first entrance into Spain.

Mr. Jackson, since that time, has resided in a diplomatic capacity, at the courts of Berlin, Constantinople, Paris, and Copenhagen, at *all* of which places he discharged the duties of his high and responsible station, with fidelity to his government and honor to himself.

It appeared necessary to give this brief notice of Mr. Jackson, because for these four months past all the democratic papers in the Union have been daily issuing the most base and atrocious lies and calumnies against this gentleman.

In the month of July 1809, the account came to this country that the British government disavowed the agreement made with the United States by Mr. David Erskine, as having been concluded in direct violation of his orders and instructions. Immediately

all the democratic presses in the union resounded with clamors against "the *baseness* and *perfidy* of the British nation." King George the Third was incessantly reviled as "a hypocrite, and a tyrant," and Mr. Canning was greeted with the courteous appellations of "liar, scoundrel, coward, fool," and many other compliments equally refined and elegant.

The leading democratic administration prints declared, "that the British government had given certain instructions to Mr. David Erskine, who strictly and literally obeyed them; but finding itself outwitted by the superior sagacity of Messrs. Madison, Smith, and Gallatin, it now comes forward *with a lie in its mouth*, and endeavors to cover its own folly from the world by basely sacrificing its honest and *able* minister, who, inheriting all the talents of his incomparable father, the sage Lord Erskine, undoubtedly the greatest statesman (Lord Erskine *a statesman*!) now in Britain, has as much wit as Mr. Canning, and far more wisdom."

The character of Mr. Jackson, at that time only the *proposed* Minister from Britain, was, (and is indeed to this day, October 20th 1809) attempted to be blackened by every species of the most infamous slander. The most atrocious, inconsistent, contradictory lies have been every day for these four months past invented, in order to render him at once an object of contempt and of abhorrence in the eyes of the American people. The government of the United States was incessantly called upon by news-

paper denunciations, and speeches and resolutions in democratic clubs and meetings, “ *not* to receive Jackson ; to forbid him *upon pain of death* to pollute the continent of America with his cursed foot ; to declare immediate war against Great Britain ; beginning with the *confiscation* of all British property, public and private, in and out of the United States’ funds ; and *progressing* onward to the capture of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New-Brunswick, and ending with seizing *all* the West-India islands, *half* of which are to be given to *France*, and the other half retained by America.”

All this puling, miserable jargon is perpetually bruited into our ears at this moment ; and the most extravagant assertions are made as to the *precise* moment in which Britain will cease to be a nation. Some of the profounder statesmen say “ *four months* ;” others, more humane, allow her to live until the end of *six months* from the present hour, positively asserting that “ beyond the early spring of 1810 nothing earthly can prolong her national existence.”

Compare these ebullitions of democratic justice and liberality with the conduct of Britain in relation to Mr. Munroe, when appointed American Ambassador to the court of St. James. Mr. Munroe, was known to be an incorrigible democrat ; he had actually laid a plan before the French government, when resident minister for the United States at Paris, for the destruction of Britain, and was remarkable for nothing so much as for his hatred to England.

Yet against this man not a single paragraph ever appeared in the British prints, either before his arrival at, or during his stay in, or after his departure from, London. Nevertheless, against Mr. Jackson, long before he arrived, and every hour since he has resided in these United States, although he has never in word or deed expressed any dislike towards this country, the precious organ-pipes of democracy have been and now are incessantly pealing the loudest thunders of reproach and calumny; greeting him with no other appellations than those of "the Copenhagen murderer," "the Copenhagen assassin," "the murderer of thousands and tens of thousands," "the *intended* destroyer of the United States," and so forth, and so forth.

It is a notorious fact, that while all the democratic presses in the Union are daily and hourly groaning with the weight of abuses perpetually heaped upon Britain, it seldom happens that even a single paragraph of censure upon America appears in the British public prints. This can only be accounted for on the principle, that the quantity and virulence of calumny vented against a given object, are generally in proportion to the *importance* of that object.

In France the private conversations and the public works pour out a greater abundance of abuse upon Britain than upon all the other nations of the earth put together; because France

feels that British wealth, valor, wisdom, and influence oppose insuperable obstacles to her incessant endeavors to subjugate and enslave the world. And in Britain France is honored with a larger portion of invective than is bestowed upon all the rest of the habitable globe collectively ; because French power, and French violence and injustice, immediately endanger the repose and security of the British empire.

This rule holds equally in respect to individuals as to nations ; the tongue of slander, and the pen of virulence are directed against the brave, the wealthy, the powerful, the eloquent, the wise and good ; and not against the foolish and the feeble, the cowardly and the insignificant. The application of this principle will enable us to draw a tolerably correct inference as to the *relative* importance of Britain and America to each other and to the world at large ; notwithstanding the incessant assurances and fulminations of our democrats here, that “ the *whole* British empire is *entirely dependent* upon these United States.”

I cannot conclude the subject of ambassadors without stating, on the authority of a senator now in congress, the following instance of Mr. David Erskine’s diplomatic *wisdom*. Towards the close of the winter session of Congress in 1808—9, Mr. *Giles* brought into the senate of the United States his famous *non-intercourse* bill. Mr. *Giles* is undoubtedly the most able leader of all the de-

mocratic party in the Union, and as undoubtedly, the most virulent enemy of Britain, and the most partial admirer of France.

Mr. Giles proposed the insertion of a clause in his non-intercourse bill to this effect, namely, that the *French* ships of war should be *admitted* into the waters and harbors of the United States, while the *British* ships of war should be rigorously *excluded* from those harbors and waters. A gentleman rose on the floor of the senate and opposed this clause of the bill, as being highly dishonorable to America, in showing a most servile and flagrant partiality for France, and a no less base and unjust hostility against England. Mr. Giles replied, that he had waited upon Mr. David Erskine, the British minister, at Washington, and asked him if there would be any objection on the part of Britain to the insertion of such a clause; Mr. Erskine replied, that the British government would have *no objection* to such an exemption in favor of French ships of war, while those of Britain were interdicted.

This declaration appeared so extraordinary, that it was supposed Mr. Giles had made some mistake; and a *federal* member of the senate immediately went to Mr. Erskine, and inquired if he really were in earnest in asserting that the British government would have no objection to the admission of French war-ships into the Ame-

rican ports, while those of Britain were excluded? Mr. Erskine again made answer that *his* government had *no* objection to the insertion of such a clause in favor of France, and to the injury of Britain.

At the time when Mr. David Erskine took upon himself to assure both the federal and democratic parties of the union that the British government was altogether indifferent as to how much favor America might show to France, and how much injustice she might exercise towards Britain, he actually had in his possession the instructions of Mr. Canning, expressly forbidding him to commence *any* negotiations with the American government until it had put Britain and France upon a *perfect equality* of treatment by the United States.

The farther development of Mr. David Erskine's diplomatic conduct in this country I must postpone until I discuss the foreign relations of the Union in my View of America. I shall now only add, that it has long been matter of deep astonishment to all the thinking part of the American public, how Mr. Fox could possibly send, and how Mr. Canning could possibly continue in the office of British ambassador to these United States the honorable David Montague Erskine, whose entire want of all native talent, and whose unpardonable ignorance of all, even the simplest elements of political information, have long since

rendered him the object of universal scorn or compassion in the eyes of every well-wisher to the best interests of America and Britain.

Another very prevailing doctrine among a certain class of politicians in the Union is, that Britain, in *addition* to her speedily approaching subjugation by France, is now on the eve of a most terrible political *revolution*, from the furious contentions of the various internal factions which are tearing out the bowels of their common country. And they quote scraps from Cobbett's Political Register, pages from the Edinburgh Review, extracts from the opposition speeches in Parliament, and the *reform*-harangues of the Crown & Anchor tavern; as *conclusive* proofs, that the British constitution is about to be overturned, the public debt sponged, the nobility degraded, the two Houses of Parliament dissolved for ever, the clergy butchered, the merchants robbed, all the people and property put in requisition; in a word, that all the horrors of anarchy and violence, of cruelty and blood, which have been acted on so extensive a scale in France, are to be immediately renewed "with greater perfidy and barbarity in England."

But a great mistake as to the real state of political parties of Britain pervades the whole phalanx of politicians to whom I allude. The British nation is pretty equally divided into two great political parties, the *whig* and the *tory*; each of

which includes within itself a vast body of talent, information, rank, property and influence. *Both* these parties are attached to the present form of government in Britain, both are desirous of upholding the constitution and the monarchy ; they only differ as to their separate views respecting the best *means* of accomplishing this great and desirable end.

Where the government is both stable and free, as in Britain, parties may be safely allowed to take their full range of exertion. There must be differences of opinion, and mutual opposition will engender bitterness of contest, and some rancorous feeling. There must be rivalships among those whom genius, rank, or reputation have made powerful ; and the contests of such opponents will often deeply agitate, but seldom endanger the safety of a nation. For the common aim of *both* parties is to obtain power and place *under* not *over* the government ; as was the case in France, during the explosion of the revolution ; and as must ever be the case in the struggles of democracy.

It is an act of gross and flagrant injustice to confound the strictures of the Edinburgh Review, and the speeches of the opposition in Parliament, with the ignorant scurrility of Cobbett's Political Register and the ravings of the jacobin reform-faction at the Crown & Anchor. The very able and temperate letter of the Earl of Selkirk, to Major

Cartwright, lately published in the London papers, sufficiently unfolds the views of the *reformers*. And a conclusive proof that Cobbett has fallen into the sere and yellow leaf of jacobinism is, the perpetual and commendatory citations of his Political Register in all the democratic papers of the Union ; the papers of that very same democratic party, whose fraud and *treason* to their own country are no where more ably and more successfully exposed than by Mr. Cobbett himself in his lucubrations of Peter Porcupine.

But whoever carefully peruses the pages of the Edinburgh Review, and the speeches of the opposition in Parliament, will find, however violent or intemperate they may be in their expressions of censure against the existing British administration, yet they are both equally strenuous in their determination to support the constitution and government of Britain against all the attacks of the common enemy of mankind.

In the reign of George the second, an ambassador from Spain to Britain, expressed his wonder, to a gentleman of London, that the two contending whig and tory parties should so desperately hate each other ; and observed that the nation must be so weakened by their mutual opposition as soon to fall an easy prey to the invasion of a foreign foe.

The English gentleman led away the Spaniard to see two British bull-dogs fight, which they did

most furiously, tearing each other very terribly ; after a while, a bear was turned in upon the floor where the two dogs were fighting ; they instantly ceased their mutual strife, both attacked the bear, speedily drove him off, and then renewed their quarrel with each other.

This, said the Englishman to the Spaniard, is a correct resemblance of the whig and tory parties ; they worry one another incessantly ; but should any bear, in the shape of France or Spain, attack their common country, they will both instantly unite to buffet the bear ; which being done, they will worry each other as before.

Lord Chatham's glorious war, which followed soon after, and for a long season completely shattered the power both of France and Spain, fully verified the correctness of the parallel between the political parties and the bull-dogs of Britain.

Not so the miserable remnant of the *jacobin* faction in England ; these beings, alike destitute of property, influence, talent, knowledge, numbers, and principle, always, in common with their brother disciples of democracy all over the world, scrupulously copy the example of their great patron and pay-master, Bonaparte ; and with the words "*liberty, reform, amelioration of the condition of man,*" &c. &c. on their lips, show by all their actions, that they are prepared for the perpetration of injustice, fraud, butchery, and every crime

that can cover the earth with horror and desolation.

Hatred to their *own* country, more especially if that country be Britain, is the characteristic feature of *every* jacobin. That this pernicious race is not yet quite extinct in England, the following *circular* letter from a mercantile house in Liverpool, to their American correspondents, written for the sole purpose of exciting these United States into a *war* with Britain, will sufficiently prove.

The chief active, *letter-writing* partner in the house, is a *United Irishman*, who was *in arms* against his own country, in the late rebellion against Britain, at Wexford, in Ireland. This letter has been industriously copied, and re-copied in many of the democratic papers of the administration party in the Union, "as a conclusive proof of the *absolute necessity* of America immediately declaring war against the base, perfidious, cowardly, British nation; (not a syllable against *France*,) seeing that the *patriotic* house of Dixon, Lavater, & Co. of Liverpool, (England,) have *manfully*, and *liberally*, and *philanthropically*, revealed the *infamous intentions* of the *most corrupt* and atrocious government in the world."

Liverpool, 2d September, 1809.

“ Whilst we are fully convinced that, as far as it is practicable, the course of American policy will be unalterably pacific, we are not without our fears that the intercourse will again be suspended. The partial repeal of our Orders in Council, and the mild character of our constructive Blockade, may, if skilfully and temperately urged, lead to a happy issue ; but knowing that the sentiment of the British minister is lofty and unwise, — ‘ that America will, America *must* submit,’ (quoting these as Mr. Canning’s own words,) we apprehend that Mr. Jackson’s instructions are not quite so conciliatory as the novelty and oppression of the case, as well as the vital interests at stake, so evidently and powerfully demanded.

“ Unfortunately for our country, there is a war-like character in *our* Councils, which is *totally adverse* to any permanent arrangement ; and sooner or later, this spirit, if not laid by the nation, will seek an opportunity of *discharging itself* upon *America*. Even where the interests of America are concurrent with the measures of Britain, the disposition is never allowed to grace the act, and the English minister, with a degree of asperity which is without precedent and without apology, shamelessly avows, that the *good* which was done to *America* by *his* measures, was *undesigned* by *his* government ! How *can* we ultimately look to

peace from an administration where the *very desire* of doing good from a good motive is *renounced* in the most daring and profligate manner.

“ It is very clear that the governments of America and England have not yet come together with that earnestness, or understood each other with that precision, which the magnitude of the subject, the very nature of the discussion, and above all, the distant position of the two nations, so pre-eminently demanded ; we will further venture to assert, without any qualification or condition whatever, that Mr. Erskine is not the *only* member of the diplomatic tribe who has incurred the displeasure, or forfeited the confidence of his government.

“ That Mr. Madison will act towards *England*, as well as France, with temper, moderation, and firmness, *we have no doubt whatever* ; but the points in discussion are of the most delicate and vital nature. What *can* be the equivalents for the honor—for any portion of the honor, or just neutrality of a nation ?

“ *Our* conviction is, that if you *do not contend*, you will *seek in vain* for ample justice from France or *England* ; and the question then will be :—unable to obtain justice from *either*, will you, upon the cold doctrine of *prudence* or *necessity*, submit to a system of impartial rigor, insult, and oppression from *both* ? The *position* of America gives her strength ; and though in distinct and differ-

ent points, she is perhaps unequal to other nations, still she may be *honest* to herself.

“ This in *our* opinion, is the *great question*, even if the dispute should for a time be *patched up*, which must arrest the attention of the next Congress. The *Representatives of America*, we think, will do their duty ; but after what is past, should they in a temporizing spirit, or with those compliances of which Europe furnishes an ample catalogue of examples, *compromise* the neutral rights, honors, and advantages of their country ; then, we are convinced, they will find at home a power *more fatal* to them than England or France, or even France and England united.

“ We have been led into these political speculations from a strong *conviction* of their *importance* ; and from the unalterable belief, that however *our* commerce may fluctuate under the vicissitudes of the negotiations, it is the discussions in *Congress* which must give a *firm* and *ultimate* turn to our market.”

We remain, &c.

Dixon, Lavater & Co.”

The discussion as to the expediency or the evil of political parties existing in a country is kept up in the United States, with great ingenuity and perseverance, by the advocates on both sides of the question.

One class of politicians declare that the existence of political parties in a country is absolutely necessary, in order to keep alive the spirit of liberty in

that country ; for if there were no party in opposition to the existing government, that government, unwatched and unchecked, would soon degenerate into unmitigated despotism, by the necessary tendency which all men in power feel to continually augment their authority. In arbitrary and tyrannic countries no clashing of parties exists ; there all is the calm, the silent torpor of anguish and despair ; the despot commands, and the slave obeys ; the monarch frowns, and the people die.

All analogy, we are told, confirms the validity of this doctrine. The state of the *natural* world, abhorring absolute quiescence, and requiring continual motion, points out the necessity of frequent collisions in the *moral* world. From the slumber of the stagnant lake are exhaled the steams of pestilence and death ; but the unwearied agitation of the ocean-wave, and the incessant turbulence of the billowy deep, preserve the mighty mass of waters from putrefaction and decay.

“ Where there is no liberty men may be exempt from party. There are fewer mal-contents in Turkey than in any free state in the world. Where the people have no power, they enter into no contests, and are not anxious about its use. The spirit of discontent becomes torpid for want of employment, and sighs itself to rest. The people sleep soundly in their chains, and do not even dream of their weight. They lose their turbulence with their energy, and become as tractable as any other tame animals.

“ Yet that heart is base and slavish which would not bleed freely, rather than submit to such a condition ; for liberty, with all its parties and agitations, is preferable to the torpor of slavery. Who would not prefer the little republics of ancient Greece, where liberty once prevailed in its excess, its delirium, terrible in its charms, and glistening to the last with the blaze of the fire that consumed it, to the dozing slavery of modern Greece, where the degraded wretches have suffered, until they merit scorn ?”

Another order of statesmen, at the head of whom stand the venerable Washington, and the *unimitated, inimitable* Hamilton, deprecate the prevalence of political parties, as injurious to the most essential interests of the community.

In General Washington's *valedictory* address to the people of the United States, are these sentiments upon the subject of political parties delivered.

“ I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular references to the founding them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human heart. It exists under different shapes, in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed ; but in those of the *popular* form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.

“ The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party-dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid deformities, is *itself a frightful despotism*. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual, and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

“ Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight, the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

“ It serves always to distract the public councils, and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms ; kindles the animosity of one part against another ; foment occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door to *foreign* influence and corruption, which finds facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party-passions. Thus the policy and will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

“ There is an opinion that parties in free countries

are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true ; and in governments of a *monarchical* cast patriotism may look with an eye of indulgence, if not of favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments *purely elective*, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent it from bursting into a flame ; lest, instead of warming, it should consume."

That these precautions and admonitions are just and salutary, there can be no doubt. But it is absolutely impossible to prevent the very general and powerful influence of party-spirit, in every popular and free government, owing to the necessary and natural diversity of opinion in the very few that can think ; the unavoidable ignorance and folly of the many who are led ; and the continual clashings of the different passions, prejudices, and interests of all ; which ever must and will have vent in opposition, clamor, violence, and faction, when unrestrained by the fear of punishment, or disgrace.

In all free governments party is a necessary engine of good, as well as a frequent instrument of evil. *Neutrality* in politics cannot be safely allowed. In-

difference about political matters, is a selfish, cowardly insensibility to the public welfare. It was enacted by the laws of Solon, that no citizen of Athens should be neutral in politics ; the sage legislator wisely concluding that he must be a bad citizen who did *not interest* himself in the political affairs of his country.

CHAPTER IX.

BUT the *firmest* ground of my conviction that Britain will ultimately triumph in this terrible contest with the common enemy of human kind, is the great and rapid extension of *Evangelical Religion* throughout the whole of her dominions, for some years past.

I am fully aware of all the sneers and taunts to which I expose myself by this open and unequivocal declaration. The appellations of *puritan*, *fanatic*, *methodist*, and so forth, will no doubt be most abundantly at my service, from a vast variety of critics, of every different gradation of talent and knowledge ; but all united in one common point, the most deadly hatred to the religion of Jesus Christ. In a matter, however, which I believe, know, and feel to be true, I shall endeavor to arm myself with

patience, alike against the feeble sneer of the unfledged, puny witling, and the deeper gashings of well-disciplined but malignant genius.

I indeed rejoice in the late and present diffusion of evangelical religion over the British empire, in all her sects and denominations, both nationally established and dissenting, as the surest pledge that Divine Providence will enable her piety, wisdom, and valor, finally to beat down all the aggressions and resistance of her formidable foe.

As God generally brings about the execution of his own great purposes on earth by the intervention of *secondary* means, I expect the final coercion of the overgrown power of France, to be accomplished by the Divine blessing on the judicious and heroic exertions of Britain in the cause of all social virtue and happiness against the destroyer of every hope of man.

By spreading the light of the gospel over the east and west, and upon the African continent, Britain is preparing the way for the introduction of the blessings of civilization into vast portions of the globe, which have hitherto been benighted in the thickest darkness of barbarity, ignorance, and superstition. She has also, by the extension of evangelism over her own more immediate territory in the British isles, exalted, adorned, and strengthened all the bulwarks of her civil polity; by erecting a purer and a higher standard of moral obligation; by quickening industry in all its

branches; and by pouring the light of knowledge in a clear and more ample stream over the minds of her people.

It is righteousness which exalteth a nation, draws down the blessing of heaven upon it, increases all the products and enjoyments of peace, and renders a people irresistibly powerful in war against all foreign enemies. It is a remarkable fact, that at the battle of Trafalgar, the seamen who on board Lord Nelson's own ship displayed the most signal instances of cool and determined intrepidity, were a little knot of *evangelical* sailors, whom the admiral would never suffer to be disturbed in their devotions, alleging—"that for punctual and skilful discharge of duty, and for terrible courage in fighting the enemy, these *honest Methodists* had not their equals in the whole British navy."

Nor should it be forgotten how terrible England was to all her foes during the time of Cromwell, when a great portion of the nation was evangelical; and how soon she bowed her head to the dust after Charles the second had introduced the foul and feculent tide of irreligion, and its inseparable concomitants profligacy and immorality, into every corner of the land; then the people were quickly dispirited and despised; and the *government* itself was a *hireling pensioner* of the French king.

It has been long, and is now the prevailing fashion, to represent the religion of the *puritans*,

at the period to which I allude, as *entirely* consisting of cant and hypocrisy ; but it should be remembered that the *extent* of hypocrisy must always be regulated by that of true religion. If religion had not been generally spread over the community, there could have been no effectual demand for extensive hypocrisy, which in itself is never any thing more than the homage that vice pays to virtue. If the great body of the people had not highly valued religion, it could never have been worth the while of the leading statesmen of those days to play the hypocrite, and feign themselves pious in order to become acceptable in the eyes of the nation.

If the statesmen of the *present* day in Europe and in America do not find it necessary to conceal their utter disregard for all seriousness and religion, but can afford to avow their principles of speculative and practical infidelity, it only proves that there is *too little* religion in their respective communities to compel them to wear the mask of hypocrisy, and to assume the semblance of that piety which is very generally diffused ; in a word, it only proves that the hosts of infidels are *now* become more numerous and daring than they were in some former ages.

Do I say that religion *will* ensure the protection and blessing of Divine Providence upon Britain ? Nay, but it *has* ensured this blessing and this protection. To what *other* cause than the signal

blessing of Almighty God can the ingenuity of man attribute it, that Britain has stood erect and lofty; has enlarged the borders of her dominions; has increased in wealth, industry, and power beyond all example; has excelled in intelligence, piety, morals, valor, enterprise, civilization, knowledge, in every nobler virtue and every polished grace; while the other nations of Europe have bowed their necks beneath the bloody dominion of frantic and impious France; while *France herself* has been for a series of years, and is now, a prey to a wide-wasting desolation, to which no tongue can give utterance, which no imagination can conceive; her whole people let loose from every salutary restraint of religion and of moral obligation, and presenting the hideous, loathsome spectacle of one entire mass of systematic and legalized corruption; her agriculture neglected; her external commerce annihilated; her manufactures drooping; her science and literature darkened almost to extinction; her whole community groaning under the most cruel and remorseless tyranny that ever bent the spirit of man to the earth; her sons dragged in chains to whiten with their bones, and fatten with their blood, the soil of other lands; while her deserted widows and her fatherless babes lie rotting in unburied heaps throughout every nook and corner of her swollen and overgrown empire.

Look at the contrast—look at Britain; see all

her children protected in their equal rights by the unstained administration of equal justice ; the full security of life, of liberty, and of property, preserved to all ; a continual accumulation of wealth in all the departments of her dominions ; an improved and improving system of agriculture ; an extensive and extending commerce ; manufactures thriving and increasing beyond all former parallel ; the arts liberally patronised ; science in all its branches promoted ; her lands, canals, houses, rivers, all presenting the most unequivocal proofs of incessantly progressive industry and prosperity ; her people progressive in pure religion, and sound morals, steady in their habits and manners ; the enlargement of her territorial possessions by honorable conquest ; her inexhaustible stock of talents, the living genius of freedom and intelligence, which explores the powers and recesses of nature to abridge and to embellish the productions of art ; rendering knowledge tributary to the wants, the comforts, and the enjoyments, not only of her own offspring, but of the whole human race.

Look at this contrast, and then say that the hand of divine Providence is *not* in this matter.

Mr. Burke, in the eighth volume of his works, p. 235—250, assigns the following *causes* of the French revolution.

“ The revolution in France had the relation of France to *other* nations as one of its *principal* objects. The changes made by that revolution were

not made the better to accommodate her to the old and usual relations, but to produce new ones. The revolution was made, not to make France free, but to make her *formidable* ; not to make her a neighbor, but a mistress ; not to make her more observant of laws, but to put her in a condition to impose them. To make France truly formidable it was necessary that France should be new-modelled.

“ They who have not followed the train of the late proceedings, have been led by deceitful representations, (which *deceit* made a part in the *plan*) to conceive that this totally new model of a state, in which nothing escaped a change, was made with a view to its *internal* relations only.

“ In the revolution of France *two* sorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to its pursuits : the *philosophers* and the *politicians*. They took different ways, but they met in the same end. The philosophers had one predominant object, which they pursued with a fanatical fury ; that is, *the utter extirpation of religion*. To that every question of empire was subordinate. They had rather domineer in a parish of atheists, than rule over a Christian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly subservient to their proselytizing spirit in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himself.

They who have made but superficial studies in the natural history of the human mind, have been

taught to look on *religious* opinions as the only cause of enthusiastic zeal, and sectarian propagation. But there is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very same effect.

“ The social nature of man impels him to propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The understanding bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the discipline of his opinions. Religion is among the most powerful causes of enthusiasm. When any thing concerning it becomes an object of much meditation, it cannot be indifferent to the mind.

“ They who do not love religion, hate it. The rebels to God perfectly abhor the author of their being. They hate him with all their heart, with all their mind, with all their soul, and with all their strength. He never presents himself to their thoughts, but to menace and alarm them. They cannot strike the sun out of heaven ; but they are able to raise a smouldering smoke that obscures him from their own eyes. Not being able to revenge themselves on God, they have a delight in vicariously defacing, degrading, torturing, and tearing in pieces his image in man.

“ Let no one judge of them by what he has conceived of them, when they were not incorporated, and had no lead. They were then only passen-

gers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and, without being aware of it, partook of its influence. In that situation, at worst, their nature was left free to counter-work their principles. They despaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They considered them as a reserved privilege for the chosen few.

“ But when the possibility of dominion, lead, and propagation presented itself; and that the ambition which so often before had made them hypocrites, might rather gain than lose by a daring avowal of their sentiments; then the nature of this infernal spirit, which has evil for its good, appeared in its full perfection. Nothing indeed but the possession of some *power* can with any certainty discover what at the bottom is the true character of any man.

“ Without reading the speeches of *Vergniaud*, *François* of *Nantz*, *Isnard*, and some others of that sort, it would not be easy to conceive the passion, rancour and malice of their tongues and hearts. They worked themselves up to a perfect frenzy against religion and all its professors. They tore the reputation of the clergy to pieces by their infuriated declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their massacres. This fanatical atheism left out, we omit the principal feature in the French revolution.

“The other sort of men were the politicians. To them, who had little or not at all reflected on the subject, religion in itself was no object of love or hatred. They disbelieved it, and that was all. Neutral with regard to that object, they took the side which in the present state of things might best answer their purposes. They soon found that they could not do without the philosophers ; and the philosophers soon made them sensible that the destruction of religion was to supply them with means of conquest ; first at home, and then abroad.

“The philosophers were the active internal agitators, and supplied the spirit and principles ; the politicians gave the *practical* direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the composition, sometimes the other. The only difference between them, was in the necessity of concealing the general design for a time, and in their dealing with foreign nations ; the fanatics going straight forward and openly, the politicians by the surer mode of zig-zag. In the course of events, this, among other causes, produced fierce and bloody contentions among them. But at the bottom, they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and substantially in all the means of promoting these ends.

“Without question, to bring about the unexampled event of the French revolution, the concurrence of a very great number of views and

passions was necessary. In that stupendous work, no one principle by which the human mind may have its faculties at once invigorated and depraved, was left unemployed ; but I can speak it to a certainty, and support it by undoubted proofs, that the ruling principle of those who acted in the revolution *as statesmen*, had the *exterior aggrandizement of France* as their ultimate end in the most minute part of the internal changes which were made.

“It is not easy to form a conception of the *general* eagerness of the active and energetic part of the French nation, itself the most active and energetic of all nations, previous to its revolution, upon *that* subject. The foreign speculators in France, under the old government, were twenty to one of the same class then or now in England ; and nearly all of them most emulously set forward the revolution. The whole official system, particularly in the diplomatic part, the regulars, the irregulars, down to the clerks in office, a most numerous corps, co-operated in it. All the intriguers in foreign politics, all the spies, all the intelligencers, actually or late in function, all the candidates for that sort of employment, acted *solely* upon *that* principle.

“On that system of aggrandizement, there was but one mind ; but two violent factions arose about the means. The first wished France divested from the politics of the continent, to attend

solely to her marine, to feed it by an increase of commerce, and thereby to overpower *England* on her own element. They contended, that if *England* were disabled, the powers on the *continent* of Europe would fall into their *proper subordination*; that it was *England* which deranged the whole continental system of Europe.

“The others, who were by far the more numerous, though not the most outwardly prevalent at court, considered this plan for France as contrary to her genius, her situation, and her natural means. They agreed as to the *ultimate* object, the *reduction* of the *British* power, and if possible, its naval power; but they considered an *ascendency* on the European *continent* as a necessary preliminary to that undertaking.”

No man living can possibly entertain a more entire veneration for the opinion of Mr. Burke, on every subject illumined by his incomparable understanding, *qui pæne omnia tractavit, et nihil tetigit quod non ornavit*. It is, therefore, with extreme reluctance that I venture for a moment to dissent from his conclusions as to the *causes* of the French revolution.

I entirely concur in the position that the French *philosophists* were a set of shallow-brained politicians, mainly bent upon the utter extirpation of all religion; and that the French *statesmen*, being much longer-sighted than the *philosophers*, used them for their own purposes, all of which

were intensely and undeviatingly directed towards the exterior aggrandizement of France.

And yet these two classes of men, the politicians and the philosophists were *not* the *causes of*, but only *main movers in* the French revolution. These causes were laid broad and deep in the pre-existing state of society on the continent of Europe, and more particularly in France ; of which these two orders of men availed themselves for the purpose of promoting their respective designs. This *predisposing* state of society was brought about by the *decay* and *almost entire extinction* of the *Christian religion*, which had been progressively and rapidly declining for a full century previous to the French revolution, all over the European continent.

Popery *naturally* and *necessarily* conducts the nations who possess it, into *practical* and *speculative atheism*. The few men of sense who happen to live in any one country in the same age, after a slight examination of its mummeries, tricks, frauds and absurdities, disbelieve it altogether ; and having no purer standard of religion to examine, they plunge themselves at once into *speculative* atheism, and as a necessary consequence, free themselves from all the restraints of moral obligation. For certainly if there be no God, and no future state, man cannot be *accountable* hereafter for any of his actions on earth ; and is therefore at full liberty to do whatever he is willing and able to do, provided that he does not

endanger his own personal safety or convenience. Thus the whole system of morals is reduced to a mere calculation of *individual expediency* ; there is no longer any general rule of morality ; but every different individual has a different code of moral obligation, which is perpetually fitted to his own convenience, caprice, and inclination.

In the many who never think, and were never intended by the condition of their nature to think, popery by its ready *absolution* of all sin, on the payment of a stipulated sum, produces pretty uniformly a course of *practical* atheism ; and equally sets them loose from all the bonds of moral restraint, as it does their more reflecting and speculative brethren.

With the freedom from all moral obligation are inseparably connected great general profligacy and want of industry. The slightest glance at the actual condition of popish and protestant countries will prove the truth of this position. The industry, civilization, and virtue of England, Scotland, and protestant Ireland, are incalculably superior to the popish part of Erin. The contrast is also peculiarly striking in Germany and Switzerland, where the different territories being intermingled, the traveller continually passes from a protestant to a popish country.

Poverty, filth, idleness, and profligacy invariably point out the influence of papal superstition ; and opulence, cleanliness, industry and good order as uniformly result from the flourishing condition of

protestanism. The same contrast holds with equal force as to the diffusion of intelligence, which generally takes place in protestant districts; while the thick darkness of ignorance envelops the inhabitants of popish regions. The number of malefactors and criminals in popish far outweighs that in protestant countries, other things being equal. For a full and ample investigation of this subject, consult "An Essay on the Spirit and Influence of the Reformation of Luther;" the work which obtained the prize on the question proposed in 1802, by the National Institute of France; written by M. Villers (himself a revolutionary atheist,) and published at Paris, in 1804.

The progress of *declining protestanism* in a country is somewhat different, but its termination is the same; namely, in *entire profligacy*. For the mode by which protestant churches contrive to preach themselves gradually into *deism*, see "The History of the Church of Christ," by Joseph Milner, M. A. American edition, published in 1809, vol. 1, p. 99, 129.

It is to be remembered that although nominally protestant countries often contrive to degenerate from Christianity into what they call *deism*, yet the *practical* effects to society are the same as those of atheism, between which and deism there is only some slight *speculative* difference about a first cause, or no first cause. But *both* the deist and the atheist hold themselves to be alike free from all moral obli-

gation ; neither of them considers himself as *accountable* to any superior divine tribunal hereafter, for his actions on earth. And consequently deists and atheists are equally prone to commit any species of immorality and crime, that may suit their convenience, or comport with their inclination.

This *practical identity* of deism and atheism must be understood as confined to countries where divine revelation is known, and where the gospel is or may be preached ; for in *pagan* countries where the sacred scriptures are unknown, the *deists* are much more under the influence of moral obligation than are the *atheists*, in consequence of following more steadily and with greater honesty the dictates of *natural conscience*, which they in common with all men, whether sitting under the light of revelation or not, possess as a monitor within their own bosoms.

The celebrated Doctor John Owen, in his *Treatise on Spiritual Mindedness*, p. 175, 12mo. edition, observes that the greatest iniquity and corruption are *not* to be sought for, neither will they be found among the *heathens*, whether of savage or of comparatively civilized life. These idolatrous nations are kept within some bounds of wickedness by the light of reason, and by the operations of natural conscience. But the greatest corruption and iniquity, the most horrible blasphemy, the most atrocious crimes, the most unrelenting, cold-blooded, *heartless* cruelty are to be found in the thoughts, words,

and actions of *infidels* in those countries, where the blessings of revelation are accorded to man. All the crimes of all the pagans on the whole earth during the lapse of an entire century do not equal in magnitude and horror the thousandth part of the baseness and atrocity of the French during the last twenty years.

The reason assigned by Doctor Owen for the greater criminality of the infidel, in Christian countries, than that of the idolatrous pagan is, that Divine Providence suffers the *lesser*, the *natural* light, of conscience to be extinguished in those who *wilfully* reject all belief in the *greater* light of revelation; whence they give themselves up to the commission of every iniquity which their hardened hearts can devise, and which their murderous hands can perpetrate.

I am well aware that many *deists* in Christian countries do in *words* deny the justice of this representation, and affect to consider themselves as accountable for their "deeds done in the flesh" to the Supreme Being; but upon being closely questioned, and made to follow out their own principles into their ultimate and legitimate consequences, they *invariably* confirm by *facts* what they contradict in terms; they invariably swamp themselves in *practical* atheism, leaving *their Deity* to slumber supinely in apathy and indifference, while they pursue the career which appetite impels, or convenience dictates, without *any* regard to the consequences that might accrue in a *future* life.

For a full commentary on this position consult what are called "The *philosophical* works of Lord Bolingbroke."

Now hardened infidelity, whether it be called deism or atheism, no matter which, and the most abandoned profligacy, shrinking from the commission of no crime however base and atrocious, is precisely the definition of *jacobinism*. For a conclusive proof of the correctness of this definition I most confidently appeal to the malignant unbelief and infamous character of *every* thorough-paced, genuine jacobin, now resident in France, in Britain, in these United States, or in any other country; always indeed bearing in mind the broad distinction between the well meaning and deceived democrat, and the crafty, *deceiving* jacobin.

Precisely in this situation, namely, that of popery, having naturally gravitated into atheism, and that of protestantism having for want of all proper and wholesome church discipline, degenerated into deism, was nearly the whole continent of Europe for many years previous to the French revolution; and profligacy and intelligence being more universally diffused over France than over any other nation of continental Europe, the horrible explosion necessarily took place there in the first instance.

It was this state of society in which infidelity had untied all the ligaments of moral obligation,

and let loose all the depravity of the human heart to find uncontrolled vent in the commission of every enormity, that made an *effectual demand* for the labors and writings of the French *philosophists*; of Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Condorcet, Diderot, and many other most unprincipled men, who devoted their great talents and greater information to the *sole* purpose of covering the earth with atheism and crime.

Of this state of society, and of the efforts of these infidel-fanatics, the *statesmen* of France availed themselves, in order to *guide*, (not to *cause*, for the causes were found in the universal profligacy, which would have produced a revolution, that is, an entire destruction of all social order, if no one politician had ever existed in France) the career of the revolution towards the exterior aggrandizement of the great nation. A conclusive proof of the general depravity in France is the ease and readiness with which parents denounced their children, children dragged their parents to the guillotine, and no tie of kindred blood prevented the assassin's knife, even in the *very first stages* of the revolution; which event therefore did *not cause* the profligacy; it was previously existing, and itself caused the revolutionary explosion.

Nor shall we wonder at this, when we remember, that scarcely any man in Paris, for some years previous to the revolution, could summon

up sufficient assurance to call the children, who ran about his house, and *bore his name*, his own offspring.

A venerable American statesman now living, while he was minister from the United States to France, had an opportunity of seeing a *French philosopher* die in Paris ; the Frenchman died with the same stupid, brutal insensibility as that with which a dog or a pig would lie down and breathe his last breath. The American envoy observed, that a *brother philosopher* of the man who had just died, stood looking on the dead body with as much unconcern as if he had been surveying a dead calf suspended in the shambles. He therefore entered into a conversation with this *enlightened* being, of which the following is a very short example : the letter *A* stands for the American, and *F* for the Frenchman.

“ *A.* Do you feel no anxiety about the *future* condition of your friend who lies dead here ?

F. No ; there is *no* future state ; *Voltaire* has settled that point long since.

A. Do you think then that God will not call men to account hereafter for their actions on earth ?

F. No ; there is *no* God ; *Diderot* has clearly demonstrated this matter.

A. If there be no God then, there can be no moral obligation ; and if so, how is human society to be held together ?

F. By the *enlightened self-interest* of the *very few philosophers*, who will govern the *canaille*, the multitude, by *terror*."

Mr. Wyndham, in his never to be forgotten speech against the base peace of Amiens, says, "the authors of the French revolution wished to *destroy morality and religion*. They wished these things as *ends*; but they wished them also as *means* to a higher and more extensive design. They wished for a double empire; an empire of *opinion* and an empire of political power; and they used the one of these as a mean of effecting the other. What are we to think of a country, that having struck out of men's minds, as far as it has the power to do so, *all sense of religion and all belief of a future state*, has struck out of its system of civil polity the institution of *marriage*; that has formally, professedly, and by law, established the intercourse of the sexes upon the footing of an *unrestrained concubinage*; that has turned the whole country into *one universal brothel*?"

The necessary and natural progress of the horrible anarchy which sprung up from the subversion of all moral duty, and all social order, to its termination in military despotism in France, is most impressively described by Sir James M'Intosh in his profoundly philosophical and political speech on the trial of M. Peltier in the year 1803.

"The French revolution began with great and fatal errors. These errors produced atrocious

crimes. A mild and feeble monarchy was succeeded by bloody anarchy, which very shortly gave birth to military despotism. France in a few years described the whole circle of human society.

“All this was in the order of nature. When every principle of authority, and civil discipline ; when every principle which enables some men to command, and disposes others to obey, was extirpated from the mind by atrocious theories, and still more atrocious examples ; when every old institution was trampled down with contumely, and every new institution covered in its cradle with blood ; when the principle of property itself, the sheet-anchor of society was annihilated ; when in the persons of the new possessors, whom the poverty of language obliges us to call proprietors, it was contaminated in its source by robbery and murder, and it became separated from that education and those manners ; from that general presumption of superior knowledge, and more scrupulous probity, which form its only liberal titles to respect ; when the people were taught to despise every thing old, and compelled to detest every thing new ; there remained only one principle strong enough to hold society together ; a principle utterly incompatible indeed with liberty, and unfriendly to civilization itself ; a tyrannical and barbarous principle ; but in that miserable condition of human affairs, a refuge from

still more intolerable evils ; I mean the principle of military power, which gains strength from that confusion in which all the other elements of society are dissolved, and which in these terrible extremities is the cement that preserves it from total destruction."

But although the military despotism of France at present holds nearly the whole continent of Europe in chains, it will not probably prevent that terrible *re-action* upon itself, arising from the present confused, unsocial, irreligious, immoral, condition of Europe ; all the nations of which perhaps, ere long will be destined to run the same bloody career of revolutionary warfare, upon which Spain has just entered. France has hitherto been the great instrument, in the hand of divine Providence, to inflict vengeance and punishment, not only on her own apostacy and iniquity, but also on the iniquity and apostacy of the rest of continental Europe. And her system of conscription, her destruction of all productive industry, her cutting away her own internal resources, peculiarly fit her for experiencing much more extensive and wide-wasting calamity, than she has yet suffered ; when the day of retribution shall arrive.

Mankind have been permitted by Divine Providence to make three great and decisive experiments of the effects necessarily resulting from

their own uncontrolled depravity, on a very wide and ample field.

1. A *revelation* of the only true and pure religion was made to our first parents, whose posterity soon swerved into the most horrible impiety and profligacy. The flood swept away these rebels against God; and a second promulgation of the only genuine and undefiled religion was made through the instrumentality of Noah, whose posterity also, following the course of the natural depravity of the human heart, and of man's free agency, speedily plunged into all the absurdities and horrors of paganism, which overspread the whole world, excepting one little spot where the oracles of God were miraculous preserved. The necessary and universal fruits of paganism were to cover the earth with the most awful darkness, ignorance, profligacy, and oppression.

2. In the fulness of time our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ came to introduce the last and most perfect dispensation of grace and truth, called in the sacred scriptures "*the kingdom of heaven*," and within a few years after his ascension the gospel was spread over nearly the whole surface of the earth. From the purity of evangelical doctrine and its *inseparable* companion, sound morality, men gradually declined into superstition and error, until *popery* covered the world with darkness and profligacy.

3. The reformation, by *Luther*, by *Calvin*, and

some other chosen instruments of Divine Providence, again opened to mankind the sources of pure, evangelical light, which also soon became again darkened, and almost entirely extinguished, at least on the European continent, by the rise, and rapid and general progress of *infidelity*, which third great, and far more terrible experiment in its destructive consequences than those of paganism and popery combined, is now running its career of desolation over the miserable remnant of the Christian world.

From the progress of infidelity, cutting away all the ties of moral obligation, breaking up every great cement of society, and scattering its fragments in frantic derision and malignant scorn to the four winds of heaven ; it cannot be, but that the whole continent of Europe must ere long pass through the fiery ordeal of the most fearful and bloody convulsions ; tearing up by the roots all the little remains of civil government, and scattering to pieces those potentates, principedoms, thrones, and dominations, which have hitherto *appeared to* withstand the pitiless pelting of the revolutionary tempest.

Into what forms of polity, whether of vague, weak, unpurposed democracy ; of well-poised, energetic, and lasting aristocracy ; or of unrelenting, murderous military despotism, these terrible disorders and conflicts shall subside ; into how many and how great principalities and powers the

European continent shall be ultimately divided and subdivided, is not given to human wisdom to foresee.

In *Britain*, however, a very different process has taken place from that which has laid waste, and is still desolating the continent of Europe. She early embraced the reformation in name and in effect; in England and in Scotland popery gradually gave way to the light of evangelical truth; and civilization, order and morality followed as invariable effects from a producing cause. In Ireland, indeed, the greater portion of the people are still more than half barbarous, idle, uncivilized, and profligate, from the prevalence of popery; which is to my mind one of the strongest amongst innumerable arguments for the *emancipation* of the Irish papists, that so many millions of human beings might have the *only* opportunity which man can give of emerging from barbarous superstition into civilization and order, by the diffusion of instruction, by the preaching of the gospel, by the full participation of equal political rights and privileges.

From the reign of Charles the second, religion in Britain gradually declined to a very low ebb, until the middle of the reign of George the second, when a great *revival* took place, and from that time down to the present hour, *vital, practical* religion has been, and is, gaining ground in every part of the British dominions. And it has been attended uniformly by an increase of industry,

social order, sound morals, intelligence and civil liberty.

At no time however, even amidst the most grievous declensions of serious religion, have the *fundamental* doctrines of the gospel suffered in Britain those impious and destructive perversions, which they invariably underwent on the continent of Europe. This great and inestimable benefit has arisen partly from there having always been a remnant of *evangelical* teachers and professors in the national churches of England and of Scotland, and the various other Christian sects which are spread over the British empire ; partly from the *orthodox* articles and creeds of the British national churches maintaining strong and perpetual bulwarks against all the corruptions, pollutions, and innovations of heresy ; and partly from the happy faculty which the heretics themselves in Britain have always possessed of speedily preaching their places of worship empty, and leaving only the pews and benches to be *reasoned* into their peculiar mode of explaining away, and frittering into nothing, all the essential and fundamental doctrines of the sacred scriptures.

A decisive testimony of the *social* benefits derived to a nation from the prevalence of Christianity is borne by Frederic the second of Prussia, who was himself a most incorrigible infidel. A clergyman in Prussian Poland, one of the many myriads of continental divines, who had reasoned

themselves, and preached their flocks into *deism*, sent Frederic a letter, stating that he, the Polish pastor, had discovered *fifty new* arguments against the authenticity and credibility of the Old and New Testaments. The king returned for answer, that the parson was doubtless very ingenious and very philosophical in having discovered fifty new arguments against the Bible; and probably that by hard labor and deep study, he might be able to find out a hundred and fifty more; but if he dared to *disorder the community by publishing one of them* he should be hanged up (*tout suite*) forthwith.

A conclusive proof that the *pre-existing* state of society in France produced the revolution in that country, is, that the *same* experiment was made to introduce *jacobin-atheism* into Britain; but failed, owing to the superior energy of the government; the pure religion of a great portion of the people; the sound sense, good morals, and steady habits of the nation; making no effectual demand for the universal diffusion of impiety, and the total destruction of all social order, virtue, prosperity and happiness.

The *same* experiment was also made in the United States, where it has most fatally succeeded. In this country *jacobin-atheism* has taken very wide and deep root, owing to a variety of circumstances, which *at present* it is not my business to state. Suffice it to say, that the very same *effects* have been produced by this horrible

experiment in America, as were produced in France, allowing for the different condition, moral and physical, of the two countries.

Thomas Paine's "*Age of Reason*" was so industriously circulated throughout the Union by the leaders of the democratic, then the opposition, now the government-party of this country, as very materially to lessen the annual average sale of bibles in America for some years.

I am very desirous of not being misunderstood, as wishing to represent the prevalence of Christianity in the United States as at a low ebb. I firmly believe that, in proportion to its population, there is *at present* as much religion in America as in Britain. But great numbers of really religious people in this country have been, and *are now*, seduced by the jacobins; as many religious people were at one time so seduced in Britain by the jacobins there.

In fact, the *wisdom* and *energy* of the *British government* were the all-effectual means of stopping the progress of jacobinism in that country; and *after* it had been checked, when the whole nefarious plots of the real jacobins were gradually disclosed, the sober, serious part of the community shrunk back with horror from the whole jacobinical scheme. But if *the government* had not kept the monster at bay, and exposed his hideous deformity, many thousands of the best-intentioned people in England would have *continued*, as they

had *begun*, to help forward the designs of jacobinism ; until the whole mischief had been effected, when they could only have wept over their own short-sighted folly on their way to the guillotine.

In *Ireland* also, many plain, serious Christians were duped into being enrolled in the ranks of *United Irishmen*. Had our American government possessed *sufficient strength* to wring the neck of this *Gallo-popish-infidel* serpent, the United States would *now* have been comparatively sound from the taint of jacobinism.

At this moment, however, the *jacobin mob* at Baltimore, in Maryland, is not one iota inferior in cowardly cruelty, and brutal ferocity, to the Paris mobs under Robespierre and Marat. Some few months since, the Baltimore democrats stripped a poor wretch naked, covered him with tar and feathers, and tore one of his eyes out of its bleeding socket, for having said—" that he hoped Bonaparte would never be able to conquer and enslave England !" Eight of these rioters were taken up, and indicted. During their trial, the mob surrounded the court house, and threatened to murder the lawyers, judges, and jury, if their brother-patriots were not immediately acquitted.

The prisoners however were found guilty, and condemned to pay a paltry fine, and be imprisoned for a few months. Mr. Wright, the Governor, the Chief Executive Magistrate of the State of Mary-

land, then issued his pardon to these jacobin-butchers ; and published his “ *reasons*” for so doing in the newspapers. The reason which this Chief Magistrate of an independent, sovereign State assigned for pardoning these destroyers of all social order and civil security, was—that he did not, in the present critical state of the world, deem it expedient to check the generous enthusiasm of the people of Maryland in favor of *liberty*, (meaning *France*) ; and therefore he pardoned those bloodhounds, for having wantonly and wilfully maimed a fellow-citizen for life ; and invited them to continue their murderous depredations upon the peace, property, life, and limb of every honest and respectable person in Baltimore, and elsewhere ; lest for want of exercise, their “ *generous enthusiasm in favor of liberty*” might be checked.

South of the Potomac the American States are very generally jacobinical, in the full sense of the term ; namely, deadly enemies to religion ; despisers of all moral obligation ; cruel, fraudulent, and ferocious.

In Pennsylvania, this last spring, 1809, the democrats actually chose one *Simon Snyder* for the State-Governor, avowedly because he was a man of *no* talents or information ; declaring in all their newspapers, handbills, pamphlets, speeches, and club-resolutions, how very fatal all learning and sense invariably were to the “ *pure cause of democracy* ;” wherefore they invited their compatriots to elect the

“enlightened democrat Simon Snyder; and put down all schools, and colleges, and seminaries of learning!”

The *first-fruits* of this precious election were,—that Governor Snyder called out a detachment of the Pennsylvanian militia, and ordered it to *oppose* the execution of a process of attachment issued from the Supreme Federal Judicial Court of the United States. Accordingly the militia marched under General Bright, and at the point of the bayonet prevented the Marshal from serving the process. This heroic achievement was performed in the middle of the day, in the open street of the city of Philadelphia. Governor Snyder, not contented with this act of sedition at least, if not treason, against the General Government of the Union, wrote and published in the newspapers a letter, setting forth his “great satisfaction at the *patriotism* and *intrepidity* of General Bright and the militia under his command, so worthy of the spirit of 1776,” &c. Now General Bright had some hundreds of militia-soldiers under his command, and the Marshal of the Supreme Court was only a single individual. So much for Governor Snyder’s views of courage and patriotism.

The western States beyond the Alleghany mountains are universally democratic: among a million of specimens which might be easily collected, take only one for the sake of brevity. A newspaper at Nashville, in the State of Tennessee, dated September 24th, 1809, recommends a *leading democrat* as a

suitable candidate for the *State Legislature*, because he is *a lover of plunder*.

“ Mr. Bradford, you are requested to make known, through the medium of your paper, that *Patrick Beagley* is a candidate for the Assembly at the next election; his sentiments are *pure republican*, and he is decidedly in favor of *an equal distribution of property*.”

In Louisiana the storm of jacobinical desolation is gathering fast. In consequence of the late immense importation of French banditti, black, white, and mulatto, from San Domingo, and Cuba, the *effective* population of New Orleans is now in the proportion of *fourteen* French to *one* American; and that proportion is daily increasing in favor of the French. The democratic Governor of New Orleans industriously puts Frenchmen, who make no scruple of openly avowing their contempt and detestation of the Government of the United States, into high and responsible offices under that Government. The explosion of a political volcano may therefore shortly be expected in Louisiana.

Indeed those persons who think most anxiously and profoundly upon the present aspect of affairs in this country, are looking forward with the terrible certainty of conviction to a repetition of the tragedies of Paris, Nantz, Lyons, and La Vendee, in these United States within the lapse of a few years; allowing indeed for this, that popery and infidelity have not yet debased the individual character of Americans generally.

The great sheet-anchor of hope to this northern continent is to be found in the steady habits, the superior intelligence, the sober morals, the daring enterprise, and the dauntless intrepidity of the *New-England* states. Of this, however, the leaders of American democracy are fully aware ; and are therefore with all industry and speed *cutting away* that sheet-anchor of our safety and our hope by *destroying* all the commerce of these states ; well knowing that a *merely agricultural* people must always be too poor, feeble, and widely scattered, ever to make any *effectual* resistance to the desolation of jacobinical tyranny which is rapidly pervading this country..

Is all this the idle, delusive dream of one entirely ignorant of the institutions of democracy, and their invariable tendency to anarchy, blood, and slaughter? Nay ; but the scenes daily and hourly passing before our eyes are only *verifying* the predictions which the paramount genius and eloquence of Hamilton were thundering upon us during the last ten or fifteen years, before his *assassination* by Burr.

Whoever has inclination and leisure to see this subject well examined and ably discussed, may consult the late Fisher Ames's acute and impressive Essay "*On the Dangers of American Liberty*," published in his works, p. 379—437, to which I have now only time to refer.

Jacobinism in the United States produces precisely the same effects that it does every where else ; it sours all the charities of life ; it divides father against

son, and son against father, and produces the most deadly and lasting feuds among kindred. Accordingly scarcely a numerous family exists in the Union, the peace and harmony of which are not cut up by the roots in consequence of some of its members having swamped themselves in the Serbonian bog of democracy.

Nor is it possible ever to bring a democrat who happens to be a professor of Christianity to regulate his conduct by the standard of the scriptures. A great portion of the democrats throughout the Union have already cast away all belief in revelation, and with it all regard to moral decency; but even the few who still nominally linger upon the confines of the gospel, cannot be induced to obey its blessed precepts of brotherly love and charity, and of obedience to constituted authorities.

Of this jacobin-irreligious spirit and disposition, we have a remarkable instance in the conduct of nearly a whole congregation settled in one of our neighboring counties in this state of New-York. In the year 1795, these pious people, in common with their brother-democrats of all denominations, committed great violences and disturbances on account of *Mr. Jay's* having concluded a treaty with Britain. They paraded the streets, abused their own government, execrated Britain, burned Mr. Jay in effigy, and erected liberty-poles with a French red cap on their tops, and absurd devices on their bottoms; which liberty poles are standing to this hour, in full

testimony of the stupidity, ignorance, and knavery of democracy.

The minister of the congregation to which I allude, took occasion one Sunday, during the continuance of these riots, to read the *thirteenth chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews* for the edification of his flock; which being done, a great proportion of the congregation grew very angry and declared, that the *New Testament* was written *only* for slaves under a monarchy, and was never intended for independent *republicans*.

Indeed this intimate connection between democracy and infidelity is so generally understood in our New-England states, that when it is asked "what is become of such a one, for he never comes to church now?" the answer almost invariably is "Oh, he is *turned democrat*."

I must do the people in our southern states, namely in Maryland, Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and Louisiana, the justice to say that they are more impartial; for there, in general, the very few federalists that are to be found, imitate the laudable example of the vast body-jacobin in those districts, in their utter disregard of revelation, and their becoming freedom from all the prejudices of moral restraint.

In good truth, it requires no great stretch of understanding to infer, arguing from the past to the future, what will be the *euthanasia* of democracy in the United States. We see what it has accomplish-

ed in France ; and however we may flatter ourselves with “ being more *enlightened* and more *virtuous* than the *base, slavish* Europeans ;” and with our mobs “ being *rational* and *self-collected, temperate* and *dignified*,” with much other unpurposed nonsense of the same sort, there can be no doubt that the same causes will invariably produce the same effects, whenever a favorable opportunity shall occur.

We know and feel that in *this* country the foundations of civil society *have been already* shaken to their very centre ; and that all the relations of life, social and domestic, *have been already* mildewed and withered by the blasts of *jacobin-atheism* which have long blown, and *still continue to blow* from off the accursed shores of the *Sodom* and the *Gomorrhah* of our days ; even from the polluted coast of France, whose people have thrown off all allegiance to their God, and are now waging eternal war with every virtue that can adorn, and with every amiable quality that can endear the human character to our hearts.

All those who have cast their view broad and expanded over the eventful series of human actions and crimes which of late years has laid waste the fairest portions of the earth, and has caused *that* century which in its beginning wore an angel form, to assume towards its close the features of a demon, and then to vanish in a shower of blood ; will unanimously attribute all the horrors that have lately darkened, and that still continue to

darken the horizon of our existence, to the efficient agency of *one* foul and feculent source of all iniquity, even *jacobinism* ; for, in respect to society, *sin* and *jacobinism* are convertible terms.

Jacobinism first taught its votaries, primarily in France, and then in the other countries of the globe, to cherish and to disseminate all that audacious licentiousness of opinion which spurns at the influence of habit, discards the experience of former times, and annihilates all the tender and elevated feelings of the human heart ; which abolishing the standard of moral obligation raised by the hand of God himself, and revealed in his own divine word, presumes on every question, political, moral, social, domestic, and individual, to decide merely according to the dictates of personal convenience and selfish appetite ; which justifies the means by the end, prefers *atheism* to Christianity, and subjects every being on whom it can lay its bloody grasp, to the desolation of rapine and murder ; and all for the *general* good ; good so very general that it destroys all individual happiness.

The fire of jacobinism had long been pent up in the bowels of continental Europe, until at length, after having in secret consumed the bands of religion and of honor, it burst forth into that tremendous volcanic explosion, the *French revolution*, which has convulsed all the civilized earth to its basis ; has changed the aspect and relations of the moral and political world ; and has made all things,

human and divine, to become confusion worse confounded.

With a lie in her right hand, and with the feltest malignity rankling in her heart, she has uniformly declared, and even *now* has the impudence to declare, through all her thousand venal presses in *this* country, that *France*, the land where the milk of human kindness continually overflows, *never did, nor does now*, entertain any desire of *foreign* conquest; that all the schemes of domination and aggrandizement, so generally supposed to have influenced the mighty views of *Richlieu*, of *Louvois*, and of *Bonaparte*, are all vile falsehoods and calumnies invented by the enemies of France and of universal peace. We are daily and hourly told, from the million springs and sources of democracy in the United States, that France *always did and does now* abhor every intention of disturbing other countries; of subverting their established governments; of destroying their national independence; of annihilating their rights and privileges. All the contests of France are contests of *self-defence*.

If we may believe the fair speeches of jacobinism that *even yet* crowd our American newspapers, pamphlets, and books, by the *revolution* France has secured unto herself *for ever* the most profound internal tranquillity; the purest and the most exalted domestic happiness; the highest and most unquestioned public faith; the most perfect,

the mildest, the most equitable system of government ; the most universal, the tenderest spirit of philanthropy that can cheer and dignify the human heart, too long saddened and degraded by the corrupt and tyrannical institutions of *all the European* societies (except that of France) hitherto established among men. And yet, (such is the illimitable nature of her benevolence) to *other* nations France imparts the most uncontrolled kindness ; a friendship liberal and enlarged beyond all mortal conception ; eternal peace ; the sublimest morality ; and the purest religion, the freedom from *all* prejudices.

Such, the American democrats tell us, are the fruits of the French revolution, founded, as they still persist in declaring it to be founded upon the successful struggles of a virtuous people to ameliorate the condition of suffering humanity, founded as it is upon principles that *cannot fail* to produce the immediate, and to ensure the permanent happiness, not only of France, but of *all* the other nations of the earth.

And when we ask how it happens that these marvellous and exalted principles have *not yet* produced these beneficial results ; have *not yet* created nor established the social and domestic happiness of the human race ? and when we add that this same system of *eternal peace* has engendered a more extensive and a more bloody warfare, and that this *universal philanthropy* has given

birth to a series of more general and complicated calamity and horror, than have ever been produced by *all* the combined efforts of the *other* corrupted institutions of society, savage, and civilized, ancient and modern ; we are told, with a smile of self-sufficient applause, that the *despots* of the earth *alone* are worthy of censure for not courteously and gratefully receiving the blessings which France and jacobinism proffer to them ; and if we still presume to pause and to doubt, we are insultingly bidden to cast our eyes upon the *emancipated* and happy state of Spain, of Portugal, of Holland, of Italy, of Switzerland, and of all that vast portion of the Germanic empire which enjoys the protection, and the more than maternal tenderness of Gallic domination.

A very slight examination of the subject will enable any man of common understanding to perceive that jacobinism rests on a wild theory, fallacious and impracticable ; founded on an entire ignorance of the nature and end of man, and utterly subversive of the very existence of all civilized communities.

Accordingly, we have seen in France all the elements of human society cradled in blood ; and as the only means of restraint in the absence of all law, human and divine, a *military despotism* enforced in all its rigor ; a military despotism which sports with the lives, plunders the property, and manacles the thoughts, words, and deeds

of the French people, in a far greater degree than the Sublime Porte and all his hordes of murderous Janissaries dare to inflict upon their slaves. And joined to the most unqualified, unrestrained tyranny *at home*, the Gallic despot carries into effect the most boundless and destructive schemes of foreign domination ; thus rendering the people, upon whom he tramples as on the dust under his feet, at once the instruments of their own internal desolation, and the curses and the destroyers of all the surrounding nations.

In this *forced* and frenzied state of society, France, although streaming with the blood of her own people, possesses vast power of plunging other countries into the gulf of her own misery, without having the least ability to lighten the burden of her own sufferings.

It is well known that her *foreign* system, on which she has acted with little or no variation, excepting at occasional short intervals of feebleness and indecision in some few of her administrations, ever since the commencement of the reign of Louis the eleventh, and on which she *now* acts with more determination and industry than ever, forbids to *every other* country the hope of safety from her forbearance. Wherever she can make an impression by force or fraud, by allurements or by terror, by menaces or by blandishments, she will not be deterred by any obligation of treaties, nor be diverted by any law of God or

man, from pursuing her plan of establishing *one, universal, French* sovereignty over all the earth.

And let it never be forgotten that her *foreign* system of aggrandizement, by conquest, must always bear along with it her *domestic* system of rapine, violence and bloodshed ; and that *every* nation which either bows beneath her sword, or receives her protection as *a friend*, must see all its institutions entombed in one common grave. In *that* dark and disastrous hour, all the privileges and distinctions of the different orders of the community ; all the most sacred and endearing relations of social and domestic life ; the personal security, the property, the rights, the conveniences, the comforts, the enjoyments of every individual, the last beamings of religion, the twilight and the day of hope ; all that can render human existence dignified, desirable, and lovely, will be swept away into the charnel-house of death.

But how is Bonaparte to destroy Britain, seeing that the English are so *incalculably superior* to the French, in wealth, industry, courage, intelligence, religion, morals, freedom, in a word, in every thing that can render a nation *permanently* great and powerful ?

“ The *decrees*, the blockading decrees of the sagacious emperor Napoleon,” say the enlightened democrats of these United States, “ will *speedily* destroy the cowardly, perfidious British, and reduce them to

slavery under the French power, by *ruining* the commerce of England," and so forth.

I remember well, how fresh ebullitions of joy successively burst forth from all the hosts of democracy in the Union, at the successive information of Bonaparte's having issued his *Berlin*, *Milan*, and *Bayonne* decrees ; after *each* of which it was most confidently pronounced that " Britain could not hold out more than *six months* at the very farthest." This assertion was renewed with greater vehemence than ever when " the *illustrious* Jefferson had with his *accustomed* wisdom and foresight put forth the *restrictive energies* of America, which would starve that cowardly bully, England, into unconditional submission, in *less than three months*." Whoever will take the trouble of consulting the columns of Mr. Jefferson's *National Intelligencer*, Mr. Madison's *Monitor*, and Mr. Duane's *Aurora*, and many other democratic prints, may discover a great profusion of *such* political wisdom, and eloquence, as that which I have just quoted. Indeed, in their daily and hourly ravings against Britain, the political effusions of these statesmen surpass even the average dulness of democracy.

The Berlin decree was issued nearly *three years* since ; and although the " *six months*," and the " *three months*," which were to complete the period of Britain's national existence, have passed away many times over, yet the undaunted democratic prophets in this country, still continue to rave forth

their assurances that “ Britain is now *actually perishing* from the operation of the French decrees.”

The very circumstance of Bonaparte’s issuing these decrees is a *full confession* on his part, that he despairs of ever injuring Britain by *fighting* ; whence he is willing to aim at her ruin by bankruptcy ; which is a very slow process, and tedious withal, to a man of his impatient, military habits. An assassin who wished to murder a wealthy merchant who was in full credit, would hardly wait the tardy and uncertain event of his bankruptcy ; if he could possibly finish the business more speedily by the dagger or the knife.

The incessant clamoring also which Bonaparte makes at this time for a *convention* of all the continental powers of Europe to meet at Vienna, in order to devise more effectual means of destroying Britain, is a conclusive proof that he finds the strength of the *Great Nation alone* inadequate to accomplish this desired object. The whole European continent *has been already* directed against Britain, under the auspices and genius of the Corsican, with no other effect than weakening the national resources, and preventing their reproduction, all over the continent, and of augmenting the wealth and power of the British empire.

But happily, we are not left to rely merely on inference as to the conviction of Bonaparte that he has nothing to expect but disaster from fighting with Britain, and that his only *forlorn* hope

is to endeavor to *bankrupt* her ; for we have his *own* declaration to that effect.

Colonel Pinckney of the United States, son of General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in his "*Travels through the South of France, in the years 1807—1808,*" &c. published in London in 1809, gives an account of his being present at an audience given by Bonaparte in his palace at Paris ; from this part of Mr. Pinckney's book I extract the following paragraphs.

"Bonaparte now advanced to the imperial ambassador, with whom, when present, he always begins the audience. I had now an opportunity to regard him attentively. His person is below the middle size, but well-composed ; his features regular, but in their *tout ensemble* stern and commanding ; his complexion sallow, and his general mien military. He was dressed very splendidly in purple velvet ; the coat and waistcoat embroidered with gold bees, and the grand star of the Legion of Honor worked into the coat.

"He passed no one without notice ; and to all the ambassadors he spoke once or twice. When he reached General Armstrong, he asked him "If America could not live *without foreign* commerce as well as France?" And then added, without waiting for an answer—"There is *one* nation in the world which must be taught by experience that *her merchants* are not necessary to the existence of all other nations ; and that she cannot

hold us all in commercial slavery. *England is only vulnerable in her (comptoirs) counting-houses.*"

The whole democratic party, in these United States, continually inform us, that, "Commerce *invariably* weakens, corrupts, and destroys *every* nation which has recourse to it, by making the people weak and dissipated, cowardly and vicious; by diminishing population; witness the ruin of Carthage, Tyre, Sidon, Venice, Holland, and Rome in her decline; *all* of which nations perished on *no other* account but because they were commercial. Whence it follows as an *irresistible corollary*, that the *wisest policy* of the United States will be to *abandon the ocean* altogether; and leave the corruptions of commerce to be at once the bait and the destruction of the slaves of Europe."

This "*irresistible corollary*," Mr. Jefferson has been endeavoring to draw, for the benefit of the Union, now about two years; by abandoning all its trade to the slaves of Europe. The numberless beneficial results of commerce to every nation that happens to have sense and spirit enough to cultivate it, are far beyond my power even to hint at; but the objections urged against trade are very easily shown to be false and foolish.

If commerce add nothing to national wealth and strength, *why* does Bonaparte so incessantly and strenuously endeavor to ruin the commerce of Bri-

tain as the *only* possible means of effecting her subjugation to France? If commerce add nothing to national wealth and strength, how is it that *Spain*, who three hundred years since was the most formidable nation in the world, has dwindled down into its present poor and feeble state, notwithstanding her boundless American colonies, and her inexhaustible mines of the precious metals, while Britain, who was three centuries ago comparatively an insignificant nation, is now become the most powerful state on the globe, although her little island yields no gold or silver mines, and is of narrow extent. How has this happened, but because Britain has been an enterprising commercial nation, and Spain has neglected trade?

Rome *never was* a commercial nation; in the earlier days of her republic she was foolish and ignorant enough to affect to despise trade; and in her decline the tyranny of her *imperial* government, (the object of Bonaparte's fond imitation) entirely stifled and destroyed all the commerce of Europe.

Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, Venice, and Holland, owed *the whole* of their power to their commerce, which enabled them to exist as formidable nations *much longer* than they could possibly have done, by continuing mere beggarly, ignorant, feeble, agricultural people. Their commerce supported

them against the whole world; and they drooped only when their trade declined.

As to commerce weakening a nation by rendering its people luxurious and dissipated; this assertion is directly contrary to *fact*. Trade by enriching *a whole* nation, diffuses plenty, comfort, and opulence throughout all its parts; but the dissipation and luxury of non-commercial, of merely agricultural countries, are much greater and more destructive than *can* ever take place in trading nations. For instance in the agricultural nations of Europe, as Prussia, Poland, Germany, Spain, the people are mainly divided into two classes; namely, a few ignorant, idle nobles, who have no other employment than the pursuit of vice and folly; and a great mass of the people, who are slaves, poor, wretched, spiritless boors, serfs, and vassals.

But in commercial countries, as in Britain at this moment, wealth flows in and enriches the great body of the people; actually builds up the *third estate*, the middle orders; and the opulent merchants, though living plentifully, are yet *industrious* themselves, and are perpetually putting in motion a vast quantity of productive industry in all the departments of agriculture, trade, and manufactures. There is *no* opportunity for the wealthy merchants in a commercial country to be so luxurious and dissipated as are the over-grown land-proprietors in merely agricultural nations;

the middle orders of a trading people live abundantly and prosper ; and the lower classes work, earn the full means of subsistence, and re-produce their species in a continually progressive ratio.

Next, as to commerce necessarily producing vice and cowardice ; an extensive commerce breeds a great marine, the most effectual nursery of a hardy and intrepid body of men ; and by dividing labor, enables the state to maintain an army by voluntary enlistments, whose *business* it is to fight, instead of a paltry militia of peasantry, whose business it is to plough, and, when called into battle, to run away. Britain, the greatest commercial country in the world, far surpasses all the European continental nations in the skill and valor of her army and navy.

And lastly, as to commerce *depopulating* a nation ; trade, by increasing the demand for agricultural produce, augments the means of subsistence ; and wherever these are, the population increases proportionably. On a given number of square miles, other things being equal, a much greater number of people is always found in commercial than in anti-commercial countries.

Add to all this, the vast quantity of human enterprise, courage, intellect, and knowledge, which commerce puts in motion. The least commercial are the most ignorant nations, as China and Russia ; and the most commercial are the most enlightened countries, witness Britain and the Uni-

ted States, of which last-mentioned nation the back lands have been cleared and settled for more than five hundred miles distant from the great seaport towns and cities, *solely* by the vast influx of wealth that commerce poured into the Union *before* Mr. Jefferson drew his "*irresistible corollary*" in the shape of the *embargo*, during the winter of 1807. Since that time, indeed, America has been most fearfully retrograde in all the circumstances which contribute to national peace, prosperity, strength, and honor.

Commerce introduces and cherishes *freedom*; trade and despotism are incompatible, as is now seen most strikingly in France and Russia; for *all* commercial bodies are in fact *republican* institutions, generally consisting of representative aristocracies, as the chambers of commerce in these United States, and the great incorporated trading companies in Britain. The subject of commerce however is inexhaustible, and my time and opportunity very limited; I shall therefore only state, that the history of the whole world uniformly proves, that trade invariably and directly promotes the industry, wealth, virtue, civilization, freedom, knowledge, power, and happiness of the people that extensively cultivate it; and indirectly augments the convenience, comfort, riches, and prosperity of the whole world.

France herself for many ages was the most com-

mercial nation in continental Europe, excepting Holland, and undoubtedly she has always been the most warlike of all modern countries. *Commerce* first roused the spirit of resistance on the part of the *people* to the feudal despotism; and reared the independence of the *Hanse Towns*. The *agricultural* Germans in their woods, and the Scandinavians amidst their snows, were some of the most debauched and profligate people in Europe.

But *what* effect are Bonaparte's decrees to produce upon Britain?

1. Can the Continent of Europe do as well with the *whole* of its foreign trade cut off as Britain can do with a *very small* part of her foreign trade cut off? It is evident that the Corsican's decrees can only, in the utmost extent of their power, deprive Britain of that portion of her trade which she used to transact with the European Continent. But this branch of trade is very small and insignificant in comparison of the whole extent of British commerce. In the debate which took place in the House of Commons on the commercial treaty between France and Britain, concluded by Mr. Eden, now Lord Auckland, in the year 1786, Mr. Flood stated that the annual average value of *exports* from Britain to all the world, including her own colonies, had, for some years past, amounted to nearly one hundred millions sterling; and that in the year 1785, the merchandise exported from the British Isles into France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Venice, Portugal,

and Turkey amounted only to four millions and a small fraction; being rather less than *one* part in *twenty* of the sum total of exports from Britain.

This statement referred to a time of profound peace; but in war the proportion of Britain's European Continental trade is still less in comparison with her whole commerce. If therefore Bonaparte can shut Britain out completely from the whole Continent of Europe he can only prevent her from exporting a comparatively small portion of her merchandise; for which benefit he irreparably injures all the Continental nations, not excepting France herself, by destroying *the whole* of their export trade; and thus most materially cripples their agriculture and their manufactures.

2. But *can* Bonaparte by his decrees *diminish* the whole trade of Britain? That he has not been able to do it yet, is most certain; for British commerce is now more extensive than ever. The people on the Continent of Europe are not one whit the more inclined to go naked, because Bonaparte has taken a fancy to see them all *sans-culottes*. The general warfare has so cut up the manufactures of Continental Europe, that recourse must be had to Britain for some articles of prime necessity, and many of great convenience, or a total privation of them must be endured.

The Continental nations prefer applying to Britain for goods to obeying the Corsican's imperial decrees; and accordingly large quantities of British

manufactures find their way continually into the Continent of Europe, notwithstanding all Bonaparte's endeavors to prevent it.

A conclusive proof that Britain has not suffered any diminution in her great staple-manufacture, from the operations of the terrible Berlin, Milan, and Bayonne decrees, may be gathered from the following account of the present condition of the *woollen* manufacture in the north of England, taken from the *official* returns, including a period from the 25th of March 1808 to the 25th of March 1809.

Narrow Cloths.

	<i>Pieces.</i>	<i>Yards.</i>
Milled in 1808—9,	144,624, making	5,309,007
———— 1807—8,	161,816, ———	5,931,253
	—————	—————
Decreased, . .	17,193, ———	622,246
	—————	—————

Broad Cloths.

	<i>Pieces.</i>	<i>Yards.</i>
Milled in 1808—9,	279,859, making	9,050,970
———— 1807—8,	262,024, ———	8,422,143
	—————	—————

Increase, . . .	17,835, making	628,827
Deduct, . . .	17,193, ———	622,246
<hr/>		<hr/>
and the total increase in yards is, . . .		6,581 $\frac{1}{2}$
which multiplied by 2, give an increase		
of yards		13,162
		<hr/>

The increase of 628,827 yards in *broad* cloths is at least in a *double* proportion to the decrease in *narrows* which is only half the width of the broad cloths. It should also be noticed, that in March 1808, the stock of cloth on hand was very great, whereas now there is scarcely any. So that notwithstanding Bonaparte's decrees, more British woollens have been manufactured, and very many more have been *sold*, during the last, than in any preceding year.

Whence the *only* effect produced by these imperial decrees is, that Bonaparte's own subjects, and allies have the satisfaction of smuggling British goods into the European continent at an advanced price of fifty or a hundred per cent. and of depriving their respective governments of the duties on these goods which would accrue from their lawful importation.

3. Although the *aggregate* trade of the whole world has been lessened by the decrees of Bonaparte, and, the cowardly imitations of his vassal states in the different quarters of the globe, yet Britain's share or proportion of commerce has been

considerably augmented. France, Holland, Germany, Russia, Italy, Denmark, now cease to export any of their various commodities, and Britain *in part* supplies those foreign markets, which used to be open to the goods of continental Europe.

In addition to which, the trade of Spain, of her immense colonies, and of the Brazils, has been also recently unlocked to Britain, whose commerce is now far more extensive than it ever has been at any former period; so much so that the price of her tonnage is about double to what it used to be before Bonaparte's decrees and Mr. Jefferson's all-wise *embargo* were laid on, in order "to put the *finishing stroke* to the navigation, manufactures, and trade of Britain," as we were triumphantly told in print by the bosom-friend and most honored state-companion of Mr. Jefferson himself.

In good truth, the impoverished state of continental Europe, and the almost total dissipation of its floating and mercantile capital, in consequence of the long continued ravages of war, has not only crippled for the present, but must inevitably retard for a long time to come, the growth of its manufacturing industry; whence it is now and will continue to be for many years *more than ever* dependant upon Britain for the primary necessities and the chief conveniences of life.

Mr. Comber, in p. 294—313, of his book so often referred to before, makes some very sensible obser-

vations on this subject. “ A commercial intercourse *cannot* well exist, under any circumstances, between two nations without benefiting *both*; because nothing would be long sent from one to the other, for which there is not an effectual demand, and consequently an equivalent in some shape or other returned; and if the equivalent be not of less value to the giver (on both sides) than the commodity which he receives, it would be a losing trade to one or both parties concerned, and of course would speedily cease.

As the demand thus maintained by an exchange of equivalents mutually encourages the production of the articles exchanged, the annual produce of both countries is augmented. Hence no nation *can* restrain this intercourse, or throw obstacles in its way, without suffering *at least* as much injury as it inflicts.

But in the present anti-commercial conflict between Britain and France it cannot be doubted which is the greatest sufferer; for the frantic attempts made against British commerce not only fail in diminishing their export trade, but also leave entirely unimpaired their vast abundance of solid, permanent wealth, their inexhaustible sources of riches resulting from habits of industry and the annual accumulation of national capital; while at the same time the various countries of continental Europe that are under the influence of Bonaparte are entirely deprived of many of the comforts and some of the necessities of life, by the annihilation of all

their foreign trade ; and in the measures of *retaliation* to which they have driven Britain they find insuperable obstacles thrown in the way of their intercourse with each other, by the interruption of their coasting navigation, and the consequent grievous diminution of their internal or home trade.

If the issue of the contest should depend on the comparative degree of suffering resulting to the different contending powers, a speedy determination might be confidently anticipated ; but it depends chiefly on the will of a remorseless individual, who considers the misery or destruction of the whole human race as nothing when put in competition with the projects of his personal ambition, or the gratification of his own selfish pride and vanity. A termination depending upon such causes is extremely doubtful ; because it is not easy to calculate the precise quantity of national misery that can induce a people to counteract or oppose the will of a military despot. And although the improvement of a nation, and the development of its resources, may be rapidly progressive ; yet its *retrograde* movements are generally too slow and imperceptibly wasting, to produce sudden and decisive effects by the entire alteration of great political measures. Whence a country badly governed is usually suffered to sink silently and gradually into destruction by the ruin of all its *internal* resources ; as is most conspicuously exemplified in the obstinate adherence to the *anti-com-*

mercial system by the present administrations of France and these United States.

There is therefore no probability of a *speedy* crisis in the affairs of continental Europe, which might tend to counteract the measures that Bonaparte has adopted for the sole purpose of destroying Britain. And any attempt on the part of England to avert the *supposed* consequences of these terrible decrees, would only increase the arrogance of the Corsican, and induce him to believe in the efficacy of his *anti-commercial* scheme, and that the British empire could at any time *be subdued* by *paper* proclamations, edicts, embargoes, non-importations, and non-intercourses.

It is therefore the true interest and sacred duty of Britain to persevere in the contest, until Bonaparte feels by the ruin of his own empire the inefficacy of all his blockading endeavors to destroy, or even to injure the British commerce. When this is once demonstrated in the face of the whole world, the conviction of the utter folly and feebleness of such a system of arrogance, as it regards Britain, accompanied by the salutary experience of the grievous and irreparable evils which it entails upon the countries that adopt it, will prevent *other* governments in future from imagining that “the putting forth their *restrictive energies* is one of the *ordinary* but *effectual* modes of *coercing the British into unconditional submission.*”

That this, or any other contest in which the strength of opposing powers is tried, might occasion inconvenience or distress to a few trading individuals, is a matter comparatively of no moment, and should not on any account deter Britain from maintaining her maritime rights and interests, and asserting her national honor. For although many are base enough to consider national honor as nothing when put in competition with mercantile gain and profit, yet it is with *nations* as with *individuals*, those who have not sufficient virtue, wisdom, and courage to defend their character and honor from all attacks, are invariably devoted to perpetual insult and degradation, to ultimate and lasting bondage.

The following *Spanish* gazette, dated August 8th, 1808, gives the most accurate and conclusive view of the effects necessarily resulting from Bonaparte's anti-commercial edicts.

“ Is the blockade of the European Continent against the English *practicable*? If the Old and the New Continent were under the domination and sovereignty of one sole monarch, and it were possible that on all the shores, and in the whole circumference of the earth, his orders were obeyed and executed, unopposed by cogent necessity and circumstances, then the blockade of Continental Europe might be practicable and effective.

But to ordain or expect that for *one* kingdom or empire, which has not even the command of the western part of Continental Europe, *all the other*

potentates, without any attention to their situation, relations, and wants, should willingly deprive themselves of the benefits of commerce, and forego the *necessaries* of life and comfort; raise and consign to destruction the surplus produce of their countries; and give up the resources which industry and navigation procure; is a pretension extravagant and impracticable in foreign dominions, and unjust and tyrannical at home.

It is well known that *ports* are the *sources* of the *wealth* of States, and the channels through which specie, and all other articles of necessity, convenience, and enjoyment pass. If this entry of public prosperity be shut to mankind, they will be restricted to the bare produce of their soil, and be through the want of specie reduced to *indigence*. Without this specie (or its equivalent) they cannot be brought to raise and keep up their armies, project and achieve conquests. It has therefore been wisely said, that *that* power would *command* the European Continent which could hold the dominion of the seas, and whose navigation and commerce would at the same time flourish.

Yet in despite of these glaring truths, *France* has for these fifteen years past never ceased projecting *ridiculous, chimerical, impracticable* enterprises. She has the levity to declare the continent blockaded to the English, *before* she has secured the possession of the coast of Europe. This novelty captivated all the credulous, *insensate* admirers of fantastic extra-

vagance; while it met with *condign derision* from the statesman, and the reflecting mind. In fact, the report of Talleyrand, the approbation of the senate, and the imperious decree of Bonaparte, are illustrious subjects of farce, and precious stuff for the pen of play-wrights.

And indeed what can be imagined more preposterous and ludicrous than to *decree*, whilst engaged in a hazardous contest with Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, unpossessed of the full control of Denmark, Spain, Austria, Portugal, and Turkey, and even before the reduction of Calabria, and the expulsion of the Pope and the Queen-regent of Etruria from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean; that the *whole* continent of Europe should shut up its ports to the English; sacrifice its commerce and interests; barely because Napoleon is pleased to ordain it so? He has however ordained it, and the exalted imagination of the sanguine and visionary French already saw the *English navy annihilated, and Britain crushed*.

What sad pictures did not France and her partisans all over the world draw of the situation of the British? Inaction, famine, discontents, and *revolutions*, were successively agitating Britain; there were many in France, (and in these United States also,) who in positive anticipation, already beheld *king George* humiliated, and prostrate on his knees, soliciting peace from the hero of the age, and the arbiter of the destinies of man. So

vast is the influence of *error* in the realms of *ignorance*,

But the ill-fated, proscribed English, so far from retrograding, have made *still greater* strides to wealth and power; while in France and Spain, specie vanished, and even the opulent began to feel themselves constrained to assimilate their regimen to that of the muleteer and the sheep-driver.

The colonies, both Spanish and French, were by this decree, openly put to the verge of revolution; and driven to the necessity of consulting for their independence. The allies of France, who derive their whole support from commerce, to prevent their ruin, were forced to renounce the protection and alliance of Napoleon; their armies were on the eve of falling to pieces, and dispersing for want of means to keep them together; destitute of commodities, and unable even to convey them, their maritime forces being reduced or over-awed, the inhabitants of *Spanish America* were on the point of being driven to the necessity of opening their ports to the English.

This project, then, has been *monstrously absurd*. Bonaparte was, no doubt, aware that *his decrees* could not be the means of wresting the trident from the hand of *England*, or releasing the ports from *her blockade*; or of taking reciprocal vengeance; it was too clear to him that *Britain* had the forces to block *him up*, and that *he* had none

to prevent it. But he had *nobler* objects in view ; the continent of Europe was to be partitioned between *his* family ; and this expedient was by him conceived to be the most effectual way to conceal his schemes from the French, who were to be dragged like beasts to the shambles for slaughter.

And thus he masked under the veil of national interest the ill-disguised scheme of aggrandizing his own family. These decrees have been no obscure omen of the premeditated articles of the peace of *Tilsit*, and of the division of Europe into two empires ; of which he, the projector, was for the present to seize that which would extend in one line from the mouth of the Vistula to Corfu, confined in other directions by the Baltic, the Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic. Prussia was to hold the remainder.

Necessarily must have entered into the accomplishment of this project, the subjugation of Spain, Portugal, Etruria, the States of the Church, the Hanseatic Towns, Denmark, and finally Austria, which yet remained to be pared down. These were *all* comprehended in the *Decree* of the *continental blockade*, which was the plausible means of coloring the entrance of his armies into Spain, preceded by *proclamations*, declaring that they come *solely* for the purpose of compelling the common enemy, (Britain) to keep within his own bounds, and of inducing him to a *maritime peace*.

The French entered upon the stage, and began to act. They no sooner had obtained the desired footing, than the mask was thrown off, and rapine and desolation of chiefs and cohorts became the order of the day. The English, without comparison, *more sagacious and wise* than the French, have seen and predicted in the execution of the decree of the blockade of continental Europe, the *overthrow* of the monstrous empire of France, and the emancipation of the European States. Britain has saved her allies, and consigned *other* nations to the lessons of experience; and in fact, they have been all undeceived, are all desirous of throwing off their shackles; and *some* have disclosed their sentiments, and thrown open their ports to the English, who with a generosity equal to their power, have dispensed to them unreserved aid.

The communication having been opened, they find that Britain stands *more* flourishing, *more* undaunted, and *more* exalted than ever, before them. Let us blush at our credulous confidence in *French* representations; let us consign to the flames their false, seductive papers; and for ever disclaim their friendship. Struck with shame, we acknowledge our error; renounce all adherence to *France*, and vow everlasting friendship to *Britain*."

Indeed, it argues no very profound policy in Bonaparte to endeavor to counteract the *habits* of

more than *a hundred millions* of human beings by the will of himself, a single individual. Man is the creature of habit, whose guidance he follows in a thousand instances, for one in which he obeys the dictates of reason. Bonaparte orders more than a hundred millions of people on the continent of Europe, to forego all the benefits of foreign commerce, and in consequence, to endure the daily and hourly privations of many of the prime necessities of life, and of many conveniencies and comforts which long habit has converted into necessities. A very respectable German merchant informed me yesterday, that all his letters from his correspondents in Germany and Holland, concur in stating that a very great proportion of those families in continental Europe who used before the stoppage of all external trade to live in affluence and luxury, are now reduced to the same rude and homely fare with that of the peasantry in ordinary times; and that the vast body of the people are ground down to an inexpressible state of penury and wretchedness.

Now there is nothing in all this that is calculated to rouse the national pride, or to fan the martial fire of the inhabitants of continental Europe; but the constant pressure of privation and inconvenience pervading all their individual and social habits, penetrating into and destroying the inmost recesses of their domestic comfort, haunting their tables and their beds, and casting a face of uni-

versal cheerlessness and gloom over all the pursuits of themselves and of their families; *can* only sharpen and deepen the most deadly and unrelenting hatred against the *sole* author of all their misery; against the individual who wantonly sacrifices all their comfort and happiness in the prosecution of his selfish, hopeless, impracticable project of destroying Britain.

When Peter the first of Russia issued an imperial decree ordering all his subjects to *shave* themselves, the commotion was so violent, and the resistance of the Russians to this infringement upon their long continued habits so determined, that the despotic Tzar, who exercised the uncontrolled power of life and death over his people, was obliged to recall his decree; because he found it easier and less dangerous to the safety of his throne to take off the head than the beard of a Muscovite.

Nor could that infatuated philosopher, Joseph the second, emperor of Germany, induce his subjects in Austria, where his power was absolute, to bury their dead bodies in lime-pits; because it was contrary to the mode of interment to which they had been accustomed.

And in the revolutionary war, notwithstanding the famous *non-importation* act of 1774, the *American* army was always clothed in *British* cloth, which, during the first years of the war was imported into the United States from Amsterdam,

and afterwards from Gottenburgh, when the Dutch were dragged reluctantly into the war against England by the ascendancy of *French* influence in their national councils. The same circumstance took place as to a vast variety of other commodities, which the *habits* of the American people induced them to purchase indirectly from Britain, in spite of the combined forces of the non-importation act and the war, which indeed raised the prices of imported articles to the American consumer to an average of from *seventy* to a *hundred* per cent.

I am therefore inclined to think that the inveterate habits of the people of continental Europe will so far elude the utmost vigilance of Bonaparte and his army of custom-house officers, as to enable them to import British manufactures in considerable quantities, until the day of *re-action* shall burst asunder the fetters of *anti-commercial* bondage by shaking the enormous empire of France to the very centre of its foundations.

If then Bonaparte's anti-commercial decrees cannot destroy Britain, by *what* means is he to accomplish her ruin? By *fighting*? Of the hopelessness of that experiment he has received ample testimony written in very legible and permanent characters, at *Corunna* and *Talavera*, within these twelve months since; where he has had the mortification of finding that his boasted French veterans cannot stand in battle against a

far inferior number of British troops. It is indeed the peculiar characteristic of the people of Britain, that their spirit and courage rise in proportion as dangers and difficulties thicken around them, and they have nothing to fear from the combined violence of the whole world directed against them, if they only remain true to themselves, and resolutely persevere in upholding their national rights and honor against all the assaults of fraud and force.

Besides, the insular situation of Britain renders it peculiarly difficult for a foreign enemy to accomplish her subjugation. It is not quite so easy for Bonaparte to pour his myriads of armed slaves into the British isles, as into Spain or Germany. Admiral Lord Bridport used to say, "that the French might invade England as soon as they pleased, but that they should not come by water."

The French have for some years past been perpetually endeavoring to *invade* the little island of Sicily, and have always been frustrated in their attempts by the British fleet which commands the bay, although they are masters of all the opposite coast, can command any number of troops for the expedition, and have a very short run by water to encounter.

Britain is all-powerful at sea, and can annoy France, can insult her coasts, can prevent the resuscitation of her commerce, and thus cripple her

finances and resources. In return for all which France threatens England with invasion, but how is a fleet of flat bottomed boats to elude the vigilance of the British fleet, and land an army large enough to produce any serious effect on Britain?

But suppose they were landed; an English army, well appointed, and of most undaunted valor, would soon destroy any hostile force that could be disembarked. No doubt, much evil, short of absolute subjugation, might be inflicted on a country by an invading army, more particularly in Britain, which is very ill calculated to become the scene of military operations, owing to its vast wealth, its crowded population, its multitudes of traders and mechanics, its public debt and paper currency, its commercial credit, and the various factitious qualities of a nice and most complicated system of society.

But the question now before us is, will Bonaparte ultimately *conquer and enslave* Britain? Now, no one who has had an opportunity of examining the resources, physical and moral, of the French and British empires, can for a single moment hesitate to assert that Bonaparte, even if he could succeed in combining all continental Europe against England, and shut her out from *all* the foreign markets in the world; that even then it would be more easy for him to turn aside the waters of the ocean than to subdue the high spirit of the *mistress of the deep*.

And if he even succeed in making good his landing on that queen of isles, "that precious stone set in the silver sea," he will find that the tide of hostile invasion will be rolled back upon him, and upon his slaves, by the living rampart of British bodies; every day will be a day of battle; every inch of ground will be floated in the blood of his bravest followers; and the subjugation of Albion will only be purchased by the slaughter of all her children.

The following examination into the effects resulting from war or peace to France and Britain, in the present critical situation of Europe, I owe to the pen of the same illustrious statesman, from whom I borrowed the account of the existing condition of Holland.

"A *peace* with France now, would expose the British East-India possessions to a very serious increase of danger. At present, the French have not a single settlement on the continent of India, and are consequently excluded from communication with the native powers. But peace, by restoring to them Pondicherry and their lesser settlements, will re-open to them the avenue to intrigue at the courts of the Indian princes.

Bonaparte, unless very closely watched and spiritedly resisted, will introduce his officers in order to discipline their troops, and prepare them, by the most assiduous exertions, to dispute with Britain on her next rupture with France, the pos-

session of that vast country. India has long been the favorite object of Bonaparte's ambition ; the spirit which led him to attempt its conquest through Egypt and Arabia, still animates him. He regards it, not with the deliberate consideration of a statesman, but with the enthusiasm of a soldier ; with the ardor of vulgar prejudice, as an inexhaustible mine of wealth ; the source of the riches and power of Britain. He well knows, that during the continuance of war, his efforts to shake the British power in that envied country will be hopeless, but in peace he will prepare, in fraud and secrecy, the means of its radical subversion.

An *interval* of peace, if of short duration, would also open to the body-jacobin in Ireland an intercourse with *their* patron and master in France, whose emissaries would soon flock over in the pretended capacity of commercial commissaries.

The commerce, the finances, the colonial policy of Britain have always hitherto flourished, and do now continue to flourish, during the war which has annihilated the trade, the colonies, and the credit of France. But in peace Britain would be obliged to maintain nearly the same large and expensive establishments which she supports during the war, without the same extent of commerce ; while France would recruit her navy, recover her commerce and colonies, and be speedily ready to renew the encountre with every advantage on her

side, and every disadvantage on the side of her antagonist.

While Bonaparte lives it is vain to expect any *lasting* peace for Europe. In his celebrated conversation with Lord Whitworth, during the peace of Amiens, this *pacific* chief declared that then, in a time of profound tranquillity, he was going immediately to complete his army to *four hundred and eighty thousand* men, and was confident of equalling in ten years that fleet which makes England mistress of the seas.

Of Bonaparte's disposition there can be no doubt. The settled purpose of his soul is to aim at *universal empire*. He pursues this object with undeviating constancy in peace and in war. He advances to it alternately by force of arms, and by secret intrigues. He maintains in peace an army of half a million of men that he may pursue a uniform course of encroachment, and reply to the remonstrances of his neighbors by threats of immediate war.

At the peace of Amiens the most liberal, *far too liberal*, concessions were made to him by Britain, in order to afford him every inducement for the maintenance of peace. Britain asked to retain nothing which might injure the interests or wound the pride of France. With a wise and moderate enemy this policy would have laid the foundation of permanent tranquillity; with a headstrong tyrant it was only the signal for new aggressions.

The interval of peace was to him a time of greater activity, of *more extensive aggrandizement* than the most vigorous war. He parcels out Germany, he incorporates Piedmont with France, he enslaves Switzerland, he sows the seeds of war in India, he plans another perfidious surrender of Malta, and a second invasion of Egypt. He threatens to exclude England from intervention in the affairs of the European continent, and he orders the construction of twenty sail of the line in one year. His own harbors he shuts to the trade of Britain, and he commissions spies to survey her ports. And in the midst of these aggressions he represents himself to Europe, with unparalleled assurance, as injured, because the British ministry, awakened at last to his violence, refused to deliver up the key of Egypt and of India.

The first wish of Bonaparte's heart was, that Britain should have joined with France in conquering and oppressing Europe. "Two such countries," to use his own words, "by a proper understanding, might govern the world. Had he not felt the enmity of Britain on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens," (that is, had the British yielded an unqualified obedience to whatever he thought proper to demand) "there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; *participation* in indemnities as well as in influence on the European continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing

that could have given satisfaction and have testified his friendship."

He once expected that Britain, insatiable of conquest, like himself, might have been tempted to join in a base league against the sacred rights of nations; when, after exhausting her strength in the subjugation of Europe, he would have bent his utmost efforts to subdue the British Isles. Awakened however from this delusion, his present scheme is to overthrow Britain; *and in her the rest of the world.*

He will endeavor to attain this object by a gradual progress, similar to that which led to the completion of his usurpation in France. Violence and fraud combined effected his appointment to the consulate, at first for a limited period. In the third year of his sway, emboldened by a successful career, he procures his nomination for life. In the fifth he openly lays aside the mask, and assumes the absolute sovereignty of a country which had so lately braved utter extinction in the cause of liberty.

Advanced in France to the plenitude of power, and secure of its duration, his ambition now takes a different range. He will pursue the degradation of Britain with the same combination of artifice and violence; the same unwearied perseverance which led to his own exaltation, *war is an insurmountable obstacle* to his progress, and he therefore desires *an interval of peace.*

The ungovernable passion of ambition hurries him on, not only beyond every restraint of religion

and morality, but even against the dictates of sound policy. Was there ever an act of wilder injustice than to establish a *king* in Holland, where royalty is proscribed by the concurrent voice of every party? Was there ever a *more impolitic* step taken than his atrocious usurpation of Spain, by which he has converted an obedient and useful ally into a fierce and ungovernable enemy?

The same mind which planned these daring innovations, will hope to effect the expulsion of Britain from India, to wrest from her the sovereignty of the seas, to dismember Ireland from the British empire, and even to feed upon the hope of dictating a humiliating treaty in London.

The man who is thus animated with the most implacable rancorous hatred against Britain, is endowed with talents to which the history of nations scarcely exhibits a parallel in the lapse of centuries. His invention supplies expedients for every difficulty; his subtlety has deceived successively every enemy; his mind, incessantly active, renounces all relaxation, and occupies itself with perpetual schemes of ambition. He has maintained himself for years in possession of that absolute power which few of his predecessors enjoyed for so many months. He has not only baffled every assault from abroad, and conspiracy at home; but has made them all subservient to his aggrandizement. The greater part of continental Europe is subject to his control, and

every force, except the armies and the fleets of Britain, has fled before him.

Peace is desired by Bonaparte, only as it will furnish more vigorous means of war. Is he anxious to re-establish the trade and manufactures of France, in order to promote the general happiness of his subjects? Can such a disposition be ascribed to *him* who poisons his own sick and wounded troops, and assassinates his prisoners? No. He desires peace that he might recruit his finances and his navy. A soldier in the cabinet, as in the field, he appreciates every thing by its utility in war; and much as he sometimes affects to value commerce, we should see him in the midst of peace, if he could prevail on Britain again to make such a disastrous peace for herself, and so advantageous to France, as was that *cowardly, infamous* peace of *Amiens*, continue to keep at least half a million of his subjects armed, and abstracted from the pursuits of industry.

Let us now examine the relative situations of the two countries in war and peace. In the present war, the balance of advantages in *every* respect is in favor of Britain. To France war with the British has become an inglorious and a hopeless contest. Her fleets have either been destroyed and captured; or are accounted fortunate, if, returning from a fruitless enterprise, they reach their own harbors in safety. And of late, in Spain and Portugal, her boasted, *invincible* veteran troops, led on by Bonaparte's

greatest commanders, have been *uniformly beaten* by *very inferior* numbers of British soldiery.

There remains only the hazardous, difficult, desperate attempt at invading Britain ; which if effected would doubtless end in the entire destruction of the assailants, and complete the victorious, preponderating attitude of the British empire.

To Britain, war against France has been a series of the most brilliant successes. It is in their allies only that the British have experienced misfortunes ; with the termination of almost every successive campaign, the aspect of the war has entirely changed. France, so terrible by land, is inactive and languid in her operations at sea. England is every where triumphant on the ocean, and reaps all the glory and benefit of active warfare.

The advantages of a peace to France are incalculable. It will relieve her from a disastrous contest ; it will restore her colonies ; revive her expiring commerce ; recruit her exhausted finances ; create innumerable seamen, and re-establish her navy in its former splendor. But which of these benefits will Britain reap from a termination of the war ? Her trade, her finances, her navy are flourishing beyond all former example. Will her *security* be increased by peace, or her *burdens* considerably lessened ?

In the former and better times of Europe, the advantages of peace were solid and immediate.

Fleets and armies were disbanded on both sides, and the burdens of war ceased with the signature of the definitive treaty. At present there can be *no* important reduction of Britain's war-establishment. She *must* continue armed, and bear the burden of war in the midst of peace ; *all* of whose advantages to her may be comprised in

1. A *partial, a very small* reduction of her public expenditure.

2. The diminution of insurance, and other war-charges on her trade.

3. If a satisfactory treaty of commerce be concluded, a more free communication with the European continent.

Whether or not the consequence of peace would be an *extension* of British trade and manufactures, is a question of difficult solution. By the majority of those engaged in them, this question will be answered in the *negative*. And the expected improvement of the *finances* of Britain by a peace, is evidently much over-rated.

No peace therefore ought to be made by Britain except on terms commensurate with her preponderance in war ; terms highly advantageous to herself, and conducive to the safety of continental Europe. It is not enough that the basis of negotiation be such terms as would satisfy Britain if she were in the situation of France. For if she even possessed the power of France she would be infinitely less dangerous to the liber-

ties of Europe, than is that restless State. *Morality* in Britain, among private and public men, is by no means at so low an ebb, as with the giddy people of France and their perjured ruler. Britain does not negotiate with her neighbors for the express purpose of deceiving them; or persist in a domineering control, after declaring their independence by solemn treaties.

Had Britain been in the situation of France, treaties so advantageous as those of Luneville, Amiens, and Presburg, would never have been violated by the wanton excesses of ambition. Has this ambition been moderated since the period when the British were compelled to renew the war with the common enemy of human kind? Does Bonaparte's conduct for the last seven years, particularly justify Britain in showing again that confidence which she *so unwisely* evinced in the treaty of Amiens, and which confidence he has so grossly, so basely abused?

Intrigue and falsehood have always been the favorite instruments of the *French* government; but these weapons are wielded at present with an assurance and activity beyond all former example. Bonaparte as far surpasses in bold and systematic fraud his republican predecessors, as *they* were superior to the old government.

After the experience of the treaty of Amiens, a state of perturbation and anxiety worse than war, Britain *ought* to be satisfied with no treaty of peace

between her and France, which does not contain the provisions of *real* tranquillity. Its conditions must be explicit and incontrovertible. Britain must *never again* rely on the professions of her enemy, nor even upon that moderate system which it is his interest to pursue. She must lay her account with meeting an insatiable spirit of aggrandizement, which will explain in its own favor whatever shall not be clearly defined, and will seize for itself whatever shall not be occupied by Britain.

It is a common practice in capitulations on the continent of Europe, that the French impose upon the credulity of those with whom they treat, by inserting a clause, that “wherever the conditions of surrender appear doubtful, their interpretation shall be in favor of the inhabitants.” The capitulation is signed, and the gates opened to the French, who enter and *violate successively*, under pretext of necessity, *every* stipulation which they have made.

Bonaparte only desires peace at present, for the sake of breaking it more advantageously hereafter; war is predominant in his thoughts, and aggrandizement by fraud or force the perpetual object of his solicitude; ambition, instead of being satiated by success, preys upon his mind, and grows by what it feeds on. In 1803, when he considered the British ministry as feeble, foolish, timid and spiritless, *threats* were his favorite weapons. He

menaced Britain in his message to his own councils, in his communications to Lord Whitworth, in his appeals through Andreossi.

But when the British had defied his threats, and dared him to the conflict, he adopted a different tone. In his overture for peace in January 1805, he assailed the *humanity* of Britain, and affected to extol, as of incalculable value, those Indian conquests which he well knew were barren glories. In 1806 he represented himself to Mr. Fox as aggrieved by preceding administrations, as unjustly attacked, and as anxious to make every sacrifice for so inestimable a blessing as peace. In his communications with Britain at that time, he pretended to congratulate the country on the appointment of a ministry "*estimable by their illumination*;" while at the same hour he instructed his emissaries to seek access at St. Petersburg, and endeavor to detach that court from all British alliance, by traducing Mr. Fox as the most fickle of men; as absorbed in interests purely English; and an enemy to the co-operation of Britain and Russia.

How poor Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris; how he was duped by Talleyrand; how he was laughed at by Champagny; how he was insulted by General Clarke; and finally sent bootless home from Paris to London, it is needless now to dwell upon.

The evils of war and the advantages of peace

are so greatly on the side of *France*, that she ought to account no sacrifice, except her national honor, too great to avoid the one, and obtain the other. Britain has conquered from her and from Holland, Pondicherry, St. Lucia, Tobago, Surinam, Curra-coa, Demerara, Essequibo, Berbice, San Domingo, Martinique, and the Cape of Good Hope; has destroyed the French navy, and made the flower of her seamen prisoners. Against all these acquisitions, France has to place only Hanover; so unjustly occupied that it is doubtful if she should be allowed to introduce it into the scale of equivalents.

The *continuance* of the war promises to be equally in favor of Britain. She causes to France incalculable deprivations and annoyance by her fleets and armies; while the sum total of French injury to her consists in petty, privateering depredations on her trade, and in the threat of invasion. Of invasion no one doubts that the issue would be favorable to Britain. France challenged her rival to the combat by denying that she was able *single-handed* to withstand her. Britain accepted the defiance; she has fought for nearly seven years, and been *uniformly victorious*.

While the advantages of *war* are thus entirely on the side of Britain, the benefits of *peace* are nearly in the same degree on the side of France. No wonder that in such a situation the well-wishers to Britain should urge a continuance of war until circumstances justify the expectation of

greater tranquillity in peace ; more especially as the British finances are, in consequence of the powerful operation of the sinking fund, in a state of extraordinary prosperity ; in such a state that, although for the year 1809, a year unexampled in the weight of expenditure, the enormous sum of *eighty-three millions* and a fraction is granted for supplies, yet the addition to the national debt during this year is less than *one fiftieth* of the aggregate amount ; and not equal to the actual yearly diminution of the public debt by the *progressive depreciation* in the value of money.

War, no doubt, is a great evil ; but peace with *danger* and *dishonor*, is a far greater evil. It is the fashion among all democrats to make it a merit in any man to desire peace, and to display a great parade of words which cost nothing, and in *their* mouths mean nothing ; I allude to the perpetual phraseology of “ general good of the human race ” — “ blessings of humanity ; horrors of war, blood and slaughter ; unprofitable consumption of the labor of *fellow-men* in the arts of destruction,” and a vast variety of other matter equally edifying ; as if the question of war or peace were a mere, naked, abstract proposition ; and not, like every other great question involving the interests and fortunes of men, to be always examined and decided upon according to the circumstances with which it is connected.

France has no prospect of either taking any of

the British settlements, or of re-capturing any of her own which she has lost. It is therefore the duty of Britain to insist upon the *safety of continental Europe* in a negotiation with the common enemy. Endangered, like the rest of the world, by the fatal preponderance of France, the common safety of the world can only be found in those provisions which, obtained by sacrifices on the part of Britain, shall arrest the career of French aggression against weaker states.

By the acquisition of all Italy, and especially of Venetian Dalmatia, France has opened a direct road to the heart of the Turkish empire; in the projected dismemberment of which Bonaparte will not now be contented with Egypt as his share. He will tempt Russia to co-operate with him in the partition of Turkey, by offering her Constantinople and the heart of the empire, pretending to desire for himself, at first, only the maritime part; he will flatter himself, with his characteristic perfidy, that he will soon find means of expelling her from her new acquisitions; and that, seizing for himself the whole of Turkey, he will ensure the acquiescence of Russia in his future usurpations by the threats of immediate war; threats by which he long overawed Austria; and by which he vainly thought to intimidate Britain.

Such a barrier therefore must be secured on the side of Turkey, against Dalmatia, as shall enable

her to withstand either the secret intrigues or the open violence of France.

Malta is now less necessary to France, but doubly important to Britain. It is no longer required by Bonaparte as a stepping-stone to Egypt; but is indispensable to Britain as a central station from which to detach her squadrons, in order to assert the integrity of the Turkish empire or to impede its downfall, should Russia, seduced by the perfidious intrigues of France, concur in the base partition. Malta therefore *must* be ceded to Britain; it can be intrusted to the honor and courage of a British garrison *alone*.

The retention of the Cape of Good Hope by the British is obviously dictated by the avowed designs of France upon India. The Cape is highly important to the trade of Britain; it is the intermediate climate to season her troops to the burning sun of India; the station from which she can threaten Mauritius, when the ambition of France again forces her into war; above all, the retention of the Cape is imperiously required by the absolute subjection of Holland to France. If the Cape be restored to Holland, it will become a depot to France for the assemblage of armaments against India.

Britain then might, on condition of retaining Malta and the Cape, which no power can wrest from her, venture to forego the advantages of a state of warfare that is to her every where successful; and submit to that *increase* of strength in France and

her allies, which will be the speedy consequence of peace. She might restore all her other conquests, and acknowledge the *past* changes on the continent of Europe ; provided France give up Hanover, consent to the establishment of a barrier on the side of Dalmatia ; give an indemnity to the king of Naples, now cooped up in the Island of Sicily ; guarantee the independence of Spain and her colonies under a government of their own choice ; and give assurance that *in future* no more changes in the state of Europe shall be attempted.

The treaty of Amiens is no valid argument against these conditions. It is an example indeed of less satisfactory terms obtained under an equally favorable combination of circumstances. But the treaty of Amiens is universally acknowledged to have been a compact in terms *altogether inadequate* to the just demands of Britain. At that time, the British people, weary of war, vainly expected to enjoy in a *nominal* peace the blessings of real tranquillity. A feeble, cowardly ministry, anxious to obtain a little, fleeting popularity, made concessions to Bonaparte, evidently inconsistent with the just rights of Britain ; and most impolitic and pernicious in their operation to the British empire, to Europe, and to the world.

The narrowness of the principles of that treaty ensured the impossibility of any *permanent* peace. The relations of the two powers were not accurately defined ; no bar was put upon the ambition of

France; there was no treaty of commerce, an object of the first consequence in preserving a good understanding between the two powers. Hence all thinking men *justly inferred* the insincerity of France, and the *very puny intellect* of the British administration.

A treaty which only makes a kind of temporary provision for the interests of the day, neglects to look into futurity, and to fix, as far as possible, those mutual obligations which may give permanence to the relations of amity, is obviously *far worse* than continued war. It is in fact no more than a truce. It gives a little breathing time to the belligerents, who afterwards rush into hostilities with new causes of irritation, and with more deadly rancor.

That the treaty of *Amiens* was of this kind subsequent events have fully proved. The manner in which the definitive treaty itself was negotiated augured every thing unfavourable to the interests of Britain. It was protracted, cold, and harassed by questions and discussions on subjects which were before settled in the preliminaries. And after all, it was little more than a *transcript* of the preliminary arrangements; and instead of taking a wide and general basis, left equal room for the future assumptions of the enemy and the complaints of Britain.

The ambition of Bonaparte could not even be restrained *until* the definitive treaty was signed. Almost immediately after the signing of the preliminaries “ Louisiana,” said Lord Grenville in his celebra-

ted speech on this subject in the House of Lords, " was added to the power of France. This was not all ; the ink was still wet, the wax was not yet cold, with which this treaty was concluded, when Piedmont, the bulwark of Italy, was annexed to the French empire. Then, seeing the *indifference* of the government of Great Britain, the blow was struck by which the ancient ally of the British Crown, the king of Sardinia, was driven back from his seat. Let us look back into the progress of events. The treaty was made in the month of March, it was ratified in May ; in June Piedmont was by a formal decree annexed to France ; in August the Consular government made a grand sweep and disposal of the entire constitution of Germany, and of the powers in it. Not *a day* had elapsed, (he might challenge observation on the word) not *a single day* had elapsed, without some act of insult, indignity, or attack upon Great Britain or her ancient allies, since that time."

But there were causes which operated more immediately upon the interests of Britain, and produced suspicion in the government, and alarm in the people. Not only was Switzerland invaded, and her long-established liberties entombed in the yawning sepulchre of Gallic rapacity ; not only was Holland kept in a state of the most abject subjection, in *direct opposition* to the terms of treaty, but her navy was at the disposal of France,

and hostile preparations were forming in her ports for the express purpose of annoying Britain.

In France also, British property had suffered the grossest violence, while justice in the French courts was denied to British subjects; a number of vexatious and illiberal restrictions had been laid upon British commerce; and designs of the blackest treachery against the internal peace of Britain were discovered, happily in sufficient time to prevent their ripening into danger; but which did not the less mark the *character* of the power with whom the British had so lately interchanged the pledges of friendship.

Colonel *Despard* and his accomplices were known to be in the *pay* and under the *direction* of *France*. It was *proved* in evidence on the trial, that Colonel *Despard* himself *avowed* this connection, and deferred one of his projects because—"he waited for *news* and *money* from *France*."

The peace had scarcely been concluded before a number of persons were landed in different parts of Great-Britain and Ireland, under the name of *commercial commissioners*, but who were proved on their examination to be *French military officers*. In their possession were found instructions from the French ministers, directing to such inquiries as could have *no* relation to commerce, and could only be useful in a military view.

At length, even the *Addington* ministry was awa-

kened, and the British nation began to put itself into a posture of defence. It should however, be always remembered that Mr. Addington (now Lord Sidmouth) did *incalculably more injury* to Britain, by his foolish, feeble, administration, and his cowardly peace of *Amiens*, than Bonaparte could possibly have done by fifty years of warfare against her. It is to be hoped that the British people will learn, from this fatal example, that *ordinary* minds are not fit to be intrusted with the helm of government ; that *dulness* and *ignorance* are never innoxious in high political stations ; that countries *invariably perish* when their movements are directed by *weakness* and *timidity*.

Britain throughout the contest has always been successful. In the years of continental operations these successes were clouded by the disasters of her allies ; but when she was left *alone* in the struggle, they shone forth with undiminished lustre. In 1797 the Emperor of Germany was forced to withdraw from the alliance ; and every jacobin at home and abroad predicted that the lot of Britain would be either an immediate invasion, or a humiliating peace. But the British replied to these gloomy presages by the victory of the Nile.

In 1799 Austria re-animated, took up arms, and although at first eminently successful, was in the succeeding year compelled to acknowledge the superiority of her rival. Britain, become again the *only* object of the vengeance of France, achieves,

unaided, the victory of Copenhagen, and the conquest of Egypt. In 1803 Bonaparte re-echoes the vulgar opinion, in defying England to contend single-handed with France. Britain again decided the question; and how complete would have been her triumph, and the disgrace of France, had not her victories been clouded by the disasters of continental Europe!

The safety and superiority of Britain are assured by the inability of France to attack her otherwise than with troops weakened and divided by the obstructions to their passage by sea. Britain therefore ought to exact from France and her allies the price of cessation from successful hostility. By sea, France is at present as completely humbled as when Britain dictated peace in 1763. She is now indeed all-powerful on the European continent; but that power to the British, who have defied it, can cause no intimidation.

The cessation of continental war reduces the contest to mere maritime operations. In these the discovery of the plan of forcing the enemy to close action, *by breaking the line*, has doubled the former superiority of Britain. It puts an end to all evasive manœuvres, and leads promptly to that direct trial of skill and courage, in which it is the birth-right of Britons to be irresistible. A French fleet cannot now, as formerly, sneak off after exchanging a few broadsides; they have now no alternative, but to sacrifice half their ships, or come to a general engagement. The re-

sult of a naval battle is no longer the capture of a few vessels, but the almost entire annihilation of the enemy's squadron.

The accessions of strength to France by land, great as they have been, are *equalled* by the increase of Britain's naval ascendancy; and were all the combined fleets of Europe to assail her with united strength, the result would be to her a series of brilliant victories.

But *what* prospect is there of peace for Europe? Bonaparte, to be sure, has made repeated overtures for peace, accompanied by flaming professions of humanity, in which it would be a satire on the credulity of any one to suppose that he was considered sincere. As well might we deem him a devout papist because he has found the re-establishment of popery in France conducive to his popularity; or consider him a convert to Mohamedism, because in Egypt he proclaimed himself a prophet, and the destroyer of Christianity.

In all his negociations his constant practice is, during the overtures, and in the early stages of the communications, to *promise* every thing. But in the arrangement of the actual conditions, where the explicit nature of the terms prevents the possibility of subterfuge, he uniformly resorts to the most determined obstinacy, and provoking delay. This has been invariably the French mode of conduct ever since the first explosion of the revolution; but

Bonaparte far excels all his jacobin predecessors in this career of fraud and falsehood.

When Lord Malmesbury was sent to Paris in 1796, the Directory agreed to treat on the basis of mutual cessions; an admission which they afterwards qualified by the very *temperate* and *consistent* declaration that they would listen to no proposals contrary to the constitution, the treaties, and the fundamental laws of the Republic; namely, *that* constitution by which the chief part of their acquisitions was annexed to France, while the remainder were erected into republics dependent upon her; and *those* treaties by which they had guaranteed to Spain and Holland the restitution by Britain of all her conquests.

If the British *yield* to Bonaparte in any one important point they will find him altogether intractable in every other. Remember the delays and artifices which he practised at Amiens. Even then it was necessary to *threaten* and to *equip armaments* in order to make him agree to the *very few* sacrifices which Britain required in a treaty so highly favorable to *him*.

In negotiation with Bonaparte, only *one effectual* plan is to be followed; let the language of Britain be direct and firm, and her terms explicit. Let her offer a peace on such conditions as *her success* justifies, and the *security* of continental Europe demands. Let her tender him a treaty on these conditions with the one hand, holding in

the other the alternative of war. Let her adhere to these terms with inflexible firmness ; a firmness equally remote from haughtiness as from submission.

Bonaparte, as usual, will alternately storm and flatter ; but Britain *must* despise his threats, beware of his artifices, and refute his sophistry. *Her* claims are just, and *her* means are most ample for the accomplishment of these claims. She asks to deprive France of nothing, but to stipulate protection and tranquillity for continental Europe. If he refuse, let the war be continued ; and let him and all his vassal states enjoy the full benefit of perpetual warfare with the people that rule the ocean.

Indeed, the well-known ambition of the Corsican offers *no* prospect *as yet* of obtaining those conditions which *alone* can render peace eligible or safe. Pride and resentment are predominant in his heart ; the rage of ambition will stifle the dictates of sound policy ; and he will sooner encounter all the evils of war than subscribe a treaty which is *just* to Britain, and which shall ensure the *future safety* of continental Europe."

Yet base and unprincipled as is the character of Bonaparte, terrible and overbearing as is his power, the state of Europe is infinitely better now, under the ascendancy of military despotism, than it could possibly be under the domination of *jacobinism*. The military tyranny of France

does call into exertion the loftier attributes of courage and of talent ; but the murderous demon of jacobinism, as cowardly as it is cruel, as stupid and ignorant as it is cowardly, invariably destroys in its career of desolation, all the monuments of art, and all the records of science ; all the *living* intellect and valor which might at once protect and adorn the dearest interests of human kind. The army of France, therefore, has done well to wrest all power from the jacobins of France.

Had the powers of continental Europe remained at peace, had they not armed against the destructive encroachments of new-born democracy, jacobin-France would have involved them all in anarchy and blood, and seized their dominions ; the travelling guillotine would have superseded all law, order, justice, decency, religion, morality ; every vestige of genius and of wisdom would have been swept away by the deluge of human blood ; vulgarity, brutal cruelty, lust, rapine, murder, and every thing that can render man hateful and loathsome to his kind, would have been spread over all the face of Europe.

Say then that the leaden sceptre of dulness and of ignorance were stretched over a slumbering world ; that all the noble and daring faculties of the human mind were plunged “ in the sleepy drench of the forgetful lake,” that all of art, of science, of literature, were annihilated ; that all the conveniences, comforts and enjoyments which

the labor and the ingenuity of man, working with unremitted assiduity through a long succession of ages, have contrived, planned, and executed, were swallowed up in the gulf of forgetfulness ; that all the finer feelings, all the softer emotions of the heart, all that lifts man up nearer to the Great First Source of all perfection, were obliterated ; say in one word, that the abomination of desolation—that *jacobinism were triumphant* ; and what would be the condition of the human race ?

Man would then wander on the great ocean of life, without buoy to float, without beacon to warn, without compass to steer, without chart to direct, without star to light him on his way. Existence would be a weary and a cumbrous load, a misery and a curse ; and would compel the unhappy sufferer, as he stood “ upon the bank and shoal of time,” to leap the gulf, to plunge into the confines of eternity, and to appear before the dread tribunal of his God ; “ uncalled, unhouselled, unanointed, unannealed.”

Resistance to *jacobin France* therefore became a sacred duty : it held out the *only possibility* of resisting her aggressions, and of repressing her encroachments ; and though resistance has failed to prevent her exterior aggrandizement, it has saved the European continent from civil disorder, from anarchy, from jacobinism. Although partitioned out among the Corsican and his allies and vassals,

it yet has regular military governments ; and every change must apparently be for the better, by substituting the vigor of a new dynasty in the room of the old, worn out, feeble despotisms that have during the lapse of so many ages slumbered over the continent of Europe.

“ Time, or the chances of war, or the violence of re-action from the *people* of continental Europe, may shatter down the overgrown empire of France, and either throw the states again into the hands of their lawful princes, or the clashing of interests may produce new and contrary combinations and alliances, which, by restoring the balance of power, might once more establish the independence of Europe.

No doubt, the moment that the *marine* of Britain is conquered, from that moment she is *blotted out from the list of nations*. But of such an event there seems to be no very great probability. Bonaparte has used every means which his own resources and his influence over other powers has furnished, to rival the British navy ; but every effort of this kind has been defeated by the genius and courage, the skill and intrepidity of Britain’s naval officers and men ; and by the wise and vigorous measures of her government.

His own powerful fleets having been nearly annihilated, his next attempt was to seize those of weaker powers, and by combining them with the force of his allies in a general confederacy, to dis-

pute with Britain the empire of the ocean. *That* plan has also been broken, and the confederacy destroyed in its bud. France may build ships, but *during the war* she cannot fill them with seamen. Not only her intercourse with her colonies is suspended, but even *her own coasting trade*; (notwithstanding *Mr. Cobbett's* assertions to the contrary;) she has in consequence *no* nursery for seamen. These can only be trained by long or frequent voyages, which, whilst the war continues, cannot be made.

Peace alone can replenish the navy of France, and long experience render it efficient. This, however, is *no* impediment to a peace with France; for such is the superior skill and valor of British seamen, that no uneasiness need be felt as to the result of a naval engagement, under the best circumstances in which France could place her navy, in case of a renewal of war. Should peace bring out of her ports a navy equal or superior in number to that of Britain, the British would do as they have often done before, confide in the justice of their cause, and the blessing of Divine Providence, to crown their valor and dexterity with another addition to the splendid list of their naval victories.

Whether in peace or in war, if Britain be but true to herself, she may regard all the efforts of France to rival her as a maritime power, without dismay.

The continuance of the *present* prosperity of British commerce, in the event of a peace, must

altogether depend upon the terms of that peace. The war *ought* to be maintained with *perpetually increasing* vigor and resolution until *such* a peace can be commanded, as will not only place Britain in a secure and prosperous situation, but will also affirm the *future safety* of continental Europe. The *next* peace which Britain makes, will be either the death-warrant of her own national independence, and of the liberties of Europe and of the world, or will secure her own privileges for ever, and uphold the rights and interests of all other nations against the domineering insolence of France.

It is not the *partial*, the *comparatively little* interests of her merchants and manufacturers, that is *now* at stake ; but it is the interest of the whole British empire, and of all the posterity of the British people ; it is the interest of all Europe ; nay, but it *is* the interest of America, of Asia, of Africa, of the universal world.

Above all let Britain *never* place the shadow of confidence in the *truth*, the *justice* the *honor*, the *moderation* of the *French government*. It is the *most fatal* error into which she can fall ; and that man is a most deadly enemy to his country who wishes to inspire such confidence. With such an enemy as France every suspicion *ought* to be awake. Neither the character of Bonaparte, nor that of the nation which he governs, in its present state, is entitled to *any* confidence. *Justice* and *honor* are out of the question ; *interest*, *ambition*, *perfidy*, *violence*, *wrong*, *oppression*, are the *only* principles of *their* conduct.

Britain can never expect a peace to which she *ought* to accede, until it is the *interest* of France to make it ; and the conditions of that peace will be *no longer* observed by the present French government, than while they accord with the state of its interests, or the views of its ambition. Peace with *such* a government can hold out no cheering prospect to Britain, either in its arrangements or its permanence, until France imperiously feel it to be *her interest* to make, and to *preserve peace*.

It is true, the navy of France is now in a state of deplorable degradation ; her colonies and her dependant states are become more limited ; the practicability of intercourse with those that remain is rendered a matter of most difficult enterprise ; and her commerce, before too contracted to produce any favorable effects upon her internal wealth, has been reduced to the brink of annihilation, by *her own decrees*.

France has indeed enlarged her territory to an extent hitherto unknown ; but she has neither secured to herself, nor to her newly organized states, the *means* of rendering her empire great and prosperous. Society must at least assume the appearance of tranquillity, before industry can be excited to those exertions which shall produce more than the mere supply of necessary wants ; and it is peace alone which, by encouraging general commerce, can recruit the energies of countries exhausted by revolutions, by exactions, and by war.

Spain and Portugal by their hatred and resis-

tance to France, are a vast and a perpetual drain of blood and treasure from Bonaparte and his slaves ; Holland is reduced to the verge of absolute ruin ; France has lost the only medium through which her foreign commerce could circulate, the intercourse of neutrals : and Russia, blinded for a time by councils, the labyrinths of which she has not sufficient capacity to explore, has plunged into a contest in which she has every thing to lose, and nothing essential to her real interest to gain.

Bonaparte boasts of having an army of *eight hundred thousand* soldiers ; but if he had twice that number the whole of his military force could not annihilate a single British frigate ; the whole of his power *cannot* give effect to his blockading decrees beyond the limits of his own harbors ; and he must either be contented to stretch his bloody sceptre over a wilderness of desolation, or give prosperity to continental Europe by a peace which shall open the navigation of the seas, and unite the interests of Britain and of the rest of Europe, by reciprocating the productions of their soil and mechanical skill, through the medium of a maritime intercourse.

But this state of things ought greatly to encourage the perseverance and patience, not to slacken the efforts of Britain. It cannot be inferred from this, that the time is arrived when an advantageous peace may be made with France. Every day's intelligence from the continent of Europe proves how greatly every state at enmity with Britain is suffering from the interruption of its commerce ; but the ty-

rant of the continent, supported by his immense military force, has the means, for a time, of stifling their murmurs, and crushing their resistance. He will, in the contest into which he brings their sufferance with the power of Britain, push them to the utmost limits of endurance ; and will first try the extent of *British* patience and firmness, before he will relieve the pressure of *his own* slaves, by entering into liberal arrangements for a general peace.

The navy of Britain is her right arm, is peculiarly calculated for offensive attack, and must continue to be wielded with vigor. It is in reality, what the lever of Archimedes was in imagination, *the power that moves the world*. To relax in her efforts would not relieve Britain from the operation of the blockading decrees of Bonaparte, which existed *before* the British government resorted to measures of retaliation ; and if ever Britain make a good peace for herself and for the rest of the world, it must be by always standing in the most menacing attitude ; by presenting the most undaunted front to external threats, and domestic privations. To *yield* is ruin ; and to betray *impatience* is to throw herself at the feet of her enemy.

Of late Bonaparte has bent all his efforts to force Britain to *renounce* her *maritime* rights ; he is perpetually insisting upon a “ *a maritime peace* ;” that is, a peace in which Britain shall renounce all interference and connection with the European continent ; and suffer her naval rights and ancient maritime jurisprudence, the firmest bulwark of

her safety and prosperity, to become the subject of discussion and infringement.

But the British people will *not* accept this *basis* of a treaty of a peace ; they will not suffer their naval superiority, the most precious gift of Providence, the most valuable legacy of their ancestors, and which has been confirmed to them by the genius and courage of their contemporaries, who have fought and died in their defence ; to be made the *subject* of *negociation*, even for a moment. I thank God, that if Britain be only true to herself, she can most triumphantly support the contest. While her navy stands unshaken amidst the wreck of nations, her commerce will not only be protected, but *enlarged*.

Difficulties only call forth the resources of a great people ; and the resources of England are not exhausted ; they are not even impaired ; nay, but they are *augmented* by the continuance of the war. She possesses now an extensive and an increasing trade ; her capital, her industry, and her enterprise must finally break down all the barriers which are opposed to her prosperity. Bonaparte *knows* this, and he *fears* it ; and if he cannot either intimidate or cajole Britain into her own destruction, he is prepared to *acknowledge* those maritime rights, against which he now so loudly declaims, and which for that very reason the British ought as strenuously to defend.

This then is the glorious object of the present conflict ; Britain is called upon by every conside-

ration of justice, honor, and interest, to *defend and to uphold her maritime rights*. They are as dear to her as the soil on which she treads, as the constitution under which she lives, as the vital air which she breaths ; *they are the only guarantee of her national independence ; they are the only sure pledge of her future commercial prosperity*. If the sea cannot be *her empire*, let it be *her grave*. This is the true position, this is the high destiny of *Britain* ; and nothing but *political suicide*, a total incapacity to meet the bounties of Providence, and to improve its blessings, can induce *her* to hesitate for a moment, as to the course which she *ought* to pursue."

What then is the *conclusion* from all this ? The conclusion is, that Britain is to press forward most vigorously the war *both by sea and land*, to harass and annoy France ; to cut away all her external resources ; to impede and to cripple all her internal means ; and by every possible effort of terrible hostility to hasten the hour of *re-action* upon the French by the *people* of continental Europe ; to hasten that hour, when by the excess of misery, and by the destruction of all peaceful occupations, and the consequent general diffusion of military pursuits and habits, the whole continent of Europe shall seek in resistance to France the only possible relief from her oppressions ; when the intrepid Germans, the gallant Spaniards, the undaunted Swiss, together with the other enslaved and insulted nations of Europe, shall pour their

effective and armed population on all sides, and in perpetual streams upon the swollen and overgrown French empire, and its vassal states of *old men* and *boys*, but ill-fitted to withstand so terrible an assault. And let that hour of vengeance upon the tyrant be animated and illumined by the same generous aid of blood and treasure, of genius and heroic valor with which Britain now encourages the people of Spain and Portugal in their opposition to the common enemy of the world.

The memorable counsel which Mr. Burke gave in the year 1796, respecting the *mode* and the *spirit* with which it behoved Britain to resist France, is still more applicable to the *present* contest, inasmuch as the French power is now more formidable, extensive, and pernicious than it then was. In the eighth volume of Mr. Burke's works p. 251—264, are to be found observations full of political wisdom, which ought to be engraven on the tablets of the heart of every statesman. From them I shall extract as much as suits my present purpose, and for the remainder refer the reader to Mr. Burke himself.

“ When I contemplate the *scheme* on which *France* is formed, and when I compare it with those systems with which *it is* and *must ever be* in conflict, those very things which seem as defects in her polity make me tremble.

The states of the Christian world have grown up to their present magnitude in a great length of time, and by a great variety of accidents. They

have been improved to what we see them with greater or less degrees of felicity and skill. *Not one* of them has been formed upon a regular plan, or with any unity of design. As their constitutions are not systematical, they have not been directed to any *peculiar* end, eminently distinguished, and superseding every other. The objects which they embrace are of the greatest possible variety, and have become in a manner infinite.

In all these old countries the state has been made *to* the people, and not the people conformed to the state. Every state has pursued, not only every sort of social advantage, but it has cultivated the welfare of every *individual*. His wants, his wishes, even his tastes have been consulted. This comprehensive scheme virtually produced a degree of *personal liberty* in forms the most adverse to it. *That liberty* was found under monarchies styled absolute, in a degree unknown to the ancient commonwealths.

Hence the powers of all our modern states meet in all their movements with some obstruction. It is therefore no wonder that when these states are to be considered as machines to operate for some one great end, this dissipated and balanced force is not easily concentrated, nor made to bear with the whole force of the nation upon any one point.

The *British* state is without question that which pursues the greatest variety of ends, and is the least disposed to sacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole. It aims at taking in the en-

the circle of human desires, and securing for them their fair enjoyment. The Legislature of Britain has ever been closely connected in its most efficient part, with individual feeling, and individual interest. *Personal liberty*, the most lively of these feelings, and the most important of these interests, which in *other* European countries has rather risen from the system of manners and the habitudes of life, than from the laws of the state (in which it flourished more from neglect than attention), in *England* has been a *direct object of the government*.

On *this* principle England would be the *weakest* power in the whole system. Fortunately however the great riches of Britain, arising from a variety of causes; and the disposition of the people which is as great to spend as to accumulate, has easily afforded a disposable surplus that gives a mighty momentum to the state. This difficulty, with these advantages to overcome it, has called forth the talents of the English *financiers*, who with the surplus of industry poured out by prodigality, have outdone every thing which has been accomplished in other nations. But still there are cases in which England feels more than several others, though they all feel, the perplexity of an immense body of balanced advantages, and of individual demands, and of some irregularity in the whole mass.

France differs essentially from all those governments which are formed without system,

which exist by habit, and which are confused with the multitude, and with the complexity of their pursuits. What now stands as a government in France, is struck out at a heat. The design is wicked, immoral, impious, oppressive; but it is spirited and daring; it is systematic; it is simple in its principle, it has unity and consistency in perfection.

In France entirely to cut off a branch of commerce; to extinguish a manufacture; to destroy the circulation of money; to violate credit; to suspend the course of agriculture; even to burn a city, or lay waste a province of their own, does not cost them a moment's anxiety. To them the will, the wish, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of *individuals* is as nothing. *Individuality* is left out of their scheme of government. The *state* is all in all.

Every thing is referred to the *production* of force; afterwards every thing is trusted to the *use* of force. It is *military* in its principle, in its maxims, in its spirit, and in all its movements. The state has *dominion* and *conquest* for its *sole* objects; dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies by arms.

Thus constituted, with an immense body of natural means, which are lessened in their *amount* only to be increased in their *effect*, *France* has, since the accomplishment of the revolution, a complete *unity* in its direction. It has destroyed every resource of the state which depends upon opinion, and the good will of *individuals*. The

riches of convention disappear. The advantages of nature in some measure remain ; even these are astonishingly lessened ; but the command over what remains is complete and absolute.

Despotism will always find means of despotic supply. In *France* the government has found the short cut to the productions of nature, and while others in pursuit of them are obliged to wind through the labyrinth of a very intricate state of society, it seizes upon the fruit of the labor ; it seizes upon the laborer himself. Were France but half what it is in population, in compactness, in applicability of its force, situated as it is, and being what it is, it would be too strong for most of the states of Europe, constituted as they are, and proceeding as they proceed.

Would it be wise to estimate what the world of Europe, as well as the world of Asia, had to dread from Genghiz Khan, upon a contemplation of the resources of the cold and barren spot in the remotest Tartary, from which first issued that scourge of the human race ? Ought we to judge from the excise and stamp-duties of the rocks, or from the paper-circulation of the sands of Arabia, the power by which Mahomet and his tribes laid hold at once on the two most powerful empires of the world ; beat one of them totally to the ground, broke to pieces the other, and in a few years overturned governments, laws, manners, religion, and extended an empire from the Indus to the Pyrenees ?

Material resources never have supplied, and never can supply the want of unity in design, and constancy in pursuit. But unity in design, and perseverance, and boldness in pursuit, have *never* wanted resources, and *never* will. We have not considered as we ought, the dreadful energy of a state, in which the *property* has nothing to do with the government, in which the property is in complete subjection, and where nothing rules but the *mind of desperate men*.

The rulers of France have found their resources in *crimes*. The discovery is dreadful, the mine exhaustless. They have every thing to gain, and they have nothing to lose. They have a boundless inheritance in hope, and there is no medium for them betwixt the highest elevation and death with infamy.

From all this, what is my inference? It is, that this new system of robbery in France *cannot* be rendered safe by any art; that it *must* be destroyed, or it will destroy all Europe; that to destroy this common enemy of man, by some means or other, the force *opposed* to it, should be made to bear some analogy to the *force* and *spirit* which that enemy exerts; that eternal war ought to be made against it in its most vulnerable parts. In one word, with France in her present state, nothing independent *can* co-exist."

It is evident that a *living* statesman in Britain, who follows in the mighty career of Mr. Burke, with equal steps, as to native genius and talent,

but perhaps with more varied and extensive information, (I mean *Mr. Brougham*, the author of the luminous and profound "*Inquiry into the Colonial Policy of the European Powers*,") has his eye steadily bent upon the day of approaching *re-action* by the European continent upon the French empire. In the following passage he glances at this desirable but terrible event, with his accustomed splendor of eloquence.

"In the person of Bonaparte the success of unprincipled power is strongly exemplified. Yet we are far from measuring the amount of that power by the extent of the superficies over which his authority is felt. The minds of men are *not* bowed to the yoke. The *elements* of *resistance* are *not* extinguished. From the loss of civil occupations, a military spirit is fast spreading itself over the continent of Europe; and in the very cloud which blackens all our horizon, we may see the bow which is set for a token, that the tempest will not be for ever.

"Whether or not this generation will live to see the troubled waters subside, and the ancient landmarks of the world re-appear above the flood, is indeed more difficult to conjecture. But whatever be the destined means of our deliverance, we think we may say with certainty that it will *not* be accomplished by a coalition of *sovereigns*; (but by the *people* of Continental Europe, following the example of the heroic Spaniards, and rising in fierce and untamable resistance against the oppressions of

France;) and that if England is to have her due and proper share in this great redemption, it must be by persevering in her ancient maxims of just and honorable policy; and by exhibiting an invincible contrast to the violence and selfishness of her enemy."

From all that has been said we conclude, that it is at once the interest and the duty of Britain steadfastly to abide by that high-spirited and lofty declaration which she made to Russia, at an hour when the *whole* of Continental Europe, with the exception only of Sweden, was combined against her under the auspices and direction of Bonaparte. From this declaration, dated Westminster, December 18, 1807, I most gladly extract the following manly and nervous paragraphs, which display a dignity and an energy of character well-becoming a great and a magnanimous people.

"The requisition of his Imperial Majesty of Russia for the immediate conclusion, by his Britannic Majesty, of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance as it is offensive in the manner. His Majesty has at *no* time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on an admissible basis; and the Emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember that the last negotiation between Great Britain and France was broken off, upon points immediately affecting, *not* his Majesty's *own* interests, but those of his *Imperial ally*."

“ But his Majesty neither understands, nor will he admit the pretension of the Emperor of Russia to *dictate* the time or mode of his Majesty’s pacific negotiations with other powers. It never will be endured by his Majesty that *any* government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of *serviency* to France, by the adoption of an insulting and peremptory tone towards Great Britain.

His Majesty *proclaims anew* those principles of *maritime* law, against which the armed neutrality, under the auspices of the Empress Catharine, was originally directed; and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. *Those* principles have been recognised and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe; and acted upon by no power with more strictness and severity than by *Russia*, in the reign of the Empress Catharine.

Those principles it is the *right* and the *duty* of his Majesty to maintain; and against *every* confederacy his Majesty is *determined*, under the blessing of Divine Providence, to maintain them. *They* have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of Great Britain; but they are become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the maritime power of Great Britain constitutes the *sole* remaining bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the *only* refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.”

FINIS.



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